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Daniel Nash was a pilot for the 102nd Fighter Wing.

TimelineEdit

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(Between 8:30 a.m. and 8:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001: FAA Boston Center Supervisor Alerts Otis Air Base Tower to Flight 11, Requests Fighters

The air traffic control tower at Otis Air National Guard Base. [Source: CapeCodFD.com] Daniel Bueno, a supervisor at the FAA’s Boston Center, calls the air traffic control tower at Otis Air National Guard Base to alert it to the problems with Flight 11 and request military assistance. [FILSON, 2003, PP. 47; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 22] Otis Air Base, at Cape Cod, Massachusetts, is one of NORAD’s seven alert sites in the continental United States, which keeps two armed fighter jets ready for immediate takeoff. [FILSON, 2003, PP. 50; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 17] Supervisor Calls Otis, Violating Protocol - Bueno calls the control tower at Otis even though, according to author Lynn Spencer, he “knows it’s not standard operating procedure to call the military directly—that’s supposed to be done by FAA headquarters.” But he has “checked the FAA regulation manual, and in the back under section FAAO 7610.4J, Appendix 16, it states that fighters can be launched directly at FAA request, so he is going to make that happen. He may not be FAA headquarters, but he is FAA!” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 22] Bueno Requests Fighters, Told to Call NEADS - Bueno tells the controller at the Otis tower that Flight 11 has lost its identification signal and appears to be headed toward Manhattan; it looks like a possible hijacking, and fighter jets are needed, fast. [FILSON, 2003, PP. 47] But the controller tells Bueno that he must follow the protocol, which is to contact NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS). The controller says: “You’ve got to go through the proper channels. They’re the only ones with the authority to initiate a scramble order.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 22] Bueno asks the controller for the telephone number for NEADS. [102ND FIGHTER WING, 2001] Following this call, the tower controller will contact the Otis Air Base operations desk, to let it know that it might be receiving a call from NEADS (see (Between 8:31 a.m. and 8:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 27] Otis Pilots Critical of Bueno - The two alert pilots at Otis Air Base will later criticize Bueno for calling the base directly. One of them, Major Daniel Nash, will complain: “It sounds like the FAA didn’t have their [act] together at all when they were calling the [Otis] tower.… To me, it sounded like there was someone who didn’t know what they were doing.” [BOSTON GLOBE, 9/11/2005] Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Duffy, the other alert pilot, will comment: “It didn’t happen the way it was supposed to.… We were the ones who were contacted right away and knew about it before the air defense sector.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 50] Time of Call Unclear - Bueno also calls the FAA’s Cape Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON), which is located on Otis Air Base, at 8:34 a.m. and requests that fighters be launched from Otis (see 8:34 a.m. September 11, 2001). [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 4/19/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 9/22/2003 ] Whether he makes that call before or after he calls the Otis tower is unstated. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, “the first notification received by the military—at any level—that American 11 had been hijacked” is when the FAA’s Boston Center calls NEADS just before 8:38 a.m. (see (8:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 20] If that is correct, it would indicate that Bueno calls the Otis tower after he calls the Cape TRACON. Entity Tags: Daniel Bueno, Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center, Daniel Nash, Otis Air National Guard Base, Timothy Duffy Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

(Between 8:31 a.m. and 8:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Otis Air Base Tower Controller Contacts Base’s Operations Desk with Details of Hijacking

Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Duffy. [Source: CBC] After being informed of the possible hijacking of Flight 11, an air traffic controller in the control tower at Otis Air National Guard Base calls the base’s operations desk to let it know that it might be receiving a call from NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 27-28] Daniel Bueno, a supervisor at the FAA’s Boston Center, has just called the control tower at Otis Air Base, at Cape Cod, Massachusetts, alerting it to the problems with Flight 11 and requesting military assistance. The controller who took the call told Bueno he needed to call NEADS in order to get fighter jets launched (see (Between 8:30 a.m. and 8:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [FILSON, 2003, PP. 47; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 22] Tower Controller Calls Operations Desk - According to author Lynn Spencer, the tower controller subsequently “figures a call [to Otis Air Base] will be coming from NEADS soon and a scramble order is likely. He knows the fighter pilots will appreciate the heads-up.” He therefore calls the Otis Air Base operations desk. According to Spencer, the phone is answered by Master Sergeant Mark Rose, who is the superintendent of aviation management, in charge of flight records and currency for the pilots of the 102nd Fighter Wing. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 27] But according to the 102nd Fighter Wing’s own history of the 9/11 attacks, the call is answered by a Technical Sergeant “Margie Woody.” [102ND FIGHTER WING, 2001] Controller Confuses Superintendent - Rose (or Woody, if the wing’s account is correct) is initially confused by the call. The tower controller does not identify himself or say where he is calling from, but instead begins by asking, “What do you have available?” As Spencer will describe, “For all [Rose] knows, this could be a wrong number or a crank call,” so rather than giving information about the base, Rose responds, “What are you talking about?” The controller then identifies himself and explains that he has just received a report about a hijacking. Rose realizes he needs to pass the call on to someone more appropriate. Pilot Informed of Hijacking - Pilot Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Duffy, who is the director of operations for the 102nd Fighter Wing, is standing next to Rose by the operations desk. Rose tells him, “Duff, you got a phone call,” and then says the caller is “Otis tower—something about an apparent hijacking under way: American 11, a 767, out of Boston and headed for California.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 27-28] Duffy will later recall his response to this news: “As soon as we heard there was something about a hijacking we got moving.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 50] On his handheld radio he calls Major Daniel Nash, who along with Duffy is an “alert” pilot on duty at this time, and instructs him to suit up ready for any scramble call. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 28] The two pilots will run to the nearby locker room, put on their G-suits and helmets, and then head out toward their jets (see (8:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CAPE COD TIMES, 8/21/2002; BOSTON GLOBE, 9/11/2005] Meanwhile, a commander at Otis will phone NEADS to report the FAA’s request for military assistance (see Shortly After 8:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). Call Is Not 'the First Notification Received by the Military' - The exact time the tower controller calls the operations desk at is unclear. Duffy will later guess that the call occurs “at about 8:30, 8:35.” [FILSON, 10/22/2002; FILSON, 2003, PP. 50] But according to the 9/11 Commission Report, “the first notification received by the military—at any level—that American 11 had been hijacked” is when the FAA’s Boston Center calls NEADS just before 8:38 a.m. (see (8:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 20] According to the102nd Fighter Wing’s history of the 9/11 attacks, the call to the operations desk is made at 8:38 a.m. [102ND FIGHTER WING, 2001] Bueno also called the FAA’s Cape Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON), which is located on Otis Air Base, at 8:34 a.m., to request that fighters be launched from Otis (see 8:34 a.m. September 11, 2001), and in response, the TRACON contacts the Otis tower and operations desk (see (8:36 a.m.-8:41) September 11, 2001). [FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 4/19/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 9/22/2003 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 9/30/2003 ] Entity Tags: Timothy Duffy, Otis Air National Guard Base, Daniel Nash Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

(8:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Fighter Pilots Unofficially Told to Get Ready to Scramble After Flight 11 Edit

in a template

Source:http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a840otisgeready#a840otisgeready

Major Daniel Nash (codenamed Nasty) and Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Duffy (codenamed Duff) are the two F-15 Wikipedia pilots who would scramble after Flight 11. Apparently, they get several informal calls warning to get ready.

According to Nash, at this time, a colleague at the Otis Air National Guard Base tells him that a flight out of Boston has been hijacked, and that he should be on alert.[1] NEADS senior technician Jeremy Powell (informed about the hijacking at 8:37 a.m.), says that he telephones Otis Air National Guard Base soon thereafter to tell it to upgrade its “readiness posture.” [2]

Boston flight control had tried calling the Otis base directly at 8:34 a.m., although the result of that call remains unclear. Duffy recalls being warned:

“I was just standing up by the ops desk and I was told I had a phone call. I asked who it was and they said the [Boston] tower calling and something about a hijacking. It was Flight American 11, a 767 Wikipedia, out of Boston going to California. At the time we ran in and got suited up.”[3] [, 6/3/2002; [1][4]


At NEADS, the mission crew commander Major Kevin Nasypany orders his Weapons Team, which controls the fighters, to put the Otis planes on “battle stations.” This means the two “alert” pilots are “jolted into action by a piercing ‘battle horn.’ They run to their jets, climb up, strap in, and do everything they need to do to get ready to fly short of starting the engines.”[5] NEADS Commander Robert Marr is also reported as having ordered the Otis pilots to battle stations.[6] [7] Duffy confirms, “Halfway to the jets, we got ‘battle stations’… which means to get ready for action.” [3]

The actual scramble order does not come until the pilots are already waiting in the fighters: “We went out, we hopped in the jets and we were ready to go—standby for a scramble order if we were going to get one.” [4] Duffy continues, “I briefed Nasty on the information I had about the American Airlines Flight. About four-five minutes later, we got the scramble order and took off.” </ref name=aw63 />However, the official notification to scramble these fighters does not come until 8:46 a.m.

  1. 1.0 1.1 CAPE COD TIMES. 8/21/2002. http://web.archive.org/web/20031004122117/http:/www.capecodonline.com/special/terror/ithought21.htm. 
  2. NEWHOUSE NEWS SERVICE. 1/25/2002. http://web.archive.org/web/20020219050126/http://www.newhouse.com/archive/story1a012802.html. 
  3. 3.0 3.1 AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY. 6/3/2002. 
  4. 4.0 4.1 BBC. 9/1/2002. 
  5. "9/11 Live: The NORAD tapes". VANITY FAIR. 8/1/2006. 
  6. FILSON (2003). p. 55. 
  7. 9/11 Commission Report,26 July 2004,Page 20


8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001: Otis Fighters Launched toward Flight 11 Two F-15 fighter jets are scrambled from Otis Air National Guard Base in Cape Cod, Massachusetts, which is 153 miles from New York City. The fighters are launched in response to the hijacked Flight 11, but this plane is already crashing into the World Trade Center at this time (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001). [WASHINGTON POST, 9/15/2001; CNN, 9/17/2001; NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/18/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Delay - The FAA’s Boston Center alerted NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) to the hijacking of Flight 11 and requested that fighter jets be scrambled at just before 8:38 a.m. (see (8:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001), but the mission crew commander at NEADS only instructed the leader of his weapons team to launch the Otis fighters at 8:45 a.m. (see 8:45 a.m. September 11, 2001). [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Otis Aircraft Head to Runway - As soon as the pilots at Otis Air Base are strapped into their aircraft, the green light directing them to launch goes on. They start their engines and taxi out of the hangar to the nearest runway. One of the pilots, Lt. Col. Timothy Duffy, radios his command post for guidance, asking, “Do you have words?” The response he gets is, “Possible hijack, American Flight 11, 737, flight level 290 [29,000 feet], over JFK [International Airport in New York City].” (This flight information is partly incorrect, since American 11 is a 767, not a 737.) According to the Cape Cod Times, the jets will be up in the air before their radar kicks in. [CAPE COD TIMES, 8/21/2002; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 42] The Otis pilots have already been preparing for the scramble order to come since learning of the hijacking from the FAA’s Cape Cod facility, some time shortly after 8:34 a.m. (see (8:36 a.m.-8:41) September 11, 2001). [BBC, 9/1/2002; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 27-30] Their jets are reportedly not airborne until seven minutes after being scrambled, at 8:53 a.m. (see 8:53 a.m. September 11, 2001) and there will be conflicting accounts of what their original destination is (see (8:53 a.m.-9:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Entity Tags: Timothy Duffy, Otis Air National Guard Base, Daniel Nash Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(8:53 a.m.-10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Otis Pilots Unclear about What Is Happening After taking off in their F-15s, the two pilots scrambled from Otis Air National Guard Base in response to Flight 11 are not properly informed about the unfolding events. One of these pilots, Lt. Col. Timothy Duffy, later describes, “When you get the scramble order… you are usually not sure what is going on.” However, after they were informed there had been a hijacking (see 8:34 a.m. September 11, 2001), the two “knew it was the real thing,” according to Major Daniel Nash, the other pilot. [FOX NEWS, 9/8/2002] But as they are “headed right down Long Island,” Duffy recalls, “[w]e had no idea what was going on.” [CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 9/10/2006] When the second World Trade Center tower is hit at 9:03, they are unaware that a second plane has been in trouble, and their request for clarification of their mission from NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) is met with “considerable confusion” (see (9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/3/2002; FILSON, 2003, PP. 60-63] (According to the 9/11 Commission, NEADS itself only receives its first notification about a second possible hijacking at 9:03 (see (9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 24 ] ) Furthermore, it is not until after 10:30 a.m. that the two pilots will learn that Washington has also been attacked, when a controller informs them of this in passing, but does not elaborate. [CAPE COD TIMES, 8/21/2002] Nash will later complain: “Anybody watching CNN that morning had a much better idea of what was going on than we did. We were not told anything.” [MICHAEL BRONNER, 2006] Duffy later reflects: “People lose track of how much chaos there was. We were in a situation that was just a mess, you know, and we were trying to get our arms around it a little bit.” [CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 9/10/2006] Entity Tags: Daniel Nash, Timothy Duffy Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(8:53 a.m.-9:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Otis Fighters Head toward New York Area; Accounts Conflict over Exact Destination

Route of the Otis Air National Guard fighters to New York City. [Source: Yvonne Vermillion/ MagicGraphix.com] The two F-15 fighter jets launched from Otis Air National Guard Base in Cape Cod respond to the hijacking of Flight 11, but there will be conflicting accounts regarding their initial destination. The fighters were scrambled at 8:46 (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001), and are airborne by 8:53 (see 8:53 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 20] Flying toward New York City - News reports shortly after 9/11 will say that, after taking off, the Otis fighters begin “racing towards New York City.” [CBS NEWS, 9/14/2001; CNN, 9/14/2001; CAPE COD TIMES, 9/15/2001] Other news reports similarly say they initially head toward New York City. [WASHINGTON POST, 9/12/2001; AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/3/2002; FOX NEWS, 9/8/2002] Major General Larry Arnold, the commanding general of NORAD’s Continental Region, will say the fighters are “coming to New York.” [MSNBC, 9/23/2001; SLATE, 1/16/2002] Lt. Col. Timothy Duffy, the lead Otis pilot, tells the BBC, “When we took off we started climbing a 280-heading, basically towards New York City.” [BBC, 9/1/2002] In one account, Duffy recalls that, after launching, he calls for the location of his target and is told, “Your contact’s over Kennedy,” meaning New York’s JFK International Airport. Duffy will add, “[W]e started heading right down to Long Island, basically.” [ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002; BAMFORD, 2004, PP. 15] In another account, he says that he and the other Otis pilot, Major Daniel Nash, “climbed up, [and] we were supersonic going down to Long Island.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 57] Without a Target, Heading for Military Airspace - According to some accounts, however, the two Otis fighters do not initially head toward Manhattan. Major James Fox, the leader of the weapons team at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), will later recall: “We had no idea where [Flight 11] was. We just knew it was over land, so we scrambled [the Otis fighters] towards land.” [NEWHOUSE NEWS SERVICE, 1/25/2002] The 9/11 Commission will conclude that, after taking off, because they are “Lacking a target,” the fighters are “vectored toward military-controlled airspace off the Long Island coast.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 20] Colonel Robert Marr, the battle commander at NEADS, says that when the Otis fighters took off, his “intent was to scramble [them] to military airspace while we found out what was going on.” He says that, before 9:03 when the second World Trade Center tower is hit, the fighters are “heading down south toward Whiskey 105 and we don’t really have a mission for them at this point.” Whiskey 105 is military training airspace southeast of Long Island, a few minutes flying time from New York City. [FILSON, 2003, PP. 56 AND 58-59] To New York, then Redirected to Military Airspace - Other accounts will say the Otis fighters initially head toward New York City, but are subsequently redirected to the military airspace off Long Island. According to author Lynn Spencer, after taking off, Duffy and Nash fly “supersonic toward New York for approximately 15 minutes.” But just after the second WTC tower is hit, Duffy suggests to the weapons controller at NEADS that the two fighters head to the Whiskey 105 training airspace off Long Island, and that is where they then go. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 83-85] Tape recordings of the NEADS operations floor will reveal that, at 8:45 a.m., Major Kevin Nasypany, the facility’s mission crew commander, gave Major Fox a coordinate north of New York City, and told him to “Head [the Otis jets] in that direction” (see 8:45 a.m. September 11, 2001). Then, at 8:52, he told one of his staff members, “Send ‘em to New York City still” (see 8:53 a.m. September 11, 2001). But, according to Vanity Fair, shortly after the second tower is hit, the NEADS weapons technicians get “pushback” from civilian FAA controllers, who are “afraid of fast-moving fighters colliding with a passenger plane,” so the two fighters are directed to a “holding area” just off the coast, near Long Island (see 9:09 a.m.-9:13 a.m. September 11, 2001). [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Accounts are also unclear regarding what speed the Otis jets fly at after taking off (see (8:53 a.m.-9:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: James Fox, Larry Arnold, Daniel Nash, Robert Marr, Timothy Duffy Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(8:53 a.m.-9:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Otis Fighters Fly toward New York Area; Accounts Unclear over Speed The two F-15 fighter jets that took off from Otis Air National Guard Base in Cape Cod head toward the New York area. But accounts will be unclear regarding what speed they fly at as they respond to the hijacking of Flight 11. The two jets were scrambled from Otis at 8:46 (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001), and are airborne by 8:53 (see 8:53 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 20] Flying Supersonic - In a number of accounts, it is claimed the fighters fly faster than the speed of sound. [CAPE COD TIMES, 8/21/2002] Lead pilot Lt. Col. Timothy Duffy will tell the BBC: “I was supersonic.… I don’t know what we could have done to get there any quicker.” [BBC, 9/1/2002] He tells ABC News, “[W]e go supersonic on the way, which is kind of nonstandard for us.” [ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002] According to author Lynn Spencer, “against regulations, [Duffy] takes his plane supersonic, breaking the sound barrier as he passes through 18,000 feet. This is a violation that can get a pilot into a good deal of trouble since the sonic boom tends to break windows in the homes down below.” When the other Otis pilot, Major Daniel Nash, radios and says, “You’re supersonic,” Duffy responds, “Yeah, I know, don’t worry about it.” Then, “Without hesitation, [Nash] follows his lead” and also goes supersonic. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 43] Flying 'Full Blower' - Duffy will recall, “I was in full blower all the way,” as he flies toward New York. [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/3/2002] In another account, he similarly says, “When we took off I left it in full afterburner the whole time.” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 57] F-15s can fly at up to 1,875 miles per hour. [CAPE COD TIMES, 9/12/2001; US AIR FORCE, 3/2008] According to an Otis Air Base spokeswoman, “An F-15 departing from Otis can reach New York City in 10 to 12 minutes.” [CAPE COD TIMES, 9/16/2001] But, according to the Boston Globe, while “In their prime, the planes can go Mach 2.5 [and] could have been to New York in less than 10 minutes,” Duffy and Nash are “flying F-15 Eagles that were built in 1977.… Because of their age and the three large fuel tanks they were carrying… the planes couldn’t attain that speed, both pilots said.” [BOSTON GLOBE, 9/11/2005] Different Speeds Given - Various speeds will later be given for how fast the Otis jets are traveling. Consistent with Duffy’s claims of flying “supersonic,” ABC News says the two fighters fly “at Mach 1.2, nearly 900 miles per hour.” [ABC NEWS, 9/11/2002] According to the Boston Globe, the fighters are flying at “about Mach 1.4—more than 1,000 miles per hour.” [BOSTON GLOBE, 9/11/2005] Major General Larry Arnold, the commanding general of NORAD’s Continental Region, says they fly at “about 1.5 Mach, which is, you know, somewhere—11 or 1,200 miles an hour.” [MSNBC, 9/23/2001; SLATE, 1/16/2002] Major General Paul Weaver, the director of the Air National Guard, says the jets fly “like a scalded ape,” but as to their exact speed, he only says they are “topping 500 mph.” [DALLAS MORNING NEWS, 9/16/2001] And by 9:03 a.m., when the second World Trade Center tower is hit, the Otis fighters are still 71 miles from New York, according to NORAD. [NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/18/2001] The 9/11 Commission will state that they only arrive over Manhattan at 9:25 a.m. (see 9:25 a.m. September 11, 2001), though accounts of most witnesses on the ground indicate they do not arrive until after 10:00 a.m. (see (9:45 a.m.-10:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 24] Accounts are contradictory regarding what exact destination the Otis jets are initially heading toward after taking off (see (8:53 a.m.-9:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Timothy Duffy, Paul Weaver, Larry Arnold, Daniel Nash Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Contradictions over Otis Fighter Mission and Whereabouts

The minute Flight 175 hits the South Tower, fighter pilot Major Daniel Nash will recall, clear visibility allows him to see smoke pour out of Manhattan, even though NORAD will say he is 71 miles away from there. [CAPE COD TIMES, 8/21/2002] The other Otis pilot, Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Duffy, recalls, “We’re 60 miles out, and I could see the smoke from the towers.” They call NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) for an update, and, as Duffy will recall: “At that point, they said the second aircraft just hit the World Trade Center. That was news to me. I thought we were still chasing American [Airlines Flight] 11.” [ABC NEWS, 9/14/2002] In another account Duffy will relate: “It was right about then when they said the second aircraft had just hit the World Trade Center, which was quite a shock to both [Nash] and I, because we both thought there was only one aircraft out there. We were probably 70 miles or so out when the second one hit. So, we were just a matter of minutes away.” [BBC, 9/1/2002] He asks NEADS for clarification of their mission, but the request is met with “considerable confusion.” [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/3/2002] Bob Varcadipane, a Newark, New Jersey, air traffic controller who sees the Flight 175 crash, will claim: “I remember the two F-15s. They were there moments after the impact. And I was just—said to myself, ‘If only they could have gotten there a couple minutes earlier.’ They just missed it.” [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] However, the 9/11 Commission appears to believe that the pilots never get near New York City at this time. According to the Commission’s account, lacking a clear target, the Otis fighters took off toward military controlled airspace over the ocean, off the coast of Long Island. A map released by the Commission indicates that at 9:03 they are about 100 miles away and heading southwest instead of west to New York City. [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004] Tape recordings of the NEADS operations floor reveal Major Kevin Nasypany telling Colonel Robert Marr, “Fighters are south of—just south of Long Island.” [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] The 9/11 Commission says that, at 9:10 a.m., the FAA’s Boston Center tells the Otis fighters about the second WTC tower being struck. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 459] Entity Tags: Bob Varcadipane, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Robert Marr, Timothy Duffy, World Trade Center, Kevin Nasypany, Daniel Nash Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

9:09 a.m.-9:13 a.m. September 11, 2001: Otis Fighters Remain in Holding Pattern over Ocean instead of Defending New York City The two F-15 fighter jets launched from Otis Air National Guard Base in response to Flight 11 (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001) have been directed to “Whiskey 105,” a military airspace training area over the Atlantic Ocean, just south of Long Island. According to the 9/11 Commission, “To avoid New York area air traffic and uncertain about what to do, the fighters were brought down to military airspace to ‘hold as needed.’ From 9:09 to 9:13, the Otis fighters stayed in this holding pattern.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 20; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 85] Otis pilot Major Daniel Nash will later comment, “Neither the civilian controller or the military controller knew what they wanted us to do.” [CAPE COD TIMES, 8/21/2002] 'Pushback' from FAA Controllers - By 9:08 a.m., Major Kevin Nasypany, the NEADS mission crew commander, had learned of the second World Trade Center crash and wanted to send the Otis fighters to New York City. However, according to Vanity Fair, the NEADS “weapons techs get ‘pushback’ from civilian FAA controllers, who have final authority over the fighters as long as they are in civilian airspace. The FAA controllers are afraid of fast-moving fighters colliding with a passenger plane, of which there are hundreds in the area, still flying normal routes.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 25 ; VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Author Lynn Spencer will add: “[L]ocal FAA controllers are busy shutting down New York’s airspace and are less than eager to grant the fighters access to the civilian airspace. They’re afraid of fast-moving fighters colliding with the hundreds of airliners that are still in the area. Many of those flights are doing unpredictable things just now, such as canceling their flight plans and changing course, and controllers are not convinced that they can provide adequate separation if fast-moving fighters are added to the mix. They just need a few more minutes, they keep saying.” New York Center Not Answering Phone - Nasypany tries contacting the military liaison at the FAA’s New York Center, but no one is answering the phone. According to Spencer, “He wants the Otis fighters over New York, not in military airspace 100 miles off the coast, but he has little choice. Without permission from the FAA to penetrate the civil airspace over New York, NEADS must advise the Otis F-15 pilots… to continue to remain clear of the city.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 111-112] Director Wants Jets 'Closer In' - At 9:10 a.m., the senior director on the NEADS operations floor tells the weapons director, “I want those fighters closer in.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 459] NEADS weapons controller Major Steve Hedrick asks Major James Fox, the weapons team leader, “Can we give [the fighters] a mission?” Fox replies, “Right now their mission is to hold.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 111] Then, at around 9:11 a.m., either the senior weapons director at NEADS or his technician instructs the Otis fighters to “remain at current position [holding pattern] until FAA requests assistance.” Fighters Exit Holding Pattern for New York - Just before 9:13 a.m., the Otis pilots tell their controller at the FAA’s Boston Center that they need to establish a combat air patrol over New York. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 459] According to the 9/11 Commission, “Radar data show that at 9:13, when the Otis fighters were about 115 miles away from the city, the fighters exited their holding pattern and set a course direct for Manhattan” (see 9:13 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 24] Entity Tags: James Fox, Federal Aviation Administration, New York Air Route Traffic Control Center, Kevin Nasypany, Steve Hedrick, Daniel Nash, Northeast Air Defense Sector Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

9:13 a.m. September 11, 2001: Otis Jets Leave Holding Pattern and Head for New York The two F-15s launched from Otis Air National Guard Base in response to Flight 11 finally exit their “holding pattern” off the Long Island coast, and fly directly toward New York. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 26 ] According to the 9/11 Commission, the two fighters had been sent to the military-controlled airspace over the Atlantic Ocean because they lacked a target, and so have been flying in this area for the last few minutes (see 9:09 a.m.-9:13 a.m. September 11, 2001). They are currently about 115 miles from the city. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 20 AND 24] Visibility is extremely clear and Lt. Col. Timothy Duffy, one of the two Otis pilots, will later recall that he can see the World Trade Center towers burning in the distance. He has just called NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) and asked: “What do you want me to do next? What do you need from me right this second?” [CAPE COD TIMES, 8/21/2002; FILSON, 2003, PP. 63] NEADS Takes Control of Airspace - At NEADS, battle commander Colonel Robert Marr had lost patience waiting for approval from the FAA to send the Otis jets to New York, and so has just declared “AFIO” (Authorization for Interceptor Operations) for New York airspace, which gives the military authority to enter that airspace without permission (see (9:12 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 113] Therefore, a couple of minutes after Duffy made his inquiry, NEADS weapons controller Major Steve Hedrick gets back to him to relay the AFIO directive. Hedrick instructs Duffy: “Proceed direct to Manhattan and set up combat air patrol. NORAD has taken over control of the airspace.” Duffy confirms, “Okay, got that.” Fighters Request Lower Altitude Clearance - Duffy, who is currently flying at 20,000 feet, immediately requests clearance from the FAA to fly at lower altitude. He calls its New York Center and identifies himself with his military call sign, saying, “Panta 4-5 needs to go direct to New York City and I need lower [altitude]… right now.” The controller gives him a heading and clears him to descend to 18,000 feet. After the two Otis jets exit military airspace at 9:13, they descend to 18,000 feet and Duffy asks the New York Center controller again for lower altitude clearance. He is given permission to descend to 16,000 feet, and upon further requests is allowed to go down to 11,000 feet. Finally, Duffy insists, “Guys, I need all the way to the surface!” and the controller replies: “Roger. Panta 4-5 is clear all altitudes.” “They just gave us the airspace,” Duffy will later recall. [FILSON, 2003, PP. 63; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 113-114] Conflicting Times - According to the 9/11 Commission, the two Otis fighters will arrive over Manhattan at 9:25 (see 9:25 a.m. September 11, 2001), but numerous witnesses on the ground there will later recall only noticing fighters overhead after 10:00 a.m. (see (9:45 a.m.-10:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 24] Entity Tags: Daniel Nash, New York Air Route Traffic Control Center, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Timothy Duffy, Steve Hedrick Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Otis Pilot Says He Would Shoot Down a Hijacked Aircraft

In answer to a question from a weapons controller at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), one of the pilots that took off in response to Flight 11 confirms that he would be willing to shoot down a hijacked aircraft. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 153] Major Kevin Nasypany, the NEADS mission crew commander, has already checked that his section heads and weapons technicians are prepared to order the shooting down of a civilian aircraft (see (9:19 a.m.) September 11, 2001). At 9:32, after NEADS received a report of a hijacked plane approaching Washington (see 9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001), Major James Anderson asked Nasypany what would happen if they located that aircraft, saying, “Are we gonna shoot him down if they got passengers on board?” [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] Duffy Says He Would Shoot down a Plane - Nasypany wants to be sure that his pilots are willing to follow a shootdown order, should one be issued. He therefore directs his weapons controller who is dealing with the fighter jets launched from Otis Air National Guard Base (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001) to check this. The weapons controller radios Otis pilot Lt. Col. Timothy Duffy and tells him, “If we get another hijack track, you’re going to be ordered to shoot it down.” He then asks, “Do you have a problem with that?” Somewhat startled by the question, Duffy replies, “No—no problem with that.” He reportedly thinks to himself, “If I have a problem with that order, I am in the wrong seat.” According to author Lynn Spencer, Duffy is “doing what he’s been trained to do.… [I]f he gets a legal, lawful order to take out an airliner, then that’s what he’s going to do. He knows every other fighter pilot would do the same.” Duffy and the other Otis pilot that launched with him, Major Daniel Nash, are “confident no plane will get past them: they’ll do what it takes, and follow any order, to protect New York.” [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 153] Duffy will later tell the Boston Globe: “[P]eople have said, ‘Would you have done it [i.e. shot down a hostile airliner]?’ Absolutely, that’s my job.” [BOSTON GLOBE, 9/11/2005] No Shootdown Order Issued - However, according to the 9/11 Commission, NEADS personnel will only learn that NORAD has been cleared to shoot down threatening aircraft at 10:31 a.m. (see 10:31 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 42] And, according to most accounts, the two Otis pilots never receive an order from the military to shoot down an airliner (see (After 9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CAPE COD TIMES, 8/21/2002; BOSTON GLOBE, 9/11/2005] Duffy and Nash will also be contacted by a civilian air traffic controller regarding the possibility of shooting down a hijacked aircraft (see (9:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [BBC, 9/1/2002] Entity Tags: Daniel Nash, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Kevin Nasypany, Timothy Duffy Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(Shortly After 9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Otis Jets Refueled by Tanker out for Training Mission

A KC-135 Stratotanker. [Source: Boeing] The two F-15 fighter jets launched from Otis Air National Guard Base in response to Flight 11 (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001) are finally able to refuel, after they request to rendezvous with a tanker plane that was scheduled to refuel Otis jets out on training missions this morning. [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/3/2002; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 153] By around 9:35 a.m., according to author Lynn Spencer, the two Otis jets are running increasingly low on fuel and need to find a fuel tanker right away. For about the last 25 minutes, technicians at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) have been searching for a tanker (see (9:09 a.m.) September 11, 2001), but the two Otis pilots have apparently not heard back from them about this. Now one of these pilots, Major Daniel Nash, has come up with a solution. Prior to being put on alert duty, he had been acting as the scheduling officer at Otis, and therefore knows that a training mission that Otis jets were scheduled to fly today called for refueling. Consequently, there is a KC-135 tanker plane from Bangor, Maine, that should be available. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 112 AND 152-153] This is presumably one of the eight KC-135s that are attached to the 101st Air Refueling Wing, which is based at Bangor International Airport. [PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, 9/13/2001] It had been scheduled to rendezvous with the Otis fighters on their training mission about 20 minutes from now in “Whiskey 105,” the military training airspace just south of Long Island, where Nash and his fellow Otis pilot Timothy Duffy had earlier been flying in a “holding pattern” (see 9:09 a.m.-9:13 a.m. September 11, 2001). The KC-135 should be on its way there now. Nash calls Duffy and tells him, “[W]e have a tanker scheduled for the training missions this morning off the coast in 105.” Duffy then calls NEADS and requests that the KC-135 orbit at 20,000 feet above New York’s JFK International Airport. Minutes later, NEADS has coordinated with Bangor to borrow the tanker, and the two Otis jets are able to take turns refueling. [GRANT AND THOMPSON, 10/6/2006, PP. 4 ; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 153] According to the 9/11 Commission, the two Otis jets first arrived over Manhattan at 9:25 a.m. (see 9:25 a.m. September 11, 2001), but accounts of most witnesses on the ground indicate they do not arrive there until after 10:00 a.m. (see (9:45 a.m.-10:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 24] Entity Tags: Daniel Nash, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Timothy Duffy, 101st Air Refueling Wing Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(After 9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Otis Pilots Reportedly Never Receive Shootdown Order, though One Account Suggests Otherwise According to most accounts, the two fighter jets launched from Otis Air National Guard Base in response to the hijacked Flight 11 (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001) never receive an order from the military to shoot down hostile aircraft. However, one account will suggest otherwise. [CAPE COD TIMES, 8/21/2002; FILSON, 2003, PP. 70; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 42-44; BOSTON GLOBE, 9/11/2005] According to the 9/11 Commission, personnel at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) learn that NORAD has been cleared to shoot down threatening aircraft at 10:31 a.m., but they do not pass this order on to the fighter pilots (see 10:31 a.m. September 11, 2001). The only order conveyed to the pilots is to “ID type and tail” of hostile aircraft. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 42-43] In 2005, the Boston Globe will report that the two Otis pilots, Major Daniel Nash and Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Duffy, “stressed that they never had orders to shoot down any of the [hijacked] planes.” [BOSTON GLOBE, 9/11/2005] However, in October 2002, Duffy will tell author Leslie Filson that, while flying over Manhattan, he and Nash “were given clearance to kill over their radio frequencies, but to this day aren’t sure who gave that order. Was it NEADS or a civilian air traffic controller?” [FILSON, 2003, PP. 70, 89] At around 9:35 a.m., NEADS radioed Duffy to check he would be prepared to shoot down a hijacked aircraft (see (9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 153] And at some point, a civilian air traffic controller tells the two Otis pilots that if another plane is hijacked, it will have to be shot down (see (9:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CAPE COD TIMES, 8/21/2002] Entity Tags: Timothy Duffy, Daniel Nash, Northeast Air Defense Sector Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(9:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001: FAA Controller Tells Otis Pilots They May Have to Shoot down a Hijacked Aircraft

An F-16 flies over New York City on September 12, 2001. Smoke is still rising from the World Trade Center. [Source: Air National Guard] An air traffic controller at the FAA’s New York Center radios the pilots launched from Otis Air National Guard Base in response to Flight 11 (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001) and tells them they may have to take out a hijacked aircraft. One of the two Otis pilots, Major Daniel Nash, will later recall, “The New York controller did come over the radio and say if we have another hijacked aircraft we’re going to have to shoot it down.” [BBC, 9/1/2002] However, he will add that this is just “an off-the-cuff statement.” [CAPE COD TIMES, 8/21/2002] It is unclear at what time this communication occurs, though a BBC documentary will place it at about the time the South Tower collapses, which would be around 9:59 a.m. [BBC, 9/1/2002] NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) has already radioed one of the Otis pilots to check that he is prepared to shoot down a hijacked aircraft (see (9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 153] But according to most accounts, the two pilots never receive an order from the military to shoot down hostile aircraft (see (After 9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 43; BOSTON GLOBE, 9/11/2005] Entity Tags: New York Air Route Traffic Control Center, Timothy Duffy, Daniel Nash Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(2:15 p.m.) September 11, 2001: Fighters Land Back at Otis Air Base after Flying Patrol over New York The two F-15 fighter jets that launched from Otis Air National Guard Base in Cape Cod, Massachusetts, in response to the hijacked Flight 11 (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001) land back at their base after flying a combat air patrol (CAP) over New York City. [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/3/2002; FILSON, 10/2/2002] The F-15s, which belong to the 102nd Fighter Wing of the Massachusetts Air National Guard, are piloted by Major Daniel Nash and Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Duffy. [ROSENFELD AND GROSS, 2007, PP. 35] Fighters Intercepted about 100 Aircraft - Duffy and Nash’s job during the CAP was to identify and divert all aircraft from the Manhattan area. Duffy will later recall, “We would pull up next to them and tip our wings or fly across in front of them to get them to leave the area.” [102ND FIGHTER WING, 2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 1/7/2004 ] He will say that during their time flying over Manhattan, “All of the sudden, you get contacts coming toward the city that are unidentified and aren’t talking to anybody, and we were getting real nervous.” [FILSON, 10/22/2002] Duffy will estimate that the two fighters intercepted and escorted about 100 aircraft in total, including emergency, military, and news helicopters, plus dozens of small private planes whose pilots were unaware of the attacks on New York. Some of those pilots had seen the smoke over the city and decided to investigate. [AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/3/2002; CAPE COD TIMES, 8/21/2002] One Fighter over Manhattan at All Times - Duffy and Nash had alternated their responsibilities, so that one of them would remain over Manhattan at all times while the other would intercept aircraft or be refueled by a tanker plane over the ocean (see (Shortly After 9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). After flying the CAP for about two hours, they were joined by a couple more F-15s from Otis Air Base. While those jets flew at around 18,000 feet, Nash and Duffy remained at around 10,000 feet. [CAPE COD TIMES, 8/21/2002; FILSON, 10/2/2002; FILSON, 10/22/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 1/7/2004 ] Eventually, after several hours flying over Manhattan, Nash and Duffy were ordered to return to their base. Base Hectic with Activity - Upon landing, they find that Otis Air Base is very different to how it was when they took off. Rows and rows of their unit’s fighters are lined up near the runway, surrounded by about 100 maintenance personnel who are frantically working to prepare the aircraft for battle. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 273-274] Armed security officers in flak jackets are guarding every entrance to the base; personnel are swarming in the buildings; and officers are trying to locate all the reserve pilots. Pilot Learns of Pentagon Attack - The two fighter pilots had been poorly informed about what was going on regarding the terrorist attacks, and were only told in passing by an air traffic controller that there had been an attack in Washington (see (8:53 a.m.-10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). After he gets out of his plane, Nash is informed by a crew member that an aircraft crashed into the Pentagon. [CAPE COD TIMES, 8/21/2002; MICHAEL BRONNER, 2006] Nash and Duffy subsequently go to their unit’s “intelligence shop” and describe what they have done since taking off from the base hours earlier. [FILSON, 10/2/2002] Entity Tags: Timothy Duffy, Daniel Nash, Otis Air National Guard Base, 102nd Fighter Wing Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

(Shortly After 2:15 p.m.) September 11, 2001: After Landing at Otis Air Base, Fighter Pilot Told of Plane Shot Down over Pennsylvania One of the pilots of the two F-15s from the 102nd Fighter Wing that took off in response to the hijacked Flight 11 (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001) is told by a colleague that the military has shot down an aircraft over Pennsylvania. After the fighter pilots, Major Daniel Nash and Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Duffy, land at Otis Air National Guard Base in Cape Cod, Massachusetts, having spent the past few hours flying a combat air patrol over New York (see (2:15 p.m.) September 11, 2001), a “bunch of people” at the base start telling them “what was going on,” Nash will later recall. A crew chief tells Nash that an F-16 fighter jet shot down a fourth airliner over Pennsylvania. Nash will comment, “Obviously that wasn’t true, so there were lots of rumors floating around.” [CAPE COD TIMES, 8/21/2002; FILSON, 10/2/2002] Some early news reports suggested the possibility of a plane having been shot down by the US military (see 11:28 a.m.-11:50 a.m. September 11, 2001). [FORBES, 9/11/2001; TCM BREAKING NEWS, 9/11/2001] But the Pentagon has by now informed the White House that the military did not shoot down Flight 93 over Pennsylvania (see (Shortly After 12:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001). [WASHINGTON POST, 1/27/2002; MSNBC, 9/11/2002]

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