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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Event: Jane GarveyType of Event: Interview Date: October 21,2003 Special Access Issues: NonePrepared by: Bill Johnstone Team Number: 7 Location: Commission Offices: GSA Conference RoomParticipants - Non-Commission: Jane GarveyParticipants - Commission: Sam Brinkley, Bill Johnstone, John Raidt, Lisa Sullivan Background and Mission [U] Ms.Garveywas FAAAdministrator from 1997-2002. [U] Ms. Garvey indicated that during her tenure at the FAA, the agency's top prioritieswere always safety, security and system efficiency. In backing up that statement, shepointed out that three of the main members of the FAA "management board" were the associate directors for security (Irish Flynn, later Mike Canavan), safety (Guy Gardner,later Nick Sabotini) and air traffic control(Steve Brown). She met with these managerstwice a week (usually Mondays and Fridays). Security Reporting [U]When Ms. Garvey arrived at the FAA, she was aware of the good reputation that FAA Security chief Irish Flynn had both inside and outside the agency. Consequently,she didn't see a need to change the agency's security leadership. When she took over the agency had just gone through a difficult period, with the Pan Am 103, the ValuJet crash, and TWA 800, and Ms. Garvey looked to the recommendations of the Gore Commissionas the blueprint she needed to focus on for safety (which was a "huge" issue) and security. She believed that Flynn received good cooperation from the agency leadershipinimplementing the Gore security recommendations. She added that the approach ofY2Kwas also a focal point for her, especially because of Congressional criticism ofFAA's preparedness to deal with the problem. [U] With respect to security reporting, Ms. Garvey indicated that Irish Flynn had a"pretty direct line" to both her and Deputy Administrator Belger whenever he needed to discuss anything. She did not receive daily reports, but relied on Flynn to keep her informed and anytime he needed her attention he got it. Ms. Garvey believed Flynn did agood job in keeping her informed on security matters. If there was a problem, she kept
Commission Sensitive [U] As theplanes were being grounded, screeningthedisembarking passengerswas notconsidered. For one thing, given the many planes diverted to small airports in the U.S.andCanada, it is not at all certain that the capacity to do this in any reasonable time frame even existed. Immediate Response to 9/11 [U] Ms. Garvey indicated that in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, her focus was to getthesystemup andrunning again,and topdetermine what security counter-measureswould be need to be undertaken. Sometime in October, she asked the FBI for anintensive briefing on their recommendations as to what needed to be done, based on theirinvestigation of the hijackings. The FAA's liaison to the FBI (Jack Salata) was involved in the briefing. Ms. Garvey recalled that the Bureau provided "evasive" and "imprecise" responses as to whether they had discovered other plots. [U] With respect to reports of a gun having been used in the AAL Flight 11 hijacking, Ms. Garvey did not recall receiving such a report at the time and never believed this hadoccurred, but she subsequently heard about the reports through media accounts and a GAO investigation. When she was presented with several versions of the "ExecutiveSummary" saidtohave been preparedfor her(thefirst twoversionsofwhich citedthe gun report), Garvey did not recall seeing these on the 11 th and possibly not on the 12 th either. [U] Ms.Garveydid recall thattheSecretaryhadreceivedareport, later determinedtohave been "fabricated," of a shredded U.S. airline uniform (with ID stolen) having been found in France. With respect to cockpit jump seat usage, Ms. Garvey had no direct knowledge of any 9/11-related problems, but indicated that the FAA Flight Standards Office was in charge of such access issues and that the airlines had their own policieswith respect to obtaining authorization to use the seats. [U] Garvey recalled much action growingout of therecommendationsof theSecretary'sRapid Response teams, input from the FBI andother sources,in theimmediate aftermath of 9/11. Many, but not all, of these took the form of Security Directives (SD's). Sheremembered briefings and discussions on such issues as disallowance of silverware inFirst Class (on which she had "an interesting conversation with a CEO on knives"), the curbside check-in ban, and cockpit door re-enforcement. [U] Ms. Garvey reported that Sec. Mineta had some tough conversations with airlineCEOs in this period. Garvey was "surprised" to learn of reports that she had "watered down" the initial SD's and believes that all of the items that had been determined to be necessary were included. She recalled that she "might" have questioned some of the details and implementation of some of the SD's issued in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, she did not recall receiving any input from the airlines in that regard. As time wenton, Garvey added, the airline and airport security directors did begin to question the needCommission Sensitive 10
Commission Sensitive for certain counter-measures, such as the 300-foot rule (for parking in front of a terminal)at smaller airports. Lessons Learned [U] Later, Ms. Garvey was made aware that there had been some confusion at theOperations Center at the outset, and that they didn't have the right training for such anemergency, which nothing in the recent past had prepared them to deal with. Belger did a review and focused on such issues as the composition of the Operations Center staffing and the notification of NORAD (which she learned was initially done at a "low level"). As a result, certain FAA policies were changed very quickly. Garvey acknowledged thatthe FAA did not do a very good job of documenting the lessons learned, and while one could see the results of what they learned in the many actions taken in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, she wished they had done more in this regard. [U] Re-opening the national airspace required an ongoing review of the lessons learned,especially with respect to Reagan National Airport, and involved the input from other federal agenciesaswellasother interested parties. [U] Ms. Garvey stated that, with the benefit of hindsight, one could lose sight of thecontext within which the aviation security system was operating on 9/11. She felt thatthey did a good job back then of doing what they knew to do: "we responded well to whatwe then understood the threat to be." She feels that she and others in the system shouldhave done a better job of communicating their actions back then, and the reasons for them. Ms. Garvey believes that the Commission faces a challenge in trying to put itsreport in the perspective and tenor of the pre-9/11 timeframe. Garvey Recommendations 1) Not just with respect to aviation but also more generally, there is a critical need toinstitutionalize the collection and sharing of relevant intelligence. Garvey thoughtthis function probably needs to be centralized, with one entity possessing all of the relevant information for dissemination. 2) There is a continuing need to clarify the roles and responsibilities for aviationsecurity. The airports should have a clear role carved out with respect to perimeter security. There should be federal control of checkpoint screening, butnot necessarily a federal workforce. (Ms. Garvey expressed a concern that theairlines' overriding financial mission would always detract from security, if theywere given responsibility for screening again.)3) Security Boards for airlines is an "interesting idea" (in response to a suggestion from Commission staff). Commission Sensitive 11
Commission Sensitive 4) We need better security training for flight crews (including certification). Ms.Garvey felt that now that the airlines had been relieved of screeningresponsibilities they could focus more on this and other layers of security. 5) The security system needs to retain an element of randomness to defeat determined adversaries. 6) We need more "robust" risk management. (She reported that FAA did this moreintuitively.)CommissionSensitive 12