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July 1995: US National Intelligence Estimate Concludes Islamic Militants Are Intent on Attacking inside US Edit

The US intelligence community releases a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) entitled “The Foreign Terrorist Threat in the United States.” Partly prompted by the World Trade Center bombing two years earlier (see February 26, 1993), it warns that radical Islamists have an enhanced ability “to operate in the United States” and that the danger of them attacking in the US will only increase over time. [TENET, 2007, PP. 104; SHENON, 2008, PP. 314] It concludes that the most likely terrorist threat will come from emerging “transient” terrorist groupings that are more fluid and multinational than older organizations and state-sponsored surrogates. This “new terrorist phenomenon” is made up of loose affiliations of Islamist extremists violently angry at the US. Lacking strong organization, they get weapons, money, and support from an assortment of governments, factions, and individual benefactors. [9/11 COMMISSION, 4/14/2004] The estimate warns that terrorists are intent on striking specific targets inside the US, especially landmark buildings in Washington and New York such as the White House, the Capitol, Wall Street, and the WTC. [SHENON, 2008, PP. 314] It says: “Should terrorists launch new attacks, we believe their preferred targets will be US government facilities and national symbols, financial and transportation infrastructure nodes, or public gathering places. Civil aviation remains a particularly attractive target in light of the fear and publicity that the downing of an airline would evoke and the revelations last summer of the US air transport sector’s vulnerabilities.” Osama bin Laden is not mentioned by name, but he will be in the next NIE, released in 1997 (see 1997; see also October 1989). [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 4/16/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 54 ] Entity Tags: US intelligence Category Tags: Warning Signs, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics

July 1995: Bosnian Muslims Massacred at Srebrenica by Serb Forces

Nasir Oric. [Source: Reuters / Corbis] Bosnian Serb forces enter Srebrenica, capturing the Dutch peacekeeping forces there. Thousands of Muslim civilians are brutally executed by the Serbs. [CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 10/2/1995; CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 10/24/1995; NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, 9/24/1998; BBC, 6/9/2005] The commander of the Bosnian Muslim forces based in Srebrenica, Nasir Oric, forcibly prevented Muslim civilians from leaving Srebrenica prior to the Serb attack. [GLOBE AND MAIL, 7/12/1995] However, Oric and his troops quietly withdrew from Srebrenica just two days before the Serbs arrived, leaving the civilians to fend for themselves. There is fighting between Muslim forces who favor the retreat, and those who want to stay and defend the city. [NEW YORK TIMES, 7/24/1995] The International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP) will announce in 2005 that they have been able to identify the remains of 2032 victims of the Serb assault. [INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON MISSING PERSONS, 6/21/2005] Entity Tags: Ralph Mutschke, Nasir Oric Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Balkans

July-October 1995: Wave of Attacks in France Blamed on Algerian Islamist Militants Were Likely Masterminded by Algerian Government

A Paris subway car bombed in 1995. [Source: Associated Press] Ten French citizens die and more than two hundred are injured in a series of attacks in France from July to October 1995. Most of the attacks are caused by the explosion of rudimentary bombs in the Paris subway. The deaths are blamed on the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) Algerian militant group. Some members of the banned Algerian opposition Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) living in exile in France are killed as well. For instance, high-level FIS leader Abdelbaki Sahraoui is assassinated on July 11, 1995. The GIA takes credit for these acts. The attacks mobilize French public opinion against the Islamic opposition in Algerian and causes the French government to abandon its support for recent Algerian peace plans put forth by a united opposition front (see January 13,1995). [BBC, 10/30/2002; RANDAL, 2005, PP. 171, 316-317; GUARDIAN, 9/8/2005] However, in September 1995, French Interior Minister Jean-Louis Debré says, “It cannot be excluded that Algerian intelligence may have been implicated” in the first bombing, which hit the Saint-Michel subway stop in Paris on July 25 and killed eight. [BBC, 10/31/2002; RANDAL, 2005, PP. 316-317] And as time goes on, Algerian officials defect and blame Algerian intelligence for sponsoring all the attacks. Ali Touchent is said to be the GIA leader organizing the attacks (see January 13,1995). But Mohammed Samraoui, former deputy chief of the Algerian army’s counterintelligence unit, will later claim that Touchent was an Algerian intelligence “agent tasked with infiltrating Islamist ranks abroad and the French knew it.” But he adds the French “probably did not suspect their Algerian counterparts were prepared to go so far.” [RANDAL, 2005, PP. 316-317] A long-time Algerian secret agent known only by the codename Yussuf-Joseph who defected to Britain will later claim that the bombings in France were supported by Algerian intelligence in order to turn French public opinion against the Islamic opposition in Algeria. He says that intelligence agents went sent to France by General Smain Lamari, head of the Algerian counterintelligence department, to directly organize at least two of the French bombings. The operational leader was actually Colonel Souames Mahmoud, head of the intelligence at the Algerian Embassy in Paris. [OBSERVER, 11/9/1997] In 2002, a French television station will air a 90-minute documentary tying the bombings to Algerian intelligence. In the wake of the broadcast, Alain Marsaud, French counterintelligence coordinator in the 1980s, will say, “State terrorism uses screen organizations. In this case, [the GIA was] a screen organization in the hands of the Algerian security services… it was a screen to hold France hostage.” [NEW ZEALAND LISTENER, 2/14/2004] Entity Tags: Ali Touchent, Islamic Salvation Front, Alain Marsaud, Mohammed Samraoui, Abdelbaki Sahraoui, Souames Mahmoud, Yussuf-Joseph, Smain Lamari, Jean-Louis Debré Timeline Tags: Alleged Use of False Flag Attacks Category Tags: Algerian Militant Collusion, Alleged Al-Qaeda Linked Attacks

July 4, 1995: Kashmir Kidnapping Leads to US Charity, but US Takes No Action Against It On July 4, 1995, six Western tourists are kidnapped in Kashmir, India. A Norwegian is soon found beheaded while an American manages to escape. The remaining hostages, two British, one German, and one American, are never found and are apparently killed in December 1995. The kidnapping is executed by an alias of the Pakistani militant group later known as Harkat ul-Mujahedeen. The kidnappers demand the release of a number of jailed Islamists, including Saeed Sheikh and Maulana Masood Azhar, both imprisoned in India (see November 1994-December 1999). Counterterrorism expert Rohan Gunaratna claims the leaders of the operation were trained by al-Qaeda. [GUNARATNA, 2003, PP. 284-285] In January 1996, a secret CIA report will say that, according to a foreign intelligence agency, Enaam Arnaout, the US director of the Benevolence International Foundation (BIF), was in Pakistan and matches the description of a man involved in the kidnapping who then left Pakistan in early October for Bosnia via the US. [CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 1/1996] Yet despite this information, the US will take no action against Arnaout or BIF. The US will not even designate Harkat ul-Mujahedeen until over two years after the kidnapping. [GUNARATNA, 2003, PP. 284-285] An airplane hijacking in 1999 will free Azhar and Sheikh (see December 24-31, 1999). Entity Tags: Harkat ul-Mujahedeen, Enaam Arnaout, Al-Qaeda, Benevolence International Foundation, Central Intelligence Agency, Maulana Masood Azhar, Saeed Sheikh Category Tags: Saeed Sheikh, BIF, Alleged Al-Qaeda Linked Attacks

July 5, 1995-May 1997: Hamas Leader Held in the US, Then Let Go

Mousa Abu Marzouk. [Source: US Department of Corrections] On July 5, 1995, high-level Hamas leader Mousa Abu Marzouk is detained at a New York City airport as he tries to enter the US. An immigration agent checks Marzouk’s name against a watch list and finds a match. Marzouk’s name had apparently been added to the watch list in recent months, so he had not been stopped on previous trips. Although not a US citizen, he had been living in the US for 14 years. Israel considers him the head of Hamas’ political wing, and he is already under indictment in Israel for at least ten attacks that killed at least 47 people. In 1994 he appeared on Lebanese television to take credit for a Hamas suicide attack in Israel, saying, “Death is a goal to every Muslim.” When he is detained in New York, he is found with an address book that the FBI says contains the names, telephone numbers, and addresses of numerous “active and violent terrorists and terrorist organizations.” More than 20 percent of the addresses are in the US. He is also carrying paperwork connecting him to charities and companies worth more than $10 million, which the FBI suspect are part of a Hamas money laundering operation in the US. On August 16, 1995, the US declares him a “Specially Designated Terrorist.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 7/28/1995; EMERSON, 2002, PP. 86-87; FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, 6/2/2003; WALL STREET JOURNAL, 6/21/2004] In August 1995, the US announces it will extradite Marzouk to Israel rather than try him in the US. Extradition hearings proceed slowly until 1997, when Marzouk announces he will no longer fight being deported to Israel. Then Israel makes the surprise announcement that it is no longer seeking Marzouk’s extradition. They cite a fear of a highly publicized trial and the fear of retaliatory terrorist attacks. In May 1997, the US deports Marzouk to Jordan, “ending what had become an embarrassing case for both the United States and Israel.” Jordan in turn deports him to Syria, where he will live and continue to work as a top Hamas leader. At the time of his deportation, it is claimed that one reason Marzouk is being deported is because the evidence against him is weak. [NEW YORK TIMES, 4/4/1997; NEW YORK TIMES, 5/6/1997; EMERSON, 2002, PP. 87-89] However, FBI agent Robert Wright will later claim that he uncovered more than enough evidence to convict Marzouk, but that higher-ups in the FBI did not want to disrupt the Hamas support network in the US, apparently in hopes that Hamas would commit enough violent attacks to disrupt peace negotiations between Israel and more moderate Palestinians (see June 2, 2003). Entity Tags: Hamas, Mousa Abu Marzouk, United States, Robert Wright Category Tags: Robert Wright and Vulgar Betrayal, Terrorism Financing

July 6, 1995-June 26, 1996: Bojinka Suspect Granted Asylum in Australia and Continues to Live There Openly A Syrian suspected of involvement in the al-Qaeda Bojinka plot is granted asylum in Australia even though the Australian government is aware of some of his apparent terrorism ties. Ahmad al-Hamwi, a.k.a. Omar Abu Omar, was head of the International Relations and Information Center (IRIC) from 1993 to 1995, a charity front closely tied to the failed Bojinka plot (see January 6, 1995). In 1995, Philippine investigators determined that most of the funding for the plot went through a bank account controlled by al-Hamwi. [INSTITUTE OF DEFENSE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES, 3/7/2003 ] At the same time, he was roommates with Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, bin Laden’s brother-in-law, and married the sister of one of Khalifa’s Philippine wives. He worked closely with Khalifa in the IRIC until Khalifa was forced to leave the country in late 1994 (see December 1, 1994). [AUSTRALIAN, 4/8/2006] Shortly after the Bojinka plot is foiled by Philippines authorities in early 1995, the IRIC is shut down and al-Hamwi is brought in for questioning. However, he is let go and travels to Australia in July 1995 then immediately applies for asylum there. The Australian asylum review board is aware of the following things:

He was interrogated by Philippines intelligence and questioned about his ties to WTC bomber Ramzi Yousef and the Bojinka plot to kill the Pope. 
He tells the review board that he was interrogated by a senior officer with direct ties to the Philippine president 
He came into Australia using a fake Dutch passport and has two fake Syrian passports. 
He has ties to Khalifa, who had been convicted of funding a bombing in Jordan. 
He is a longtime member of the militant group the Muslim Brotherhood. 

But incredibly, in June 1996 he is granted him asylum on the grounds that he could be persecuted in Syria due to his ties to the Brotherhood. [REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL, 6/26/1996; AUSTRALIAN, 4/8/2006] In 2006, it will be reported that he is still living openly in Australia. Further, Philippines intelligence alleges that he came to the Philippines after having been banned from Turkey for his suspected involvement in a 1986 bombing there. It is not clear how the Australian government missed information like this, or if they just ignored it. [AUSTRALIAN, 4/8/2006] In the wake of these 2006 reports, the Australian government will claim to be investigating his status. Yet there have been no reports that he has been arrested or had his residency revoked since then. [AUSTRALIAN, 4/10/2006; AGE (MELBOURNE), 4/10/2006] Entity Tags: Refugee Review Tribunal, Operation Bojinka, International Relations and Information Center, Ahmad al-Hamwi, Muslim Brotherhood, Mohammed Jamal Khalifa Category Tags: 1995 Bojinka Plot, Philippine Militant Collusion, Other Possible Moles or Informants, Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia

July 19, 1995: Bin Laden’s Brother-in-Law Khalifa Set Free in Jordan Bin Laden’s brother-in-law Mohammed Jamal Khalifa is pronounced not guilty of all charges and set free in a retrial in Jordan. Khalifa had been convicted and sentenced to death in a December 1994 Jordanian trial, but then a key witness recanted and the verdict was overturned in April 1995 (see Early April 1995). The US then deported him to Jordan to face retrial anyway (see April 26-May 3, 1995). [AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 7/19/1995] He quickly returns to Saudi Arabia, where he has citizenship. Michael Scheuer, the first head of the CIA’s bin Laden unit, will later claim that that “day he flew back to Saudi Arabia, he was greeted by a limo and a high-ranking official of the government embraced him.” [LANCE, 2006, PP. 164] One later article similarly claims, “Returning to Saudi Arabia, Khalifa was allegedly welcomed like a hero by Prince Sultan, Saudi’s second deputy premier.” [PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, 8/11/2000] Khalifa will go on to help found a militant group in Yemen that will take credit for the USS Cole bombing in 2000 (see 1996-1997 and After), while his Philippine front companies will continue to fund militant groups with few obstacles long after 9/11 (see 1995 and After). Entity Tags: Michael Scheuer, Jordan, Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, Sultan bin Faisal Category Tags: 1995 Bojinka Plot, Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, Philippine Militant Collusion, Saudi Arabia

July 19, 1995: ’Wall’ Memo Cuts Criminal Investigators Off from Intelligence Information

Attorney General Janet Reno, who signed the 1995 Procedures memo. [Source: US Department of Justice] The Justice Department issues the “wall” memo, a later heavily criticized memo that establishes procedures to regulate the flow of information from FBI intelligence investigations to criminal investigators and prosecutors. Such procedures already exist, but this “wall” is now formalized and extended. The memo is signed by Attorney General Janet Reno, but is based on a similar one recently issued by Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick governing the 1993 WTC bombing cases (see March 4, 1995). The wall exists to prevent defendants from successfully arguing in court that information gathered under a warrant issued under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) should not be used in a criminal prosecution, as the standard for obtaining a FISA warrant is considered to be lower than that for obtaining a criminal search warrant (see Early 1980s). Such arguments are usually unsuccessful, according to the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, which believes that courts are showing “great deference” to the government when such challenges are made. The procedures, which now apply to all intelligence investigations regardless of whether or not a FISA warrant has been issued, state that the FBI must consult the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, not local United States Attorneys’ offices, about intelligence investigations when it is considering starting a parallel criminal investigation, and that it must do so when there is reasonable indication of a significant federal crime. This means that FBI headquarters has veto power over whether a field office can contact a local prosecutor about an intelligence investigation. However, Criminal Division prosecutors should only be consulted and cannot control an investigation. [OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, 7/19/1995; US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 11/2004, PP. 25-30 ] These procedures will be implemented in such a way that even greater restrictions are placed on information sharing (see (Late 1995-1997)), although a partial exception will be created for the Southern District of New York, which handles a lot of terrorism work (see August 29, 1997). The procedures will also be much criticized for the way they are implemented in the FBI (see July 1999). The increased barriers to information sharing often mean that the FBI monitors terrorists as before, but the information does not get passed to criminal investigators, so the cells carry on operating in the US and the FBI carries on monitoring them. For example, the FBI monitors a Florida-based cell that funds and recruits for jihad throughout the world for nearly a decade before it is rolled up (see (October 1993-November 2001)). Some money raised by terrorism financiers in the US goes to Bosnia, where the US has a policy of enabling covert support for the Muslim side in the civil war (see April 27, 1994). Prosecutor Andrew McCarthy will later call the wall a “rudimentary blunder,” and say that it “was not only a deliberate and unnecessary impediment to information sharing; it bred a culture of intelligence dysfunction.” [NATIONAL REVIEW, 4/13/2004] John Ashcroft, Attorney General in the Bush Administration (see April 13, 2004), will say that “Government buttressed this ‘wall’,” and will call it the “single greatest structural cause for September 11.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 4/13/2004] Entity Tags: US Department of Justice, John Ashcroft, Jamie Gorelick, Janet Reno, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Andrew McCarthy Category Tags: Counterterrorism Action Before 9/11

August 1995: Bin Laden Criticizes Saudi Royals, Threatens Attacks on US Forces in Saudi Arabia Edit

Bin Laden writes an open letter to King Fahd of Saudi Arabia. He calls for a campaign of guerrilla attacks to drive US forces out of the kingdom. [PBS FRONTLINE, 9/13/2001] Bin Laden rails against Saudi government mismanagement and corruption. “Do we not have the right to ask you, O King, where has all the money gone? Never mind answering-one knows how many bribes and commissions ended up in your pocket.” He also decries the presence of US troops in Saudi Arabia. He concludes, “Our best advice to you now is to submit your resignation.” But bin Laden does not call for revolution or the overthrow of the Saudi royal family, and pointedly makes no mention of Crown Prince Abdullah, the next in line to be king. [WRIGHT, 2006, PP. 209-210] In November 1995, al-Qaeda will bomb a US-operated training center in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia (see November 13, 1995). Entity Tags: Fahd Bin Abdul Aziz, Osama bin Laden Category Tags: Osama Bin Laden, Saudi Arabia, Alleged Al-Qaeda Media Statements

Between August and December 1995: Atta Seen with Bin Al-Shibh by Roommate

Ramzi bin al-Shibh (front center) at the Al Quds mosque in Hamburg. [Source: History Channel] A roommate of future 9/11 hijacker Mohamed Atta will later say that he remembers that Atta was already associating with Ramzi bin al-Shibh in 1995 and that he saw bin al-Shibh at Atta’s residence then. At this time Atta is a graduate student at a technical university in Hamburg, whereas bin al-Shibh, who will allegedly play a co-ordinating role in 9/11, arrives in Germany in August 1995 and lives in a refugee camp near Hamburg under a false name. [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 9/15/2002; MCDERMOTT, 2005, PP. 38] Entity Tags: Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Mohamed Atta Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Mohamed Atta, Al-Qaeda in Germany

August 4-8, 1995: Croatians Launch Operation Storm, Expelling Serbs from Krajina The Croatian military launches Operation Storm, a massive assault aimed at seizing Krajina, a Serb-populated region located within Croatia’s borders that, a year and a half earlier, had declared itself an independent state. As the Croatian force of 200,000 approaches the city of Knin, Krajina’s 40,000-strong army quickly retreats. Over the next two days, the Croatian army fires some 3,000 shells on Knin. According to two senior Canadian military officers who are present during the attack, the shelling is indiscriminate and targets civilians. [NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, 10/22/1998; NEW YORK TIMES, 3/21/1999; INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS, 12/31/2000] Col. Andrew Leslie, one of the Canadians, will later say that no more than 250 shells hit military targets, leading him to believe that “the fire was deliberately directed against civilian buildings.” He will also recall seeing corpses of dead Serbians at Knin Hospital “stacked in the corridors… in piles.” [CANADA NATIONAL POST, 4/9/1999] The operation results in a mass exodus of as many as 150,000 Serbian residents, who flee their homes in tractors, cars, and horse-drawn carts. [NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, 10/22/1998; NEW YORK TIMES, 3/21/1999; INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS, 12/31/2000] This event will be remembered as the largest single instance of ethnic cleansing to have occurred during the Yugoslav war. [NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, 10/22/1998] A 150-page report later issued by an international war crimes tribunal in The Hague, titled “The Indictment. Operation Storm, A Prima Facie Case,” finds that the Croatians were responsible for a number of atrocities. “During the course of the military offensive, the Croatian armed forces and special police committed numerous violations of international humanitarian law, including but not limited to, shelling of Knin and other cities. During, and in the 100 days following the military offensive, at least 150 Serb civilians were summarily executed, and many hundreds disappeared,” the report will say. “In a widespread and systematic manner, Croatian troops committed murder and other inhumane acts upon and against Croatian Serbs.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 3/21/1999] During the preceding year, Military Professionals Resources, Inc. (MPRI), a private military contractor, had been providing Croatian military officers with training—ostensibly in “Democracy Transition.” After the assault on Krajina, observers will suggest that MPRI’s team of instructors, made up of former US military generals, had actually trained the Croatians in a set of military tactics, known as “AirLand Battle 2000,” which were then used against the Serbs in Krajina. [NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, 10/22/1998] A number of media accounts will even report that MPRI personnel helped plan the Croatian occupation and ethnic cleansing of the Serb-populated region. “Even the Foreign Military Training Report published by both the State Department and Department of Defense in May refers to these allegations against MPRI not entirely disparagingly,” UPI reports. [UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 7/18/2002] There is also evidence that the US provided Croatian President Franjo Tudjman with a green light just a few days before the operation. [NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, 10/22/1998] In September 1995, USAF General Charles Boyd, who was Deputy Commander in Chief European Command at the time condemns the Clinton Administration for having “watched approvingly as Muslim offensives began this spring, even though these attacks destroyed a cease-fire Washington has supported. This duplicity, so crude and obvious to all in Europe, has weakened America’s moral authority to provide any kind of effective diplomatic leadership. Worse, because of this, the impact of US actions has been to prolong the conflict while bringing it no closer to resolution.” [FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 9/1995] Entity Tags: Military Professional Resources Inc., Andrew Leslie, Franjo Tudjman, Operation Storm, Croatian army Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Balkans

August 7, 1995: Clinton Sides with Interventionists During Cabinet Meeting Edit

The differences on Bosnia policy between Madeleine Albright, Anthony Lake, and Richard Holbrooke on the one hand and the Pentagon on the other, are aired at a cabinet meeting. Albright et. al. argue for a firm commitment to military intervention. “They maintained that the stakes went far beyond the particulars in Bosnia. The issue was not one state or two, three, or none. Rather, the issue was US credibility as a world leader, its credibility in NATO, the United Nations, and at home.” Meanwhile, “the Pentagon was most concerned about avoiding a sustained military involvement, and saw in arm, train, and strike the shades of Vietnam.” Clinton comes down firmly on the side of intervention. After the meeting, Anthony Lake is dispatched to Europe to brief US allies on the new policy on Bosnia. [DAALDER, 2000, PP. 106 - 110] Entity Tags: William Jefferson (“Bill”) Clinton, Anthony Lake, Richard Holbrooke, Richard Holbrooke, Madeleine Albright Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Balkans

August 11, 1995: Clinton Vetoes Bill for US to Defy UN Weapons Embargo on Bosnia On July 26, 1995, the US Senate votes for the US to defy a UN weapons embargo against Bosnia. On August 1, the House of Representatives also votes to defy the embargo. But on August 11, President Clinton vetoes the legislation. According to the Los Angeles Times, he argues that “the measure would backfire by increasing atrocities, torpedoing diplomacy and ultimately converting the complex ethnic war into ‘an American responsibility.’” [CNN, 8/5/1995; LOS ANGELES TIMES, 4/5/1996] Entity Tags: William Jefferson (“Bill”) Clinton Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Balkans

August 27, 1995 and Shortly After: CIA and Albanian Intelligence Recruit Knowledgeable Informer The CIA and Albanian intelligence recruit an informer knowledgeable about al-Qaeda in the Balkans. The informer, whose name is Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr, but is known as Abu Omar, is recruited by a special unit of the Albanian National Intelligence Service (ShIK) created at the behest of the CIA. An officer in the unit, Astrit Nasufi, will say that the unit is actually run by a CIA agent known as “Mike” who is based on the US embassy in Tirana, Albania, and who teaches them intelligence techniques. The CIA and ShIK are worried about a possible assassination attempt against the Egyptian foreign minister, who is to visit Albania soon, so about twelve radical Egyptians, members of Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya and Islamic Jihad, are detained beforehand. Nasr is not on the list, but is detained because of a link to a suspect charity, the Human Relief and Construction Agency (HRCA). He is held for about 10 days and, although he initially refuses to talk, ShIK has a “full file” on him after a week. He provides information about around ten fellow Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya members working for HRCA and two other charities, the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation and the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society, both of which will be declared designated supporters of terrorism after 9/11. However, he says there are no plans to kill the Egyptian foreign minister, as this would mean Albania would no longer be a safe haven for fundamentalist Muslims. The intelligence Nasr goes on to provide is regarded as good quality and includes the identities of operatives monitoring the US embassy and entering and leaving Albania. The CIA is most interested in monitoring former mujaheddin joining the Bosnian Muslims, and Nasr also provides intelligence on Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya branches in Britain, Germany, and Italy, in particular the Islamic Cultural Institute in Milan, which is a base for mujaheddin operations in the Balkans and is raided by the Italian government around this time (see Late 1993-December 14, 1995). Even though cooperation appears to be good, after a few weeks Nasr suddenly disappears and the CIA tells ShIK that Nasr has moved to Germany. [CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 7/2/2005] Nasr will later surface in Italy and will become close to Islamic militants in Milan (see Summer 2000), but will be kidnapped by the CIA after 9/11 (see Noon February 17, 2003). Entity Tags: Revival of Islamic Heritage Society, Islamic Jihad, State Intelligence Service (Albania), Central Intelligence Agency, Astrit Nasufi, Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, Islamic Cultural Institute, Human Relief and Construction Agency, Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Kosovar Albanian Struggle Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Balkans, Other Possible Moles or Informants, Al-Qaeda in Italy

August 30, 1995: NATO Launches Bombing Campaign Against Bosnian Serbs “Operation Deliberate Force,” a massive NATO bombing campaign against the Bosnian Serbs, begins. [CNN, 8/31/1995] Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Balkans

September 1995: Raid Does Not Stop Bosnian Charity Front Controlling Illegal Weapons Pipeline German and Austrian police raid the Vienna, Austria, office of the Third World Relief Agency (TWRA). Investigators fill three vans with documents, enabling them to gain a full picture of the illegal weapons network the TWRA has been running. But by this time, TWRA appears to be winding down most of its activities. The need for TWRA’s smuggling routes greatly declined after a direct weapons pipeline opened between Iran and Bosnia with the tacit approval of the US. But the raid results in no charges and TWRA’s Vienna office remains open. One Austrian investigator will later say, “They did a lot of talking here but as long as they did not move weapons through our territory, we could not arrest them.” [WASHINGTON POST, 9/22/1996] Authors J. Millard Burr and Robert Collins will later question that rationale, noting that, “The TWRA ledgers, however, gave a full accounting of the transfer of huge sums for arms trafficking through the First Austrian Bank.” The Bosnian government officially shuts down TWRA after the Austrian raid, but in fact it remains open and active in Bosnia, and continuing to ship weapons. In fact, TWRA will still remain open and active there and elsewhere long after 9/11 (see January 25, 2002). The US government has yet to take any official action against TWRA as well. [BURR AND COLLINS, 2006, PP. 143] Entity Tags: Third World Relief Agency Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Balkans, Terrorism Financing

September-October 1995: Unocal Obtains Turkmenistan Pipeline Deal Oil company Unocal signs an $8 billion deal with Turkmenistan to construct two pipelines (one for oil, one for gas), as part of a larger plan for two pipelines intended to transport oil and gas from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan and into Pakistan. Before proceeding further, however, Unocal needs to execute agreements with Pakistan and Afghanistan; Pakistan and Ahmed Shah Massoud’s government in Afghanistan, however, have already signed a pipeline deal with an Argentinean company. Henry Kissinger, hired as speaker for a special dinner in New York to announce the Turkmenistan pipeline deal, says the Unocal plan represents a “triumph of hope over experience.” Unocal will later open an office in Kabul, weeks after the Taliban capture of the capital in late 1996 and will interact with the Taliban, seeking support for its pipeline until at least December 1997. [COLL, 2004, PP. 301-13, 329, 338, 364-66] Entity Tags: Ahmed Shah Massoud, Unocal, Taliban, Turkmenistan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Henry A. Kissinger Category Tags: Pipeline Politics

September 1, 1995: Judge’s Ruling Ensures that Ali Mohamed Does Not Have to Testify in Trial, Even Though Prosecution Knows Where He Is Defense counsel for El Sayyid Nosair, one of the militants accused in the “Landmarks” bomb plot (see June 24, 1993) along with the “Blind Sheikh,” Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman, applies for a missing witness instruction for double agent Ali Mohamed. The counsel, Roger Stavis, believes that it would benefit his client to have Mohamed testify, because Mohamed worked for militants connected to Abdul-Rahman as well as the FBI (see 1990), CIA (see 1984), and US army (see 1986). Therefore, Stavis might be able to use Nosair’s connection with Mohamed to convince the jury that Nosair was acting on the instructions of an agent of the US government. Stavis has been attempting to contact Mohamed with no success for some time, although the prosecution is in contact with him where he lives in California (see December 1994-January 1995). Under federal law, a trial judge can give a missing witness instruction if one party at a trial wants a witness to testify but cannot find him, whereas the other party can find him but does not seem to want him to testify. Based on such an instruction, the jury can then decide that the party that could find him, but did not get him to testify, did so deliberately because it thought the testimony would be damaging to it. Author Peter Lance will later comment that, given the circumstances, “Stavis had every right to expect that jury charge,” but Judge Michael Mukasey merely responds, “I don’t think a missing witness charge on that gentleman is warranted and I am not going to give one.” Lance will comment that by failing to grant the missing witness instruction, Mukasey helps “bury the significance” of Mohamed, and conceal his role in Islamic militancy from the public. [LANCE, 2006, PP. 208; RAW STORY, 9/25/2007] President Bush will later appoint Mukasey to be the US attorney general (see November 8, 2007). Entity Tags: Michael Mukasey, El Sayyid Nosair, Peter Lance, Roger Stavis, Ali Mohamed Category Tags: Counterterrorism Action Before 9/11, Ali Mohamed

September 1, 1995: American Columnist Mocks European ‘Failure’ to Lead Europe Paris-based American columnist William Pfaff writes with regard to NATO’s bombing campaign against the Bosnian Serbs (see August 30, 1995): “The humiliation of Europe in what may prove the Yugoslav endgame has yet to be fully appreciated in Europe’s capitals. The United States today is again Europe’s leader; there is no other. Both the Bush and Clinton administrations tried and failed to convince the European governments to take over Europe’s leadership.” Pfaff’s words will later be cited approvingly by Richard Holbrooke in his book, “To End a War.” Holbrooke will recall that the “[p]ress and public reaction was highly positive” to the operation. [HOLBROOKE, 1999, PP. 102-103] Entity Tags: William Pfaff, Richard Holbrooke Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Balkans

September 13, 1995: Muslim Militant Rendered by CIA in Croatia, Then Killed in Egypt Talaat Fouad Qassem, 38, a known leader of the Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (the Islamic Group), an Egyptian extremist organization, is arrested and detained in Croatia as he travels to Bosnia from Denmark, where he has been been living after being granted political asylum. He is suspected of clandestine support of terrorist operations, including the 1993 World Trade Center bombing (see February 26, 1993). He also allegedly led mujaheddin efforts in Bosnia since 1990 (see 1990). In a joint operation, he is arrested by Croatian intelligence agents and handed over to the CIA. Qassem is then interrogated by US officials aboard a US ship off the Croatian coast in the Adriatic Sea and sent to Egypt, which has a rendition agreement with the US (see Summer 1995). An Egyptian military tribunal has already sentenced him to death in absentia, and he is executed soon after he arrives. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 10/31/1995; WASHINGTON POST, 3/11/2002, PP. A01; MAHLE, 2005, PP. 204-205; NEW YORKER, 2/8/2005] According to the 1999 book Dollars for Terror, two weeks before his abduction, Qassem was in Switzerland negotiating against Muslim Brotherhood leaders. Some Muslim Brotherhood exiles were negotiating with the Egyptian government to be allowed to return to Egypt if they agreed not to use Muslim Brotherhood Swiss bank accounts to fund Egyptian militant groups like Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, but Qassem and other radicals oppose this deal. So the removal of Qassem helps the Muslim Brotherhood in their conflict with more militant groups. [LABEVIERE, 1999, PP. 70-71] Entity Tags: Croatia, Egypt, Talaat Fouad Qassem, Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Muslim Brotherhood Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Balkans, Terrorism Financing, Al-Qaeda in Balkans, Terrorism Financing, Key Captures and Deaths

Shortly Before October 1995: FBI Learns KSM Traveling to Sudan and Qatar Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) goes to Sudan, but he is soon discovered there by the Sudanese intelligence agency. Sudan is facing increasing trouble with Western countries due to its reputation as a terrorist haven, so KSM is told to leave and given a few weeks to move on. Later in the year, Sudanese intelligence tells an FBI agent about KSM’s recent visit and also reveals that he was headed to Qatar (where he has already been based for several years 1992-1996). By October 1995, the FBI tracks KSM to a certain apartment building in Qatar, but he will escape capture (see October 1995). [MINITER, 2003, PP. 85-86] Entity Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Sudan, Federal Bureau of Investigation Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed

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