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early morning* morning* 6am-7am* 7am-8am* 8am-8:30am* 8:30am - 8:40am* 8:40 a.m. to 8:45 a.m.* 8:45 a.m. to 8:50 a.m.* 8:50 a.m.* |9am-10am 10:00-10:10* 10:05-10:10* 11am-midday* afternoon

9:00Edit

(9:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: United Airlines Learns Flight 175 Is Missing from Radar Edit

New York Center informs the air traffic control coordinator at United Airlines’ headquarters, outside Chicago, that Flight 175 is missing from radar. Although Flight 175’s transponder signal changed at around 8:47 [see 1], according to the 9/11 Commission the air traffic controller handling the flight only noticed the change at 8:51 [see 2].[1]

(9:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Northern Vigilance Operation Canceled; False Blips Reportedly Purged from NORAD Radar ScreensEdit

A soldier monitors a NORAD radar screen. [Source: National War College] NORAD has had fighter jets deployed to Alaska and Northern Canada for the past two days. They are there for a real-world maneuver called Operation Northern Vigilance, tasked with monitoring a Russian air force exercise being conducted in the Russian Arctic all this week (see September 9-11, 2001). [NORAD, 9/9/2001] At its operations center deep inside Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado, NORAD is also reportedly at “full ‘battle staff’ levels for a major annual exercise that tests every facet of the organization.” The operations center is now contacted by NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), based in Rome, New York. NEADS says the FAA believes there is a hijacking in progress and is asking NORAD for support; this is not part of the exercise. As the Toronto Star will later report: “In a flash, Operation Northern Vigilance is called off. Any simulated information, what’s known as an ‘inject,’ is purged from the screens.” [TORONTO STAR, 12/9/2001] NORAD has the capacity to inject simulated material, including mass attacks, during exercises, “as though it was being sensed for the first time by a radar site.” [US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 1/15/1999] However, Northern Vigilance is a military operation, not a training exercise. [NORAD, 9/9/2001; US CONGRESS, 3/11/2005] So presumably the “simulated information” is part of a NORAD exercise currently taking place, such as Vigilant Guardian (see (6:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Therefore, many minutes into the real 9/11 attacks, there may be false radar blips appearing on the screens of NORAD personnel. Additional details, such as whose radar screens have false blips and over what duration, are unclear. However, while the Toronto Star will indicate that the simulated material is removed from NORAD radar screens shortly before 9:03 a.m., when the second attack on the World Trade Center takes place, at 10:12 a.m. an officer at the operations center will call NEADS and ask it to “terminate all exercise inputs coming into Cheyenne Mountain” (see 10:12 a.m. September 11, 2001). [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/11/2001; TORONTO STAR, 12/9/2001] This would indicate that the NORAD operations center continues receiving simulated radar information for over an hour more, until after Flight 93 has crashed (see (10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and the terrorist attacks have ended. The Russians, after seeing the attacks on New York and Washington on television, will quickly communicate that they are canceling their Russian Arctic exercise. [TORONTO STAR, 12/9/2001; NATIONAL POST, 10/19/2002] Entity Tags: Northeast Air Defense Sector, Vigilant Guardian, Operation Northern Vigilance, North American Aerospace Defense Command

Between 9:00 a.m. and 9:10 a.m. September 11, 2001: American Airlines Orders No New Takeoffs in US Edit

American Airlines orders all its aircraft in the Northeast United States that have not yet taken off to remain on the ground, and then, minutes later, extends this order nationwide. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 30-31 ] At the American Airlines System Operations Control (SOC) center in Fort Worth, Texas, managers have learned that communications have been lost with a second one of their aircraft, Flight 77 (see 8:58 a.m. September 11, 2001). Therefore, at around 9:00, Gerard Arpey, the airline’s executive vice president for operations, orders a “ground stop” of all American Airlines and American Eagle flights in the Northeast US. This means aircraft that have not yet taken off must remain on the ground. Minutes later, American learns that United Airlines has lost contact with one of its flights. So, some time between 9:05 and 9:10, it extends its ground stop order to apply to all American Airlines and American Eagle aircraft across the entire US. [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 9-10] United Airlines will also prevent any further takeoffs of its flights at 9:20 (see (9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001] And the FAA will give out a similar order to all its facilities, initiating a “national ground stop,” at around 9:25 a.m. (see (9:26 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [TIME, 9/14/2001] At around 9:15, American Airlines will order all its airborne flights to land (see (9:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 31 ] Entity Tags: American Airlines, Gerard Arpey Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

(9:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Air Force Crisis Action Team Activated

Matt Swanson. [Source: Iowa State University] The Air Force’s Crisis Action Team (CAT) at the Pentagon is activated. The CAT is under the command of the US Air Force chief of staff, and reportedly it “coordinates Air Force reaction to anything that might be a threat to the United States.” After hearing the CAT has been activated, Major Donna Nicholas heads down to the Air Force Operations Center in the basement of the Pentagon’s C Ring, where the CAT is carrying out its activities. She arrives there after 9:03, when the second WTC tower is hit, and someone tells her, “Just so you know, we’re considering that we’re under attack.” The Operations Center is “a flurry of activity as Air Force officials worked to gather information, both from the media and from their own intelligence sources.” [DOVER POST, 9/19/2001; SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY MAGAZINE, 12/2001] The Defense Department’s own book about the Pentagon attack will describe that, prior to the Pentagon being hit, “Members of the Air Force Crisis Action Team [have] already begun to assemble [in the Operations Center] for a 10:00 a.m. briefing; one of their responsibilities [is] to work with the Army to provide assistance to civil authorities in New York.” [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 136] The CAT’s usual first in charge is away. So Lieutenant Colonel Matt Swanson, its second in command, has to take their place supervising emergency operations for the Air Force. But he is only called from his Pentagon office to the Air Force Operations Center to join the CAT after the time of the second attack. [PROSPECTUS, 9/2006, PP. 3-6 ] Similarly, James Roche and John Jumper, the Air Force secretary and chief of staff respectively, will not arrive at the center until after the Pentagon is hit at 9:37 (see (Shortly After 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Donna Nicholas, US Department of the Air Force, Air Force Crisis Action Team, Matthew Swanson Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

(9:00 a.m.-9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Chief of Naval Operations Continues with Budget Meeting while US Is Under Attack The Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Vern Clark, the Navy’s top officer, is in his office on the fourth floor of the Pentagon for a budget meeting. Although it is clear after the second WTC tower is hit that the US is under attack, Clark apparently does nothing in response, and no attempt is made to evacuate him from the Pentagon. Reportedly, when the Pentagon is hit at 9:37, he is “receiving a budget briefing.” It is only then that a member of his staff enters his office and tells him, “You’ve got to evacuate.” Clark will then head to the Pentagon’s National Military Command Center (NMCC), where he meets with other senior Department of Defense leaders, and decides to re-establish the Navy’s command center in another secure location in Washington, DC (see After 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). Clark later reflects, “There has never been an experience like this in my lifetime. We were thinking about the immediate protection of the United States of America.” [SEA POWER, 1/2002; NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, 6/14/2007] Entity Tags: Vern Clark

(9:00 a.m.-9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Top Navy Official Unconcerned about Danger of Attack on PentagonEdit

Timothy Keating. [Source: Department of Defense] Admiral Timothy Keating, who is the Navy’s director of operations in the Pentagon, is back in his fourth-floor office for a 9:00 a.m. meeting with David Newton, the US ambassador to Yemen. Keating has just returned from the Navy Command Center on the Pentagon’s first floor, where he’d received his daily briefing, and where he’d seen the television reports of the first crash at the World Trade Center (see (8:48 a.m.-9:02 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Despite seeing the second plane hitting the WTC on television, Keating and Newton reportedly do not question their own safety at the Pentagon. Though it is now obvious that the US is under attack, they start discussing the upcoming first anniversary of the terrorist attack on the USS Cole. In 2002, Keating will recall, “We were discussing the fact that the Cole attack was coming up on a year’s anniversary—those were almost our exact words at the moment the plane impacted [the Pentagon],” which happens at 9:37. But in 2006, Keating will give a different account, telling Washington Post Radio that, after seeing the second crash on TV, he understands this is an attack. In response, he claims, he makes some phone calls and is on his way back to the Navy Command Center when the Pentagon is hit. [SEA POWER, 1/2002; SHIPMATE, 9/2006 ; AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE, 9/11/2006] The Command Center is mostly destroyed in the attack, and 42 of the 50 people working in it are killed. [WASHINGTON POST, 1/20/2002; NATIONAL DEFENSE MAGAZINE, 6/2003] Entity Tags: Timothy Keating, David Newton Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001: 9/11-Style Simulation Set to Commence at Agency near Pentagon

John Fulton. [Source: NLESI] A training exercise is scheduled to begin at a US intelligence agency located just over 20 miles from the Pentagon, based around the scenario of a small corporate jet plane experiencing a mechanical failure and crashing into a tower building there. The exercise, which has been planned for several months, is to take place at the headquarters of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) in Chantilly, Virginia, four miles away from Washington Dulles International Airport and 24 miles from the Pentagon. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/21/2002; UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 8/22/2002] Its purpose is to test the agency’s employees’ ability to respond to a small aircraft crash. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/21/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/14/2003] Simulated Plane Crash - The exercise is set to commence at 9:00 a.m., when its observers meet to be briefed. The observers and exercise role players are to move to their positions for the exercise 10 to 15 minutes later. The plane in the exercise scenario is a Learjet 35A with two pilots and four passengers on board, which takes off at 9:30 a.m. from Dulles Airport. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/14/2003] This is the airport Flight 77, which crashes into the Pentagon at 9:37 a.m., took off from earlier in the morning (see (8:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 8-10] A minute after taking off, the Learjet is supposed to experience a mechanical failure. It then goes out of control, leading it to crash into one of the four towers at the NRO’s headquarters at around 9:32 a.m. (see 9:30 a.m.-10:30 a.m. September 11, 2001). No real plane is going to be used in the exercise, but some stairwells and exits at the NRO headquarters are to be closed off in order to simulate the damage from the crash, forcing employees to find other ways to evacuate the building. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/21/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/14/2003] Scenario Created by War Gaming Division - The exercise scenario was imagined by the NRO’s internal war gaming division. [UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 8/22/2002] The exercise is being run by John Fulton, the chief of this division, and his team at the CIA. [NATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AND SECURITY INSTITUTE, 8/4/2002; NATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AND SECURITY INSTITUTE, 8/6/2002 ] Highly Secretive Agency - The NRO is an agency of the US Department of Defense. Its mission is “to ensure that the US has the technology and spaceborne and airborne assets needed to acquire intelligence worldwide.” [US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 9/18/1992] It operates many of the nation’s spy satellites. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/21/2002] According to the New York Times, “It designs, builds, and operates spy satellites that photograph and overhear what other countries are up to.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 8/10/1994] The NRO employs some 3,000 people. These employees are drawn from the CIA and the military. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/21/2002] The New York Times has called the NRO “probably the most secretive of the intelligence agencies.” Until 1992, its existence was not even officially disclosed. [NEW YORK TIMES, 8/10/1994] Exercise Canceled - According to NRO spokesman Art Haubold, the exercise will be called off “as soon as real world events began to unfold.” However, he does not give a specific time. All but the NRO’s most essential employees will then be sent home. [UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 8/22/2002] Haubold will later comment, “It was just an incredible coincidence” that the exercise scenario “happened to involve an aircraft crashing into our facility.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/21/2002] Entity Tags: National Reconnaissance Office, Central Intelligence Agency, Art Haubold, John Fulton Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Training Exercises

(9:00 a.m.-9:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Boston Airport Director Requests Flight ManifestsEdit

Ed Freni. [Source: Associated Press] As he learns of the two plane crashes in New York, a director at Boston’s Logan Airport—from where the two crashed aircraft took off—contacts the airlines to request the passenger manifests for these flights. At around 9:00 a.m., Ed Freni, who is Logan’s director of aviation operations, has just been informed that a plane—believed to be from his airport—has hit the World Trade Center, and another plane from the airport is missing (see (8:50 a.m.-9:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). He calls the American Airlines station in Logan’s Terminal B. A friend of his there tells him they are concerned about American Airlines Flight 11. The friend says Amy Sweeney, one of its flight attendants, called from the air (see 8:22 a.m. September 11, 2001), said they were flying low over Manhattan, and then her line went dead (see (8:44 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Freni asks to be faxed a copy of the manifest for Flight 11. The manifest holds the names of passengers on an aircraft by seat number. If there is an accident, it allows officials to begin contacting next of kin. At 9:05, he arrives at the Massachusetts Port Authority (Massport) aviation office on the 18th floor of the FAA control tower at Logan, where he has arranged to meet John Duval, the airport’s deputy director of operations. Freni sees on television the footage of the South Tower being hit just two minutes earlier. He calls his contacts at various airlines at Logan and learns that United Airlines is concerned about its Flight 175. He asks United to fax him the manifest for this plane. According to author Tom Murphy, Freni will receive the manifests for Flight 11 and Flight 175 at 9:30 a.m. (see 9:30 a.m. September 11, 2001). Meanwhile, Duval is talking with FAA officials further up in the control tower. They tell him: “United 175 came from here. We lost contact at 8:43.” [MURPHY, 2006, PP. 33-35] Entity Tags: United Airlines, Ed Freni, American Airlines, John Duval Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events


9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001: Pentagon Command Center Learns of Flight 11 Hijacking, But Does Not Discuss Scrambling FightersEdit

The deputy director of operations and his assistant in the Pentagon’s National Military Command Center (NMCC) have been notifying senior Pentagon officials of the first WTC tower being hit. At around 9 a.m., the senior NMCC operations officer contacts the Operations Center at FAA headquarters asking for information, and is informed of the hijacking of Flight 11. This is the earliest time mentioned by the 9/11 Commission Report that the NMCC learns of this hijacking.[2] Yet, according to military instructions, the NMCC is supposed to be “the focal point within Department of Defense for providing assistance” in response to hijackings in US airspace. [3] Apparently, during the call, the FAA Operations Center does not connect the plane crashing into the WTC with the hijacked Flight 11, which it claims is still airborne: The relevant entry in the NMCC operations officer’s log will state, “9:00 NMCC called FAA, briefed of explosion at WTC possibly from aircraft crash. Also, hijacking of American Flight 11 from Boston to LA, now enroute to Kennedy [International Airport in New York City].” Nor is there any discussion about launching fighter jets. [4]

9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 175 Passenger Peter Hanson Predicts Crash into Building Edit

Flight 175 passenger Peter Hanson calls his parents a second time, and says to his father, “It’s getting bad, Dad—A stewardess was stabbed—They seem to have knives and Mace—They said they have a bomb—It’s getting very bad on the plane—Passengers are throwing up and getting sick—The plane is making jerky movements—I don’t think the pilot is flying the plane—I think we are going down—I think they intend to go to Chicago or someplace and fly into a building—don’t worry, Dad—If it happens, it’ll be very fast—My God, my God.” [SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 7/23/2004] Entity Tags: Peter Hanson Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls

(9:00 a.m.-9:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Top Air Force Officials Learn of Attacks on WTC, Yet Continue with Scheduled Meeting

General Lance W. Lord. [Source: Air Force Space Command] At the Pentagon, several top Air Force officials together learn of the attacks on the World Trade Center, yet initially appear to make only limited efforts toward an emergency response. In the Air Force Council conference room, located in the Pentagon basement, General John Jumper is chairing his first staff meeting as Air Force chief of staff. [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 136] Jumper only became chief of staff five days earlier, on September 6, and this is his first official duty day. [AIR FORCE MAGAZINE, 10/2001; MIDLAND REPORTER-TELEGRAM, 4/2/2002; AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND NEWS SERVICE, 9/5/2002] Others in the meeting include Secretary of the Air Force James Roche and Lance Lord, the assistant vice chief of staff of the Air Force. The meeting has just gone through its intelligence briefing, and then, at about 9:00 a.m., a technician turns the large briefing screen on to CNN. It displays the coverage of the burning North Tower of the World Trade Center. Everyone then sees as the second plane crashes into the South Tower. Jumper declares, “We’re under attack.” [AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND NEWS SERVICE, 9/5/2002; GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 136] Tim Green, the assistant executive to the Air Force chief of staff who is also in the meeting, later recalls: “Everyone in the room knew instantly that we were at war. It’s amazing to watch people in that situation, they immediately shift gears from whatever they were doing to do what needed to be done.… We set up a Crisis Action Team down in our Operations Center and they began working immediately.” [MIDLAND REPORTER-TELEGRAM, 4/2/2002] Another report confirms that the Air Force’s Crisis Action Team (CAT) is activated at “about 9 a.m.” (see (9:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [DOVER POST, 9/19/2001] However, according to the Defense Department’s own book about the Pentagon attack, “After viewing televised news for about eight minutes,” Jumper resumes his meeting. He concludes it quickly, and then departs for his office. Jumper and Roche will not arrive at the Pentagon’s Air Force Operations Center, from where the CAT is carrying out its emergency operations, until after 9:37, when the Pentagon is hit (see (Shortly After 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [GOLDBERG ET AL., 2007, PP. 136] Entity Tags: John P. Jumper, Tim Green, Lance Lord, US Department of the Air Force, James G. Roche Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001: Transportation Department Crisis Management Center Coordinates Emergency Response On the order of Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta, the Department of Transportation’s Crisis Management Center (CMC) was quickly activated after the first WTC tower was hit (see (8:48 a.m.-9:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001). It is thus fully operational by this time, with security procedures initiated, secure lines of communication, and key contacts on line. The CMC is located in the Office of Emergency Transportation, on the 8th floor of the DOT’s Washington headquarters. It serves as a focal point for the transportation response during emergencies, enabling senior department personnel to conduct operations in a coordinated manner. [US DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 12/30/1999 ; US CONGRESS. SENATE. COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION, 9/20/2001; US CONGRESS, 10/10/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003] It includes representatives from all nine transportation modes (i.e., the different means of transport, such as road, rail, air), including Federal Aviation, as well as public affairs, and intelligence and security functions. It is capable of gathering information in real time via its own reporting system, and provides a flow of information to the DOT leadership, the White House, and Cabinet leaders on developments within the nation’s transportation infrastructure (including in the air). The CMC will remain fully operational, manned on a 24/7 basis, even in the weeks after the attacks have ended. [US CONGRESS, 10/10/2001; MINETA TRANSPORTATION INSTITUTE, 10/30/2001, PP. 12] Furthermore, according to Mineta, in an incident “involving a major crash of any type,” the Office of the Secretary of Transportation “goes into a major information-gathering response. It contacts the mode of administration overseeing whatever mode of transportation is involved in the incident. It monitors press reports, contacts additional personnel to accommodate the surge in operations, and centralizes the information for me through the chief of staff. In major incidents, it will follow a protocol of notification that includes the White House and other agencies involved in the incident.” He says that these activities, “albeit in the nascent stage of information-gathering,” took place in the initial minutes after Flight 11 hit the WTC. [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003] Entity Tags: US Department of Transportation Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(9:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: United Airlines Chief Assures Employees that Crisis Is ‘Not a Drill’ When he arrives at the United Airlines System Operations Control (SOC) center, United’s chief operating officer Andy Studdert has to reassure employees that the unfolding crisis is not a training exercise. [CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 7/16/2003] Shortly before 9:00 a.m., Studdert had been in a meeting at the United Airlines headquarters, outside Chicago, with United’s CEO Jim Goodwin. His secretary had rushed in and told him about the first plane hitting the World Trade Center. Studdert immediately got up and ran across to the SOC, located next to the headquarters building. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004] However, ten days previously, he had surprised the staff there with a crisis-training exercise, where he’d told them a flight over the Pacific had broken radio contact and suffered a potentially disastrous engine failure. For 30 minutes, the staff had believed the story, before he told them the truth. So when he arrives at the SOC at around 9:00 a.m., the Chicago Tribune will report, Studdert senses disbelief among his employees at the real-world crisis. He therefore shouts out to reassure them, “This is not a drill!” According to USA Today, the staff already realizes this. [USA TODAY, 8/13/2002; CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 7/16/2003; 9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004] Entity Tags: United Airlines, Andy Studdert Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175, Training Exercises

September 11, 2001: More Than $100 Million Rushed from WTC Data recovery experts later looking at 32 hard drives salvaged from the 9/11 attacks discover a surge in credit card transactions from the World Trade Center in the hours before and during the attacks. Unusually large sums of money are rushed through computers even as the disaster unfolds. Investigators later say: “There is a suspicion that some people had advance knowledge of the approximate time of the plane crashes in order to move out amounts exceeding $100 million. They thought that the records of their transactions could not be traced after the mainframes were destroyed.” The data recovery effort is led by the German company Convar. Convar will not disclose the identity of its clients. [REUTERS, 12/17/2001; REUTERS, 12/19/2001; IDG NEWS SERVICE, 12/20/2001] Entity Tags: World Trade Center, Convar, Gmbh Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Insider Trading/ Foreknowledge, All Day of 9/11 Events

(9:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Bin Laden Brother Attends Carlyle Group Conference The Carlyle Group is a large private-equity investment firm, closely associated with officials of the Bush and Reagan administrations, and has considerable ties to Saudi oil money, including ties to the bin Laden family. This morning it is holding its annual investor conference at the Ritz Carlton hotel in Washington, DC. Among the guests of honor is investor Shafig bin Laden, brother of Osama bin Laden. [OBSERVER, 6/16/2002; LONDON TIMES, 5/8/2003] Former President George H. W. Bush, who makes speeches on behalf of the Carlyle Group and is also senior adviser to its Asian Partners fund [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 9/27/2001] , attended the conference the previous day, but is not there today (see (8:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [WASHINGTON POST, 3/16/2003] Entity Tags: Bin Laden Family, Shafig bin Laden, Carlyle Group Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Saudi Arabia, Bin Laden Family, All Day of 9/11 Events

(9:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Clarke Alerted to Crisis, Immediately Activates Interagency Group Edit

Richard Clarke is at a conference[which?][where?] three blocks from the White House when a telephone call alerts him to the crisis. He runs to his car. He responds, “Activate the CSG on secure video. I’ll be there in less than five.” The CSG is the Counterterrorism Security Group, comprising the leaders of the government’s counterterrorism and security agencies. Clarke hurriedly drives to the White House. [5][CLARKE, 2004, PP. 1]

(9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001): Moussaoui Cheers 9/11 Attacks Edit

Zacarias Moussaoui cheers as he watches the 9/11 attacks on television inside a prison, where he is being held on immigration charges. At his trial in 2006 [see 3] he will recall watching television and seeing “the blue sky and the World Trade Center in flames.” . [6]

(9:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Condoleezza Rice Informs President Bush Flight 11 Has Hit the WTC, but Knows Nothing ElseEdit

in a template This article has been assessed as havingUnknown importance.

Good scope?NoN Timeline?NoN wikified? +YesY red links < 10?NoN all red links fixed?NoN referenced?NoN Illustrated?NoN Googled and added info? NoN Checked 9/11 records archives? NoN Checked Wikinews? NoN Checked Wikisource? NoN

Condoleezza Rice later claims she was in her White House office when she heard about the first World Trade Center crash just before 9:00 a.m. [see 4]. She will recall, “I thought to myself, what an odd accident.” She reportedly speaks to President Bush around 9:00 a.m. on the telephone, and tells him that a twin-engine plane has struck the WTC tower. She says, “That’s all we know right now, Mr. President.” . [7] Rice later claims: “He said, what a terrible, it sounds like a terrible accident. Keep me informed.” . [8] Despite her title of national security adviser, she is apparently unaware that NORAD scrambled fighter jets about 15 minutes earlier in response to the hijacking of Flight 11 [see 5]. She goes ahead with her usual national security staff meeting.[9] Author James Bamford Wikipedia will comment,

“Neither Rice nor Bush was aware that the United States had gone to ‘battle stations’ alert and had scrambled fighter jets into the air to intercept and possibly take hostile action against multiple hijacked airliners, something that was then known by hundreds of others within NORAD, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the Pentagon.”[10]


Congressman Dan Miller, who is waiting in a receiving line to meet Bush at the Booker Elementary School in Sarasota, says he waits a few minutes for the call with Rice to end. Bush appears unbothered when he greets Miller after it. Miller recalls, “It was nothing different from the normal, brief greeting with the president.”[11]


(9:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Informed of the First Plane Crash, Bush Goes Ahead with Photo-Op Edit

in a template Emma E. Booker Elementary school principal Gwen Tose-Rigell Wikipedia is summoned to a room to talk with George W. Bush. She recalls, “He said a commercial plane has hit the World Trade Center, and we’re going to go ahead and go on, we’re going on to do the reading thing anyway.”[12][13] One local reporter notes that at this point, “He could and arguably should have left Emma E. Booker Elementary School immediately, gotten onto Air Force One and left Sarasota without a moment’s delay.” [14][15]

(9:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: WTC South Tower Announcement: OK to Return to Offices Edit

A public announcement is broadcast inside the WTC Tower Two (the South Tower, which has yet to be hit), saying that the building is secure and people can return to their offices. [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/11/2002] Such announcements continue until a few minutes before the building is hit, and “may [lead] to the deaths of hundreds of people.” No one knows exactly what is said (though many later recall the phrase “the building is secure”), or who gives the authority to say it. [USA TODAY, 9/2/2002] Additionally, security agents inside the building repeat similar messages to individuals in the tower. For instance, one survivor recounts hearing, “Our building is secure. You can go back to your floor. If you’re a little winded, you can get a drink of water or coffee in the cafeteria.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/13/2001] Another survivor recalls an escaping crowd actually running over a man with a bullhorn encouraging them to return to their desks. [NEWSDAY, 9/12/2001] Businessman Steve Miller recalls hearing a voice say over the building’s loudspeaker something similar to: “There’s a fire in Tower One. Tower Two in unaffected. If you want to leave, you can leave. If you want to return to your office, it’s okay.” [WASHINGTON POST, 9/16/2001] British visitor Mike Shillaker recalls, “As we got to around floor 50, a message came over the [loudspeaker], telling us that there was an isolated fire in Tower One, and we did not need to evacuate Tower Two. Again, thank god we continued down, others didn’t.” [BBC, 9/1/2002] Despite messages to the contrary, about two-thirds of the tower’s occupants evacuate during the 17 minutes between the attacks. [USA TODAY, 12/20/2001]

(After 9:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Indianapolis Flight Control Issues Alert to Look for Flight 77; FAA and NORAD Not Notified According to the 9/11 Commission, shortly after 9:00 a.m., Indianapolis flight control begins to notify other government agencies that American 77 is missing and has possibly crashed. For instance, at 9:08 a.m., Indianapolis contacts Air Force Search and Rescue at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, and tells them to look out for a downed aircraft. It is not clear what Air Force Search and Rescue does with this information. Indianapolis also contacts the West Virginia State Police at about 9:15 a.m., and asks whether they have any reports of a downed aircraft (see Soon After 9:09 a.m. September 11, 2001). However, they apparently do not contact NORAD, but do notify the FAA regional center at 9:09 a.m. (see 9:09 a.m. September 11, 2001). [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Entity Tags: North American Aerospace Defense Command, Indianapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center, 9/11 Commission, Langley Air Force Base, Federal Aviation Administration Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

(Shortly Before 9:02 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Boston Center Military Liaison Learns of Second Hijacking over FAA TeleconferenceEdit

Colin Scoggins, the military liaison at Boston Center, learns from an FAA teleconference that there is a second hijacked plane over the US. He has previously called New York Center and was told, “We’re working a hijack,” but mistakenly thought the controller was referring to Flight 11 [see 6]. According to Lynn Spencer, Scoggins now hears on the FAA headquarters’ hijack teleconference of the second hijacked airliner, Flight 175. Lynn Spencer (2008). Touching History:The Untold Story..... 48-49 and 82

Spencer’s account is consistent with a May 2003 statement by the FAA, according to which the FAA established its teleconference “[w]ithin minutes after the first aircraft hit the World Trade Center” [see 7]. [16][9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003]

But the 9/11 Commission will claim that the FAA headquarters’ hijacking teleconference is only established at “about 9:20” [see 8].[17] According to Spencer, Scoggins assumes that NEADS is also on the FAA teleconference and is receiving the same information that he is about the second hijacking. However, the “FAA headquarters’ teleconference is between air traffic control facilities, the [FAA] Command Center, the Defense Department, and several other agencies; NORAD is not looped in.” Lynn Spencer (2008). Touching History:The Untold Story..... PP 82 Although the FAA will claim that the “Air Force liaison to the FAA immediately joined the FAA headquarters [teleconference] and established contact with NORAD on a separate line,” the Air Force liaison will subsequently claim she only joins the teleconference after 9:37 a.m., when the Pentagon is hit [see 9].[18] [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003; US DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 8/31/2006 ] Even though Scoggins assumes NEADS is already aware of the information, he will subsequently call it with the news of the second hijacking [see 10].Lynn Spencer (2008). Touching History:The Untold Story..... pp 82</ref>

9:01Edit

(9:01 a.m.-9:04 a.m.) September 11, 2001: United Airlines Dispatcher and Air Traffic Control Coordinator Try Contacting Flight 175Edit

At the United Airlines System Operations Control (SOC) center outside Chicago, flight dispatcher Ed Ballinger learns that Flight 175 is suspected as being hijacked, and then sends text messages to try and make contact with it. [19]

The SOC center has just been contacted by the United Airlines maintenance office in San Francisco, about a call it received from an attendant on Flight 175, who had reported that their plane had been hijacked [see 11].[20] [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001] Subsequently, around 9:01 or 9:02, a dispatch manager at the SOC goes to Ballinger’s desk and informs him of the details of this call. [21] Ballinger is the flight dispatcher responsible for United’s aircraft flying from the East Coast to the West Coast, which include Flight 175 (and also Flight 93). [22][CHICAGO DAILY HERALD, 4/14/2004] At 9:03, he sends an ACARS Wikipedia message to Flight 175: “How is the ride. Anything dispatch can do for you.” At the same time, the United Airlines air traffic control coordinator also sends an ACARS message to the flight: “NY approach lookin for ya on [frequency] 127.4.” Just after 9:03, unaware it has now crashed into the World Trade Center, Ballinger and the air traffic control coordinator re-send these ACARS messages to Flight 175. 9/11 Commission August 2004 Staff report,26 August 2004,Page 9, Page 23 , Page 24 Twenty minutes later, Ballinger will remain unaware that Flight 175 has crashed and still be trying to contact it by ACARS [see 12].9/11 Commission August 2004 Staff report,26 August 2004,Page 26

All airlines have a staff of dispatchers like Ballinger who, under FAA rules, are responsible for monitoring aircraft in flight. They follow each flight’s progress, relay safety information, and handle any problems that arise. Lynn Spencer (2008). Touching History:The Untold Story..... PP. 14 AND 35 United Airlines dispatchers typically monitor up to two dozen flights at once. [23][LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 68] Ballinger has 16 transcontinental flights taking off early this morning that he is responsible for. [24][NEW YORK OBSERVER, 6/20/2004]

(9:01 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 175 Almost Collides with Another Aircraft Edit

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Just one or two minutes before it crashes into the World Trade Center, Flight 175 narrowly avoids a mid-air collision with another commercial aircraft. [25][TMJ4, 6/25/2008] Midwest Airlines Flight 7 Wikipedia (Midex 7) is a DC-9 Wikipedia jet bound from Milwaukee Wikipedia to New York’s La Guardia Airport, with about 30 passengers and five crew members on board. [26][MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, 6/24/2008] Pilot Gerald Earwood and co-pilot Eric Fjelstad have been concerned at the unusually slow radio responses they have been receiving from New York Center air traffic controllers.[27] As they are approaching La Guardia from the southwest, Earwood is again frustrated as he awaits the controller’s response to his latest transmission. [28][MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, 6/24/2008]

Suddenly, the voice of a panicked controller comes over the radio: “Midex 7, are you with me? Midex 7, Midex 7, are you with me?” Unknown to Earwood, controllers have noticed that Flight 175 is now flying directly at his plane at over 500 miles per hour. Earwood replies, “Midex 7 is with you out of 7 for 4,000,” meaning he has just passed through 7,000 feet in his descent to his assigned altitude of 4,000 feet. The controller orders: “Roger, Midex 7, turn left now! Head two-four-zero degrees now, as quick as you can!” The pilots of Midex 7 begin a standard 30-degrees-of-bank turn. But even though they are doing exactly what they have been ordered to, the controller continues, “Left turn, Midex, left turn!” Several seconds later, the controller restates his order: “Midex 7, tighten it up! Roll left! Now! Now! Now!” Earwood looks out of the window for the plane he is meant to be avoiding, but cannot see anything.

As Midex 7 is completing its left turn, the controller comes back over the radio even more panicked than before, ordering: ”Roll right, Midex! Roll right as hard as you can! Keep it tight, Midex. Roll hard right! Now! Now!” Midex 7 complies with the instruction, but Earwood is wondering where the plane is that he is trying to avoid. At the FAA’s New York Center, air traffic controllers watch as the radar returns for Flight 175 and Midex 7 get so close that they appear to merge on the screens. Finally, Flight 175 continues its rapid descent toward New York, after having narrowly avoided a collision. [29] Midex 7 returns to its approach to La Guardia Airport, and then Earwood overhears a radio transmission from another pilot, who reports that a second plane has hit the World Trade Center. Earwood will later estimate that Flight 175 crashes into the South Tower 60 to 90 seconds after its near-collision with Midex 7. He sees the fireball coming from the tower, but does not immediately connect it with the aircraft he has just avoided. [30][MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, 6/24/2008] Minutes earlier, Flight 175 almost collided with at least two other planes as it descended toward Manhattan [see 13], and prior to that it had almost collided with Flight 11 [see 14]. [31][TELEGRAPH (NASHUA), 9/13/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 9/17/2001] The incident with Midex 7 will not come to light until 2008, when it is described in the book Touching History: The Untold Story of the Drama that Unfolded in the Skies Over America on 9/11, by Lynn Spencer. [32][TMJ4, 6/25/2008]

(9:01 a.m.) September 11, 2001: FAA’s New York Center Tells FAA Command Center about Flight 175 Hijack Edit

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In a conference call, Peter Mulligan, a manager at New York Center, tells the FAA Command Center in Herndon, Virginia: “We have several situations going here. It’s escalating big, big time. We need to get the military involved with us.” [33][FEDERAL AVIATION AUTHORITY, 10/14/2003, PP. 15 ] This is apparently a reference to the hijacking of Flight 175. [34]

Mulligan does not initially give any details of the hijacked aircraft, such as its flight number, position, or heading, but soon leaves the phone to inform his military liaison of the hijack [see 15]. After about one minute, Mulligan comes back on the phone, says that the liaison has been notified, and adds: “We’re involved in something else. We have other aircraft that may have a similar situation going on here.” Again, he provides no detailed information about the second hijacked plane, whose number does not appear to be communicated to the FAA’s Command Center before it crashes. [35][FEDERAL AVIATION AUTHORITY, 10/14/2003, PP. 16-18 ]

According to the transcript of the 9/11 Commission hearing at which a recording of the teleconference is played, it is the Herndon Command Center that says, “We’re involved with something else, we have other aircraft that may have a similar situation going on here.” [36][9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] This version, which indicates the Command Center already knows about the hijacking of Flight 175 when Mulligan passes on the notification, is subsequently picked up by some media. [37][38]However, this will be altered in the Commission’s final report, which attributes the “We’re involved with something else” statement to Mulligan. [39] The transcript of the call on which this section of the report is based indicates that the statement is actually made by Mulligan and that the 9/11 Commission is therefore only correcting an initial error it made at the hearing in its final report. [40][FEDERAL AVIATION AUTHORITY, 10/14/2003, PP. 18 ]

(9:01 a.m.) September 11, 2001: President Bush Claims to See First WTC Crash on Television while at Elementary SchoolEdit

President Bush later makes the following statement: “And I was sitting outside the classroom waiting to go in, and I saw an airplane hit the tower—the television was obviously on, and I use to fly myself, and I said, ‘There’s one terrible pilot.’ And I said, ‘It must have been a horrible accident.’ But I was whisked off there—I didn’t have much time to think about it.”[41] He has repeated the story on other occasions. [42] Notably, the first WTC Crash was not shown live on television. Further, Bush does not have access to a television until 15 or so minutes later. [43] A Boston Herald article later notes, “Think about that. Bush’s remark implies he saw the first plane hit the tower. But we all know that video of the first plane hitting did not surface until the next day. Could Bush have meant he saw the second plane hit—which many Americans witnessed? No, because he said that he was in the classroom when Andrew Card whispered in his ear that a second plane hit.” The article, noting that Bush has repeated this story more than once, asks, “How could the commander in chief have seen the plane fly into the first building—as it happened?” [44] A Bush spokesman later calls Bush’s repeated comments “just a mistaken recollection.” [45]

(9:01 a.m.) September 11, 2001: La Guardia Flight Controllers and Port Authority Unaware of Hijackings Edit

An unidentified woman in the La Guardia control tower speaks to a Port Authority police officer. La Guardia is one of two major New York City airports. The Port Authority patrols both the WTC and the city’s airports. The woman asks the officer what has happened at the WTC, and the officer replies that he has learned from the news that a plane crashed into it. [NEW YORK TIMES, 12/30/2003] Around the same time, one flight controller in the tower says to another, “But you don’t know anything.” The other responds, “We don’t know. We’re looking at it on Channel 5 right now.” [BERGEN RECORD, 1/4/2004] “Nothing on the [later released transcripts] shows that the La Guardia controllers knew that the planes flying into their airspace had been seized by terrorists, or that military aircraft were screaming in pursuit over the Hudson River.” Port Authority officials appear to be equally oblivious. [NEW YORK TIMES, 12/30/2003] Entity Tags: La Guardia Airport Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(9:01 a.m.) September 11, 2001: FAA’s New York Center Informs TRACON Controllers about Flight 175Edit

New York Center contacts the New York Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) and asks for help in locating Flight 175. Different air traffic controllers scan different altitudes, and TRACON controllers only deal with low-flying planes. These controllers have remained uninformed about the fate of Flight 11 until about now. “We had 90 to 120 seconds; it wasn’t any 18 minutes,” one controller wil later recall, referring to the actual elapsed time between the two crashes. Another controller will say of Flights 11 and 175: “They dove into the airspace. By the time anybody saw anything, it was over.” [46][NEW YORK TIMES, 9/13/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004]

9:01 a.m.-9:02 a.m. September 11, 2001: Military Liaison at New York Center Informed of Flight 175 Hijacking; Says Responding Fighters Are in the Air Edit

The military liaison at New York Center is reportedly told that Flight 175 has been hijacked. The information is passed on to the liaison by New York Center manager Peter Mulligan. In an apparent reference to the hijacking on a phone bridge with other air traffic control facilities, Mulligan first says the situation is escalating [see 16] and adds, “Just get me somebody who has the authority to get military in the air now.” Mulligan then drops out of the teleconference for a short while, but returns and says: “It’s OK. I’ve got it taken care of over here. I got… my military guy. We got some interceptors in the air.” [47][FEDERAL AVIATION AUTHORITY, 10/14/2003, PP. 15-17 ] According to the 9/11 Commission Report, Mulligan says this between 9:01 and 9:02. [48] A person at the New York Center then calls NEADS at 9:03 [see 17]. Presumably, this is the military liaison Mulligan just informed of the hijacking.

9:02Edit

(9:02 a.m.-9:07 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Boston Center Military Liaison Calls NEADS about Second Hijacking Edit

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Good scope?NoN Timeline? +YesY wikified? +YesY red links < 10?NoN all red links fixed?NoN referenced?NoN Illustrated?NoN Googled and added info? NoN Checked 9/11 records archives? NoN Checked Wikinews? NoN Checked Wikisource? NoN

Moments before Flight 175 crashes into the World Trade Center, Colin Scoggins, the military liaison at Boston Center, calls NEADS to notify it that there is a second hijacked aircraft over the US. Scoggins learned of the second hijacking on the FAA headquarters’ hijack teleconference [see 18] and senses that he should call NEADS with this latest information. According to Lynn Spencer, Scoggins

“imagines that he must be one of dozens of FAA facilities flooding [NEADS] with phone calls. What he doesn’t know is that his is in fact the only one giving them information about the flights this morning, other than the coverage on CNN.”
—Spencer, [49]


However, the 9/11 Commission will say that NEADS also learns of the second hijacking around this time from New York Center, stating,

“The first indication that the NORAD air defenders had of the second hijacked aircraft, United 175, came in a phone call from New York Center to NEADS at 9:03”
—Commission, [see 19].[50]


Just after Scoggins reports the second hijacking to NEADS, those on the NEADS operations floor see the live television coverage of Flight 175 hitting the South Tower on a screen at the front of the room. [51] Apparently, Scoggins’s phone call continues for several minutes: According to the 9/11 Commission,

“Between 9:04 a.m. and 9:07 a.m., the NEADS identification technicians were on the phone with FAA Boston Center seeking further information on Flight 175 when Boston Center confirmed a second crash at the World Trade Center.” [52]


(Shortly Before 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001: New York City Workers Reportedly Find Emergency Command Center Empty before It Is Supposedly EvacuatedEdit

After the first World Trade Center tower is hit, Barry Jennings, a City Housing Authority worker, and Michael Hess, New York’s corporation counsel, head up to the emergency command center of the Mayor’s Office of Emergency Management (OEM), which is on the 23rd floor of WTC 7. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/11/2001] The center, opened in 1999, is intended to coordinate responses to various emergencies, including terrorist attacks (see June 8, 1999). [CNN, 6/7/1999] However, Hess and Jennings find no one there. [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 109-110 ; BBC, 7/6/2008] Center Is Empty; Jennings Warned to Leave - Jennings will describe that, when he arrives at the emergency command center, “To my amazement, nobody’s there.” He says: “I saw coffee that was still hot, that was still smoldering. They had screens all over the place, but the screens were blank. So I didn’t know what was going on.” He then phones several individuals, including one of his superiors. When Jennings says where he is, the superior responds: “Get out of there. Get out of there now.” Hess then runs back into the center, after having found the stairwell, and says: “We’re the only ones up here. We gotta get out of here.” [DYLAN AVERY, 2007; BBC, 7/6/2008] 9/11 Commission Claims Command Center Not Evacuated until Later - Yet, according to the 9/11 Commission, “After the South Tower was hit [at 9:03], OEM senior leadership decided to remain in its ‘bunker’ and continue conducting operations, even though all civilians had been evacuated from 7 WTC.” The Commission will claim the emergency command center is not evacuated until 9:30 a.m. (see (9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 305] But according to the London Independent, Hess and Jennings arrive there by the time the South Tower is hit, which suggests the center is evacuated earlier than officially claimed. [INDEPENDENT, 9/13/2001] Jennings himself will recall, “I had to be inside on the 23rd floor when the second plane hit.” [DYLAN AVERY, 2007] The possibility that the emergency command center is evacuated earlier than the 9/11 Commission claims is partly confirmed by OEM Commissioner John Odermatt, who later says that after the first plane hit the WTC, he left only two staffers there (see (Soon After 8:46 a.m.-9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [BARRETT AND COLLINS, 2006, PP. 34] Jennings and Hess subsequently head down the stairs, but will become trapped in WTC 7, and have to be rescued by firefighters (see 12:10 p.m.-12:15 p.m. September 11, 2001). [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 109-110 ] Entity Tags: Michael Hess, Office of Emergency Management, Barry Jennings Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center

9:02 a.m. September 11, 2001: Indianapolis Center Controller Calls American Airlines Second Time, Says Flight 77 Location Unknown An air traffic controller at the FAA’s Indianapolis Center contacts the American Airlines dispatch office in Texas, and informs dispatcher Jim McDonnell that the center is unable to make contact with Flight 77 and does not know the location of this aircraft. The same controller called American Airlines and spoke with McDonnell four minutes earlier, reporting that radio contact had been lost with Flight 77 (see 8:58 a.m. September 11, 2001). McDonnell now says he has tried contacting Flight 77 but did not get a reply back. The controller then tells him: “We, uh, we lost track control of the guy. He’s in coast track but we haven’t, we don’t [know] where his target is and we can’t get a hold of him. Um, you guys tried him and no response?” McDonnell confirms, “No response.” The controller continues: “Yeah, we have no radar contact and, uh, no communications with him. So if you guys could try again.” McDonnell replies, “We’re doing it.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 10/16/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 30 ] Flight 77 made its last radio communication with controllers at 8:51 (see 8:51 a.m. September 11, 2001), and deviated from its assigned course at 8:54 (see (8:54 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 8-9] Entity Tags: American Airlines, Indianapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center, Jim McDonnell Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

9:03Edit

9:03 a.m. and After September 11, 2001: United Airlines Dispatchers Notify Flights of Aircraft Crashing into WTC, but Give No Warnings Edit

Beginning at 9:03, a number of United Airlines flight dispatchers send text messages to several United aircraft, indicating to the pilots that planes have flown into the World Trade Center. But, according to the 9/11 Commission, “These messages provided no details or warnings.” [53]

It is not until 9:21 that United dispatchers are told to warn their flights to secure cockpit doors [see 20]. [54] The dispatcher responsible for Flight 175 and Flight 93—Ed Ballinger—begins sending warning messages to the flights he is monitoring at 9:19 a.m., informing them that two aircraft have hit the WTC [see 21].[55] Airline dispatchers have an important part to play in managing aircraft in flight. According to Lynn Spencer, under FAA rules, dispatchers

“take guardianship of each company aircraft in the sky. They are assigned to a certain number of aircraft and know all there is to know about each: who is flying, who is working the cabin, how many pounds of fuel are onboard, the flight plan, the alternate plan, and anything at all relevant to that flight. If there is a glitch in the system, the pilot talks to the dispatcher, and together they formulate a plan of action.”
—Spencer[56]


United Airlines dispatchers are each responsible for monitoring from ten to 30 flights during a shift, and monitor anything up to two dozen flights at a time. [57][58]

9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 175 Crashes into WTC South Tower; Millions Watch Live on TelevisionEdit

Flight 175 hits the South Tower of the World Trade Center (Tower Two). Seismic records pinpoint the time at six seconds before 9:03 a.m.[59] [60]

According to the NIST report, the crash time is 9:02:59. [61] According to the 9/11 Commission Report, the crash time is 9:03:11.[62] Millions watch the crash live on television. The plane strikes the 77th through 85th floors in the 110-story building. Approximately 100 people are killed or injured in the initial impact; 600 people in the tower eventually die. The death toll is far lower than in the North Tower because about two-thirds of the South Tower’s occupants have evacuated the building in the 17 minutes since the first tower was struck. [63][64]

The impact severs some columns on the south side of the South Tower. Each of the Twin Towers is designed as a “tube-in-tube” structure and the steel columns which support its weight are arranged around the perimeter and in the core. The plane, which is traveling at an estimated speed of around 500 mph [see 22], severs 33 of the building’s 236 perimeter columns and damages another one. [65] The perimeter columns bear about half of the tower’s weight, so the damage to them reduces the tower’s ability to bear gravity loads by about 7.1 percent. [66] The actual damage to the 47 core columns is not known, as there are no photographs or videos of it, but there will be much speculation about this after 9/11. It will be suggested that some parts of the aircraft may be able to damage the core even after crashing through the exterior wall [see 23].[67] According to NIST’s base case model, five of the core columns are severed and another five suffer some damage.[68] This may reduce the tower’s ability to bear loads by a further approximately 8 percent, meaning that the aircraft impact accounted for a loss of about 15 percent of the building’s strength. This damage will be cited as an event contributing to the building’s collapse after 9/11 [see 24]. NIST’s base case estimate of damage to the North Tower’s core will be similar, even though the aircraft impact there was dissimilar [see 25]. Flight 11 hit the North Tower’s core head on, whereas Flight 175 only hits the corner of the South Tower’s core. [see 26] In addition, some of the fireproofing on the steel columns and trusses may be dislodged [see 27].[69] Photographs and videos of the towers will not show the state of fireproofing inside the buildings, but the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) will try to estimate the damage to fireproofing using a series of computer models. Its severe case model[see 28] will predict that 39 of the 47 core columns are stripped of their fireproofing on one or more floors and that fireproofing is stripped from trusses covering 80,000 ft2 of floor area, the equivalent of about two floors. NIST will say that the loss of fireproofing is a major cause of the collapse [see 29], but only performs 15 tests on fireproofing samples [see 30]. [70] According to NIST, less fireproofing is stripped from the North Tower [see 31].

9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001: President Bush’s Security Agents Watch Second WTC Crash on Television; Bush Continues with Photo-Op Edit

According to Sarasota County Sheriff Bill Balkwill, just after President Bush enters a Booker Elementary classroom, a Marine responsible for carrying Bush’s phone walks up to Balkwill, who is standing in a nearby side room. While listening to someone talk to him in his earpiece, the Marine asks, “Can you get me to a television? We’re not sure what’s going on, but we need to see a television.” Three Secret Service agents, a SWAT member, the Marine, and Balkwill turn on the television in a nearby front office just as Flight 175 crashes into the WTC. “We’re out of here,” the Marine tells Balkwill. “Can you get everyone ready?”. [71] However, Bush stays at the school for another half-hour. Who makes the decision to stay—and why—remains unclear, and the Secret Service won’t comment on the matter. Philip Melanson, author of a book on the Secret Service, comments, “With an unfolding terrorist attack, the procedure should have been to get the president to the closest secure location as quickly as possible, which clearly is not a school. You’re safer in that presidential limo, which is bombproof and blastproof and bulletproof.… In the presidential limo, the communications system is almost duplicative of the White House—he can do almost anything from there but he can’t do much sitting in a school.” . [72] The decision to allow the president to remain in the classroom seems odder still considering that, according to the Tampa Tribune, the reason that Sandra Kay Daniels’ classroom has been selected for Bush’s photo-op is “not because [it] fulfilled some complicated formula; her classroom merely was situated next to the school’s north door, making it easier to organize elaborate security.” . [73]

9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001: Newark Controllers Watch Flight 175 Hit WTC Edit

Air traffic controllers at Newark International Airport are on the phone with controllers at New York Center and are asked to find Flight 175 from their windows. They see it and watch in horror as it drops the last 5,000 feet and crashes into the World Trade Center. Controller Rick Tepper will recall:

“He was in a hard right bank, diving very steeply and very fast. And he—as he was coming up the Hudson River Wikipedia, he—he made another hard left turn and—just heading for downtown Manhattan.… You could see that he was trying to line himself up on the tower. Just before he hit the tower, he almost leveled it out and just—just hit the building.”

Newark tower immediately calls the FAA’s Herndon Command Center and says it will not land any more airplanes in Newark, in an effort to keep aircraft away from New York City. This is the first step in shutting down the national airspace system. [74][MSNBC, 9/11/2002]

9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001: Pentagon Command Center Staff See Second Attack on WTC, Yet Accounts Conflict Over Urgency of Their ResponseEdit

Those in the National Military Command Center (NMCC) within the Pentagon see the second plane hitting the World Trade Center live on television. According to Dan Mangino, an operations officer at the center, the staff there had thought the first WTC crash was a “terrible accident,” but after seeing the second one, “we knew immediately that it was a terrorist attack.” The American Forces Press Service later reports, “Personnel in the center shifted into hyperdrive.… Phones in the center began ringing off the hook.” Mangino says he initiates “the process to stand up a working group in advance of the direction that would come down later.” One of his deputies is responsible for this process. Yet, despite this supposed urgency, Mangino later recalls that he “knew he would have little time in the days ahead, so he quickly ran to the concourse to get some money out of an automated teller machine.” He will not arrive back at the NMCC until after the Pentagon is hit. [AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE, 9/7/2006] Brigadier General Montague Winfield had earlier on allowed a colleague to temporarily take over from him as the NMCC’s deputy director for operations (see 8:30 a.m. September 11, 2001). Yet, despite the obvious emergency now taking place, he does not retake charge of the center until more than an hour later, at around 10:15-10:30 a.m. (see (Shortly After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Furthermore, according to the 9/11 Commission, the NMCC does not begin a “significant event” conference call in response to the attacks until 9:29 a.m., which is 26 minutes after the South Tower is hit (see (9:29 a.m.-9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 37] Entity Tags: National Military Command Center, Dan Mangino, Montague Winfield Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

(9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Contradictions over Otis Fighter Mission and Whereabouts Edit

The minute Flight 175 hits the South Tower, fighter pilot Major Daniel Nash will recall, clear visibility allows him to see smoke pour out of Manhattan, even though NORAD will say he is 71 miles away from there. [CAPE COD TIMES, 8/21/2002] The other Otis pilot, Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Duffy, recalls, “We’re 60 miles out, and I could see the smoke from the towers.” They call NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) for an update, and, as Duffy will recall: “At that point, they said the second aircraft just hit the World Trade Center. That was news to me. I thought we were still chasing American [Airlines Flight] 11.” [ABC NEWS, 9/14/2002] In another account Duffy will relate: “It was right about then when they said the second aircraft had just hit the World Trade Center, which was quite a shock to both [Nash] and I, because we both thought there was only one aircraft out there. We were probably 70 miles or so out when the second one hit. So, we were just a matter of minutes away.” [BBC, 9/1/2002] He asks NEADS for clarification of their mission, but the request is met with “considerable confusion.” [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/3/2002] Bob Varcadipane, a Newark, New Jersey, air traffic controller who sees the Flight 175 crash, will claim: “I remember the two F-15s. They were there moments after the impact. And I was just—said to myself, ‘If only they could have gotten there a couple minutes earlier.’ They just missed it.” [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] However, the 9/11 Commission appears to believe that the pilots never get near New York City at this time. According to the Commission’s account, lacking a clear target, the Otis fighters took off toward military controlled airspace over the ocean, off the coast of Long Island. A map released by the Commission indicates that at 9:03 they are about 100 miles away and heading southwest instead of west to New York City. [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Tape recordings of the NEADS operations floor reveal Major Kevin Nasypany telling Colonel Robert Marr, “Fighters are south of—just south of Long Island.” [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] The 9/11 Commission says that, at 9:10 a.m., the FAA’s Boston Center tells the Otis fighters about the second WTC tower being struck. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 459] Entity Tags: Bob Varcadipane, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Robert Marr, Timothy Duffy, World Trade Center, Kevin Nasypany, Daniel Nash Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 11, Flight UA 175

9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001: FAA Command Center Learns of Hijackers’ ‘We Have Some Planes’ Communication Edit

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At the FAA’s Command Center, manager John White learns of the communication apparently made by a hijacker on Flight 11, stating “We have some planes” [see 32], and quickly notifies the national operations manager of this. Terry Biggio, the operations manager at the FAA’s Boston Center, is relaying all the information he has about Flight 11 to the Command Center’s teleconference. In the conference room at the Command Center, White is listening in. [75] Because the air traffic controller monitoring Flight 11 had not understood the “We have some planes” hijacker communication, the Boston Center’s quality assurance specialist(bobby?) had been instructed to “pull the tape” of the transmission, listen to it carefully, and then report back. [76] Having learned that the specialist has deciphered the transmission, Biggio now relays the details of it over the teleconference. Seconds later, those at the Command Center see Flight 175 crashing into the South Tower of the World Trade live on CNN. White promptly dispatches a manager to pass on the details of the transmission to Ben Sliney, the national operations manager at the Command Center [see 33]. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 79-80] The FAA’s New England regional office also learns of the “We have some planes” communication at this time (see 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001). [77]

(9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001: FAA’s New York Center First Informs NEADS that Flight 175 Has Been Hijacked, 9/11 Commission Will ClaimEdit

The 9/11 Commission will later conclude that the FAA’s New York Center tells NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) that Flight 175 has been hijacked at this time. The Commission will refer to this as “the first indication that the NORAD air defenders had of the second hijacked aircraft.” The notification is apparently received from the military liaison at the New York Center (see 9:01 a.m.-9:02 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] NEADS Technician Announces 'Second Possible Hijack' - Tape recordings of the NEADS operations floor will reveal ID tech Stacia Rountree answering the call from the New York Center, and saying out loud, “They have a second possible hijack!” [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Colonel Robert Marr, the NEADS battle commander, will claim he first learns that an aircraft other than Flight 11 has been hijacked when he sees Flight 175 crash into the World Trade Center on television. [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/3/2002] Lieutenant Colonel Dawne Deskins will claim that when she sees Flight 175 hitting the South Tower on television, “we didn’t even know there was a second hijack.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 59] Conflicting Accounts - However, these accounts contradict NORAD’s claim that it makes shortly after 9/11 that NEADS was first notified about Flight 175 at 8:43 a.m. (see 8:43 a.m. September 11, 2001). [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/18/2001] Additionally, as Flight 175 crashes into the WTC, Canadian Captain Mike Jellinek, who is working at NORAD’s Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado operations center, is on the phone with NEADS. He sees the crash live on television and asks NEADS, “Was that the hijacked aircraft you were dealing with?” The reply is yes. (However, it is unclear whether Jellinek is referring to Flight 175 or to the smoke coming from the crash of Flight 11.) [TORONTO STAR, 12/9/2001] If the 9/11 Commission’s account is correct, several questions remain unanswered. Flight 175 lost radio contact at 8:42 a.m. (see 8:41 a.m.-8:42 a.m. September 11, 2001) and changed transponder signals at 8:47 a.m. (see 8:46 a.m.-8:47 a.m. September 11, 2001); an air traffic controller declared it possibly hijacked sometime between 8:46 a.m. and 8:53 a.m. (see (Shortly After 8:46 a.m.) September 11, 2001); and an air traffic control manager called it hijacked at 8:55 a.m.(see (8:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The Commission will not explain why the New York Center waits 10 to 16 minutes before warning NEADS that Flight 175 is possibly hijacked. [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Entity Tags: Stacia Rountree, Northeast Air Defense Sector, North American Aerospace Defense Command, Robert Marr, Mike Jellinek, New York Air Route Traffic Control Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175

9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001: CIA Near East Division Employees Think Bin Laden to Blame for Attacks In the CIA’s Near East Division (NE) front office suite on the sixth floor of the agency’s headquarters in Langley, Virginia, everyone thinks Osama bin Laden is to blame as soon as they see the second aircraft hitting the World Trade Center. Gary Schroen, a former CIA station chief in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, is in the NE office suite, where several people have been staring at the television showing the burning North Tower. As Schroen later recalls, “We were getting calls from CTC [the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center], friends of the CTC in and around the building, that the World Trade Center, one of the towers had been struck.” According to Schroen, there are “like, 30 of us standing around,” and “as soon as the second aircraft smashed into the second tower, everyone said, ‘Bin Laden. It was bin Laden.… This is the attack that bin Laden’s been promising.’” [SCHROEN, 2005, PP. 12-14; NPR, 5/2/2005; PBS FRONTLINE, 1/20/2006] When CIA Director George Tenet learned of the first WTC attack, he reportedly said immediately that he thought bin Laden was responsible (see (8:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [WOODWARD, 2002, PP. 4] Entity Tags: Gary C. Schroen, Central Intelligence Agency Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001: Boston Center Tells FAA Regional Office that Hijackers Said ‘We Have Planes’; Office Suggests Notifying MilitaryEdit

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Over an FAA teleconference, Terry Biggio, the operations manager at Boston Center, reports to the FAA’s New England regional office the “We have some planes” comment apparently made by a Flight 11 hijacker at 8:24 a.m. [see 34].[78][79]

Because the Boston Center controller monitoring Flight 11,Pete Zalewski, had not understood the communication, the center’s quality assurance specialist, Bob Jones, had been instructed to “pull the tape” of the transmission, listen to it carefully, and then report back. [80] Biggio now reports to the New England region representative:

“I’m gonna reconfirm with, with downstairs, but the, as far as the tape, Bobby seemed to think the guy said that ‘we have planes.’ Now, I don’t know if it was because it was the accent, or if there’s more than one [hijacked plane], but I’m gonna, I’m gonna reconfirm that for you, and I’ll get back to you real quick. Okay?”


Another participant in the teleconference asks, “They have what?” and Biggio clarifies: “Planes, as in plural.… It sounds like, we’re talking to New York, that there’s another one aimed at the World Trade Center.… A second one just hit the Trade Center.” Tony, The Herndon representative replies: “Okay. Yeah, we gotta get—we gotta alert the military real quick on this.” [81][82]

John White, a manager at the FAA’s Command Center is monitoring the teleconference, and so also learns of the “We have some planes” communication at this time [see 35].[79]At 9:05 a.m., Biggio will confirm for the New England region representative—with the Command Center listening in—that a hijacker said, “we have planes” (forgetting the “some”). [81][83]

  1. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 21-22 ]
  2. 9/11 Commission Report,26 July 2004,Page 35
  3. [US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 6/1/2001 ]
  4. 9/11 Commission Report,26 July 2004,Page 35, Page 462
  5. . 
  6. [BBC, 12/12/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 3/27/2006]
  7. [NEWSWEEK, 12/31/2001]
  8. [ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002]
  9. . [NEWSWEEK, 12/31/2001]
  10. . [BAMFORD, 2004, PP. 17]
  11. . [ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 7/4/2004]
  12. . 
  13. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/19/2002]
  14. . 
  15. [SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, 9/12/2001]
  16. . 
  17. 9/11 Commission Report,26 July 2004,Page 36
  18. . 
  19. 9/11 Commission August 2004 Staff report,26 August 2004,Page 23, Page 24
  20. . 
  21. 9/11 Commission August 2004 Staff report,26 August 2004,Page 23
  22. . 
  23. . 
  24. . 
  25. . 
  26. . 
  27. Lynn Spencer (2008). Touching History:The Untold Story..... PP 56-57 AND 61-62
  28. . 
  29. Lynn Spencer (2008). Touching History:The Untold Story..... PP. 74-77
  30. . 
  31. . 
  32. . 
  33. . 
  34. 9/11 Commission Report,26 July 2004,Page 22
  35. . 
  36. . 
  37. . 
  38. [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004; AMERICAN RADIOWORKS, 9/2/2004; CBC, 9/12/2006]
  39. 9/11 Commission Report,26 July 2004,Page 22
  40. . 
  41. [US PRESIDENT, 12/10/2001]
  42. [US PRESIDENT, 1/14/2002; CBS NEWS, 9/11/2002]
  43. [WASHINGTON TIMES, 10/7/2002]
  44. [BOSTON HERALD, 10/22/2002]
  45. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 3/22/2004 ]
  46. . 
  47. . 
  48. 9/11 Commission Report,26 July 2004,Page 22
  49. Lynn Spencer (2008). Touching History:The Untold Story..... pp 82
  50. 9/11 Commission Report,26 July 2004,Page 23
  51. Lynn Spencer (2008). Touching History:The Untold Story..... pp 82
  52. 9/11 Commission Report,26 July 2004,Page 24
  53. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 36 ]
  54. [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004]
  55. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 37 ]
  56. Lynn Spencer (2008). Touching History:The Untold Story..... pp 35 and 72
  57. . 
  58. [LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 68]
  59. . 
  60. [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/12/2001; CNN, 9/12/2001; CNN, 9/17/2001; NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/18/2001; USA TODAY, 12/20/2001; FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, 5/1/2002, PP. 1-10; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/21/2002; USA TODAY, 9/2/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 9/11/2002]
  61. [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 38 ]
  62. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 8]
  63. . 
  64. [USA TODAY, 12/20/2001; NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 5-9, 41 ]
  65. [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 39 ]
  66. [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 6 ]
  67. [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 107 ]
  68. [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS & TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 235 ]
  69. [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS & TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. XXXVI, 83 ]
  70. [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 41 ]
  71. [SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, 9/10/2002]
  72. [ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 7/4/2004]
  73. [TAMPA TRIBUNE, 9/1/2002]
  74. . 
  75. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 79-80]
  76. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 19]
  77. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 23 ]
  78. 9/11 Commission August 2004 Staff report,26 August 2004,Page 23
  79. 79.0 79.1 Lynn Spencer (2008). Touching History:The Untold Story..... pp 79-80
  80. 9/11 Commission Report,26 July 2004,Page 19
  81. 81.0 81.1 9/11 COMMISSION (6/17/2004). http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5233007. 
  82. 9/11 Commission Report,26 July 2004,Page 23
  83. 9/11 Commission August 2004 Staff report,26 August 2004,Page 24

(9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Airport Manager Tries Calling Special Ops Personnel at FAA, but Call Goes UnansweredEdit

The most senior manager on duty at Washington’s Reagan National Airport tries to contact Special Operations personnel at FAA headquarters, but his call is not answered. Bob Lazar, the airport’s acting operations manager, was in his office in the administrative wing of Reagan Airport at the time the first attack in New York took place. Upon hearing news of the crash, he went to the nearby break room to watch the television coverage of it. Lazar has a background in Navy Special Operations, and immediately suspected that terrorism was involved. Therefore, at around the time the second attack is taking place, he tries calling Special Operations people at the FAA headquarters in Washington, DC. However, no one answers his call. The reason for this is unknown. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/28/2003 ] Entity Tags: Bob Lazar, Federal Aviation Administration Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001: NORAD Phones Start Ringing ‘Like Crazy’ In the NORAD operations center in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado, workers see the second aircraft crashing into the World Trade Center live on television. [GAZETTE (COLORADO SPRINGS), 10/7/2001] Major General Rick Findley, NORAD’s director of operations, later says that he now realizes “it was not an accident but a coordinated attack.” Then, he recalls, “At about that moment in time, every phone in this cab, and every phone over in the command center, and every phone in all the centers in this building were ringing off the hook.” Master Corporal Daniel Milne, the emergency action controller in the operations center, will similarly recall, “The feeling was total disbelief. Then the phones started ringing like crazy.” [CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 9/11/2002; LEGION MAGAZINE, 11/2004] It is unclear what causes all the phones to simultaneously ring. According to Aviation Week and Space Technology magazine, after the second tower is hit, “Calls from fighter units… started pouring into NORAD and sector operations centers, asking, ‘What can we do to help?’” (see (After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001) [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/3/2002] So this could be one factor. Also, a 1996 article in Airman magazine had quoted Stacey Knott, a technician in the NORAD operations center. She’d said, “Things can be pretty quiet in here.” However, “One of the busiest times is during exercises. This room fills up.… The phones are ringing off the hook, and I’ve got phones in each hand.” [AIRMAN, 1996] On this morning, those in Cheyenne Mountain are in fact participating in a major exercise called Vigilant Guardian. [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/3/2002; CNN, 9/11/2006] This is reportedly only canceled “shortly after” the second attack (see (Shortly After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001) [AIRMAN, 3/2002; FILSON, 2003, PP. 59] So it is plausible that this is also a factor in causing all the phones to suddenly ring. A similar thing appears to occur in the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon. According to a news article based on the recollections of two officers who are there, after the second plane hits the WTC, “Phones in the center began ringing off the hook.” [AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE, 9/7/2006] Rick Findley later suggests that all the ringing phones are not a hindrance for NORAD, claiming, “The good news is we had lots of people here and we already had an operational architecture. We already had the command and control, the network, the phones, the data links. Everything was already in place that enabled us to react to the situation.” [CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 9/11/2002] Entity Tags: Daniel Milne, North American Aerospace Defense Command, Rick Findley, Vigilant Guardian Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Training Exercises

9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001: Cousin of the President Saved From Death in the South Tower Due to Changed Venue of Meeting

Jim Pierce. [Source: AON] Jim Pierce, a cousin of President Bush, sees the South Tower of the WTC hit from the nearby Millennium Hotel. Pierce is the managing director of the AON Corporation, an insurance company with offices in WTC 2. He had arranged a business conference, to be held on the tower’s 105th floor this morning. However, the previous night, the conference was moved to the Millennium Hotel because the group was too large for the original room. According to a book by former First Lady Barbara Bush, Pierce later learns that 12 people are in the room where the meeting was originally planned to take place when the South Tower is hit, and only one of them survives. [BOSTON GLOBE, 2001; ANANOVA, 9/18/2001; NEWSWEEK, 10/27/2003] Another AON Corporation meeting is taking place on the 105th floor of the South Tower, run by business executive Mary Wieman. Of about 50 participants in attendance, only six are able to escape. [NEW YORK TIMES, 12/17/2001; USA TODAY, 9/2/2002] Entity Tags: AON Corporation, Jim Pierce Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center

(9:03 a.m.-9:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001: President Bush Enters Classroom Photo-Op, Still Claims to Think WTC Crash Is Accidental

President Bush enters Sandra Kay Daniels’ classroom. [Source: Lions Gate Films] President Bush enters Sandra Kay Daniels’ second-grade class for a photo-op to promote his education policies. [DAILY MAIL, 9/8/2002] Numerous reporters who travel with the president, as well as members of the local media, watch from the back of the room. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/19/2002] Secret Service agents protecting the president are lying in the trusses above the classroom. [SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, 9/10/2002] Altogether, there are about 150 people in the room, 16 of whom are children in the class. Bush is introduced to the children and poses for a number of pictures. The teacher then leads the students through some reading exercises (video footage shows this lasts about three minutes). [SALON, 9/11/2001] Bush later claims that during this lesson, he is thinking what he will say about the WTC crash. “I was concentrating on the program at this point, thinking about what I was going to say. Obviously, I felt it was an accident. I was concerned about it, but there were no alarm bells.” [WASHINGTON TIMES, 10/7/2002] The children are just getting their books from under their seats to read a story together when Chief of Staff Andrew Card comes in to tell Bush of the second WTC crash. [DAILY TELEGRAPH, 12/16/2001; WASHINGTON TIMES, 10/8/2002] According to the Washington Times, Card comes in at the conclusion of the first half of the planned lesson, and “[seizes] a pause in the reading drill to walk up to Mr. Bush’s seat.” [WASHINGTON TIMES, 10/7/2002; WASHINGTON TIMES, 10/8/2002] Entity Tags: Andrew Card, Sandra Kay Daniels, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush, Key Day of 9/11 Events

(9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001: WTC Building 7 Evacuated Edit

According to a soldier at the scene, WTC Building 7 is evacuated before the second tower is hit. [FORT DETRICK STANDARD, 10/18/2001] The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) states, “As the second aircraft struck WTC 2, a decision was made to evacuate WTC 7.” This would be just after the Port Authority Police Department called for the evacuation of the entire WTC complex (see 8:59 a.m.-9:02 a.m. September 11, 2001). But by this time, “many WTC 7 occupants [have] already left the building and others [have] begun a self-evacuation of the building.” [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 109 ] All individuals in the Secret Service’s New York field office, located in WTC 7, were ordered to evacuate after the first attack, and they are in the process of doing so when the second plane hits the South Tower. [PCCW NEWSLETTER, 3/2006] The Secret Service has a Stinger missile secretly stored in the WTC, to be used to protect the president if there were an attack on the city when he visits it. [WEISS, 2003, PP. 379] Presumably, this missile is abandoned with the evacuation. The Office of Emergency Management’s command center, on the 23rd floor of WTC 7, is not evacuated until later, at 9:30 a.m. (see (9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: World Trade Center, Secret Service Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center

(9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Fighters Do Not Have Shootdown Authority Edit

A fighter pilot flying from Otis Air Base toward New York City later notes that it wouldn’t have mattered if he caught up with Flight 175, because only President Bush could order a shootdown, and Bush is at a public event at the time. [CAPE COD TIMES, 8/21/2002] “Only the president has the authority to order a civilian aircraft shot down,” according to a 1999 CNN report. [CNN, 10/26/1999] In fact, by 9/11, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld also has the authority to order a shootdown, but he is not responding to the crisis at this time. [NEW YORK OBSERVER, 6/20/2004] Furthermore, NORAD Commander Larry Arnold later states that on 9/11, “I have the authority in case of an emergency to declare a target hostile and shoot it down under an emergency condition.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 75] Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Donald Rumsfeld Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175, Flight AA 11, Donald Rumsfeld

9:04Edit

Main article: September 11 9:04 am

9:05Edit

9:05 a.m. September 11, 2001: American Airlines Begins ‘Lockout’ of Flight 77 Information Edit

American Airlines initiates the “lockout” procedure to protect information about Flight 77. This standard procedure acknowledges an emergency on the flight and isolates information about it, so the airline’s top leadership can manage the case. A lockout safeguards information against being altered or released, and protects the identities of the plane’s passengers and crew. FAA air traffic controllers first alerted American Airlines about their loss of contact with Flight 77 at 8:58 (see 8:58 a.m. September 11, 2001), and called the airline again about the flight at 9:02 (see 9:02 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 12-13 AND 30 ] Entity Tags: American Airlines Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77

9:05Edit

Main article: September 11 9:05am-9:10am
  1. (see 8:46 a.m.-8:47 a.m. September 11, 2001)
  2. (see 8:51 a.m.-8:53 a.m. September 11, 2001)
  3. (see March 6-May 4, 2006)
  4. (see (Between 8:46 a.m. and 9:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001)
  5. (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001)
  6. (see (Between 8:40 a.m. and 8:54 a.m.) September 11, 2001)
  7. (see (8:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001)
  8. (see (9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001)
  9. (see (Shortly After 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001)
  10. (see (9:02 a.m.-9:07 a.m.) September 11, 2001)
  11. (see Shortly Before 9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001)
  12. (see 9:23 a.m. September 11, 2001)
  13. (see (8:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001)
  14. (see (Shortly After 8:42 a.m.) September 11, 2001)
  15. (see 9:01 a.m.-9:02 a.m. September 11, 2001)
  16. (see (9:01 a.m.) September 11, 2001)
  17. (see (9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001)
  18. (see (Shortly Before 9:02 a.m.) September 11, 2001)
  19. (see (9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001)
  20. (see 9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001)
  21. (see 9:19 a.m. September 11, 2001)
  22. (see October 2002-October 2005)
  23. (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001)
  24. (see October 23, 2002 and October 19, 2004)
  25. (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001)
  26. [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, 9/2005, PP. 20-23, 38-41 ]
  27. (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001)
  28. (see (October 2002-October 2005))
  29. (see April 5, 2005)
  30. (see October 26, 2005)
  31. (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001)
  32. (see 8:24 a.m. September 11, 2001)
  33. (see 9:06 a.m. and After September 11, 2001)
  34. (see 8:24 a.m. September 11, 2001)
  35. (see September_11_9am-9:05am#9:03_a.m._September_11.2C_2001:_FAA_Command_Center_Learns_of_Hijackers.E2.80.99_.E2.80.98We_Have_Some_Planes.E2.80.99_Communication)

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