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1980s and 1990s: Most 9/11 Hijackers Have Middle-Class Backgrounds Edit

After 9/11, some in Western countries will say that one of the root causes of the attacks is poverty and assume that the hijackers must have been poor. However, most of them are middle class and have relatively comfortable upbringings. The editor of Al Watan, a Saudi Arabian daily, will call them “middle class adventurers” rather than Islamist fundamentalist ideologues.[1] [BOSTON GLOBE, 3/3/2002] Nawaf and Salem Alhazmi are from Mecca, Saudi Arabia. Their father owns a shop and the family is wealthy. [2][ARAB NEWS, 9/20/2001; WRIGHT, 2006, PP. 378]

1993-1999: Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Fight for Al-Qaeda Edit

Of all the 9/11 hijackers, Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar have the longest records of involvement with al-Qaeda. CIA Director Tenet calls them al-Qaeda veterans. According to the CIA, Alhazmi first travels to Afghanistan in 1993 as a teenager, then fights in Bosnia with Alhazmi (see 1995). Almihdhar makes his first visit to Afghanistan training camps in 1996, and then fights in Chechnya in 1997. Both swear loyalty to bin Laden around 1998. Alhazmi fights in Afghanistan against the Northern Alliance with his brother, Salem Alhazmi. He fights in Chechnya, probably in 1998. [OBSERVER, 9/23/2001; ABC NEWS, 1/9/2002; US CONGRESS, 6/18/2002; LOS ANGELES TIMES, 9/1/2002; US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003, PP. 131 ] He then returns to Saudi Arabia in early 1999 where he shares information about the 1998 US embassy bombings. However it is not clear what information he disclosed to whom or where he obtained this information. [US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003, PP. 131 ] It is possible that some or all of this information came from the NSA, which is intercepting some of Alhazmi’s phone calls at this time (see Early 1999).

1996-December 2000: Majority of 9/11 Hijackers Attempt to Fight in Chechnya Edit

A young Ahmed Alnami in Saudi Arabia. [Source: Boston Globe] At least 11 of the 9/11 hijackers travel or attempt to travel to Chechnya between 1996 and 2000 (see 1999-2000):

Nawaf Alhazmi fights in Chechnya, Bosnia, and Afghanistan for several years, starting around 1995. [OBSERVER, 9/23/2001; ABC NEWS, 1/9/2002; US CONGRESS, 6/18/2002; US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003 ] 
Khalid Almihdhar fights in Chechnya, Bosnia, and Afghanistan for several years, usually with Nawaf Alhazmi. [US CONGRESS, 6/18/2002; LOS ANGELES TIMES, 9/1/2002; US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003 ] 
Salem Alhazmi spends time in Chechnya with his brother Nawaf Alhazmi. [ABC NEWS, 1/9/2002] He also possibly fights with his brother in Afghanistan. [US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003 ] 
Ahmed Alhaznawi leaves for Chechnya in 1999 [ABC NEWS, 1/9/2002] , and his family loses contact with him in late 2000. [ARAB NEWS, 9/22/2001] 
Hamza Alghamdi leaves for Chechnya in early 2000 [WASHINGTON POST, 9/25/2001; INDEPENDENT, 9/27/2001] or sometime around January 2001. He calls home several times until about June 2001, saying he is in Chechnya. [ARAB NEWS, 9/18/2001] 
Mohand Alshehri leaves to fight in Chechnya in early 2000. [ARAB NEWS, 9/22/2001] 
Ahmed Alnami leaves home in June 2000, and calls home once in June 2001 from an unnamed location. [ARAB NEWS, 9/19/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 9/25/2001] 
Fayez Ahmed Banihammad leaves home in July 2000 saying he wants to participate in a holy war or do relief work. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/25/2001; ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 9/27/2001] He calls his parents one time since. [ARAB NEWS, 9/18/2001] 
Ahmed Alghamdi leaves his studies to fight in Chechnya in 2000, and is last seen by his family in December 2000. He calls his parents for the last time in July 2001, but does not mention being in the US. [ARAB NEWS, 9/18/2001; ARAB NEWS, 9/20/2001] 
Waleed M. Alshehri disappears with Wail Alshehri in December 2000, after speaking of fighting in Chechnya. [ARAB NEWS, 9/18/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 9/25/2001] 
Wail Alshehri, who had psychological problems, went with his brother to Mecca to seek help. Both disappear, after speaking of fighting in Chechnya. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/25/2001] 
Majed Moqed is last seen by a friend in 2000 in Saudi Arabia, after communicating a “plan to visit the United States to learn English.” [ARAB NEWS, 9/22/2001] 

Clearly, there is a pattern: eleven hijackers appear likely to have fought in Chechnya, and two others are known to have gone missing. It is possible that others have similar histories, but this is hard to confirm because “almost nothing [is] known about some.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/21/2001] Indeed, a colleague later claims that hijackers Mohamed Atta, Marwan Alshehhi, Ziad Jarrah, and would-be hijacker Ramzi Bin al-Shibh wanted to fight in Chechnya but were told in early 2000 that they were needed elsewhere. [WASHINGTON POST, 10/23/2002; REUTERS, 10/29/2002] Reuters later reports, “Western diplomats play down any Chechen involvement by al-Qaeda.” [REUTERS, 10/24/2002] Entity Tags: Hamza Alghamdi, Ahmed Alghamdi, Ahmed Alhaznawi, Ahmed Alnami, Marwan Alshehhi, Fayez Ahmed Banihammad, Mohand Alshehri, Mohamed Atta, Khalid Almihdhar, Ziad Jarrah, Nawaf Alhazmi, Waleed M. Alshehri, Salem Alhazmi, Wail Alshehri, Majed Moqed, Ramzi bin al-Shibh Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

November 2, 1997-June 20, 2001: Hijackers Obtain US Visas Edit

The 19 hijackers apply and receive a total of 23 visas at five different posts from November 1997 through June 2001. Hani Hanjour, Khalid Almihdhar, Saeed Alghamdi and Ahmed Alnami, Saudi citizens, apply twice at Jeddah. Only Hanjour applies for a student visa, others for tourist/business visa. [UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 10/21/2002 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 7-45 ]

The fifteen Saudi hijackers apply for their visas in their home country. Four at the embassy in Riyadh: Hamza Alghamdi (10/17/2000), Mohand Alshehri (10/23/2000), Majed Moqed (11/20/2000) and Satam Al Suqami (11/21/2000). Eleven at the US consulate in Jeddah: Hani Hanjour (11/2/1997 and 9/25/2000), Khalid Almihdhar (4/7/1999 and 6/13/2001), Saeed Alghamdi (9/4/2000 and 6/12/2001), and Ahmed Alnami (10/28/2000 and 4/28/2001), Nawaf Alhazmi (4/3/1999), Ahmed Alghamdi (9/3/2000), Wail Alshehri (10/24/2000), Waleed M. Alshehri (10/24/2000), Abdulaziz Alomari (6/18/2001), Salem Alhazmi (6/20/2001), and Ahmed Alhaznawi (11/12/2000). 
Fayez Ahmed Banihammad and Marwan Alshehhi apply in their home country, the United Arab Emirates, respectively at the US embassy in Abu Dhabi on 6/18/2001 and at consulate in Dubai on 1/18/2000. 
Mohamed Atta (Egyptian) and Ziad Jarrah (Lebanese) apply, as third-country national applicants, at the US embassy in Berlin, respectively, on May 18 and 25, 2000.

(1998): Two Saudi 9/11 Hijackers Nonreligious and Drink Alcohol

According to the 9/11 Commission, two of the alleged Saudi 9/11 hijackers, Satam Al Suqami and Salem Alhazmi, appear “unconcerned with religion and, contrary to Islamic law, [are] known to drink alcohol.” In addition, they both have minor criminal offence records. However, Salem Alhazmi’s father will later remember that Salem “stopped drinking and started attending mosque regularly three months before he disappeared.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 232-3, 524] Entity Tags: Satam Al Suqami, Salem Alhazmi Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998: Al-Qaeda Bombs US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, Killing Over 200

Bombings of the Nairobi, Kenya, US embassy (left), and the Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, US embassy (right). [Source: Associated Press] (click image to enlarge) Two US embassies in Africa are bombed within minutes of each other. At 10:35, local time, a suicide car bomb attack in Nairobi, Kenya, kills 213 people, including 12 US nationals, and injures more than 4,500. Mohamed al-Owhali and someone known only as Azzam are the suicide bombers, but al-Owhali runs away at the last minute and survives. Four minutes later, a suicide car bomb attack in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, kills 11 and injures 85. The attacks are blamed on al-Qaeda. Hamden Khalif Allah Awad is the suicide bomber there. [PBS FRONTLINE, 2001; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V. USAMA BIN LADEN, ET AL., DAY 38, 5/2/2001] The Tanzania death toll is low because, remarkably, the attack takes place on a national holiday so the US embassy there is closed. [MILLER, STONE, AND MITCHELL, 2002, PP. 195] The attack shows al-Qaeda has a capability for simultaneous attacks. The Tanzania bombing appears to have been a late addition, as one of the arrested bombers allegedly told US agents that it was added to the plot only about 10 days in advance. [UNITED STATE OF AMERICA V. USAMA BIN LADEN, ET AL., DAY 14, 3/7/2001] A third attack against the US embassy in Uganda does not take place due to a last minute delay (see August 7, 1998). [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/25/1998] August 7, 1998, is the eighth anniversary of the arrival of US troops in Saudi Arabia, and some speculate that is the reason for the date of the bombings. [GUNARATNA, 2003, PP. 46] In the 2002 book The Cell, reporters John Miller, Michael Stone, and Chris Miller will write, “What has become clear with time is that facets of the East Africa plot had been known beforehand to the FBI, the CIA, the State Department, and to Israeli and Kenyan intelligence services.… [N]o one can seriously argue that the horrors of August 7, 1998, couldn’t have been prevented.” They will also comment, “Inexplicable as the intelligence failure was, more baffling still was that al-Qaeda correctly presumed that a major attack could be carried out by a cell that US agents had already uncovered.” [MILLER, STONE, AND MITCHELL, 2002, PP. 195, 206] After 9/11, it will come to light that three of the alleged hijackers, Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, and Salem Alhazmi, had some involvement in the bombings (see October 4, 2001, Late 1999, and 1993-1999) and that the US intelligence community was aware of this involvement by late 1999 (see December 15-31, 1999), if not before.

1999-2000: Some 9/11 Hijackers Reportedly Fail in Attempt to Enter Chechnya from Turkey

Ahmed Alghamdi. [Source: US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division] Under interrogation after 9/11, al-Qaeda manager Khallad bin Attash will indicate that some of the 9/11 hijackers try to get to the conflict in Chechnya from Turkey, but are not able to do so because the Turkey-Georgia border is closed. In Turkey, they stay in guesthouses in places such as Istanbul and Ankara. Turkish intelligence has been aware that militants often transit Turkey for some time, but there are no reports saying that the hijackers are monitored at this time (see 1996). The militants then decide to travel to Afghanistan and perhaps try to enter Chechnya again later. In this context bin Attash mentions the names of Saeed Alghamdi, Satam al Suqami, Waleed and Wail Alshehri, Abdulaziz Alomari, Ahmed Alnami, Hamza Alghamdi, Salem Alhazmi, and Majed Moqed. Ahmed Alghamdi and Saeed Alghamdi also have documentation suggesting travel to a Russian republic. However, the reliability of evidence obtained during the interrogations of figures like bin Attash is questionable due to the unreliable methods used to extract it (see June 16, 2004). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 233] Some of the lead hijackers transit Turkey (see Late November-Early December 1999). There are also reports that some of the hijackers tell family and friends in Saudi Arabia that they intend to fight in Chechnya, and it appears that some, Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, and Salem Alhazmi, may actually see combat there (see 1996-December 2000).


Early 1999: NSA Monitoring Hears 9/11 Hijacker Names, This Information Is Not Shared with CIA or FBI Edit

Salem Alhazmi. [Source: FBI] As the NSA continues to monitor an al-Qaeda communications hub in Yemen run by hijacker Khalid Almihdhar’s father-in-law (see Late August 1998), they find references to Almihdhar and the hijacker brothers, Salem and Nawaf Alhazmi. They also learn that Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi are long time friends. [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/26/2004, PP. 6 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 1/26/2004] In early 1999, the NSA intercepts communications mentioning the full name “Nawaf Alhazmi.” However, this information is not disseminated to the intelligence community, as it apparently does not meet NSA reporting thresholds. The 9/11 Congressional Inquiry will say, “Those thresholds vary, depending on the judgement of the NSA analyst who is reviewing the intercept and the subject, location, and content of the intercept.” Another intelligence organisation intercepts the same or similar calls and reports this to the NSA. The Inquiry comments: “NSA’s practice was to review such reports and disseminate those responsive to US intelligence requirements. For an undetermined reason, NSA did not disseminate the […] report.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/25/2002; US CONGRESS, 10/17/2002; US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003, PP. 135 ] The NSA continues to intercept such calls and finds more information a few months later (see Summer 1999 and Late Summer 1999). Near the end of 1999, there will be additional intercepts that give Khalid Almihdhar’s full name and the first names of the other two (see Shortly Before December 29, 1999). But while the NSA will provide some information about these new intercepts to the CIA and other agencies, they will not go back to the earlier intercepts to figure out Nawaf’s full name and close connection to Almihdhar (see December 29, 1999). Entity Tags: 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, Nawaf Alhazmi, National Security Agency, Salem Alhazmi, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Khalid Almihdhar, Central Intelligence Agency Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

April 3-7, 1999: Three 9/11 Hijackers Obtain US Visas

Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar’s US visas. [Source: FBI] (click image to enlarge) 9/11 hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi, Salem Alhazmi, and Khalid Almihdhar obtain US visas through the US Consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. [US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003] Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi are already “al-Qaeda veterans” and battle-hardened killers. Almihdhar’s visa is issued on April 7, and he can thereafter leave and return to the US multiple times until April 6, 2000. [STERN, 8/13/2003] Nawaf Alhazmi gets the same kind of visa; details about Salem are unknown. All three men have indicators in their passports marking them as Islamist radicals (see March 21, 1999, April 4, 1999, and April 6, 1999). These indicators are used to track them by the Saudi authorities, but are apparently not noticed by US officials. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 9, 33 ] The CIA claims the hijackers then travel to Afghanistan to participate in “special training” with at least one other suicide bomber on a different mission. The training is led by Khallad bin Attash, who applies for a US visa on April 3 from Yemen, but fails to get one (see April 3, 1999). The CIA will learn about Almihdhar’s visa in January 2000 (see January 2-5, 2000). The Jeddah Consulate records the fact that Nawaf and Salem Alhazmi obtain US visas a couple of days before Almihdhar, but apparently these records are never searched before 9/11. [US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003, PP. 135 ] Entity Tags: US Consulate, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia Office, Tawfiq bin Attash, Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, Salem Alhazmi Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

April 4, 1999: 9/11 Hijacker Salem Alhazmi Receives Passport Containing Suspicious Indicator of Islamist Extremism, Reportedly Tracked by Saudi Authorities 9/11 hijacker Salem Alhazmi receives a new passport from Saudi Arabia. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 10/2001, PP. 40 ] According to the 9/11 Commission, the passport contains an “indicator of extremism” that is “associated with al-Qaeda.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 9, 33 ] According to author James Bamford, this is a “secret coded indicator, placed there by the Saudi government, warning of a possible terrorist affiliation.” [BAMFORD, 2008, PP. 58-59] Alhazmi will use the passport to obtain a US visa the same day (see April 3-7, 1999). The Saudi government will reportedly use this indicator to track Alhazmi and other Saudi hijackers before 9/11 “with precision” (see November 2, 2007). Entity Tags: Salem Alhazmi Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

After Early April 1999: Three 9/11 Hijackers Leave Saudi Arabia, Reportedly Tracked by Saudi Authorities 9/11 hijackers Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, and Salem Alhazmi leave Saudi Arabia after obtaining new passports and US visas there (see March 21, 1999, April 4, 1999, April 6, 1999, and April 3-7, 1999). According to the 9/11 Commission, their passports contain an “indicator of extremism” that is “associated with al-Qaeda.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 9, 33 ] According to author James Bamford, the indicator is a “secret coded indicator, placed there by the Saudi government, warning of a possible terrorist affiliation.” [BAMFORD, 2008, PP. 58-59] The Saudi government reportedly uses this indicator to track some of the Saudi hijackers before 9/11 “with precision” (see November 2, 2007). Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi apparently return to Afghanistan to discuss an attack on the US. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 155] Salem Alhazmi’s destination is unknown. He will be reported to be in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000) and Afghanistan (see Summer 2000) the next year. Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi are placed on the Saudi terrorist watch list later this year (see Late 1999). Entity Tags: Khalid Almihdhar, Salem Alhazmi, Nawaf Alhazmi Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

December 29, 1999: NSA Tells CIA about Planned Al-Qaeda Summit Involving Future Hijackers The NSA, monitoring a telephone in an al-Qaeda communications hub in Yemen (see Late August 1998 and Late 1998-Early 2002), has listened in on phone calls revealing that hijackers Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, and Salem Alhazmi are to attend an important al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia in January 2000 (see Shortly Before December 29, 1999). Almihdhar’s full name was mentioned, as well as the first names of hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Salem Alhazmi. On this day, the NSA shares this information with the CIA’s Alec Station bin Laden unit. Other US intelligence agencies, including FBI headquarters and the FBI’s New York field office, are told as well. Although Khalid Almihdhar’s full name was mentioned in one call, the NSA only passes on his first name. Also, the NSA has already learned from monitoring the Yemen hub that Nawaf’s last name is Alhazmi and that he is long-time friends with Almihdhar (see Early 1999). However, they either don’t look this up in their records or don’t pass it on to any other agency. [9/11 COMMISSION, 1/26/2004, PP. 6 ; US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 239 ; WRIGHT, 2006, PP. 310] An NSA analyst makes a comment that is shared between US intelligence agencies, “Salem may be Nawaf’s younger brother.” This turns out to be correct. [US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003, PP. 135 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 1/26/2004, PP. 6 ] A CIA officer will later tell the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry that information from the Africa embassy bombings (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998) was reviewed in late 1999 during a worldwide effort to disrupt millennium attack plots (see December 15-31, 1999) and “a kind of tuning fork… buzzed when two [of the hijackers] reportedly planning a trip to [Malaysia] were linked indirectly to what appeared to be a support element… involved with the Africa bombers.” [US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003, PP. 135 ] The fact that they are connected to the Yemen communication hub already indicates some importance within al-Qaeda. It is learned they are connected to the embassy bombings in some way (see October 4, 2001 and Late 1999). [US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003, PP. 135 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 1/26/2004, PP. 6 ] The NSA report about them on this day is entitled, “Activities of Bin Laden Associates,” showing the clear knowledge of their ties to bin Laden. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 502; VANITY FAIR, 11/2004] The CIA will track Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi to the Malaysia summit (see January 2-5, 2000 and January 5-8, 2000). Entity Tags: Salem Alhazmi, Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI New York Field Office, Khalid Almihdhar, FBI Headquarters, Al-Qaeda, Alec Station, Central Intelligence Agency, Ahmed al-Hada, National Security Agency, Nawaf Alhazmi Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

Shortly Before December 29, 1999: NSA Monitors 9/11 Hijackers Talking to Each Other about Upcoming Al-Qaeda Summit The NSA has been monitoring a telephone in an al-Qaeda communications hub in Yemen (see Late August 1998 and Late 1998-Early 2002). According to Vanity Fair, “Amid the storm of pre-millennial ‘chatter,’ the [NSA] intercepted communications among three Arabic men, each of whom bore some connection to the East Africa bombings (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998) and to al-Qaeda.” The men are hijackers Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, and Salem Alhazmi. [VANITY FAIR, 11/2004] Apparently, the NSA listens in on a phone call between al-Qaeda figure Khallad bin Attash and hijacker Khalid Almihdhar, who is staying at the hub. Attash mentions Almihdhar’s full name, as well as the first names of hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Salem Alhazmi. He says he wants the three of them to come to an important al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia in January 2000 (see January 5-8, 2000). The NSA has already heard the names of the three hijackers mentioned repeatedly in 1999 while monitoring the Yemen hub (see Early 1999). Apparently, US intelligence does not yet know bin Attash’s full name or role in al-Qaeda and won’t figure it out until late 2000 (see Early December 2000). [WRIGHT, 2006, PP. 310] At the same time, US officials in Pakistan intercept Nawaf Alhazmi in Karachi calling Almihdhar at the Yemen hub. They learn Nawaf is planning a trip to Malaysia on January 4, 2000. The NSA is also monitoring Nawaf calling his brother Salem (the location of Salem at this time has not been revealed). [US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003, PP. 143-144 ; ASIA TIMES, 3/19/2004] The NSA will share details of these calls with the CIA and other agencies on December 29, 1999 (see December 29, 1999) and the CIA will eventually track Almihdhar to the Malaysia summit (see January 2-5, 2000). Entity Tags: US intelligence, Salem Alhazmi, Tawfiq bin Attash, Nawaf Alhazmi, Central Intelligence Agency, Al-Qaeda, National Security Agency, Khalid Almihdhar Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

2000 and Before: Some Saudi 9/11 Hijackers Moderately Religious in Saudi Arabia

Ahmed Alnami. [Source: US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division] Although at least two of the 9/11 hijackers are distinctly unreligious when young (see (1998)), some of them appear to be moderately religious before they travel to Afghanistan:

According to the 9/11 Commission, Hamza and Ahmed Alghamdi attend prayer services regularly; 
Salem Alhazmi stops drinking and starts going to the mosque three months before he disappears; 
Abdulaziz Alomari and Ahmed Alnami are reported to become more religious after contact with the education system in Saudi Arabia (see 1999-2000). 

But in general, the Saudi 9/11 hijackers are seen as devout, but not fanatical. For example, the 9/11 Commission will comment, “Their families often did not consider these young men religious zealots,” and Alnami’s father will say his son “practiced religion like most of us do.” [ABC NEWS, 3/15/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 232-3] Entity Tags: Hamza Alghamdi, Ahmed Alghamdi, Abdulaziz Alomari, 9/11 Commission, Ahmed Alnami, Salem Alhazmi Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

January 5-8, 2000: Al-Qaeda Summit in Malaysia Discusses 9/11 and Cole Plots; CIA Has Malaysians Monitor It

Attendees of the Malaysian summit. Top row, from left: Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. Middle row, from left: Khallad bin Attash, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Hambali. Bottom row, from left: Yazid Sufaat, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Fahad Al-Quso. [Source: FBI] About a dozen of bin Laden’s trusted followers hold a secret, “top-level al-Qaeda summit” in the city of Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. [CNN, 8/30/2002; SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, 9/27/2002] Plans for the October 2000 bombing of the USS Cole (see October 12, 2000) and the 9/11 attacks are discussed. [USA TODAY, 2/12/2002; CNN, 8/30/2002] At the request of the CIA, the Malaysian Secret Service monitors the summit and then passes the information on to the US (see January 5-8, 2000 and Shortly After). Attendees of the summit are said to include: Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar - The CIA and FBI will later miss many opportunities to foil the 9/11 plot through Alhazmi and Almihdhar and the knowledge of their presence at this summit. The CIA already knows many details about these two by the time the summit begins (see January 2-4, 2000), and tracked Almihdhar as he traveled to it (see January 2-5, 2000). Khalid Shaikh Mohammed - Mohammed is sometimes referred to as “KSM,” a top al-Qaeda leader and the alleged “mastermind” of the 9/11 attacks. The US has known KSM is an Islamic militant since the exposure of Operation Bojinka in January 1995 (see January 6, 1995), and knows what he looks like. US officials have stated that they only realized the summit was important in the summer of 2001, but the presence of KSM should have proved the its importance. [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 2/2/2002] Although the possible presence of KSM at this summit is highly disputed by US officials, one counterterrorism expert will testify before the 9/11 Commission in 2003 that he has access to transcripts of KSM’s interrogations since his capture, and that KSM has admitted leading this summit and told the attendees about a planes as weapons plot targeting the US (see July 9, 2003). [NEWSWEEK, 7/9/2003; NEW YORK POST, 7/10/2003] Many other media reports identify him there as well. [INDEPENDENT, 6/6/2002; CNN, 8/30/2002; CNN, 11/7/2002; CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 10/29/2003] For instance, according to Newsweek, “Mohammed’s presence would make the intelligence failure of the CIA even greater. It would mean the agency literally watched as the 9/11 scheme was hatched—and had photographs of the attack’s mastermind… doing the plotting.” [NEWSWEEK, 7/9/2003] Hambali - An Indonesian militant known as Hambali, or Nurjaman Riduan Isamuddin [BBC, 8/15/2003] , was heavily involved in the Bojinka plot, an early version of the 9/11 plot (see January 6, 1995 and June 1994). [CNN, 3/14/2002; CNN, 8/30/2002] The FBI was aware of who he was and his connections to the Bojinka plot at least by 1999 and identified a photograph of him by that time (see May 23, 1999). He will be arrested by Thai authorities in August 2003 (see August 12, 2003). [CNN, 8/14/2003; CBS NEWS, 8/15/2003] Malaysian officials recognize Hambali from summit surveillance photos, as he is a long-time Malaysian resident. But the US does not tell them of his Bojinka connections so they will not know to arrest him after the summit is over (see Shortly After January 8, 2000). [NEW STRAITS TIMES, 2/10/2002] Yazid Sufaat - Sufaat is a Malaysian who owned the condominium where the summit was held. [NEW YORK TIMES, 1/31/2002; NEWSWEEK, 6/2/2002] A possibility to expose the 9/11 plot through Sufaat’s presence at this summit is later missed in September 2000 (see September-October 2000). Sufaat will travel to Afghanistan in June 2001 and be arrested by Malaysian authorities when he returns to Malaysia in late 2001. [AUSTRALIAN, 12/24/2002] Malaysian officials also recognize Sufaat from summit surveillance photos, as he is a long-time Malaysian resident (see Shortly After January 8, 2000). [NEW STRAITS TIMES, 2/10/2002] Fahad Al-Quso - Al-Quso, a top al-Qaeda operative [NEWSWEEK, 9/20/2001] , will be arrested by Yemeni authorities in December 2000 (see Late October-Late November 2000), but the FBI will not be given a chance to fully interrogate him before 9/11. He will escape from prison in 2003. [CNN, 5/15/2003] Tawfiq bin Attash - Better known by his alias “Khallad,” Bin Attash, a “trusted member of bin Laden’s inner circle,” was in charge of bin Laden’s bodyguards, and served as bin Laden’s personal intermediary at least for the USS Cole bombing. [NEWSWEEK, 9/20/2001] He is also thought to be a “mastermind” of that attack. Attash is reportedly planning to be one of the hijackers, but will be unable to get a US visa. [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/16/2004, PP. 8] US intelligence had been aware of his identity as early as 1995. [US CONGRESS, 9/18/2002] A possibility to expose the 9/11 plot through bin Attash’s presence at this summit will later be missed in January 2001 (see January 4, 2001). Bin Attash had been previously arrested in Yemen for suspected terror ties, but let go (see Summer 1999). [CONTEMPORARY SOUTHEAST ASIA, 12/1/2002] He will be captured in Pakistan by the US in April 2003 (see April 29, 2003). Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri - Al-Nashiri is one of al-Qaeda’s top field commanders and operates out of Malaysia while 9/11 is being prepared. [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 10/10/2001; GUNARATNA, 2003, PP. 188; GRAHAM AND NUSSBAUM, 2004, PP. 59] He was involved in an arms smuggling plot (see 1997) and the East African embassy bombings (see August 22-25 1998), in which his cousin was martyred (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998). He also organized the attack against the USS The Sullivans (see January 3, 2000), and will be involved in the attacks against the USS Cole (see October 12, 2000) and the Limburg (see October 6, 2002). He will be arrested in the United Arab Emirates in November 2002. An al-Qaeda operative had identified a photo of al-Nashiri for the FBI in late 1998 (see August 22-25 1998). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 152-3] (Note: in the sources al-Nashiri is referred to by two of his aliases: Muhammad Omar al-Harazi and Al Safani). [CNN, 12/11/2000; CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 9/6/2006] Ramzi bin al-Shibh - Investigators believe he wanted to be the twentieth hijacker. His presence at the summit may not have been realized until after 9/11, despite the fact that US intelligence had a picture of him next to bin Attash, and had video footage of him. [NEWSWEEK, 11/26/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 7/14/2002; TIME, 9/15/2002; DIE ZEIT (HAMBURG), 10/1/2002; CNN, 11/7/2002] German police have credit card receipts indicating bin al-Shibh is in Malaysia at the same time. [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 9/1/2002] Ulrich Kersten, director of Germany’s federal anticrime agency, the Bundeskriminalamt, will later say, “There are indications that Ramzi bin al-Shibh was in Kuala Lumpur for the meeting.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 8/24/2002] Another account noting he was photographed at the summit further notes that he entered and left Thailand three times in the first three weeks of January 2000. [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 10/17/2001] Anonymous Malaysian officials claim he is there, but US officials deny it. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9/20/2002] One account says he is recognized at the time of the summit, which makes it hard to understand why he is not tracked back to Germany and the Hamburg cell with Mohamed Atta and other hijackers. [DER SPIEGEL (HAMBURG), 10/1/2002] Another opportunity to expose the 9/11 plot through bin al-Shibh’s presence at this summit will be missed in June. It appears bin al-Shibh and Almihdhar are directly involved in the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000 (see Around September 15-16 and October 10-21, 2000). [GUARDIAN, 10/15/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 7/14/2002; NEWSWEEK, 9/4/2002] Ahmad Hikmat Shakir - A suspected al-Qaeda agent of Iraqi nationality, Shakir is a greeter at Kuala Lumpur airport. He meets Almihdhar there and travels with him to the apartment where the summit is held. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 10/2/2002; NEWSWEEK, 10/7/2002; AUSTRALIAN, 12/24/2002; KNIGHT RIDDER, 6/12/2004] After 9/11, he will be linked to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 1995 Bojinka plot. Jordan will arrest him and let him go after the US says they don’t want to take custody of him (see September 17, 2001). Salem Alhazmi - Alhazmi, a 9/11 hijacker and brother of Nawaf Alhazmi, is possibly at the summit, although very few accounts mention it. [AUSTRALIAN, 12/24/2002] US intelligence intercepts from before the summit indicate that he at least had plans to attend. [US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003, PP. 51 ] Abu Bara al Taizi - A Yemeni al-Qaeda agent, he is reportedly meant to be one of the 9/11 hijackers, but will be unable to enter the US due to greater scrutiny for Yemenis. [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/16/2004, PP. 8] Mohamed al-Khatani - A Saudi, he allegedly will confess to attending the summit while being held in the US Guantanamo prison (see July 2002). He apparently will unsuccessfully attempt to enter the US in August 2001 to join the 9/11 plot (see August 4, 2001). However, al-Khatani will later recant his testimony and say he lied to avoid torture (see October 26, 2006). Others - Unnamed members of the Egyptian-based Islamic Jihad are also said to have been at the summit. [COX NEWS SERVICE, 10/21/2001] Islamic Jihad merged with al-Qaeda in February 1998. [ABC NEWS, 11/17/2001] However, according to the Wall Street Journal, bin Attash and al-Quso are suspected of being Islamic Jihad members at one point, so this may just be a reference to them. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10/8/2001] Entity Tags: Ulrich Kersten, Fahad al-Quso, Al-Qaeda, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Abu Bara al Taizi, Hambali, Ahmad Hikmat Shakir, Islamic Jihad, Central Intelligence Agency, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Tawfiq bin Attash, Yazid Sufaat, Khalid Almihdhar, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Salem Alhazmi, Mohamed al-Khatani, Nawaf Alhazmi, Malaysian Secret Service Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

February-Summer 2000: Saudi Hijackers Leave Home

Ahmed Alhaznawi. [Source: US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division] Several of the Saudis accused of taking part in 9/11 will later be reported to leave home around this time:

Wail and Waleed Alshehri: spring 2000; [SUNDAY TIMES (LONDON), 1/27/2002; BOSTON GLOBE, 3/3/2002; SAUDI INFORMATION AGENCY, 9/11/2002] 
Ahmed Alghamdi, Hamza Alghamdi, and Ahmed Alhaznawi, as well as candidate hijacker Saeed Abdullah Saeed Alghamdi: spring 2000. [SUNDAY TIMES (LONDON), 1/27/2002; BOSTON GLOBE, 3/3/2002; SAUDI INFORMATION AGENCY, 9/11/2002] 
Salem Alhazmi: spring 2000; [ARAB NEWS, 9/20/2001; SAUDI INFORMATION AGENCY, 9/11/2002] 
Ahmed Alnami: 2000. [ARAB NEWS, 9/20/2001; SAUDI INFORMATION AGENCY, 9/11/2002] 
Mohand Alshehri: More than a year before the attacks. [ARAB NEWS, 9/20/2001]

Entity Tags: Saeed Abdullah Saeed Alghamdi, Mohand Alshehri, Salem Alhazmi, Hamza Alghamdi, Ahmed Alhaznawi, Wail Alshehri, Ahmed Alnami, Abdulaziz Alomari, Ahmed Alghamdi, Waleed M. Alshehri Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

Spring-Summer 2000: Calls between 9/11 Hijacker in San Diego and Al-Qaeda Communications Hub Intercepted by NSA Around eight calls made by hijacker Khalid Almihdhar from San Diego to an al-Qaeda communications hub in Sana’a, Yemen, run by his father-in-law Ahmed al-Hada are intercepted by the NSA. [US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003, PP. XII, 16-17, 157 ; LOS ANGELES TIMES, 12/21/2005; WRIGHT, 2006, PP. 343; NEW YORKER, 7/10/2006 ] At least one of the calls is made from a phone registered to hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi in their San Diego apartment. [US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 251 ] Other calls are made from a mobile phone registered to Alhazmi. [MCDERMOTT, 2005, PP. 296] Calls may also be made from the communications hub to the US. [MSNBC, 7/21/2004] Dates of Calls - One of the calls takes place days after they move into their San Diego apartment in February (see January 15-February 2000). [MSNBC, 7/21/2004] Another is on March 20, 2000 and lasts 16 minutes. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 10/2001, PP. 57 ; US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 251 ] Intercepted by NSA - Although NSA analysts pick up Almihdhar’s first name, “Khalid,” they do not connect it to his second name, even though the NSA has been intercepting communications to and from the hub involving him throughout 1999 (see Early 1999 and December 29, 1999) and he is on the NSA watch list at this point (see Mid-January 2000). [US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003, PP. XII, 16, 157 ; US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 3/15/2004] Some, or perhaps all, of these calls are between Almihdhar and his wife, who lives at the communications hub and reportedly gives birth to a daughter in early 2000 while Almihdhar is in the US. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 222; SUSKIND, 2006, PP. 94; WRIGHT, 2006, PP. 343; NEW YORKER, 7/10/2006 ] However, the NSA analysts suspect that Khalid is part of an “operational cadre.” [US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 3/15/2004] Dissemination and Content - According to the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, the NSA disseminates some of this information to the FBI, CIA, and other agencies, but not all of it, as it apparently does not meet reporting thresholds. It is unclear why it does not meet such thresholds, although some sources will suggest Almihdhar was just talking to his wife. [US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003, PP. 157 ; US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 3/15/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 222; SUSKIND, 2006, PP. 94] Another source suggests operational information was passed on during the calls (see Early 2000-Summer 2001). However, two FBI agents who worked on al-Qaeda cases relating to Yemen, Dan Coleman and Ali Soufan, will later claim that they and other senior counterterrorism officials only learn about these calls after 9/11. [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 12/21/2005; SUSKIND, 2006, PP. 94; NEW YORKER, 7/10/2006 ] Significance - Author Lawrence Wright will comment: “You know, this is the key. The NSA is all over this phone. And everybody, you know, that has any connection with it is drawing links from that phone. Now imagine eight lines from Yemen to San Diego. How obvious would it be that al-Qaeda is in America[?]” [FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, 10/5/2006] Other Calls - The NSA also intercepts various other communications between the hijackers and the communications hub (see Early 2000-Summer 2001). Entity Tags: Ahmed al-Hada, Al-Qaeda, Salem Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, National Security Agency, Osama bin Laden, Lawrence Wright, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

Summer 2000: Some 9/11 Hijackers Allegedly Work as Airport Security Staff in Afghanistan Edit

Under interrogation after 9/11, al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin Attash will claim he met some of the 9/11 hijackers at Kandahar airport in Afghanistan in the summer of 2000. Although he will not be able to recall all of them, he will say the group includes Satam Al Suqami, Waleed and Wail Alshehri, Abdulaziz Alomari, Hamza Alghamdi, Salem Alhazmi, and Majed Moqed. He will say he was closest to Saeed Alghamdi, whom he convinced to become a martyr and whom he asked to recruit a friend, Ahmed Alghamdi, to the same cause. However, doubts will later be expressed about the reliability of such statements from prisoners like bin Attash, due to the methods used to obtain them (see June 16, 2004) [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 233-4] Al-Qaeda’s division of passports and host country issues is based at the airport and it alters passports, visas and identification cards. Some people involved in the plot will later be reported to have altered travel documents (see July 23, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 56 ] 9/11 hijacker Ahmed Alnami and would-be hijacker Mushabib al-Hamlan are also said to be at the same Kandahar camp, Al Farooq, and are assigned to guard the airport. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 526] By the late 1990s, the Kandahar airport will become the main logistics lifeline for al-Qaeda and the Taliban to the outside world. One Ariana pilot will later recall, “I would see Arabs with [satellite] phones walking around the terminal, in touch with the Taliban at the highest levels.” On one occasion, he sees Taliban ruler Mullah Omar meeting in the middle of the airport with a rebel leader from Tajikistan, surrounded by aides. “There they were, cross-legged on their mats, chattering into cell phones.” [FARAH AND BRAUN, 2007, PP. 140] At this time, the Kandahar airport is being mainly used by Ariana Airlines, which has been completely co-opted by al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and aircraft companies controlled by international arms dealer Victor Bout (see 1998). Entity Tags: Wail Alshehri, Waleed M. Alshehri, Mullah Omar, Tawfiq bin Attash, Ariana Airlines, Salem Alhazmi, Satam Al Suqami, Ahmed Alnami, Ahmed Alghamdi, Abdulaziz Alomari, Saeed Alghamdi, Majed Moqed, Mushabib al-Hamlan, Hamza Alghamdi Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

Summer 2000: NSA Continues to Intercept Calls between Hijackers and Yemen Communications Hub After hijacker Khaled Almihdhar returns to the Middle East (see June 10, 2000 and (Mid-June-Mid-July 2000)), the NSA continues to intercept his telephone calls to and from an al-Qaeda communications hub in Sana’a, Yemen, where his wife and children live. US intelligence understands that this is one of the most important al-Qaeda hot spots, and has been closely monitoring it since at least late 1998 (see August 4-25, 1998 and Late 1998-Early 2002). It also intercepts calls between hijacker Salem Alhazmi and the hub, as well as conversations between his brother, hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi, in the US and the hub (see Mid-October 2000-Summer 2001). [US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003, PP. 157 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 222; WRIGHT, 2006, PP. 343] The NSA had previously intercepted calls made by the hijackers to and from the communications hub, both when they were in the US and outside it (see Early 2000-Summer 2001). Entity Tags: Salem Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, National Security Agency, Nawaf Alhazmi Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

Between October 2000 and September 10, 2001: British Banking Company Profiles Fifteen 9/11 Hijackers as High-Risk Likely Terrorists Global Objectives, a British banking compliance company, identifies fifteen of the 9/11 hijackers as high-risk people and establishes profiles for them. The hijackers are regarded as high-risk for loans because they are linked to Osama bin Laden, suspected terrorists, or associates of terrorists. The list of high-risk people maintained by Global Objectives is available to dozens of banks and the hijackers’ files contain their dates and places of birth, aliases, and associates. It is unclear which fifteen hijackers are considered high-risk. It is also unknown if any Western intelligence agencies access this database before 9/11. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 2/21/2002] According to the 9/11 Commission, US intelligence is only aware of three of the 9/11 hijackers, Nawaf Alhazmi, Salem Alhazmi, and Khalid Almihdhar, before the attacks. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 181-2] However, media reports will suggest US intelligence agencies may have been aware of another six: Ziad Jarrah (see January 30, 2000); Marwan Alshhehi (see March 1999 and January-February 2000); Mohamed Atta (see January-May 2000 and January-February 2000); and Ahmed Alghamdi, Satam al Suqami, and Hamza Alghamdi (see September 2000 and Spring 2001). Entity Tags: Ahmed Alnami, Ahmed Alhaznawi, Wail Alshehri, Waleed M. Alshehri, Ziad Jarrah, Abdulaziz Alomari, Salem Alhazmi, Saeed Alghamdi, Satam Al Suqami, Mohand Alshehri, Nawaf Alhazmi, Hamza Alghamdi, Fayez Ahmed Banihammad, Hani Hanjour, Majed Moqed, Mohamed Atta, Marwan Alshehhi, Khalid Almihdhar, Ahmed Alghamdi Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

November 2000: 9/11 Hijacker Reportedly Tracked by Saudi Authorities as He Flies to Beirut, Possible Iranian Connection Mooted

Salem Alhazmi. [Source: US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division] 9/11 hijacker Salem Alhazmi flies from Saudi Arabia to Beirut. Tracked by Saudis - According to the 9/11 Commission, Alhazmi’s passport has an indicator of Islamic extremism (see April 4, 1999). Such indicators are used by the Saudi authorities to track some of the hijackers before 9/11 (see November 2, 2007), so the Saudi authorities presumably register his departure. Alleged Iran Link - The 9/11 Commission will mention this flight in a section of its report dealing with possible co-operation between Iran, Hezbollah, and al-Qaeda on travel issues (see October 8-13, 2000, After October 12, 2000, and Mid-November, 2000), but there are no direct links between this flight and Iranian operatives. The co-operation consisted of Iran allowing al-Qaeda operatives to transit Iran without stamping their passports on the way to and from Afghanistan (see After October 12, 2000), so the Commission suggests this flight may be the first step on a journey to Afghanistan. The 9/11 Commission’s statement that Alhazmi took this flight is based on intelligence reports from the NSA, mostly drafted shortly after 9/11. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 240-1, 529; SHENON, 2008, PP. 370-3] Reason for Presence in Saudi Arabia Unclear - Although several of the hijackers are in Saudi Arabia at this time to obtain visas, it is unclear why Alhazmi would be in the country, as there is no mention of him obtaining a US visa around this time. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 13-16 ] Returns, Leaves Again - Alhazmi leaves Saudi Arabia again on January 1, 2001, traveling to Yemen. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 10/2001, PP. 116 ] He is presumably tracked by Saudi authorities as he enters Saudi Arabia after returning from Beirut and also as he leaves Saudi Arabia for Yemen. Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Salem Alhazmi Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

December 12, 2000-March 2001: Hanjour and Alhazmi Live in Arizona Hijackers Hani Hanjour and Nawaf Alhazmi move together from San Diego to Mesa, Arizona, just outside Phoenix. [US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 6/20/2004] While there, Hanjour spends time training at Arizona Aviation flight school, which he previously attended in January 1998 (see 1998). According to the 9/11 Commission, “He wanted to train on multi-engine planes, but had difficulties because his English was not good enough. The instructor advised him to discontinue but Hanjour said he could not go home without completing the training.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 226] He also attends the JetTech flight school in Phoenix (see January-February 2001). In March 2001, Hanjour moves to Paterson, New Jersey, where he rents an apartment with Salem Alhazmi (see March 2001-September 1, 2001). Entity Tags: Salem Alhazmi, JetTech, Hani Hanjour, Arizona Aviation flight school, Nawaf Alhazmi Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

December 30, 2000: Three 9/11 Hijackers Possibly in Eastern US, Despite Official Claims to the Contrary Documents obtained by Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, and Salem Alhazmi indicate that they are in the New Jersey / New York area at this time, although the cards may be later fakes. All three hijackers obtain USA ID cards whose expiry date is December 30, 2006. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/21/2004, PP. 191-2 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006] USAID Systems, the Florida firm that manufactured the system through which the cards were issued, will later tell Time magazine that Almihdhar’s card was issued exactly six years before its expiration date. [TIME, 8/29/2005] However, according to the FBI and the 9/11 Commission, Nawaf Alhazmi is in Arizona (see December 12, 2000-March 2001), and Salem Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar are in the Middle East at this time (see June 10, 2000, Late October 2000-July 4, 2001, and April 23-June 29, 2001). Almihdhar’s card later proves to be a forgery, and may therefore not have been issued on this date. The Alhazmi brothers’ cards may also be forgeries (see (July-August 2001)) Entity Tags: Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, Salem Alhazmi Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

2001Edit

Main article: Salem al-Hazmi:2001
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