FANDOM


This article has been assessed as havingUnknown importance.

Good scope?NoN Timeline?NoN wikified?NoN red links < 10?NoN all red links fixed?NoN referenced?NoN Illustrated?NoN Googled and added info? NoN Checked 9/11 records archives? NoN Checked Wikinews? NoN Checked Wikisource? NoN

This page uses Creative Commons Licensed content from Historycommons.org - link

early morning* morning* 6am-7am* 7am-8am* 8am-8:30am* 8:30am - 8:40am* 8:40 a.m. to 8:45 a.m.* 8:45 a.m. to 8:50 a.m.* 8:50 a.m.* |9am-10am 10:00-10:10* 10:05-10:10* 11am-midday* afternoon

VideoEdit

WTC1 North Tower Plane Impact on 9 11 - Naudet00:44

WTC1 North Tower Plane Impact on 9 11 - Naudet

WTC 1st attack - Pavel Hlava (Raw)00:18

WTC 1st attack - Pavel Hlava (Raw)



The first impact was captured on video by Pavel Hlava and Jules and Gedeon Naudet.

Additionally timelapse photos were taken by Wolfgang Staehle Wikipedia.


This page uses Creative Commons Licensed content from Historycommons.org - link

This article has been assessed as havingUnknown importance.

Good scope?NoN Timeline?NoN wikified?NoN red links < 10?NoN all red links fixed?NoN referenced?NoN Illustrated?NoN Googled and added info? NoN Checked 9/11 records archives? NoN Checked Wikinews? NoN Checked Wikisource? NoN

TimelineEdit

(8:45 a.m.-9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Stratcom Commander and Battle Staff Absent From Command Center Due to Visiting Business Leaders Edit

At the time the attacks in New York occur, a small group of business leaders are having breakfast at Offutt Air Force Base in Omaha, Nebraska, where the US Strategic Command (Stratcom) is headquartered. With them is Admiral Richard Mies, the commander in chief of Stratcom.

They are in town for an annual charity fundraiser event due to take place later in the day, hosted by the multi-billionaire Warren Buffett. Along with other visitors who have come for the fundraiser, they are scheduled to tour the Stratcom underground command center, located 60 feet below Offutt, and receive an unclassified mission briefing. According to the Omaha World-Herald, staff members have left the command center in advance of their visit. It is only after the second attack occurs, at 9:03, that Admiral Mies excuses himself from the breakfast and the battle staff reconvenes in the center. [1][SAN FRANCISCO BUSINESS TIMES, 2/1/2002; OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, 2/27/2002]

It is unclear what effect the absence of Mies and the members of the battle staff have upon the military’s ability to respond effectively to the first attacks. Stratcom is the military command responsible for the readiness of America’s nuclear forces.[2] [ARKIN, 2005, PP. 59] The Lincoln Journal Star describes its underground command center as “a military nerve center that collects and assesses information from high-tech ‘eyes and ears’ across—and above—the globe.” [3][JOURNAL STAR (LINCOLN), 10/25/2000] The cavernous room has eight giant video screens and complex communications systems. [4][ASSOCIATED PRESS, 2/21/2002; OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, 2/27/2002]

Stratcom itself states that the senior controller in the command center “has a direct line to the National Military Command Center in Washington, DC, and to the other major command headquarters.” This system, called the Joint Chiefs of Staff Alerting Network, allows the commander in chief of Stratcom to make “prompt contact with the president, the secretary of defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other unified commanders.” Furthermore, “Through satellites and radio networks (VLF, LF, UHF and HF), the command center can communicate with aircraft in flight over any part of the world. A principal purpose of these networks is to pass National Command Authority [i.e. the president and secretary of defense] orders to the alert forces.” While only the president can order nuclear strikes, the commander in chief of Stratcom “can launch aircraft for survival.” [5][UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND, 6/22/2001] With the command center’s sophisticated capabilities, after Mies returns to it from his breakfast, the eight video screens there are “loaded up with data,” providing him with “the latest information on the unfolding drama.” [6][OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, 2/27/2002] And at the time George W. Bush arrives at Offutt, later in the day [see 1], the battle staff in the center will reportedly be “watching the skies over the United States” and “tracking a commercial airliner on its way from Spain to the United States.” [7][WASHINGTON POST, 1/27/2002; CBS NEWS, 9/10/2003]

(8:45 a.m.-9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001: American Airlines Security Director Informs FBI of Flight 11 Hijacking Edit

Larry Wansley. [Source: Publicity photo] At 8:45 a.m., Larry Wansley learns of the hijacking of Flight 11. Wansley is the managing director of corporate security for American Airlines, and is at the company’s headquarters in Fort Worth, Texas. He is informed of the hijacking in an urgent phone call from the airline’s Command Center, located on the floor above its System Operations Control (SOC), about a mile away from headquarters (see (Before 8:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The SOC learned there was some kind of problem with Flight 11 at 8:20 a.m. (see 8:20 a.m. September 11, 2001). Since as early as 8:21, details of Flight 11 attendant Betty Ong’s emergency call have been constantly relayed to Craig Marquis, a manager at the SOC (see (8:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Yet the 8:45 call is apparently Wansley’s first notification of the hijacking. He calls Danny Defenbaugh, the special agent in charge of the Dallas FBI office. Wansley is himself a former undercover FBI agent, and Defenbaugh is a longtime friend of his. This call is “the first step in the well-researched, secret hijack-response plan all commercial airlines have in place.” As Wansley is relaying information, he hears screaming from an adjacent conference room, as several employees watch the aftermath of the first WTC crash on television. The TV in Defenbaugh’s office has been turned on, but reportedly neither of the two men connects the images of the burning tower with the hijacking they are trying to deal with. As they continue discussing their response plans, television shows the second plane hitting the South Tower. No doubt realizing this is a terrorist attack, Defenbaugh says, “The ball game just changed.” Around this time, Wansley learns that the first plane to hit the WTC was the hijacked American Airlines flight. He will subsequently make a hurried drive to the nearby Command Center, where the FBI will already be setting up its own command post (see Shortly After 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001). [DALLAS OBSERVER, 11/21/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 14 ] Entity Tags: Larry Wansley, Federal Bureau of Investigation, American Airlines, Danny Defenbaugh Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 11


(8:45 a.m.-9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Secret Service Does Not Use Its Stinger Missiles to Protect New York and Washington Edit

Soldier firing a Stinger missile. [Source: US Army]

In New York, the Secret Service has a Stinger missile secretly stored in the World Trade Center, to be used to protect the president if the city were attacked when he visits it. Presumably it keeps this is in WTC Building 7 Wikipedia, where its field office is.[8] Whether the Secret Service makes any attempt at defending New York from the two attacking planes with its Stinger missile is unknown. The agency is also known to have air surveillance capabilities. These include a system called Tigerwall Wikipedia, which provides “early warning of airborne threats” and “a geographic display of aircraft activity” (see (September 2000 and after)). And according to Barbara Riggs Wikipedia, who is in the Secret Service’s Washington, DC headquarters on this day, the agency is “able to receive real time information about other hijacked aircraft,” through “monitoring radar and activating an open line with the FAA.”[9]


These capabilities would presumably be of use if the Secret Service wanted to defend the World Trade Center. Furthermore, according to the British defense publication Jane’s Land-Based Air Defence, “the American president’s residences in Washington and elsewhere are protected by specialist Stinger teams in case of an aerial attack by terrorist organizations.” [JANE'S LAND-BASED AIR DEFENCE, 10/13/2000] Knight Ridder has previously reported “several sources” telling it, “Stinger missiles are in the Secret Service’s arsenal.” [10]And according to the London Telegraph, the Secret Service is “believed to have a battery of ground-to-air Stinger missiles” ready to defend the White House. [11]Flight 77 reportedly comes within four miles of the White House before turning toward the Pentagon. [12]Whether the Secret Service makes any attempt at defending the place with its Stinger missiles is unknown. However, the Washington Post will later claim it is an “urban legend that Stinger missiles are mounted on the White House roof.” [13]

8:45 a.m. September 11, 2001: NEADS Commanders Give Order to Launch Otis Jets Edit

in a template This article has been assessed as havingUnknown importance.

Good scope?NoN Timeline? +YesY wikified? +YesY red links < 10?NoN all red links fixed?NoN referenced?NoN Illustrated?NoN Googled and added info? NoN Checked 9/11 records archives? NoN Checked Wikinews? NoN Checked Wikisource? NoN

On the operations floor at NEADS, Major Kevin Nasypany, the facility’s mission crew commander, instructs Major James Fox, the leader of the weapons team, to launch fighter jets from Otis Air National Guard Base Wikipedia.[14]

Nasypany has just received this order—to launch the jets—from Colonel Robert Marr, the NEADS battle commander. [15] Marr issued it after seeking permission to do so from Major General Larry Arnold, the commanding general of NORAD’s Continental Region (CONR)[see 2].[16]

Marr will later claim, “My intent was to scramble Otis to military airspace while we found out what was going on.” [17] Nasypany gives Fox a coordinate for just north of New York City, and tells him, “Head ‘em in that direction.” [14]

The jets will be scrambled from Otis a minute later [see 3], but there will be conflicting accounts of what their initial destination is [see 4].[16]

The 9/11 Commission will later state that, “Because of a technical issue, there are no NEADS recordings available of the NEADS senior weapons director and weapons director technician position responsible for controlling the Otis scramble.” [18]

8:45 a.m.-8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001: NEADS Technician Locates Flight 11 on Radar Screen, Then Sees It Disappear over New York Edit

Master Sergeant Joe McCain, the mission crew commander technician at NEADS, believes he has located Flight 11 on the radar screen and then watches it disappear over New York, but he does not realize it has crashed. McCain is on the phone with Colin Scoggins, the military liaison at the FAA’s Boston Center.[19] [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 40-41] NEADS personnel have been unable to locate Flight 11 on their radar screens [see 5]. [20][UTICA OBSERVER-DISPATCH, 8/5/2004]

McCain Locates Fast-Moving Aircraft - Now McCain believes he has found Flight 11, flying about 20 miles north of Manhattan. According to author Lynn Spencer, he “knows that planes tend to fly very specific routes, like highways in the sky, and this particular target seems not to be on any of those regular routes. It’s also very fast moving.” McCain tells Scoggins, “I’ve got a search target that seems to be on an odd heading here,” and then describes its location. Scoggins notices the target, but this is not Flight 11. Scoggins then realizes that Flight 11 is right behind the target McCain has identified, and yells to him: “There’s a target four miles behind it, that’s the one! That’s American 11!” McCain responds, “I’ve got it!” The aircraft is 16 miles north of New York’s JFK International Airport, and heading down the Hudson River valley. NEADS has no altitude for it, but the aircraft is clearly traveling very fast. After hanging up the phone, McCain calls out its coordinates to everyone on the NEADS operations floor. [21][SPENCER, 2008, PP. 40] McCain will later recall: “It’s very unusual to find a search target, which is a plane with its transponder turned off, in that area. This plane was headed toward New York going faster than the average Cessna and was no doubt a jet aircraft. We had many clues. The plane was fast and heading in an unusual direction with no beacon. We had raw data only. Everything just kind of fit.” [22][FILSON, 2003, PP. 56-57] (The identity of the other fast-moving aircraft McCain had noticed, four miles ahead of Flight 11, is unstated.)

Flight 11 Disappears from Radar - Less than a minute after McCain locates the track for Flight 11, it disappears. [23][SPENCER, 2008, PP. 41] McCain will recall, “We watched that track until it faded over New York City and right after that someone came out of the break room and said the World Trade Center had been hit.” [24][FILSON, 2003, PP. 57] However, McCain supposedly does not realize that the plane he had spotted has crashed into the WTC. According to Spencer: “[H]e knows only that the blip he has struggled so mightily to locate has now vanished. He figures that the plane has descended below his radar coverage area to land at JFK. The fact that the plane was flying much too fast for landing does not hit him; the concept that the plane might have been intentionally crashed is simply too far outside his realm of experience.” [25][SPENCER, 2008, PP. 41]

(Before 8:46 a.m.) September 11, 2001: CIA Director Tenet Expresses Worry about Al-Qaeda Attack Edit

CIA Director George Tenet is eating breakfast with his mentor, former Senator David Boren, at the St. Regis Hotel, three blocks north of the White House.

According to journalist Bob Woodward, Boren asks Tenet, “What are you worried about these days?” Tenet replies, “Bin Laden,” and says he is convinced the al-Qaeda leader is going to do something big. Boren asks him how could one person without the resources of a foreign government be such a threat? Tenet responds, “You don’t understand the capabilities and the reach of what they’re putting together.”[26] When, shortly afterwards, Tenet learns of the first attack on the World Trade Center, he will immediately say he thinks bin Laden is responsible [see 6].

(8:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Air Traffic Control Centers Receive False Bomb Threats? Edit

CNN Wikipedia reports that, while Flight 11 is heading toward the World Trade Center, “[S]ources say there were bomb threats called in to air traffic control centers adding to the chaos.”

One center receiving such threats is the FAA’s Boston Center, which handles air traffic over New England and monitors flights 11 and 175. Cleveland Center, which will monitor Flight 93, receives similar threats. Whether other centers are threatened is unstated. According to Newsweek Wikipedia, “Officials suspect that the bomb threats were intended to add to the chaos, distracting controllers from tracking the hijacked planes.”[27] Yet, just weeks after 9/11, the Washington Post will claim,

“Federal aviation officials no longer believe that accomplices of the hijackers made phony bomb threats to confuse air traffic controllers on Sept. 11. Sources said reports of multiple threats were apparently the result of confusion during the early hours of the investigation and miscommunication in the Federal Aviation Administration Wikipedia.” [28]


(Between 8:46 a.m. and 8:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Bush’s Motorcade Quickly Hears of Flight 11 Crash, but Bush Reportedly Still Unaware Edit

This article has been assessed as havingUnknown importance.

Good scope?NoN Timeline? +YesY wikified?NoN red links < 10?NoN all red links fixed?NoN referenced?NoN Illustrated?NoN Googled and added info? NoN Checked 9/11 records archives? NoN Checked Wikinews? NoN Checked Wikisource? NoN in a template

When Flight 11 hits the WTC at 8:46 a.m., President Bush’s motorcade is crossing the John Ringling Causeway on the way to Booker Elementary School from the Colony Beach and Tennis Resort on Longboat Key.. [WASHINGTON TIMES, 10/8/2002] </ref>

White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer is riding in a motorcade van, along with adviser Karl Rove and Mike Morell, the CIA’s White House briefer. Shortly after the attack, Fleischer is talking on his cell phone, when he blurts out: “Oh, my God, I don’t believe it. A plane just hit the World Trade Center.” (The person with whom he is speaking remains unknown.) Fleischer is told he will be needed on arrival at the school to discuss reports of the crash. [29] This call takes place “just minutes” after the first news reports of the attack according to one account, or “just before 9:00 a.m.” according to another.. [30]

Fleischer asks Morell if he knows anything about a small plane hitting the World Trade Center. Morell doesn’t, and immediately calls the CIA Operations Center. He is informed that the plane that hit the WTC wasn’t small. . [31] Congressman Dan Miller also says he is told about the crash just before meeting Bush at Booker Elementary School at 8:55 a.m. . [32] Some reporters waiting for Bush to arrive also learn of the crash just minutes after it happens. . [33]

It would make sense that the president would be told about the crash immediately, at the same time that others hear about it. His limousine has “Five small black antennae sprouted from the lid of the trunk in order to give Bush the best mobile communications money could buy.” . [34] Sarasota Magazine in fact claims that Bush is on Highway 301, just north of Main Street, on his way to the school, when he receives a phone call informing him a plane has crashed in New York City.. [35]Yet the official story remains that he is not told about the crash until he arrives at the school [see 7]. Author James Bamford Wikipedia comments, “Despite having a secure STU-III phone Wikipedia next to him in the presidential limousine and an entire national security staff at the White House, it appears that the president of the United States knew less than tens of millions of other people in every part of the country who were watching the attack as it unfolded.” [36]

8:46 a.m.-8:47 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 175 Changes Transponder Signal but Remains Easily Traceable Flight 175 stops transmitting its transponder signal. It is currently flying near the New Jersey-Pennsylvania border. [GUARDIAN, 10/17/2001; NEWSDAY, 9/10/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] However, the transponder is turned off for only about 30 seconds, and then comes back on as a signal that is not designated for any plane on this day. Then, within the space of a minute, it is changed to another new code. But New York Center air traffic computers do not correlate either of these new transponder codes with Flight 175. Consequently, according to an early FAA report, “the secondary radar return (transponder) indicating aircraft speed, altitude, and flight information began to coast and was no longer associated with the primary radar return.” Therefore, while controllers are able “to track the intruder easily… they couldn’t identify it.” However, Dave Bottiglia, the New York Center air traffic controller responsible for Flight 175, is currently trying to locate the already-crashed Flight 11, and therefore supposedly does not notice the transponder code changes on Flight 175 until 8:51 a.m. (see 8:51 a.m.-8:53 a.m. September 11, 2001). [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ; WASHINGTON POST, 9/17/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 21 ] According to a “Flight Path Study” by the National Transportation Safety Board, the change of Flight 175’s transponder code is the “first indication of deviation from normal routine.” [NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, 2/19/2002 ] Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175


8:48 a.m. September 11, 2001: Office of Emergency Management Preparing for Bioterrorism Exercise; Opens Its Command CenterEdit

John Odermatt [Source: Queens Gazette] New York City’s Office of Emergency Management (OEM) is responsible for coordinating the city’s response to major incidents, including terrorist attacks. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 283-284] Its offices are in Building 7 of the World Trade Center. Today is reportedly “going to be a busy day at the OEM,” as staff members have come to work early to prepare for Tripod, a major biological-terrorism training exercise scheduled for September 12 (see September 12, 2001). Their building shakes when the North Tower is hit at 8:46 a.m. OEM Commissioner John Odermatt initially believes a freak accident has occurred involving a ground-to-air missile, but soon after, OEM is informed that a plane hit the North Tower. Immediately, OEM staff members begin to activate their emergency command center, located on the 23rd floor of WTC 7 (see June 8, 1999). [JENKINS AND EDWARDS-WINSLOW, 9/2003, PP. 15] They call agencies such as the New York fire and police departments, and the Department of Health, and direct them to send their designated representatives to the OEM. They also call the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and request at least five federal Urban Search and Rescue Teams. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 293] According to the 9/11 Commission, OEM’s command center will be evacuated at 9:30 a.m. due to reports of further unaccounted for planes (see (9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). By that time, none of the outside agency liaisons will have arrived. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 305] Other accounts indicate the command center may be evacuated earlier, possibly even before the second tower is hit (see (Soon After 8:46 a.m.-9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (Shortly Before 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Office of Emergency Management, Tripod, John Odermatt Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center, Training Exercises

(8:48 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Pentagon Command Center Workers Apparently Learn of WTC Attack from TV, Think It Is an AccidentEdit

In the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon, personnel apparently become aware of the first attack on the World Trade Center from watching the reports on television. According to Steve Hahn, an operations officer there, “We monitor the television networks in the center, and along with the rest of America we saw the smoke pouring from the tower.” Dan Mangino, who is also an operations officer at the NMCC, says, “At first, we thought it was a terrible accident.” [AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE, 9/7/2006] The 9/11 Commission later says, “Most federal agencies learned about the crash in New York from CNN.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 35] Whether the NMCC was already aware that a hijacking was underway is unclear. According to military instructions, the NMCC is “the focal point within Department of Defense for providing assistance” in response to hijackings in US airspace, and is supposed to be “notified by the most expeditious means by the FAA.” [US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 6/1/2001 ] Boston Air Traffic Control Center started notifying the chain of command of the suspected hijacking of Flight 11 more than 20 minutes earlier (see 8:25 a.m. September 11, 2001). And at 8:32, the FAA’s Command Center in Herndon informed FAA headquarters of the possible hijacking (see 8:28 a.m. September 11, 2001). Yet, according to the 9/11 Commission, although the “FAA headquarters began to follow the hijack protocol,” it “did not contact the NMCC to request a fighter escort.” Supposedly, the first that the military learned of the hijacking was when Boston Air Traffic Control Center contacted NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) about it, at around 8:37 a.m. (see (8:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The earliest time mentioned by the 9/11 Commission that the NMCC learns of the Flight 11 hijacking is 9 a.m. (see 9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 19-20 AND 35] Entity Tags: Steve Hahn, Dan Mangino, National Military Command Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

Shortly After 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001: Rumsfeld Learns of First WTC Attack Edit

in a template

Larry Di Rita, a special assistant to Donald Rumsfeld, has sent a note to the secretary of defense to inform him of Flight 11 hitting the World Trade Center. Although some initial reports suggest the WTC may have been hit by just a small plane, according to Torie Clarke Wikipedia, the assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, “Even in the accidental crash scenario, the military might be involved in some way. Rumsfeld needed to know.” Rumsfeld, who is currently hosting a breakfast meeting with several members of Congress [see 8], later acknowledges having received this note. Yet apparently he does nothing in response. He recalls, “Everyone assumed it was an accident, the way it was described.” He says only that “we adjourned the meeting, and I went in to get my CIA Wikipedia briefing.” [37]

8:46 a.m.Edit

Main article: September 11 8:46 am


8:46 a.m+Edit

8:46 a.m.-9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001: New Jersey Air National Guard Fighters away on Training Mission, Unaware of Attacks in New York Edit

At the time of the attacks on the World Trade Center, two F-16 fighter jets are performing a training mission just eight minutes flying time away from New York, but the pilots are unaware of the crisis taking place. The two jets belong to the 177th Fighter Wing of the New Jersey Air National Guard, which is based at Atlantic City International Airport. [38][39][40]F-16s at Atlantic City are involved in scheduled training missions every day, and their first mission is usually between 8:30 a.m. and 9:00 a.m. [41] The two fighter jets are unarmed and performing practice bombing runs over a section of the Pine Barrens in New Jersey that is designated for military drills.They will not be called back to base until shortly after the second WTC tower is hit, and will then have their training munitions replaced with live air-to-air missiles. At the time of the second attack, another two jets from the 177th FW are preparing to take off for routine bombing training, but they too have their mission cancelled [see 9]. No jets will take off from Atlantic City in response to the attacks until after 9:37, when the Pentagon is hit. [42][43][40]

Colin Scoggins, the military liaison at the FAA’s Boston Center, is aware that the 177th FW launches F-16s for training flights every morning around this time, and suggested to NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) that it contact Atlantic City to use these jets in response to the hijacked Flight 11. However, when NEADS tried phoning the unit, its call was not answered [see 10]. [41][44] Apparently around 8:34 a.m., the Boston Center also attempted to contact the Atlantic City unit, but the outcome of that call is unclear [see 11].[16]

Author Peter Lance will later point out that, had the two Atlantic City F-16s flying over the Pine Barrens “been notified by the FAA at 8:34… they could have reached the Twin Towers by 8:42 a.m.,” four minutes before Flight 11 hit the North Tower [see 12].

“Even unarmed, and without a shootdown order, they might have been able to take defensive action to prevent the big 767 from crashing into the tower. In any case, the fighters would certainly have been on patrol and able to interdict UA 175, which didn’t hit the South Tower until 9:03 a.m.” [45]

Yet despite the crucial role these two fighters could have played, the 9/11 Commission Report will make no mention of them. Pointing out the irony of having the two F-16s so near to Manhattan yet with such an unrelated mission, 177th Fighter Wing public affairs officer Lt. Luz Aponte will later remark, “Isn’t that something?” [40]

8:46 a.m.-8:47 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 175 Changes Transponder Signal but Remains Easily Traceable Edit

Flight 175 stops transmitting its transponder signal. It is currently flying near the New Jersey-Pennsylvania border. [GUARDIAN, 10/17/2001; NEWSDAY, 9/10/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] However, the transponder is turned off for only about 30 seconds, and then comes back on as a signal that is not designated for any plane on this day. Then, within the space of a minute, it is changed to another new code. But New York Center air traffic computers do not correlate either of these new transponder codes with Flight 175. Consequently, according to an early FAA report, “the secondary radar return (transponder) indicating aircraft speed, altitude, and flight information began to coast and was no longer associated with the primary radar return.” Therefore, while controllers are able “to track the intruder easily… they couldn’t identify it.” However, Dave Bottiglia, the New York Center air traffic controller responsible for Flight 175, is currently trying to locate the already-crashed Flight 11, and therefore supposedly does not notice the transponder code changes on Flight 175 until 8:51 a.m. (see 8:51 a.m.-8:53 a.m. September 11, 2001). [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 9/17/2001 ; WASHINGTON POST, 9/17/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 21 ] According to a “Flight Path Study” by the National Transportation Safety Board, the change of Flight 175’s transponder code is the “first indication of deviation from normal routine.” [NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, 2/19/2002 ] Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175

8:46 a.m.-9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001: Aviation Unit Based near Pentagon away for Weapons Training at Time of Attacks

Fort AP Hill. [Source: United States Army] At the time of the attacks on the World Trade Center, members of the Army’s aviation support unit for the Washington, DC, area are away for weapons training, and do not set out to return to their base until after the time the Pentagon is hit. [ARMY CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY, 11/14/2001 ; PENTAGRAM, 11/16/2001; FORT BELVOIR NEWS, 1/18/2002] The 12th Aviation Battalion is the Military District of Washington’s aviation support unit, and includes three helicopter companies. It operates UH-1 “Huey” and UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters. The battalion is stationed at Davison Army Airfield, which is at Fort Belvoir, 12 miles south of the Pentagon. [MILITARY DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON, 8/2000] Davison Airfield’s missions include maintaining “a readiness posture in support of contingency plans,” exercising “operational control” of the Washington area airspace, and providing “aviation support for the White House, US government officials, Department of Defense, Department of the Army, and other government agencies.” [PENTAGRAM, 5/7/1999] A chief warrant officer with the 12th Aviation Battalion will later recall that members of the battalion are away this morning, at the shooting range at another Virginia Army base, Fort AP Hill, for their annual weapons training. They had set off early and driven there—a journey of one and a half to two hours. They are at the range when the attacks on the WTC take place, and only learn of them when the sister of one of their captains calls her brother with news of the attacks, presumably after seeing the coverage on television. The chief warrant officer will recall that, after hearing of the second attack on the WTC, “[W]e were all pretty much thinking we probably need to go—you know, probably need to come to work.” The range officer calls Davison Airfield and is told that the members of the battalion should “pack it in and come on back” to base. He is also told during the call that an aircraft has crashed into the Pentagon (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001), meaning this call does not occur until after 9:37 a.m. According to the chief warrant officer, the Pentagon “is basically one of our missions. So we just pretty much packed up and came back up here and came into work.” Exactly how many of the 12th Aviation Battalion’s members are away from base for the weapons training is unstated, as is the exact time they arrive back at Davison Airfield. But considering it is one and a half to two hours drive between there and the range, they presumably do not get there until some time after about 11:15 a.m. When they do eventually get back to base, the battalion members will prepare to launch helicopters in response to the Pentagon attack (see (After 11:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [ARMY CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY, 11/14/2001 ; FORT BELVOIR NEWS, 1/18/2002] Entity Tags: 12th Aviation Battalion Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon, Training Exercises

After 8:46 a.m.Edit

(After 8:46 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Emergency Response Plans Activated by Officials, Not by Bush Edit

President Bush will say in a speech later that evening, “Immediately following the first attack, I implemented our government’s emergency response plans.” [US PRESIDENT, 9/17/2001] However, the Wall Street Journal reports that lower level officials activate CONPLAN (Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan) in response to the emerging crisis. CONPLAN, created in response to a 1995 Presidential Decision Directive issued by President Clinton and published in January 2001, details the responsibility of seven federal agencies if a terrorist attack occurs. It gives the FBI the responsibility for activating the plan and alerting other agencies. Bush in fact later states that he doesn’t give any orders responding to the attack until after 9:55 a.m. [US GOVERNMENT, 1/2001; WALL STREET JOURNAL, 3/22/2004 ] Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush

(After 8:46 a.m.) September 11, 2001: FAA Establishes Open Telephone Line with the Secret Service Shortly after the WTC is hit, the FAA opens a telephone line with the Secret Service to keep the White House informed of all events. [ [SOURCES: RICHARD (“DICK”) CHENEY] A few days later, Vice President Cheney will state, “The Secret Service has an arrangement with the FAA. They had open lines after the World Trade Center was…” (He stopped himself before finishing the sentence.) [MSNBC, 9/16/2001] Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Secret Service Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush

Shortly After 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001: Newark Airport Controllers Contact Other FAA Facilities about Burning WTC

Bob Varcadipane. [Source: NBC News] At the air traffic control tower at Newark International Airport in New Jersey, controllers see the smoke coming from the World Trade Center in the distance and start calling other FAA facilities in the area about this. Controller Rick Tepper looks out the window of the tower across the Hudson River at New York City, and sees the huge cloud of smoke coming from the North Tower, which Flight 11 has crashed into it. He points this out to fellow controller Greg Callahan. In his office at the tower, Bob Varcadipane, the supervisor there, starts receiving a flood of phone calls reporting that a small aircraft has hit the WTC. According to author Lynn Spencer, “The assumption is that only a small plane could have gone so badly off course.” The Newark tower controllers start calling the towers at JFK, La Guardia, and Teterboro Airports, along with other air traffic control facilities in the area, to see if any of them has lost an aircraft. But none say they have; they have not yet been informed of the crash and are shocked at what they see when told to look out their windows at the burning WTC. Varcadipane calls the FAA’s New York Center to find out if they know whose plane hit the Twin Towers. He is told: “No, but Boston Center lost an airplane. They lost an American 767.” Varcadipane wonders if this 767 is the plane that hit the WTC, and says back: “I have a burning building and you have a missing airplane. This is very coincidental.” According to NBC: “a horrific realization dawns on controllers. American Flight 11, still missing from radar, finally has been found.” Word of the plane’s fate subsequently “quickly travels throughout the air traffic control world.” [MSNBC, 9/11/2002; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 41-42] However, the FAA’s Indianapolis Center, which handles Flight 77, will reportedly not learn of the first hijackings until around 9:20 a.m. (see (9:20 a.m.-9:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 32 ] Entity Tags: Teterboro Airport, World Trade Center, Newark International Airport, Rick Tepper, La Guardia Airport, John F. Kennedy International Airport, Bob Varcadipane, Greg Callahan, New York Air Route Traffic Control Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 11

After 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001: Hijacker’s Passport Allegedly Found near World Trade Center

Satam Al Suqami’s remarkably undamaged passport, marked and wrapped in plastic. It was shown as evidence in the 2006 Zacarias Moussaoui trial. [Source: FBI] The passport of hijacker Satam Al Suqami is reportedly found a few blocks from the World Trade Center. [ABC NEWS, 9/12/2001; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/16/2001; ABC NEWS, 9/16/2001] Barry Mawn, the director of the FBI’s New York office, will say that police and the FBI find it during a “grid search” of the area. [CNN, 9/18/2001] However a senior counsel to the 9/11 Commission will later claim the passport is actually discovered by a passerby and given to a New York City Police Department detective, “shortly before the World Trade Center towers collapsed.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/26/2004] The Guardian will comment, “The idea that Mohamed Atta’s passport had escaped from that inferno unsinged [tests] the credulity of the staunchest supporter of the FBI’s crackdown on terrorism.” (Note that, as in this Guardian account, the passport will frequently be mistakenly referred to as Atta’s passport.) [GUARDIAN, 3/19/2002] Entity Tags: Barry Mawn, New York City Police Department, Satam Al Suqami, Federal Bureau of Investigation Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Hijacker Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Other 9/11 Hijackers, FBI 9/11 Investigation

(After 8:46 a.m.) September 11, 2001: PR Firm Helps American Airlines Respond to Attacks According to PR Week magazine, “immediately” after the attacks on this day, Tim Doke, the vice president for corporate communications for American Airlines, calls Ken Luce, who is the president of the Southwest offices of public relations firm Weber Shandwick Worldwide (WSW). In response, WSW sends more than 20 people to American Airlines’ headquarters in Fort Worth, and to airports around the US. Thus, “While American couldn’t answer many questions, spokespeople subtly steered reporters away from false rumors and leaked information. Employees from WSW and American’s other agency, Burson-Marsteller, served as the firm’s eyes and ears in the airports its staff couldn’t reach while planes were grounded.” [PR WEEK, 11/5/2001] The American Airlines operations center in Fort Worth was reportedly alerted to the emergency on Flight 11 around 8:21 a.m. (see (8:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 5] However, according to the 9/11 Commission, it is not until 9:30 a.m. that the airline confirms that this aircraft had crashed into the World Trade Center. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 16 ] So the exact time when Doke called Luce is unclear. The FBI has “essentially gagged” American Airlines from any meaningful communication with the media immediately following the attacks. According to Doke, though, in response to subsequent media demands about how the terrorists got through security, American will make use of a number of airline security people it had “intentionally cultivated relationships with over the years to help carry our messages and put some of the media hysteria into perspective.” [JACK O'DWYER'S NEWSLETTER, 12/4/2002] Entity Tags: Tim Doke, American Airlines, Ken Luce, Weber Shandwick Worldwide Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events Shortly After 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001: FBI Arrives at American Airlines’ Command Center and Takes Charge of Crisis Response Shortly before 9/11, American Airlines revised its crisis plan for dealing with situations including “plane crashes and 1978-style hijackings” (see Late Summer 2001). However, on this day, “American abandoned its freshly minted crisis communications plan almost immediately, not because putting the CEO out front isn’t the best plan of action in a crisis, but because the FBI rushed to American’s Command Center and made it clear who was in charge.” [PR WEEK, 11/5/2001] Larry Wansley, the American Airlines director of security, is at the company’s headquarters in Fort Worth, Texas. He had contacted the Dallas FBI about the hijacking of Flight 11 at around 8:45 a.m. (see (8:45 a.m.-9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). After learning of the two planes hitting the World Trade Center, he makes a hurried drive to the airline’s Command Center, about a mile from the headquarters, on the floor above its System Operations Control (SOC). Already, by the time he arrives, the FBI is setting up its own command post there, reviewing the Flight 11 passenger manifest, and replaying the recording of flight attendant Betty Ong’s emergency phone call. [DALLAS OBSERVER, 11/21/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004] Tim Doke, the American Airlines vice president for corporate communications, later recounts that the “FBI essentially gagged us from any meaningful media interaction immediately following the terrorist attacks.” [JACK O'DWYER'S NEWSLETTER, 12/4/2002] American Airlines’ first press release, issued within a few hours of the attacks, will refer all questions to the FBI. [PR WEEK, 11/5/2001] Entity Tags: Larry Wansley, Federal Bureau of Investigation, American Airlines Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

After 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001: Navy Officials Monitor Events at Antiterrorist Alert Center Within moments of the attack in New York, the US Navy’s Antiterrorist Alert Center (ATAC) goes to full alert. ATAC is located at the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) headquarters in southeast Washington, DC, across the Potomac River from the Pentagon. [US NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE, N.D.; US DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, 2/2002 ; CNN, 8/27/2002] Established in 1983, it was the first 24-hour terrorism watch center in the US intelligence community. [US NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE, N.D.] In it, top Navy officials are now monitoring the day’s events. According to CNN—which gains access to a video recording of the center during the attacks—just before the Pentagon is hit, these officials are “concerned attacks on Washington could be next.” After the attack on the Pentagon, the Navy’s top leaders will start arriving at the center (see After 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [CNN, 8/27/2002] Entity Tags: US Department of the Navy Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events (Shortly After 8:46 a.m.) September 11, 2001: New York Center Air Traffic Controllers Notice Problems with Flight 175

Curt Applegate sitting next to his air traffic control terminal. [Source: NBC News] After being focused on Flight 11, Dave Bottiglia, an air traffic controller at the FAA’s New York Center, first notices problems with Flight 175. [MSNBC, 9/11/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 21] Both Flight 11 and Flight 175 have been in the airspace that Bottiglia is responsible for monitoring (see 8:40 a.m. September 11, 2001 and (8:42 a.m.-8:46 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Bottiglia has just watched Flight 11’s radar blip disappear, which means the plane has dipped below his radar’s coverage area, so is below 2,000 feet. But he does not yet realize it has crashed. He says aloud, “Well, we know he’s not high altitude anymore.” [MSNBC, 9/11/2002; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 37] Around this time, Flight 175’s transponder changes twice in the space of a minute (see 8:46 a.m.-8:47 a.m. September 11, 2001). Conflicting Accounts - According to MSNBC, “within seconds” of losing Flight 11’s blip, “Bottiglia has another unexpected problem.” While looking for Flight 11, he realizes that Flight 175 is also missing, and “instinctively… knows the two [planes] are somehow related.” He asks another controller to take over all of his other planes. [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] But according to the 9/11 Commission’s account, Bottiglia is still trying to locate Flight 11 after it crashes, and so it is not until 8:51 a.m. that he notices the problem with Flight 175 (see 8:51 a.m.-8:53 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 21 ] 'An Intruder over Allentown' - Around the time Flight 175 changes its transponder code, air traffic controller Curt Applegate, who is sitting at the radar bank next to Bottiglia’s, sees a blip that might be the missing Flight 11. He shouts out: “Look. There’s an intruder over Allentown.” According to the Washington Post, “In air traffic jargon, an ‘intruder’ is a plane with an operating transponder that has entered restricted airspace without permission.” In fact, it is the missing Flight 175. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/17/2001; MSNBC, 9/11/2002] However, these accounts make no mention of NORAD being notified about the problems with Flight 175 at this time. But according to a NORAD timeline released shortly after 9/11, NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) was alerted about Flight 175 by the FAA several minutes earlier, at 8:43 a.m. (see 8:43 a.m. September 11, 2001). [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/18/2001] Entity Tags: Dave Bottiglia, Curt Applegate, New York Air Route Traffic Control Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 11, Flight UA 175


After 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001: Software Company Reconstructs Paths of Four Hijacked Planes A Fairfax, Virginia company that makes computer software that tracks and records the flight paths of planes helps media companies and airlines to reconstruct the paths of all four of the hijacked aircraft. [WASHINGTON BUSINESS JOURNAL, 9/11/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 9/13/2001] Flight Explorer sells an Internet-accessible application that provides constantly updated information on the positions of aircraft in flight. It uses radar feeds that the FAA collects from control centers across the US. [BUSINESS WIRE, 6/16/2000; ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 8/12/2001] All of Flight Explorer’s employees begin sorting through its data “after the first crash [of Flight 11] was reported,” so presumably this is at around 8:50 a.m. Whether any particular agency, such as the FAA, requests this or they do it of their own initiative is unknown. Although there are some 4,000 planes in the air above the US at the time of the attacks, the company is quickly able to pinpoint the paths of all four hijacked aircraft. It then creates charts and animated videos of the four flights’ actual and intended routes. About 12 news agencies, including all the major networks, request these animated illustrations. [WASHINGTON BUSINESS JOURNAL, 9/11/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 9/13/2001] Flight Explorer is apparently unhindered by the fact that flights 11 and 93 have their transponders turned off during the hijackings. Its reconstruction of Flight 77’s path ends, however, at 8:57, around the time that aircraft’s transponder goes off and it disappears from controllers’ radar screens (see (8:56 a.m.-9:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Yet the 9/11 Commission will later say that, despite this disappearance, “Radar reconstructions performed after 9/11 reveal that FAA radar equipment tracked the flight from the moment its transponder was turned off.” Why the Flight Explorer illustration does not therefore show the rest of Flight 77’s journey is not clear. [AVWEB, 9/11/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Until a few years back, Flight Explorer was the only company that recorded flight paths. Since the 1999 death of golfer Payne Stewart (see October 25, 1999) the FAA has also been recording these paths. [WASHINGTON BUSINESS JOURNAL, 9/11/2001] The final report of the 9/11 Commission will make no mention of the Flight Explorer flight path recordings. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 222] Entity Tags: Flight Explorer Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(After 8:46 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Emergency Response Plans Activated by Officials, Not by Bush Edit

President Bush will say in a speech later that evening, “Immediately following the first attack, I implemented our government’s emergency response plans.” [US PRESIDENT, 9/17/2001] However, the Wall Street Journal reports that lower level officials activate CONPLAN (Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan) in response to the emerging crisis. CONPLAN, created in response to a 1995 Presidential Decision Directive issued by President Clinton and published in January 2001, details the responsibility of seven federal agencies if a terrorist attack occurs. It gives the FBI the responsibility for activating the plan and alerting other agencies. Bush in fact later states that he doesn’t give any orders responding to the attack until after 9:55 a.m. [US GOVERNMENT, 1/2001; WALL STREET JOURNAL, 3/22/2004 ] Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush

(After 8:46 a.m.) September 11, 2001: FAA Establishes Open Telephone Line with the Secret Service Edit

Shortly after the WTC is hit, the FAA opens a telephone line with the Secret Service to keep the White House informed of all events. [ [SOURCES: RICHARD (“DICK”) CHENEY] A few days later, Vice President Cheney will state, “The Secret Service has an arrangement with the FAA. They had open lines after the World Trade Center was…” (He stopped himself before finishing the sentence.) [MSNBC, 9/16/2001] Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Secret Service Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush

Shortly After 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001: Newark Airport Controllers Contact Other FAA Facilities about Burning WTC Edit

Bob Varcadipane. [Source: NBC News] At the air traffic control tower at Newark International Airport in New Jersey, controllers see the smoke coming from the World Trade Center in the distance and start calling other FAA facilities in the area about this. Controller Rick Tepper looks out the window of the tower across the Hudson River at New York City, and sees the huge cloud of smoke coming from the North Tower, which Flight 11 has crashed into it. He points this out to fellow controller Greg Callahan. In his office at the tower, Bob Varcadipane, the supervisor there, starts receiving a flood of phone calls reporting that a small aircraft has hit the WTC. According to author Lynn Spencer, “The assumption is that only a small plane could have gone so badly off course.” The Newark tower controllers start calling the towers at JFK, La Guardia, and Teterboro Airports, along with other air traffic control facilities in the area, to see if any of them has lost an aircraft. But none say they have; they have not yet been informed of the crash and are shocked at what they see when told to look out their windows at the burning WTC. Varcadipane calls the FAA’s New York Center to find out if they know whose plane hit the Twin Towers. He is told: “No, but Boston Center lost an airplane. They lost an American 767.” Varcadipane wonders if this 767 is the plane that hit the WTC, and says back: “I have a burning building and you have a missing airplane. This is very coincidental.” According to NBC: “a horrific realization dawns on controllers. American Flight 11, still missing from radar, finally has been found.” Word of the plane’s fate subsequently “quickly travels throughout the air traffic control world.” [MSNBC, 9/11/2002; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 41-42] However, the FAA’s Indianapolis Center, which handles Flight 77, will reportedly not learn of the first hijackings until around 9:20 a.m. (see (9:20 a.m.-9:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 32 ] Entity Tags: Teterboro Airport, World Trade Center, Newark International Airport, Rick Tepper, La Guardia Airport, John F. Kennedy International Airport, Bob Varcadipane, Greg Callahan, New York Air Route Traffic Control Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 11

(Between 8:46 a.m. and 9:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Key Administration Officials Allegedly Think First Crash Is an Accident Edit

A number of key White House officials later claim that, when they learn of the first crash at the World Trade Center, they initially think it is just an accident:

President Bush says that, when he learns of the crash while in Sarasota, Florida, “my first reaction was—as an old pilot—how could the guy have gotten so off course to hit the towers? What a terrible accident that is” (see (Between 8:55 a.m. and 9:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [SAMMON, 2002, PP. 42]

White House chief of staff Andrew Card, who is with the president, says, “It was first reported to me… that it looked like it was a, a twin-engine pro—prop plane, and so the natural reaction was—‘What a horrible accident. The pilot must have had a heart attack.’” [MSNBC, 9/11/2002]

Adviser Karl Rove, who is also with the president in Florida, is later questioned about his feelings after the first crash. When it is suggested, “I guess at that point, everyone is still thinking it is an accident,” Rove concurs, “Yes, absolutely.” [MSNBC, 9/11/2002]

White House press secretary Ari Fleischer, also traveling with the president on this day, says, “[W]hen only the first tower had been hit, it was all of our thoughts that this had been some type of terrible accident.” [CNN, 9/11/2006]

National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, who is in her White House office, is informed of the crash by her executive assistant (see (9:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). She later recalls, “I thought, what a strange accident.” [O, THE OPRAH MAGAZINE, 2/1/2002; MSNBC, 9/11/2002]

White House counselor Karen Hughes receives a phone call informing her of the first crash as she is about to leave her Washington, DC home. She later recalls, “they thought it was a small plane at the time… so, of course, my immediate thought was what a terrible accident.” [MSNBC, 9/11/2002; CNN, 4/6/2004] She adds, “We all assumed it was some kind of weird accident; at that point terrorism didn’t occur to us.” [HUGHES, 2004, PP. 234]

The 9/11 Commission later describes, “In the absence of information that the crash was anything other than an accident, the White House staff monitored the news as they went ahead with their regular schedules.” It will only be when they learn of the second tower being hit at 9:03 that “nearly everyone in the White House… immediately knew it was not an accident.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 35] However, when couterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke is called some time after the first crash but before the second by Lisa Gordon-Hagerty—a member of his staff who is at the White House (see (9:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001)—she tells him, “Until we know what this is, Dick, we should assume the worst.” [CLARKE, 2004, PP. 1] And when CIA Director George Tenet learns of the first crash, reportedly he is told specifically, “The World Trade tower has been attacked,” and his initial reaction is, “This has bin Laden all over it” (see (8:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [WOODWARD, 2002, PP. 4]

(After 8:46 a.m.) September 11, 2001: PR Firm Helps American Airlines Respond to Attacks Edit

According to PR Week magazine, “immediately” after the attacks on this day, Tim Doke, the vice president for corporate communications for American Airlines, calls Ken Luce, who is the president of the Southwest offices of public relations firm Weber Shandwick Worldwide (WSW). In response, WSW sends more than 20 people to American Airlines’ headquarters in Fort Worth, and to airports around the US. Thus, “While American couldn’t answer many questions, spokespeople subtly steered reporters away from false rumors and leaked information. Employees from WSW and American’s other agency, Burson-Marsteller, served as the firm’s eyes and ears in the airports its staff couldn’t reach while planes were grounded.” [PR WEEK, 11/5/2001] The American Airlines operations center in Fort Worth was reportedly alerted to the emergency on Flight 11 around 8:21 a.m. (see (8:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 5] However, according to the 9/11 Commission, it is not until 9:30 a.m. that the airline confirms that this aircraft had crashed into the World Trade Center. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 16 ] So the exact time when Doke called Luce is unclear. The FBI has “essentially gagged” American Airlines from any meaningful communication with the media immediately following the attacks. According to Doke, though, in response to subsequent media demands about how the terrorists got through security, American will make use of a number of airline security people it had “intentionally cultivated relationships with over the years to help carry our messages and put some of the media hysteria into perspective.” [JACK O'DWYER'S NEWSLETTER, 12/4/2002] Entity Tags: Tim Doke, American Airlines, Ken Luce, Weber Shandwick Worldwide Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events


Shortly After 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001: FBI Arrives at American Airlines’ Command Center and Takes Charge of Crisis Response Edit

Shortly before 9/11, American Airlines revised its crisis plan for dealing with situations including “plane crashes and 1978-style hijackings” (see Late Summer 2001). However, on this day, “American abandoned its freshly minted crisis communications plan almost immediately, not because putting the CEO out front isn’t the best plan of action in a crisis, but because the FBI rushed to American’s Command Center and made it clear who was in charge.” [PR WEEK, 11/5/2001] Larry Wansley, the American Airlines director of security, is at the company’s headquarters in Fort Worth, Texas. He had contacted the Dallas FBI about the hijacking of Flight 11 at around 8:45 a.m. (see (8:45 a.m.-9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). After learning of the two planes hitting the World Trade Center, he makes a hurried drive to the airline’s Command Center, about a mile from the headquarters, on the floor above its System Operations Control (SOC). Already, by the time he arrives, the FBI is setting up its own command post there, reviewing the Flight 11 passenger manifest, and replaying the recording of flight attendant Betty Ong’s emergency phone call. [DALLAS OBSERVER, 11/21/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 1/27/2004] Tim Doke, the American Airlines vice president for corporate communications, later recounts that the “FBI essentially gagged us from any meaningful media interaction immediately following the terrorist attacks.” [JACK O'DWYER'S NEWSLETTER, 12/4/2002] American Airlines’ first press release, issued within a few hours of the attacks, will refer all questions to the FBI. [PR WEEK, 11/5/2001] Entity Tags: Larry Wansley, Federal Bureau of Investigation, American Airlines Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

After 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001: Navy Officials Monitor Events at Antiterrorist Alert Center Edit

Within moments of the attack in New York, the US Navy’s Antiterrorist Alert Center (ATAC) goes to full alert. ATAC is located at the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) headquarters in southeast Washington, DC, across the Potomac River from the Pentagon. [US NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE, N.D.; US DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, 2/2002 ; CNN, 8/27/2002] Established in 1983, it was the first 24-hour terrorism watch center in the US intelligence community. [US NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE, N.D.] In it, top Navy officials are now monitoring the day’s events. According to CNN—which gains access to a video recording of the center during the attacks—just before the Pentagon is hit, these officials are “concerned attacks on Washington could be next.” After the attack on the Pentagon, the Navy’s top leaders will start arriving at the center (see After 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [CNN, 8/27/2002] Entity Tags: US Department of the Navy Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

Shortly After 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001: DC Air National Guard Officers Learn of First WTC Crash, Think It Is an Accident Edit

Logo of the 113th Wing of the DC Air National Guard. [Source: Air National Guard] Pilots and officers with the District of Columbia Air National Guard (DCANG) are notified of the first plane hitting the World Trade Center, but mistakenly assume this must have been an accident and continue with a meeting they are holding. [RASMUSSEN, 9/18/2003; 9/11 COMMISSION, 3/11/2004 ; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 122] The 113th Wing of the DC Air National Guard, which includes the 121st Fighter Squadron, is based at Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland, 10 miles southeast of Washington. [DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AIR NATIONAL GUARD, 7/24/2001; GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 10/21/2001; GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 11/15/2001] Pilots and Flight Managers in Meeting - Some DCANG officers are currently in a conference room at their unit at Andrews, conducting the weekly scheduling meeting, where plans for the upcoming week are discussed. According to Captain Brandon Rasmussen, a pilot who is also the chief of scheduling with the unit, about five or six people are in the meeting. [RASMUSSEN, 9/18/2003; 9/11 COMMISSION, 3/11/2004 ] As well as Rasmussen, those present include Major David McNulty, the senior intelligence officer of the 113th Wing; pilots Marc Sasseville and Daniel Caine; and a new officer, Mark Valentine. Officers Think Crash Is an Accident - An intelligence officer interrupts the meeting and says a plane has just flown into the WTC. However, the meeting participants assume the crash is an accident involving a small aircraft. [9/11 COMMISSION, 3/8/2004 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 3/11/2004 ; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 122] Rasmussen will later recall: “[A]ll of us in the meeting kind of looked at each other and looked outside the window, it was clear blue skies. It doesn’t get any more flying weather than that. So we thought, ‘What kind of a moron can’t see those big buildings right in front of them?’ We all figured it was just some light civil aircraft… little Cessnas, Piper Cubs, or whatever, someone doing some sightseeing flying up and down the Hudson and just not paying attention where he was going.” Therefore, “we continued on with the meeting, thinking we’d catch the news clips later on in the day.” The scheduling meeting will continue until its participants learn of the second plane hitting the WTC and realize this is a terrorist attack (see (9:04 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [RASMUSSEN, 9/18/2003; 9/11 COMMISSION, 3/11/2004 ; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 122-123] Some at Base Suspicious about Crash - However, according to the Washington Post, at least some individuals with the DC Air National Guard are “immediately suspicious” upon hearing of the first crash. Pilot Heather Penney Garcia will recall having wondered, “How do you make a mistake like that?” (Penney Garcia is at the 121st Fighter Squadron headquarters at Andrews, though whether she is attending the scheduling meeting is unstated.) Only Four DCANG Pilots Available - Members of the 121st Fighter Squadron have just returned from “Red Flag,” a major training exercise in Nevada (see Late August-September 8, 2001). Most of the squadron’s pilots, who fly commercial planes in their civilian lives and are involved with the unit on only a part-time basis, are consequently away from the base on this day, either back at their airline jobs or on leave, according to different accounts. [WASHINGTON POST, 4/8/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 2/27/2004; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 156] Of the seven pilots the squadron has available at the base today, three have just taken off for a training mission over North Carolina (see 8:36 a.m. September 11, 2001), meaning only four available pilots are left at the base. [9/11 COMMISSION, 2/17/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 2/27/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 3/8/2004 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 3/11/2004 ] DCANG Not Part of NORAD Air Defense Force - The DC Air National Guard flies the F-16 Fighting Falcon jet fighter, and its mission includes providing “capable and ready response forces for the District of Columbia in the event of a natural disaster or civil emergency.” [DC MILITARY (.COM), 6/2001; GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 10/21/2001] Unlike other Air National Guard units, it reports to the president, instead of a state governor. It works closely with Secret Service agents who are across the runway at Andrews Air Force Base, in the Air Force One hangar. [WASHINGTON POST, 4/8/2002; VOGEL, 2007, PP. 445] According to Aviation Week and Space Technology magazine, the 121st Fighter Squadron is “not standing alert on Sept. 11” because the DC Air National Guard is “not assigned to the North American Aerospace Defense Command air defense force.” [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 9/9/2002] Entity Tags: Brandon Rasmussen, Daniel Caine, David McNulty, Mark Valentine, Marc Sasseville, District of Columbia Air National Guard, Heather Penney Garcia Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(Shortly After 8:46 a.m.) September 11, 2001: New York Center Air Traffic Controllers Notice Problems with Flight 175 Edit

After being focused on Flight 11, Dave Bottiglia, an air traffic controller at New York Center, first notices problems with Flight 175.[46] [MSNBC, 9/11/2002;[47] Both Flight 11 and Flight 175 have been in the airspace that Bottiglia is responsible for monitoring [see 13]. Bottiglia has just watched Flight 11’s radar blip disappear, which means the plane has dipped below his radar’s coverage area, so is below 2,000 feet. But he does not yet realize it has crashed. He says aloud, “Well, we know he’s not high altitude anymore.”[48] [MSNBC, 9/11/2002;[49] Around this time, Flight 175’s transponder changes twice in the space of a minute [see 14].

According to MSNBC, “within seconds” of losing Flight 11’s blip, “Bottiglia has another unexpected problem.” While looking for Flight 11, he realizes that Flight 175 is also missing, and “instinctively… knows the two [planes] are somehow related.” He asks another controller to take over all of his other planes. [50][MSNBC, 9/11/2002] But according to the 9/11 Commission’s account, Bottiglia is still trying to locate Flight 11 after it crashes, and so it is not until 8:51 a.m. that he notices the problem with Flight 175[see 15].[51]

Around the time Flight 175 changes its transponder code, air traffic controller Curt Applegate, who is sitting at the radar bank next to Bottiglia’s, sees a blip that might be the missing Flight 11. He shouts out: “Look. There’s an intruder over Allentown.”

According to the Washington Post, “In air traffic jargon, an ‘intruder’ is a plane with an operating transponder that has entered restricted airspace without permission.” In fact, it is the missing Flight 175.[52] [WASHINGTON POST, 9/17/2001; MSNBC, 9/11/2002] However, these accounts make no mention of NORAD being notified about the problems with Flight 175 at this time. But according to a NORAD timeline released shortly after 9/11, NEADS was alerted about Flight 175 by the FAA several minutes earlier, at 8:43 a.m.[see 16].[53] [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/18/2001]

8:47Edit

(8:47 a.m.-9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Mayor Giuliani Learns of First WTC Crash, Yet Doesn’t Go to Special Emergency Command Center Edit

Rudolph Giuliani. [Source: Publicity photo] New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani is promptly informed of the first WTC crash while having breakfast at the Peninsula Hotel on 55th Street. He later claims that he goes outside and, noticing the clear sky, immediately concludes, “It could not have been an accident, that it had to have been an attack. But we weren’t sure whether it was a planned terrorist attack, or maybe some kind of act of individual anger or insanity.” Only after the second plane hits at 9:03 will he be convinced it is terrorism. After leaving the hotel, he quickly proceeds south. In his 2002 book, Leadership, he will claim that he heads for his emergency command center. This $13 million center is located on the 23rd floor of Building 7 of the WTC, and was opened by Giuliani in 1999, specifically for coordinating responses to emergencies, including terrorist attacks (see June 8, 1999). Referring to it, he writes, “As shocking as [the first] crash was, we had actually planned for just such a catastrophe.” At around 9:07 a.m., Giuliani meets Police Commissioner Bernard Kerik at Barclay Street, on the northern border of the WTC complex. [GIULIANI, 2002, PP. 3-6; 9/11 COMMISSION, 5/19/2004; BARRETT AND COLLINS, 2006, PP. 7] Yet they do not go to the command center. According to Kerik, “The Mayor and I… determined early on that the City’s pre-designated Command and Control Center… was unsafe because of its proximity to the attack.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/18/2004 ] Instead, they head to West Street, where the fire department has set up a command post, and arrive there at around 9:20 a.m. However, in his private testimony before the 9/11 Commission in 2004, Giuliani will apparently change his story, claiming he’d never even headed for his command center in the first place. He says, “Even if the Emergency Operations Center had been available, I would not have gone there for an hour or an hour and a half. I would want to spend some time at the actual incident, at operations command posts.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/19/2004; BARRETT AND COLLINS, 2006, PP. 44-45 AND 340-341] Other accounts indicate that the emergency command center is mostly abandoned from the outset, with emergency managers instead heading to the North Tower (see (Soon After 8:46 a.m.-9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Rudolph (“Rudy”) Giuliani, Bernard Kerik Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

8:47 a.m.-10:28 a.m. September 11, 2001: Hundreds Die in WTC Elevators, as Elevator Mechanics FleeEdit

During the 9/11 catastrophe, around 200 people die in the WTC’s elevators without getting help from elevator mechanics, according to an in-depth study later performed by USA Today. Some of the victims are burned by the initial explosion, some die as the elevator cars plummet when their cables are severed, and some are stuck and perish in the collapse. USA Today will say it “could not locate any professional rescues of people stuck in elevators. The Fire Department of New York and the Port Authority also could not cite successful rescues.” After the North Tower is hit, most of the WTC’s 83 elevator mechanics gather in the lobby of the South Tower, but when the second plane hits, they evacuate. In contrast, a passing elevator mechanic from another company runs into the WTC and dies trying to free trapped passengers. USA Today will comment: “When the World Trade Center was bombed in 1993, Otis Elevator’s mechanics led the rescue of 500 people trapped in elevators. Some mechanics were dropped onto the roofs of the Twin Towers by helicopter. Others, carrying 50-pound oxygen tanks on their backs, climbed through smoke to machine rooms high in the towers. On Sept. 11, the elevator mechanics—many of the same men involved in the rescues in 1993—left the buildings after the second jet struck, nearly an hour before the first building collapsed.” Although ACE Elevator, the local company which won the WTC contract from Otis in 1994, will say it was acting in accordance with procedure, USA Today will note: “The departure of elevator mechanics from a disaster site is unusual. The industry takes pride in rescues. In the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, elevator mechanics worked closely with the firefighters making rescues.” Robert Caporale, editor of Elevator World will say, “Nobody knows the insides of a high-rise like an elevator mechanic. They act as guides for firefighters, in addition to working on elevators.” The Port Authority will also say that their departure was in conflict with the emergency plan. “There was no situation in which the mechanics were advised or instructed to leave on their own.” [USA TODAY, 12/19/2001; USA TODAY, 9/4/2002] Entity Tags: World Trade Center, ACE Elevator, New York Port Authority, Robert Caporale Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center

(8:47 a.m.-9:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Engineer Finds Major Damage in Basement and Lobby of North Tower Edit

Mike Pecoraro. [Source: Chief Engineer] Mike Pecoraro, an engineer who is part of the crew that services the WTC complex, is at work in the mechanical shop in the second subbasement of the north WTC tower when it is hit. When the room he is in starts filling with white smoke and he can smell kerosene (jet fuel), he heads up stairs with a co-worker towards a small machine shop on the C level. Yet, he says, “There was nothing there but rubble. We’re talking about a 50 ton hydraulic press—gone!” He then heads for the parking garage, yet finds that “there were no walls, there was rubble on the floor, and you can’t see anything.” He ascends to the B level where he sees a 300-pound steel and concrete fire door, which is lying on the floor, wrinkled up “like a piece of aluminum foil.” Pecoraro recalls seeing similar things at the Center when it was bombed in 1993 and is therefore convinced that a bomb has gone off this time. When he makes it into the main lobby, he sees massive damage: “The whole lobby was soot and black, elevator doors were missing. The marble was missing off some of the walls. 20-foot section of marble, 20 by 10 foot sections of marble, gone from the walls.… Broken glass everywhere, the revolving doors were all broken and their glass was gone.” Pecoraro says he only later hears that “jet fuel actually came down the elevator shaft, blew off all the (elevator) doors and flames rolled through the lobby. That explained all the burnt people and why everything was sooted in the lobby.” He makes it out of the North Tower before it collapses. [CHIEF ENGINEER, 8/1/2002] Entity Tags: Mike Pecoraro, World Trade Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, WTC Investigation, World Trade Center

(Between 8:46 a.m. and 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Deputy Mayor Calls Navy; Requests Air Cover Over New York Edit

Naval Station Norfolk. [Source: US Navy] Rudy Washington, who is one of Rudolph Giuliani’s deputy mayors, sees the smoking North Tower as he is being driven into downtown Manhattan. He immediately calls Admiral Robert Natter, the commander of the US Atlantic Fleet at Norfolk Naval Station, Virginia, the world’s largest naval base. He requests air cover over New York. Norfolk Naval Station is in the region of Naval Air Station Oceana, which has F-14 Tomcats and F/A-18 Hornets. It is also near Langley Air Force Base. Natter says he will need to get in touch with the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), but will then call back. [DIGITAL JOURNALIST, 10/2001; GLOBAL SECURITY (.ORG), 11/15/2001; CBS NEWS, 4/3/2003; NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, 5/20/2004] Around this time, Washington also calls Patrick Burns at the base. Burns usually works in New York as the director of fleet support for the Navy, a civilian position that works closely with the mayor’s office and numerous other agencies. He is at Norfolk Naval Station for his two-week Naval Reserve obligation. Washington tells Burns, “I need you here.” No doubt anticipating there will be mass casualties, he adds, “I need that hospital ship.” He is referring to the hospital ship the USNS Comfort. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/11/2001; NOTRE DAME MAGAZINE, 4/2007] However, the Comfort, which is based in Baltimore, will only set off for New York at 3 p.m. the following day, and arrive at Pier 92 in Manhattan late in the evening of September 14. [US NAVY, N.D.; MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND, 9/18/2001] Entity Tags: Robert Natter, Rudy Washington, Patrick Burns, North American Aerospace Defense Command, US Department of the Navy Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175

After 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001: Hijacker’s Passport Allegedly Found near World Trade Center Edit

Satam Al Suqami’s remarkably undamaged passport, marked and wrapped in plastic. It was shown as evidence in the 2006 Zacarias Moussaoui trial. [Source: FBI] The passport of hijacker Satam Al Suqami is reportedly found a few blocks from the World Trade Center. [ABC NEWS, 9/12/2001; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/16/2001; ABC NEWS, 9/16/2001] Barry Mawn, the director of the FBI’s New York office, will say that police and the FBI find it during a “grid search” of the area. [CNN, 9/18/2001] However a senior counsel to the 9/11 Commission will later claim the passport is actually discovered by a passerby and given to a New York City Police Department detective, “shortly before the World Trade Center towers collapsed.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/26/2004] The Guardian will comment, “The idea that Mohamed Atta’s passport had escaped from that inferno unsinged [tests] the credulity of the staunchest supporter of the FBI’s crackdown on terrorism.” (Note that, as in this Guardian account, the passport will frequently be mistakenly referred to as Atta’s passport.) [GUARDIAN, 3/19/2002] Entity Tags: Barry Mawn, New York City Police Department, Satam Al Suqami, Federal Bureau of Investigation Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Key Hijacker Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Other 9/11 Hijackers, FBI 9/11 Investigation

Shortly After 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001: Neighbor Sees Suspicious Men Documenting First WTC Attack and Cheering, Calls Police Edit

A homemaker living near Liberty State Park, Jersey City, New Jersey sees three men behaving strangely on a nearby roof and alerts the authorities. This homemaker, who has given only her first name Maria, is called by a neighbor shortly after the first plane has hit the WTC and is told about the impact. She has a view of the WTC from her apartment building so she gets her binoculars and watches the disaster. However, she also notices three young men kneeling on the roof of a white van in the parking lot of her apartment building. Maria will later recall, “They seemed to be taking a movie.” They are taking video or photos of themselves with the WTC burning in the background. But what strikes Maria is their expressions: “They were like happy, you know… They didn’t look shocked to me. I thought it was very strange.” She writes down the license plate number of the van and calls the police. [ABC NEWS, 6/21/2002] Apparently the men leave the area a few minutes after the first attack is over. [COUNTERPUNCH, 2/7/2007] An FBI lookout bulletin for the van will be issued later in the day (see 3:31 p.m. September 11, 2001) and the three men (plus two more discovered with them) will be detained (see 3:56 p.m. September 11, 2001). When the men detained, one of them will be found with pictures of the group standing with the burning wreckage of the WTC in the background. [FORWARD, 3/15/2002] At least some of the pictures were taken while standing on top of the van. [NEW YORK TIMES, 10/8/2001] The lawyer for the five men will later note that one photograph developed by the FBI shows one of the men, Sivan Kurzberg, holding a lighted lighter in the foreground, with the burning WTC in the background. [NEW YORK TIMES, 11/21/2001] It will apparently be determined at least two of the men are Israeli spies, but what they were doing and why will remain in dispute. One of these Israelis will later say, “our purpose was to document the event.” [ABC NEWS, 6/21/2002] Entity Tags: World Trade Center, Sivan Kurzberg, Urban Moving Systems, Scott DeCarlo, Maria, Omer Marmari, Paul Kurzberg, Israel Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks (Mossad), Oded Ellner, Yaron Shmuel Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Israel

After 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001: Software Company Reconstructs Paths of Four Hijacked PlanesEdit

A Fairfax, Virginia company that makes computer software that tracks and records the flight paths of planes helps media companies and airlines to reconstruct the paths of all four of the hijacked aircraft. [WASHINGTON BUSINESS JOURNAL, 9/11/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 9/13/2001] Flight Explorer sells an Internet-accessible application that provides constantly updated information on the positions of aircraft in flight. It uses radar feeds that the FAA collects from control centers across the US. [BUSINESS WIRE, 6/16/2000; ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 8/12/2001] All of Flight Explorer’s employees begin sorting through its data “after the first crash [of Flight 11] was reported,” so presumably this is at around 8:50 a.m. Whether any particular agency, such as the FAA, requests this or they do it of their own initiative is unknown. Although there are some 4,000 planes in the air above the US at the time of the attacks, the company is quickly able to pinpoint the paths of all four hijacked aircraft. It then creates charts and animated videos of the four flights’ actual and intended routes. About 12 news agencies, including all the major networks, request these animated illustrations. [WASHINGTON BUSINESS JOURNAL, 9/11/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 9/13/2001] Flight Explorer is apparently unhindered by the fact that flights 11 and 93 have their transponders turned off during the hijackings. Its reconstruction of Flight 77’s path ends, however, at 8:57, around the time that aircraft’s transponder goes off and it disappears from controllers’ radar screens (see (8:56 a.m.-9:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Yet the 9/11 Commission will later say that, despite this disappearance, “Radar reconstructions performed after 9/11 reveal that FAA radar equipment tracked the flight from the moment its transponder was turned off.” Why the Flight Explorer illustration does not therefore show the rest of Flight 77’s journey is not clear. [AVWEB, 9/11/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Until a few years back, Flight Explorer was the only company that recorded flight paths. Since the 1999 death of golfer Payne Stewart (see October 25, 1999) the FAA has also been recording these paths. [WASHINGTON BUSINESS JOURNAL, 9/11/2001] The final report of the 9/11 Commission will make no mention of the Flight Explorer flight path recordings. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 222] Entity Tags: Flight Explorer Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(Soon After 8:46 a.m.-9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Emergency Management Staff Go to North Tower, Leaving Special Command Center Nearly Vacant Edit

Richard Sheirer [Source: Publicity photo] Richard Sheirer is in a meeting at New York City Hall when he is informed by telephone of the first plane hitting the World Trade Center. Sheirer is the director of the Mayor’s Office of Emergency Management (OEM), which was set up in 1996 to coordinate the city’s overall response to major incidents, including terrorism (see 1996). It has an emergency command center on the 23rd floor of WTC 7, specially intended for coordinating the response to catastrophes such as terrorist attacks (see June 8, 1999). Yet instead of going to this, Sheirer heads to the North Tower, and arrives at the fire command post set up in its lobby before the second crash at 9:03 a.m. [NEW YORK MAGAZINE, 10/15/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 5/18/2004 ] John Odermatt, Sheirer’s top deputy, also goes to the North Tower and says that, after the first plane hit, he leaves only two staffers at the command center. John Farmer, who heads the 9/11 Commission unit that assesses the city response to the attacks, will find it “strange that Sheirer, four OEM deputies, and a field responder went straight to the North Tower… rather than to the nearby emergency command center.” Journalists Wayne Barrett and Dan Collins will conclude, “[T]he command center was out of business from the outset.” [BARRETT AND COLLINS, 2006, PP. 31 AND 34] Sheirer stays at the North Tower lobby until soon after 9:30 a.m., when Mayor Giuliani requests he joins him at the temporary command post at 75 Barclay Street (see (9:50 a.m.-10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/18/2004 ] John Farmer will later complain, “We [the 9/11 Commission] tried to get a sense of what Sheirer was really doing. We tried to figure it out from the videos. We couldn’t tell. Everybody from OEM was with him, virtually the whole chain of command. Some of them should have been at the command center.” Fire Captain Kevin Culley, who works as a field responder at OEM, is later asked why most of the OEM’s top brass were with him at the scene of the incident. He says, “I don’t know what they were doing. It was Sheirer’s decision to go there on his own. The command center would normally be the focus of a major event and that would be where I would expect the director to be.” When the 9/11 Commission later investigates OEM’s shortcomings on 9/11, “No rationale for Sheirer’s prolonged lobby stay, no information conveyed to commanders, and no steps to coordinate the response” will be discovered. [BARRETT AND COLLINS, 2006, PP. 31-32 AND 34] Entity Tags: Office of Emergency Management, John Odermatt, Kevin Culley, Richard Sheirer Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center

8:48Edit

Main article: 8:48 a.am.

Shortly After 8:48 a.m. September 11, 2001: United Airlines Learns Crashed Plane Belonged to American Airlines, but Director Unable to Contact Corporate Officials about This Edit

Apparently, managers at United Airlines’ System Operations Control (SOC) center, just outside Chicago, are unaware of any unfolding emergency until they see CNN reporting the burning World Trade Center (see 8:48 a.m. September 11, 2001). “Within minutes,” the air traffic control coordinator at United Airlines’ headquarters, located next to the SOC, calls an official at the FAA’s Herndon Command Center to confirm that the plane that just hit the WTC was not one of United’s aircraft. The FAA official tells him the plane had been a hijacked American Airlines 757. Soon afterwards, the air traffic control coordinator briefs Bill Roy and Mike Barber—the director and the dispatch manager at United’s SOC—on this information from the FAA. Barber then tries notifying United’s top corporate officials about it. However, he is unable to because the airline’s pager system is not working. [54]

to sortEdit

(8:48 a.m.-9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Special NSA Warning Center First Learns from Television that US Is Under Attack Edit

Within the headquarters of the National Security Agency (NSA) in Fort Meade, Maryland is a little-known unit called the Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center (DEFSMAC). According to author James Bamford, who is an expert on the NSA, the center’s purpose is “to serve as the nation’s chief warning bell for a planned attack on America. It serves as the focal point for ‘all-source’ intelligence—listening posts, early-warning satellites, human agents, and seismic detectors.” According to one former NSA official, DEFSMAC “has all the inputs from all the assets, and is a warning activity. They probably have a better feel for any worldwide threat to this country from missiles, aircraft, or overt military activities, better and more timely, at instant fingertip availability, than any group in the United States.” If they received indications that an attack was imminent, DEFSMAC officials could “immediately send out near-real-time and in-depth, all-source intelligence alerts to almost two hundred ‘customers,’ including the White House Situation Room, the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon, the [Defense Intelligence Agency] Alert Center, and listening posts around the world.” Its analysts could be “closely monitoring all intercepts flooding in; examining the latest overhead photography; and analyzing data from early-warning satellites 22,300 miles above the equator. DEFSMAC would then flash the intelligence to the US Strategic Command at Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska, NORAD at Cheyenne Mountain in Colorado, and other emergency command centers.” But on this morning, as Bamford concludes, “DEFSMAC learned of the massive airborne attacks after the fact—not from America’s multibillion-dollar spy satellites or its worldwide network of advanced listening posts, or its army of human spies, but from a dusty, off-the-shelf TV set.” [BAMFORD, 2004, PP. 33-35] The NSA had in fact intercepted numerous calls between some of the hijackers in the US and an al-Qaeda communications hub in Yemen, beginning in early 2000 and ending just weeks before 9/11 (see Early 2000-Summer 2001). [MSNBC, 7/21/2004] It also intercepted two messages in Arabic on September 10, stating, “The match is about to begin,” and “Tomorrow is zero hour,” but these are supposedly not translated until September 12 (see September 10, 2001). [WASHINGTON POST, 6/20/2002] The NSA even intercepted a series of communications between 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) and lead 9/11 hijacker Mohamed Atta beginning in the summer of 2001 (see Summer 2001), continuing to a message where KSM gives Atta the final go-ahead for the attacks on September 10, 2001 (see September 10, 2001). Michael Hayden, the director of the NSA, will later claim that the “NSA had no [indications] that al-Qaeda was specifically targeting New York and Washington… or even that it was planning an attack on US soil” (see October 17, 2002). [NATIONAL JOURNAL, 6/19/2006] Entity Tags: National Security Agency Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

==(8:48 a.m.-9:02 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Navy Command Center Personnel Think WTC Crash Is an Accident

Michael Allen Noeth. [Source: Associated Press / Army Times] Personnel in the Navy Command Center at the Pentagon, which is located on the first floor of the building’s southwest face, learn of the attack on the WTC from television reports. The center is tasked with constantly monitoring global current events and also monitoring the latest status of all US Naval assets around the world. Its employees have to keep Navy leaders in Washington up to date on what is happening in the world as it directly relates to Navy operations and other security or military issues. Admiral Timothy Keating, who is the Navy’s director of operations in the Pentagon, describes it as a “nerve center.” Forty to 50 people man it constantly, 24 hours every day. Located within the center is the Chief of Naval Operations Intelligence Plot (CNO-IP), a small, highly secretive intelligence unit that constantly monitors geopolitical developments and military movements that could threaten American forces. The Navy Command Center has just been renovated, and its dozens of employees have been moving in during the past month. According to the Washington Post, the first the Command Center knows of the unfolding crisis is when Petty Officer Michael Allen Noeth sees the scene from the World Trade Center on the TV sets bolted to the wall, and shouts, “My God! What’s happened?” Another employee Lt. Kevin Shaeffer later recalls, “We quickly knew what was going on in New York City after the first plane hit the first tower… and stood up a watch to start logging events and tracking things for the Navy.” [ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 9/14/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 9/16/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 1/20/2002; CHIPS, 3/2003] Despite the center supposedly being a “nerve center,” those in it supposedly are not initially aware that this is a terrorist attack. According to Timothy Keating, who is presently in the Navy Command Center receiving his daily briefing, “We were quite bewildered. We couldn’t understand how a pilot could make such a significant navigational error on a day when the skies were crystal clear blue.” [WASHINGTON POST, 9/16/2001; AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE, 9/11/2006] All 30 people in the Command Center’s main room watch the footage of the WTC on the large televisions there, whispering to each other, “Think it’s an accident?” [VIRGINIAN-PILOT, 9/7/2002] However, according to the Washington Post, “A few old hands muttered to themselves that the Pentagon was probably next.” [WASHINGTON POST, 9/16/2001] According to one officer, it is only when the second plane hits the WTC that there will be an “almost instantaneous recognition” that this is a terrorist attack. [DAILY TELEGRAPH, 9/11/2002] By that time, Keating will have gone back to his office. He too supposedly only realizes this is an attack when he sees television showing the second crash. [AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE, 9/11/2006] Much of the Navy Command Center will be destroyed when the Pentagon is hit at 9:37 a.m. Forty-two of the 50 people working in it will be killed. [WASHINGTON POST, 1/20/2002; NATIONAL DEFENSE MAGAZINE, 6/2003] Entity Tags: US Department of the Navy, Timothy Keating, Kevin Shaeffer, Michael Allen Noeth Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Pentagon

(8:48 a.m.-9:04 a.m.) September 11, 2001: NSA Director Only Learns US Is Under Attack from TV Reports Air Force Lt. Gen. Michael Hayden, the director of the National Security Agency (NSA), is in his office at NSA headquarters in Fort Meade, Maryland, meeting with his senior staff. His executive assistant, Cindy Farkus, comes in and informs him of the first plane hitting the World Trade Center. He later says, “The immediate image I had was a light plane, off course, bad flying.” He is able to see the initial CNN reports showing the WTC on a muted television in his office. Nevertheless, he continues with his meeting. Immediately after the second attack occurs, Farkus again comes into Hayden’s office to inform him of it. Saying that “One plane’s an accident, two planes is an attack,” Hayden immediately adjourns his meeting and requests that the agency’s top security officials be summoned to his office. Author James Bamford, who is an expert on the NSA, later comments that this is “not the way it was supposed to be. NSA was not supposed to find out about an airborne attack on America from CNN, after millions of other Americans had already witnessed it. It was supposed to find out first, from its own ultrasecret warning center, and then pass the information on to the White House and the strategic military forces” (see (8:48 a.m.-9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [BAMFORD, 2004, PP. 18, 20 AND 33] Entity Tags: Cindy Farkus, National Security Agency, Michael Hayden Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(Soon After 8:46 a.m.-9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Emergency Management Staff Go to North Tower, Leaving Special Command Center Nearly Vacant

Richard Sheirer [Source: Publicity photo] Richard Sheirer is in a meeting at New York City Hall when he is informed by telephone of the first plane hitting the World Trade Center. Sheirer is the director of the Mayor’s Office of Emergency Management (OEM), which was set up in 1996 to coordinate the city’s overall response to major incidents, including terrorism (see 1996). It has an emergency command center on the 23rd floor of WTC 7, specially intended for coordinating the response to catastrophes such as terrorist attacks (see June 8, 1999). Yet instead of going to this, Sheirer heads to the North Tower, and arrives at the fire command post set up in its lobby before the second crash at 9:03 a.m. [NEW YORK MAGAZINE, 10/15/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 5/18/2004 ] John Odermatt, Sheirer’s top deputy, also goes to the North Tower and says that, after the first plane hit, he leaves only two staffers at the command center. John Farmer, who heads the 9/11 Commission unit that assesses the city response to the attacks, will find it “strange that Sheirer, four OEM deputies, and a field responder went straight to the North Tower… rather than to the nearby emergency command center.” Journalists Wayne Barrett and Dan Collins will conclude, “[T]he command center was out of business from the outset.” [BARRETT AND COLLINS, 2006, PP. 31 AND 34] Sheirer stays at the North Tower lobby until soon after 9:30 a.m., when Mayor Giuliani requests he joins him at the temporary command post at 75 Barclay Street (see (9:50 a.m.-10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 5/18/2004 ] John Farmer will later complain, “We [the 9/11 Commission] tried to get a sense of what Sheirer was really doing. We tried to figure it out from the videos. We couldn’t tell. Everybody from OEM was with him, virtually the whole chain of command. Some of them should have been at the command center.” Fire Captain Kevin Culley, who works as a field responder at OEM, is later asked why most of the OEM’s top brass were with him at the scene of the incident. He says, “I don’t know what they were doing. It was Sheirer’s decision to go there on his own. The command center would normally be the focus of a major event and that would be where I would expect the director to be.” When the 9/11 Commission later investigates OEM’s shortcomings on 9/11, “No rationale for Sheirer’s prolonged lobby stay, no information conveyed to commanders, and no steps to coordinate the response” will be discovered. [BARRETT AND COLLINS, 2006, PP. 31-32 AND 34] Entity Tags: Office of Emergency Management, John Odermatt, Kevin Culley, Richard Sheirer Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, World Trade Center

(8:48 a.m.-9:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Transportation Secretary Mineta and FAA Administrator Garvey in Meeting Together; Notified of First WTC CrashEdit

Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta is in a breakfast meeting with the Belgian transportation minister, to discuss aviation issues. FAA Administrator Jane Garvey is also in the meeting, which is in the conference room next to Mineta’s office at the Department of Transportation (DOT) in Washington, DC. Soon after 8:45 a.m., Mineta’s Chief of Staff John Flaherty interrupts, and takes Mineta and Garvey aside to Mineta’s office to tell them that news agencies are reporting that some kind of aircraft has flown into the WTC. While Garvey immediately goes to a telephone and contacts the FAA Operations Center, Mineta continues with the meeting. But a few minutes later Flaherty again takes him aside to tell him the plane is confirmed to be a commercial aircraft, and that the FAA had received an unconfirmed report of a hijacking. The TV is on and Mineta sees the second plane hitting the WTC live. He terminates his meeting with the Belgian minister, and Garvey heads off to the FAA headquarters. The White House calls and requests that Mineta go and operate from there, so he quickly heads out too. He will soon arrive there, and enters its underground bunker at around 9:20 a.m. (see (Between 9:20 a.m. and 9:27 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [US CONGRESS, 9/20/2001; FRENI, 2003, PP. 62-63; 9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003] Before leaving the Department of Transportation, Mineta orders the activation of the DOT’s Crisis Management Center (see 9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001). [US CONGRESS, 10/10/2001] Entity Tags: Norman Mineta, Jane Garvey, John Flaherty Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

(Shortly After 8:48 a.m.) September 11, 2001: United Airlines Learns Crashed Plane Belonged to American Airlines, but Director Unable to Contact Corporate Officials about This Apparently, managers at United Airlines’ System Operations Control (SOC) center, just outside Chicago, are unaware of any unfolding emergency until they see CNN reporting the burning World Trade Center (see 8:48 a.m. September 11, 2001). “Within minutes,” the air traffic control coordinator at United Airlines’ headquarters, located next to the SOC, calls an official at the FAA’s Herndon Command Center to confirm that the plane that just hit the WTC was not one of United’s aircraft. The FAA official tells him the plane had been a hijacked American Airlines 757. Soon afterwards, the air traffic control coordinator briefs Bill Roy and Mike Barber—the director and the dispatch manager at United’s SOC—on this information from the FAA. Barber then tries notifying United’s top corporate officials about it. However, he is unable to because the airline’s pager system is not working. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 21-22 ] Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Bill Roy, Mike Barber, United Airlines Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175

Soon after 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001: FBI Arrives at Boston Air Traffic Control Center Edit

The FBI arrives at the FAA’s Boston Center, in Nashua, New Hampshire, “minutes after Flight 11 crashed into the World Trade Center,” and seizes tape recordings of radio transmissions from the hijacked plane. Boston Center handled Flight 11, and recorded intermittent radio transmissions from its cockpit (see (After 8:14 a.m.-8:38 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 9/13/2001] According to FAA spokeswoman Laura Brown, the FAA has to turn over all its records from 9/11 to the FBI immediately afterwards. She says it is not unusual for the FAA to turn over its records after a major disaster, but normally this is to the National Transportation Safety Board, not the FBI. [GRIFFIN, 2004, PP. 185] Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center, Laura Brown, Federal Bureau of Investigation Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events

  1. . 
  2. . 
  3. . 
  4. . 
  5. . 
  6. . 
  7. . 
  8. [TECH TV, 7/23/2002; WEISS, 2003, PP. 379]
  9. [US DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, 9/2000, PP. 28 ; PCCW NEWSLETTER, 3/2006; STAR-GAZETTE (ELMIRA), 6/5/2006]
  10. [KNIGHT RIDDER, 9/12/1994]
  11. [DAILY TELEGRAPH, 9/16/2001]
  12. [ABC NEWS, 10/24/2001; USA TODAY, 8/13/2002]
  13. [WASHINGTON POST, 4/4/2002]
  14. 14.0 14.1 VANITY FAIR. 8/1/2006. 
  15. 9/11 Commission August 2004 Staff report,26 August 2004,Page 15, Page 88
  16. 16.0 16.1 16.2 9/11 Commission Report,26 July 2004,Page 20
  17. FILSON (2003). p. 56. 
  18. 9/11 Commission Report,26 July 2004,Page 459
  19. . 
  20. . 
  21. . 
  22. . 
  23. . 
  24. . 
  25. . 
  26. .  [WOODWARD, 2002, PP. 1 AND 3; CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, 12/6/2002]
  27. .  [NEWSWEEK, 9/22/2001; CNN, 9/30/2001]
  28. . [WASHINGTON POST, 9/27/2001]
  29. . [CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 9/17/2001; ALBUQUERQUE TRIBUNE, 9/10/2002; TENET, 2007, PP. 165-166]
  30. [MSNBC, 10/29/2002; KESSLER, 2004, PP. 138]
  31. [KESSLER, 2003, PP. 193; TENET, 2007, PP. 165-166]
  32. [SARASOTA MAGAZINE, 9/19/2001]
  33. [CBS NEWS, 9/11/2002]
  34. [SAMMON, 2002, PP. 38]
  35. [SARASOTA MAGAZINE, 9/19/2001]
  36. . [BAMFORD, 2004, PP. 17]
  37. . [LARRY KING LIVE, 12/5/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 3/23/2004; CLARKE, 2006, PP. 217-218; VOGEL, 2007, PP. 428]
  38. [GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 10/29/2001;
  39. . 
  40. 40.0 40.1 40.2 BERGEN RECORD, 12/5/2003]
  41. 41.0 41.1 [GRIFFIN, 2007, PP. 62]
  42. . 
  43. [CODE ONE MAGAZINE, 10/2002;
  44. Lynn Spencer (2008). Touching History:The Untold Story..... 33-34
  45. [LANCE, 2004, PP. 230-231]
  46. . 
  47. 9/11 Commission Report,26 July 2004,Page 21
  48. . 
  49. Lynn Spencer (2008). Touching History:The Untold Story..... 37
  50. . 
  51. 9/11 Commission Report,26 July 2004,Page 21
  52. . 
  53. . 
  54. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 21-22 ]
  1. (see 2:50 p.m. September 11, 2001)
  2. (see (After 8:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001)
  3. (see Template:8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001: Otis Fighters Launched toward Flight 11)
  4. (see (8:53 a.m.-9:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001)
  5. (see Shortly After 8:37 a.m. September 11, 2001)
  6. (see (8:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001)
  7. (see (Between 8:55 a.m. and 9:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001)
  8. (see (8:00 a.m.-8:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001)
  9. (see (Shortly After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001)
  10. (see (Between 8:40 a.m. and 8:46 a.m.) September 11, 2001)
  11. (see 8:34 a.m. Boston Center)
  12. (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001)
  13. (see 8:40 a.m. September 11, 2001 and (8:42 a.m.-8:46 a.m.) September 11, 2001)
  14. (see 8:46 a.m.-8:47 a.m. September 11, 2001)
  15. (see 8:51 a.m.-8:53 a.m. September 11, 2001)
  16. (see 8:43 a.m. September 11, 2001)

Ad blocker interference detected!


Wikia is a free-to-use site that makes money from advertising. We have a modified experience for viewers using ad blockers

Wikia is not accessible if you’ve made further modifications. Remove the custom ad blocker rule(s) and the page will load as expected.