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11 October 2010 - Afternoon session
1 (2.00 pm) 2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Sorry for the delay in resuming, 3 there were some technical hiccups, I understand. Yes, 4 Mr Keith? 5 MR KEITH: My Lady, before the short adjournment I was 6 dealing with the question of the bombs themselves and 7 the links to the bombers. Together with the outline of 8 the movements of the bombers and their links to the cars 9 and to Alexandra Grove and to the deadly equipment that 10 was found, must also of course be considered other 11 relevant evidence relating to the proximity of the four 12 men to the explosions and other evidence relating to 13 their intentions. 14 There are a number of strands all linking them to 15 the bombs, although I intend to do no more than outline 16 what they are, as we are not, of course, concerned with 17 their inquests, but there are a number of strands. 18 Firstly, exhaustive police enquiries established 19 clear links between Tanweer, Khan and Lindsay and the 20 places from which hydrogen peroxide was purchased 21 after February 2005. Between 22 February and 22 15 June 2005, there were 41 telephone contacts between 23 mobile phones attributed to Tanweer, Khan and Lindsay 24 and hydroponic outlets, that is to say places selling 25 hydrogen peroxide. Hussain's computer at college
1 revealed the names of two particular shops for which he 2 had searched online, and business cards and other 3 literature found at Alexandra Grove related to other 4 such similar shops. 5 Secondly, there is the CCTV and mobile phone 6 evidence of the reconnaissance mission on 28 June 2005. 7 Thirdly, we will hear in due course the expert 8 opinion of the pathologists to the effect that all four 9 men were in possession of explosive devices at the time 10 that they exploded. This is confirmed by the evidence 11 from an anthropologist, who reconstructed, as far as she 12 was able, the remaining parts of their bodies. 13 If there were any residual doubts, these are further 14 answered by two other pieces of evidence: Tanweer's 15 so-called last will and testament, which appeared a year 16 later on the internet, in which he seeks to justify 17 attacks, and the footage of Khan which appeared on 18 Al Jazeera, on 1 September 2005, to similar effect. 19 Those parts of the videos that showed them at any 20 rate must of course have been prepared prior to 7 July, 21 and thus, on account of their content, demonstrate that 22 their views had been held for some time. Indeed, the 23 release of the videos reinforces the terrorist dimension 24 of the attacks. They were made to be released following 25 the attacks themselves.
1 The bombers thus knew what they were doing and knew 2 they would die. 3 It is also likely that they deliberately intended 4 their identities to be discovered and also that the 5 links between them should be revealed, because there 6 were left in the carriages, a little way away from the 7 rucksacks, documents establishing their names. 8 Documents belonging to Khan were found not only in 9 the carriage at Edgware Road but also in the Aldgate 10 carriage. There was a credit card in his name found and 11 a Halifax Current Account Switch Card. In 12 Tavistock Square police found a wallet with identifiable 13 documents belonging to Khan. 14 My Lady, I have mentioned this evidence because 15 a number of unlikely conspiracy theories have been aired 16 in the press and on the internet. One particular 17 campaigning group has submitted voluminous submissions 18 to the Inquest team, and the submissions reflect 19 long-held views expressed on the website, that website, 20 to the effect that there are a large number of anomalies 21 that merit detailed attention. 22 We consider it important that such claims are 23 identified and addressed, many of the claims were 24 helpfully identified and summarised in the written 25 submissions advanced before you in April by
1 Kingsley Napley. 2 Where such claims do not appear to be supported by 3 the evidence that has been gathered, there is, we feel, 4 a danger that the continuation of such claims might 5 needlessly distress the bereaved families as well as 6 detracting attention away from the issues that you have 7 identified as being worthy of further investigation. 8 My Lady, as you know, the law does not oblige you to 9 conduct an inquisition into every stated rumour and 10 suspicion. There must be a reasonable basis in evidence 11 for such a suspicion before any coroner can be expected 12 to conduct an inquisition into it. 13 There is no evidence at all that we have seen to 14 suggest that the bombers were duped in some way so that 15 they did not know that they were going to die or, even 16 more absurdly, that they did not know that they were 17 carrying explosives at all. Indeed, such claims run 18 entirely contrary to all the evidence that I have 19 summarised so far. 20 It is right to say that the bombers were 21 surprisingly effective, it would seem, in concealing 22 their intentions from those around them. Tanweer played 23 cricket in the evening before putting the terrible plot 24 into effect and seemed more concerned, according to his 25 family, by the loss of his mobile phone.
1 Khan's wife was, of course, pregnant and he attended 2 hospital with her on 5 July. The evidence shows that he 3 appears to have had his car serviced the previous day 4 and he even went to the lengths of providing the parts 5 and the oil for that service. 6 Hussain told his mother that he was going to London 7 but would return to Leeds the following day. 8 Lindsay, who was married, spent his last few weeks 9 endeavouring to pursue a new relationship with a girl he 10 had met in June and tried to persuade her to spend the 11 night of 6 July with him in London. He may also have 12 been involved in criminal activity. 13 On 27 May, just five weeks before, Luton police 14 received a call from a man to the effect that there was 15 a gunman in his flat. When armed police arrived, 16 neither the owner of the flat, presumably the person who 17 called, nor the gunman were there. All had fled. 18 Then a member of the public called in to say he had 19 seen three males, two black and one Asian, wearing 20 balaclavas and running down the road and he saw one of 21 them holding a handgun. They got into a car and he 22 managed to the a note of the car registration number, 23 and it was a Fiat, R662 DSF. Lindsay's car. 24 The police marked on the police national computer an 25 interest in the car and requested that it be stopped if
1 it was sighted. They then also went to the address of 2 the registered keeper, Lindsay's address in Aylesbury 3 that we've seen on the map, but there was no reply. 4 A crime report was filed and an investigation 5 commenced. They did a silent drive-by past the address 6 again that night, but the car wasn't seen and was not 7 subsequently traced. 8 They drove past again the following day, but the 9 investigation went nowhere, I think primarily because 10 the victim of the armed robbery, or whatever it had 11 been, could neither be identified nor traced, and the 12 red Fiat Brava was not seen again until it was found in 13 the Luton car park after 7 July 2005. 14 It is entirely speculative, but there must exist the 15 possibility that, had Lindsay been apprehended and 16 arrested, his plans might have been disrupted. We will 17 never know. But may I say that, at your direction, 18 Mr Smith has written to the Chief Constable of 19 Bedfordshire asking what happened to that investigation 20 and to see what lessons, if any, can be learned. 21 The activities of the bombers, though superficially 22 out of place, are in our view entirely consistent of 23 course with their apparent determination to conceal 24 their activities. The rental of the Nissan Micra for 25 four days from the 4th to the 8th and the purchase of
1 return tickets, if that is indeed what they bought, are 2 further examples. Nor have we seen anything to support 3 the notion that the plot was monitored by one or more 4 domestic or foreign secret services, and was allowed to 5 happen in order for such agencies to exploit the 6 situation politically. 7 More prosaically, we have seen no evidence to 8 suggest that the explosions were connected to any sort 9 of power surge -- that the Aldgate explosion caused 10 extensive power cuts is an issue that I will return to 11 shortly -- or that the explosions took place under the 12 trains and thus had nothing to do with the bombers, or 13 that they were connected to fictional events aired on 14 a Panorama programme in May 2004, or to a fictional 15 terrorism training exercise that had been carried out 16 apparently that same morning by a private crisis 17 management company. 18 The suggestion in some quarters that the explosions 19 may have been caused by some sort of electrical failure 20 is contrary to the injuries, the forensic evidence and 21 the obvious fact that there were four connected 22 explosions, of which one of which occurred on a bus, 23 nowhere near any electrical source in plain sight of 24 those around it. 25 Turning to the CCTV which appears to be the object
1 of the substantial bulk of the claims, there is nothing 2 to suggest that, where there is CCTV missing, this 3 reflects anything other than the fact that many CCTV 4 systems do not continuously record. Hence, there is no 5 mystery in the fact that the CCTV at Woodall Services is 6 not continuous or that the CCTV at Luton railway station 7 appears superficially to cut part of Lindsay's leg off 8 or that several frames appear to place the railings 9 outside the station in front of Tanweer. 10 What would, we rhetorically ask, be the point in 11 anybody fabricating CCTV evidence showing them at Luton 12 when later CCTV evidence, not apparently fabricated or 13 challenged, proves them to be at King's Cross? 14 A number of other questions have been raised over 15 time concerning whether others were warned in advance 16 about 7/7 or may have had some idea of what would befall 17 London and whether there was a fifth bomber. I had 18 mentioned the fact that there may have been two cars at 19 Alexandra Grove, but a particular allegation surfaced at 20 one time in relation to a man whose extradition was 21 requested by the United States in relation to unrelated 22 matters and whether he was a "fifth man", quote. 23 Issues have also been raised whether the emergency 24 response was materially affected by the events taking 25 place at the G8 summit.
1 These issues, by contrast, whilst unlikely to have 2 much substance, do at least overlap to some extent with 3 the issues that you have directed we should look at. 4 They may have some reasonable basis, although we have 5 seen no evidence to support them so far, but they are 6 thus worthy of further investigation. They will be 7 addressed when we get to preventability and the generic 8 response of the emergency services. 9 My Lady, may I then turn to the first half an hour 10 of the events of 7 July 2005 and the timings? 11 In doing so, I shall address the precise effect of 12 the explosion of the Aldgate bomb in particular, because 13 that was the bomb that set the scene for the events that 14 followed thereafter insofar as the emergency services 15 are concerned, but of course we are concerned with all 16 four equally. 17 It's necessary to look at Aldgate because the way in 18 which that explosion affected the London Underground 19 system may shed light on the initial reaction of the 20 London Underground staff and the way in which the 21 emergency services responded thereafter. 22 In the course of describing the first half an hour 23 or so, it will become apparent that it is almost 24 impossible to separate out entirely the responses by 25 each of the emergency services to each bomb, given that
1 the calls and the responses are, of course, centrally 2 recorded. 3 There are also differences in the timings of the 4 records kept by the various services. Self-evidently, 5 they are not calibrated to any one time source, and so 6 the records from each of the different organisations 7 differ insofar as they may be recording the same events. 8 We have endeavoured to prepare time lines for each 9 scene to which I'll make reference in a moment. But it 10 has proved to be extremely difficult to be certain of 11 any of the precise times because, as I say, of the 12 difficulties in recording them. 13 Three bombs exploded in the Tube. One between 14 Liverpool Street and Aldgate station on the outer rail, 15 that is to say the eastbound rail of the Circle Line [INQ10280-4], [INQ10280-6], 16 and we have on the screen there a picture or a schematic 17 diagram of Aldgate, a very broad map showing Aldgate in 18 relation to King's Cross station and, in the bottom 19 right-hand corner, the relevant section of the 20 Circle Line showing from King's Cross going eastbound to 21 Farringdon, Barbican, Liverpool Street and Aldgate 22 station. 23 My Lady, you will see on that Tube map on the bottom 24 right-hand corner that one of the lines, I think it's 25 Metropolitan, but I will be corrected if I'm wrong,
1 deviates away from the Circle Line just before Aldgate 2 station on the Circle Line and Aldgate East station on 3 the other line and we'll see in due course where the 4 tracks separate in the tunnel. 5 The second bomb exploded between Edgware Road and 6 Paddington stations on the inner rail, that is to say 7 the westbound rail of the Circle Line [INQ10282-4]. 8 We can see there the map on the right-hand side of 9 the screen showing Edgware Road station in 10 contradistinction to King's Cross and the platforms 11 which we'll be looking at in greater detail in due 12 course of the London Underground station showing 13 platforms 1, 2, 3 and 4. 14 Just so that we can get our bearings, the platforms 15 are on the east side of the London Underground station 16 so the platforms show, as we can see here, the railway 17 lines going from east to west, on the right-hand side of 18 the page that is the railway lines of the tracks going 19 towards Baker Street eastbound. We are, of course, 20 concerned with events on the west side of the station, 21 but the platforms don't happen to be there, which is why 22 the platforms are where they are on this screen. 23 The third bomb in the underground exploded between 24 King's Cross and Russell Square station, on the 25 westbound road, that is to say the westbound rail of the
1 Piccadilly Line [INQ10283-7]. We can see from this screen, on the 2 left-hand side, the schematic diagram showing 3 King's Cross -- again, we'll become familiar in due 4 course with all the platforms and the various levels to 5 that Tube station, but in the box in the bottom 6 left-hand corner of the page, you can see there 7 a schematic diagram showing the approximate point of the 8 explosion and the location of the train as it departed 9 from King's Cross on its westbound journey. 10 Scrolling back out of the document, looking at the 11 whole page, we can see on the right-hand side an 12 expanded version of that segment showing how the train 13 had just passed the junction, as you can see, adjacent 14 to the number 5, the first carriage is at the bottom of 15 the page and the carriages are numbered sequentially. 16 As with the two other explosions in the 17 London Underground system, the trains, of course -- the 18 train, in this case, moved forward past the point of the 19 explosion and, therefore, the diagram shows that the 20 train had moved past the point at which the explosion 21 had occurred. It took place in carriage 1, and we can 22 see the point on the diagram, but by the time the train 23 stopped carriage 1 had moved further to the westbound or 24 southbound side of the explosion point. 25 When the bomb on the eastbound Circle Line -- that
1 is to say between Liverpool Street and Aldgate -- 2 exploded, it damaged cables running along the tunnel 3 wall including an 11-kilo volt cable that runs between 4 Moorgate electricity substation and a distribution point 5 at a place called Mansell Street known as Feeder 642. 6 The damage to the cables caused the transformers, 7 the electrical transformers at the distribution point in 8 Mansell Street to trip, causing widespread power 9 disruption. The trip knocked out the traction current 10 and signal supplies to the entirety of the East London 11 line as well as the traction supplies for the 12 District Line from Whitechapel to Embankment and the 13 signal supplies between Bow Road and Tower Hill. They 14 also caused plant fault, electrical plant faults, on the 15 Piccadilly and Victoria Lines. 16 Those electrical disruptions were significant and 17 they explain why it was initially thought that the cause 18 of the disruption was a power failure or a power surge, 19 because, as we'll hear, numerous members of 20 London Underground staff called in to the control room 21 and sent radio messages to the effect that the lights 22 were out, escalators had stopped, and there had been 23 a complete power failure. 24 In addition, when the bombs exploded, they caused 25 the tunnel telephone circuits to operate for the three
1 sections of the traction current. Let me say something 2 about that and explain what those references are. 3 The tunnel telephone circuits are part of a failsafe 4 system in which the London Underground tunnels carry, we 5 understand, two 50-volt copper wires four inches apart 6 down the inside of all the tunnels. If the wires are 7 pinched together or otherwise short-circuited, the much 8 greater direct current in the traction, the traction 9 current, is cut off. 10 Two of the explosions caused the copper wires to 11 short-circuit directly, either because debris from the 12 explosions themselves cut the wires and caused them to 13 touch, or because, as London Underground believed 14 initially at Edgware Road, the train may have hit the 15 tunnel wall and caused the wires to knock together. 16 I should also add that some persons have wondered 17 why the explosive force of the bombs did not cause 18 fires. We are informed and we may hear evidence in due 19 course that, after the King's Cross fire in November of 20 1987, which you will recall, my Lady, was reported upon 21 by Sir Desmond Fennell OBE, London Underground took 22 steps to ensure that the combustible nature of trains 23 and seats and so on was reduced as much as possible. 24 I've said that two of the explosions caused the 25 copper wires to short-circuit directly. The two
1 explosions where that happened were the section on the 2 southbound Piccadilly Line between Holloway Road and 3 Russell Square, but in relation to the westbound section 4 of the Circle Line between Bouverie Place and 5 Paddington, ie the inner rail, what tripped was not, in 6 fact, the wire adjacent to the carriage which had 7 exploded, but a wire on the other rail which then caused 8 a power failure which caused the other side of the 9 tunnel to trip. 10 The point of this is that the trips provide us with 11 an exact time in two out of the three cases for the 12 moments of the explosion. Transport for London has 13 computed the exact times of those power trips from 14 time-stamped paper printouts which are generated in the 15 control room when such trips occur. They have also then 16 been adjusted to give the time according to the Atomic 17 time. 18 The London Underground power control desk to which 19 I've made reference are the desks where 20 London Underground monitor and run various parts of the 21 London Underground system insofar as the power is 22 concerned. 23 So looking at each of the sites in turn, the 24 Circle Line, the westbound inner rail section, tripped 25 at 08.49.00, that is to say the inner rail -- not the
1 outer rail where the explosion occurred, but the inner 2 rail -- but it can only have been tripped by force of 3 the explosion on the other rail. So we can say with 4 confidence that the explosion at Aldgate occurred at 5 that moment, 08.49.00. 6 The Piccadilly Line westbound section tripped 7 between Holloway Road and Russell Square at 08.49.48 8 and, two seconds later, the indicators in the control 9 room that indicated that the track had current in it 10 were also extinguished. 11 The Circle Line tripped westbound between 12 Baker Street and Bouverie Place, incorporating the 13 section of the track where the explosion on the 14 westbound Circle Line occurred, but no absolute time can 15 be computed for that explosion because there is 16 a variant of plus or minus 30 seconds or so in the 17 process by which the printout in the control room prints 18 out the time stamp of the moment of the trip. 19 But the time was somewhere around 08.49.43. 20 For some unknown reason -- perhaps to cause maximum 21 devastation in the morning rush hour -- it seems that 22 the bombers intended to explode all four bombs at the 23 same time, namely, 49 minutes past the hour, and we say 24 that because it's notable that Hussain, whose failure to 25 detonate his bomb I've outlined, and who then went
1 searching, it would seem, for a battery, detonated his 2 bomb almost exactly an hour later. 3 My Lady, may I now then turn to the position as far 4 as London Underground is concerned, and look for a while 5 at the reaction of the Network Control Centre, which is 6 the operational control centre of London Underground. 7 Looking back from the vantage point of each 8 organisation gives perhaps a more accurate 9 representation of what they faced, because the time 10 lines that we've prepared show a seamless movement in 11 all the times and the events and therefore are somewhat 12 unrealistic, they're slightly misleading, because they 13 introduce a seamlessness that doesn't, in fact, reflect 14 the reality at the time. 15 In a moment or two, I intend to play some of the 16 calls to and from the Network Control Centre of 17 London Underground and to look at some of the Transport 18 for London documentation. 19 Before I do so, may I emphasise a couple of points? 20 The audio recordings that we intend to play do not 21 include calls coming in simultaneously, but which 22 weren't recorded, or calls to mobiles or other incident 23 rooms and, moreover, they are, as I've said, a selection 24 of the recordings that have been made available to us by 25 Transport for London.
1 Secondly, for those who follow these recordings on 2 Lextranet, which is the data system that we are 3 operating in these proceedings, the times on the exhibit 4 front sheets for each of those audio recordings may 5 differ, in fact, from the actual time that the calls 6 were made; firstly, because they may reflect the times 7 that the calls ended rather than the time at which the 8 calls commenced and, subsequently, the times have been 9 amended through the good offices of Transport for London 10 to reflect a more accurate Atomic time rather than 11 a time that the system recorded. 12 Just after 08.49, just before 10 to 9, the 13 Metropolitan Line controller called the eastern power 14 desk at the London Underground power control room to 15 report that all the lights at Aldgate had gone off and 16 that the station was in sheer darkness. The power room 17 was told that both Circle Lines, that is to say the 18 inner and outer rails, had gone off as well as the 19 signals [TFL20-49], [TFL20-50]. 20 So we can see there, a telephone conversation: 21 "Hello. 22 "What we lost at Moorgate? 23 "Both the Aldgate roads [the roads are the technical 24 terminology for the tracks] by the look ... and the 25 signals.
1 "Yeah, 'cause all the stations gone out as well down 2 there, the station's in sheer darkness ... 3 "We've had a trip somewhere ... 4 "We've lost traction between Moorgate and Aldgate 5 and signal roads as well." 6 So they've lost traction on the section that that 7 particular traction current dealt with, namely, the part 8 of the track between Moorgate and Aldgate, and the 9 signal roads, namely the signals for those tracks as 10 well. 11 "... let me know when you're in a position to reset 12 the TTs ..." 13 The TTs are the telephone tunnels, the failsafe trip 14 system to which I've already made reference. 15 This is the first call and thereafter calls followed 16 between other controllers and the power control room at 17 London Underground [TFL20-52]. Here is an example of one between 18 the District Line controller and the eastern desk power 19 control room operator, Mr Brimson. They've got no power 20 at Whitechapel to Tower, the rectifiers have tripped, 21 and he's lost signals between Tower and Whitechapel and 22 between Whitechapel and Campbell Road. 23 At 08.50, the London Underground Network Control 24 Centre [INQ8577-3]in Broadway in Victoria received a call to say 25 that there had been a loss of traction current at
1 Moorgate. The document on your screen, my Lady, is the 2 network operations log in which a very brief log is made 3 of each of the events as they occur. They are 4 replicated in other material elsewhere, they are 5 electric maintained documents which record events, but 6 these have a very brief summary of the times and the 7 events as they happen. 8 If we can enlarge the left-hand side of the page, we 9 can see "08.50, Met", Metropolitan Line, "Moorgate", on 10 the right-hand side, "lost TC", traction current. 11 "08.51, explosion Liverpool Street?", and then under 12 that "Met. Explosion on train [Liverpool Street - 13 Aldgate] Liverpool - Aldgate", and then there's 14 a reference to Old Street substation, the electrical 15 substation that provides electricity for the 16 underground . 17 Then at the bottom of the page, we can see at 08.59, 18 nine minutes later, under the heading of "Contact and 19 Place", "Station Edgware Road", "Particulars of 20 message", being the right-hand column: 21 "Train hit tunnel wall." 22 That's because the first information received by 23 London Underground in relation to Edgware Road was the 24 possibility of the fact that the train had hit a tunnel 25 wall.
1 At 09.01 on the top right-hand corner of that log: 2 "Met DOM", Metropolitan Line duty manager. "Person 3 under train?" Then under that, a message from somebody 4 called Steve Goz, who we believe to be a witness, 5 Mr Gozka, from whom we'll hear in due course: 6 "Walking wounded. Train hit wall - investigating 7 further." 8 Then 09.09: 9 "Explosion Moorgate - Mansion Street?" 10 Then, in fact, the story will be taken up by other 11 documents, but we can see, just to note it, because 12 we'll be coming back to it later, there is a reference 13 at 09.11 to a loud bang at Russell Square platform, and 14 also a reference to "X", possibly explosion, 15 "Russell Square, King's Cross", and then 09.19, to 16 "Code Amber" which was the system by which all services 17 on the London Underground were suspended and trains are 18 then thereafter ordered to proceed to the nearest place 19 where they can safely stop. 20 Can I, with that introduction to the 21 London Underground documents, say that it's around the 22 time, 08.50, going back to the left-hand side of that 23 page, please, that the London Ambulance Service receive 24 a call from the British Transport Police to attend 25 Liverpool underground station, and I'm going to show
1 you, if I may, the BTP transcript to give you some idea 2 of the material. 3 This is a document taken from the 4 British Transport Police files which shows a call ending 5 at 08.50.01: 6 "London Ambulance Service: London Ambulance Service. 7 "Hello, it's the BTP [British Transport Police] 8 here. 9 "Hello. 10 "Can we have your attendance, please, to 11 Liverpool Street as a precaution at Liverpool Street 12 underground station ... 13 "We believe there may have been an explosion at that 14 location. 15 "An explosion." 16 The timing of that, my Lady, is 08.50.01 and to give 17 you an example of how the documents differ, the London 18 Ambulance Service log, which I won't show up on this 19 occasion, refers to the call being made at 08.51.59, 20 almost two minutes later, but it's impossible to 21 calibrate whether that's because different systems 22 record the times at different times in the particular 23 call, and I'll come back to the London Ambulance Service 24 a little later. 25 Could we then look, please, at some of the
1 recordings of the calls to the Network Control Centre in 2 the London Underground offices in Broadway? 3 Mr Hay and Mr O'Connor, Mr Andrew O'Connor, to whom 4 I, again, am greatly indebted, have prepared schedules 5 of these recordings, as well as the time lines to which 6 we'll come in due course. We may have a problem with 7 the Trial Director. 8 My reference is INQ10483. 9 We'll come back to the schedule. 10 If I can just simply say something about the first 11 entries on it. At 08.52, so two minutes after the first 12 time that I gave, the Network Control Centre manager 13 reports to the Hammersmith & City duty office manager 14 that there has been an explosion at Liverpool Street and 15 at Edgware Road, and the log, or rather the audio 16 recordings kept by the Network Control Centre, show that 17 one of the persons to that call makes reference to 18 a call from the driver of the train, the Aldgate train, 19 Mr Batkin, who had been able to report in to the duty 20 office manager an explosion on his train, in fact a loud 21 bang, between Liverpool Street and Aldgate. 22 About a minute later, the Network Control Centre is 23 informed -- there we are, thank you very much -- at 24 08.53.09, the second entry, of a TT, a telephone tunnel 25 trip, at Holloway Road/Russell Square West, and then, at
1 08.53.28, the supervisor at Aldgate station, 2 Celia Harrison, contacts the control centre to report 3 a big explosion at Aldgate on platform 2, and she refers 4 to train 447. 5 She talks, in fact, in the call of an explosion at 6 the end of the train nearest Liverpool Street, whereas, 7 in fact, of course, the train is proceeding from 8 Liverpool Street to Aldgate, and she's asked whether or 9 not she's aware of any injuries. She says she's not 10 aware of anybody injured yet, but she asks the Control 11 Centre to call the emergency services. 12 Coincidentally, and fortunately, the 13 British Transport Police have one of their officers in 14 Aldgate station itself, so the moment there was a loss 15 of power, the British Transport Police officers were 16 able to come downstairs and she refers to the fact that 17 they are there. 18 From the way in which she describes the train, it 19 must have been apparent to the Control Centre that she's 20 talking about a train going from Aldgate to 21 Liverpool Street, which was in fact incorrect. 22 The electronic log finally before hearing these 23 recordings for 7 July, on the part of 24 London Underground, shows an entry at 08.56. We can see 25 that from the middle of the page, from this electronic
1 printout, because the time box has the entry "08.56" on 2 it, the date is adjacent, "7 July 2005", and it refers 3 to "Closures likely after an explosion in the ticket 4 office and the main line station". 5 So it gives a good example of how, notwithstanding 6 the accurate report that there had been an explosion, 7 there is a multitude of reports concerning whether or 8 not the explosion was in the ticket office or, as others 9 understood it in the mainline station, or in the 10 underground and, if so, in which part of the tunnel and, 11 if it was in a train, which part of the train. 12 At 08.57, remaining for one more moment with these 13 electronic printouts, there is an entry in relation to 14 Edgware Road for an explosion in the station: 15 "Explosion in station, Circle/District Line train 16 into wall." 17 So that documentary system seems to indicate that 18 the initial reports for this system at least were to the 19 effect, in relation to Edgware Road, that the staff 20 believed that the train had gone into the wall. 21 Finally -- I keep saying "finally", but finally, 22 before turning to the audio recordings, I should just 23 say that the first call to the Fire Brigade, the London 24 Fire Brigade, was from the Metropolitan Police and it 25 also was very quick, it was at 08.56, so just a handful
1 of minutes after the explosion at Aldgate and it was 2 a call to attend St Botolph in Aldgate [LFB23-2]. 3 This document, if we go to the bottom of the page -- 4 there should be a part underneath this, or on the 5 following page, if you can enlarge the top half of that 6 page -- this is an extract from London Fire Brigade 7 files which shows, at 08.57.39, a mobilisation order, 8 which is shown on the documentation as "Mobilise, 9 mobilise, mobilise" goes to a number of Fire Brigade 10 units [LFB23-3]. It's in connection with a fire and explosion, as 11 we can see, at St Botolph Street in the City, London, 12 and a number of vehicles, F331, F332, OK16 and E216 are 13 directed to go to that location. 14 We should be able to go back to the page before, 15 please, and go to the top of the page -- it is the 16 bottom of the page as I originally thought. If you go 17 to the second half of that page, we can see "Open", 18 that's the time at which the log is opened, "08.56.49" 19 is the time of the call concerning the events at 20 St Botolph Street and we can see then in the timeline 21 that follows thereafter the internal electronic system 22 committing particular London Fire Brigade vehicles to 23 attend that incident. 24 This extract is from a document called the MOBIS 25 log. For those who wish to pursue the issue, that's the
1 acronym for the Mobilising Information System which 2 takes information from 999 calls made to the emergency 3 services and also information about the actions that are 4 then taken by the emergency services and puts it into 5 a form that we can see here after the incident has been 6 dealt with and closed. 7 I should say that each 999 call generates a unique 8 call number and the way in which these systems work 9 generally is that actions are recorded for each one of 10 those individual 999 calls and each of those calls then 11 generates an incident report. They all have different 12 numbers, because the system is recalibrated to zero at 13 the beginning of the day, and we'll be looking in due 14 course at some of the logs concerning those 999 calls 15 kept by City of London Police. 16 Before we leave this London Fire Brigade document, 17 if you perhaps could go forward to page 3 of the INQ 18 number we can see that at 08.57.39, as I've said, four 19 vehicles we think are dispatched, and then further down 20 the page, if you go down to 09.05, 09.06, we can see the 21 address to which they're being sent is superseded. 22 Further information is received. It's now plain to the 23 Fire Brigade that the address is Aldgate station, 24 London Underground station, and then further units are 25 then committed to that incident.
1 May I now then play, please, the select schedule of 2 the recordings -- play the recordings of the calls 3 received by the Network Control Centre in the morning of 4 7 July 2005 [INQ10483-1], [INQ10483-2], [INQ10483-3], [INQ10483-4][Network Control Centre audio recordings]. 5 Whilst we listen to them, the schedule prepared by 6 Mr Hay should, I think, appear on the screen. 7 My Lady, may I perhaps be seated while we listen to 8 it: 9 (Audio played) 10 MR KEITH: My Lady, may I pause the recording there simply 11 to add a note of explanation? There's a reference in 12 that last call to the "ERU". That is the Emergency 13 Response Unit of London Underground. I should say 14 something about them at this point, because it's most 15 relevant. 16 Other documentation, namely, the logs kept by the 17 Network Control Centre, show that half an hour after 18 that, at 09.28, the Emergency Response Unit was still 19 stuck in traffic in Bishops Bridge Road, in fact 20 requesting a police escort to get it to Edgware Road in 21 time. At 9.40, the ERU duty manager was still waiting 22 in Clapham for that police escort. So there were 23 differences across London in relation to the ERUs 24 insofar as they were able to attend Edgware Road and 25 Aldgate. The Edgware Road ERU was badly held up in
1 traffic, but the ERU was able to attend Aldgate in 2 fairly good time. 3 One of the recommendations made by the 4 London Assembly in the report to which I made reference 5 was that the ERU, the Emergency Response Unit, be given 6 the right to travel in Transport for London's own bus 7 lanes, a privilege apparently denied to it up to that 8 point. That was agreed. 9 If you can continue, please. 10 (Audio played) 11 MR KEITH: My Lady, may I just make one correction, if I 12 may, to the schedule, if we could just have that back on 13 the screen for one moment and, if we go to the first 14 page, Transport for London correctly pointed out at 15 08.58.16, the message to the London Fire Brigade is to 16 request attendance at Liverpool Street and Aldgate and 17 King's Cross underground, so if I could just make that 18 plain, if I may, and that version of the schedule will 19 be corrected in due course. 20 Madam, that brings me to the end of those audio 21 recordings. I don't know whether you were considering 22 taking a short break at this stage? 23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I don't think the stenographer is 24 going to need it because we have been listening to the 25 audio. Do you need one?
1 MR KEITH: No, thank you, my Lady. 2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Unless anybody else requires a break? 3 MR KEITH: Madam, those calls reveal considerable 4 difficulties in assimilating the information that is 5 coming in, and plainly a very confused picture presented 6 itself. 7 The Piccadilly Line, Earl's Court service control 8 manager's review, a document contained by Transport for 9 London, or held by Transport for London, contains an 10 interesting summary, because it makes reference to the 11 fact that the serious power failure that accompanied the 12 Aldgate bomb meant that the CCTV monitors in the central 13 area had failed and, moreover, it contains the phrase 14 that it was mostly impossible, from around 9.00 am, to 15 gather information or to make outgoing calls from 16 Earl's Court, which is where the Piccadilly Line service 17 control manager is located, due to overloading of the 18 telephone system. 19 So we can see at the first line, 08.50, the tunnel 20 telephone for Holloway Road-Russell Square westbound 21 tripped. There was then a reference to station staff 22 checking telephones in the tunnel, tunnel telephones. 23 "Early indications were of a serious power failure 24 with loss of CCTV monitors in the central area." 25 Then a reference, as we've heard to "heavy smoke",
1 but then a reference, as you can see, to: 2 "Mostly impossible to gather information or make 3 outgoing calls from Earl's Court due to overloading of 4 the telephone system." 5 It doesn't seem that, whatever the difficulties 6 encountered by the line controller manager, that the 7 Network Control Centre's ability to communicate was 8 affected. 9 But what does, you may feel, seem rather surprising 10 is that, perhaps on account of the fact that the bombs 11 had exploded in tunnels away from public sight, no one 12 at Edgware Road or Aldgate or 13 King's Cross/Russell Square, having spoken to the 14 passengers, or perhaps to the drivers, or perhaps having 15 seen the carriages themselves, was able to phone the 16 Network Control Centre and say definitively that there 17 have been bombs. 18 There are repeated references to explosions, and, as 19 you've heard, a high degree of confusion because, of 20 necessity, the way in which information is received, but 21 a considerable amount of time had elapsed, you will have 22 seen, from the moment of the explosion of the bombs to 23 the acceptance by the staff at the Network Control 24 Centre that, in fact, they were bomb-related. 25 The record of telephone calls to the
1 British Transport Police control room is another 2 important source of information [BTP167-1]. 3 This document on the screen is a call timed at 4 08.47.06, but, again, an illustration of the 5 difficulties of the times logged at the time of some of 6 these documents, plainly couldn't have been a call at 7 08.47 because, for the reasons that I've explained, we 8 know for certain that the first bomb explodes at 9 precisely 08.49.00. 10 This is a call which therefore must have occurred 11 two minutes later, or thereabouts, at 08.47.38: 12 "Police emergency. 13 "Hello, mate. Liverpool Street here. We've had 14 a loud bang on the platform. We've got smoke at the 15 moment in Liverpool Street underground here. We are 16 evacuating." 17 We can see from further down the page that the 18 caller is a Mr Kent and he speaks of how the platforms 19 have been evacuated and the smoke and the bang appears 20 to have occurred on the platforms 1 and 2 on the 21 Metropolitan Line, but of course it wasn't, as we now 22 subsequently know. 23 At around about the same time, radio calls start 24 coming in to British Transport Police centre. I'm not 25 going to show, if you approve, the radio calls. I'm
1 going to move forward to some of the other transcripts 2 of the main line telephone calls. 3 This one is at 08.48.09. There a reference to 4 a caller from Old Street, and the caller speaks of power 5 failure. Then, at the bottom of the page, at 08.49.19, 6 a caller, a Mr Baker, from whom we'll hear in due 7 course, calls in from the BTP, the British Transport 8 Police office at Aldgate, the office that you heard the 9 caller Celia Harrison refer to in the audio recordings 10 from the London Underground Network Control Centre. He 11 says that there's been -- we can see -- "a huge big bang 12 down on the platforms. Having had a look at the moment, 13 I'm not quite sure what's happened". 14 "Possibly a train-related incident. There doesn't 15 appear to be anybody hurt. I don't know if 16 [something]". 17 He refers to lots of dust and to his mobile number 18 and at the bottom of the page, as we can see, to a bang, 19 and he refers to the fact that there was a train not 20 pulled in properly, it stopped short of the platform and 21 there's a load of dust around the area. 22 On page 5 of this document, we can then see a call 23 from BX, which is the Control Centre, the caller, so 24 that is call out from the British Transport Police 25 Control Centre, BX, asking for people to go to
1 Liverpool Street, and then, at the bottom of the page, 2 there is a phone call at 08.51.22: 3 "Hello there. Have you any update on 4 Liverpool Street? 5 "We are still looking into it. We are very busy 6 here. We have had reports of an explosion, a loud bang. 7 I don't know in what respect, at Edgware Road and 8 Aldgate." 9 Over the page, reports of power loss and the caller 10 says: 11 "So it's all power-related?" 12 And the answer is: 13 "Yeah, well, it looks that way." 14 On page 7, there is there a log of a call to the 15 London Ambulance Service for their attendance at 16 Liverpool Street as a precaution, and BTP certainly 17 state their view that they believe that there had been 18 an explosion at that location, and the address given is 19 the postal area in relation to Liverpool Street. 20 The London Ambulance Service log of that call is 21 timed approximately two minutes later so that would seem 22 to support the idea that these logs are two minutes out 23 in terms of their timings, which is consistent with the 24 first call being received, apparently, but wrongly two 25 minutes in advance of the first explosion at Aldgate.
1 Over the page on page 9, an officer from the 2 robbery -- sorry, that's page 8. If we go to page 9, an 3 officer from the robbery squad, DI Taylor, at the bottom 4 of the page, phones in to say that he's on the scene and 5 there has been a loud explosion. Over the page, please. 6 He talks of a sound of an explosion coming from Aldgate, 7 five lines down, "loads of smoke in the tunnel, from the 8 tunnel from the Aldgate end of Liverpool street". 9 Then he says at the bottom of the page in response 10 to a statement from the controller that there are plenty 11 of units going down, that is to say 12 British Transport Police units: 13 "Yeah, there's loads arriving at the moment. It's 14 actually cleared now. I mean, there's no sign of any 15 damage or any explosion. All it was, was loads of, I'm 16 told, loads of smoke." 17 Page 12, Mr Baker at the bottom of the page calls in 18 again: 19 "I've just spoken to one of your ladies, I think it 20 was 135 at Aldgate." 21 Over the page, he asks whether he can check if the 22 Fire Brigade are on the way for Aldgate: 23 "I want to make sure LFB are running", he says. 24 "We need the old incident team for the underground 25 as well as their emergency response team, whatever
1 they're called." 2 Then at the bottom of the page we can see that the 3 controller asks whether that was the Aldgate station 4 overground as opposed to Aldgate East. 5 So another issue which arises is the potential 6 confusion, not only as to which way the train is going, 7 which part of the train is affected, whether it's a bomb 8 or an explosion, but whether or not it is Aldgate 9 station or Aldgate East. 10 At page 16, two minutes later, we can see halfway 11 down the page the first reference, as far as 12 British Transport Police are concerned, to smoke and the 13 Piccadilly Line, because at 08.55 a gentleman called 14 Inspector Mingay, of whom we'll hear much more in due 15 course, calls in to say that he has smoke appearing to 16 be coming out of one of the Piccadilly Line tunnels. 17 Over the page on page 17, one of the callers to this 18 call, in the middle of the page, talks of reports of 19 a loud bang, sorts of explosions at a variety of 20 stations, Aldgate and Edgware Road, Liverpool Street, 21 and he makes reference to the fact that the Network 22 Control Centre at London Underground think that the 23 matter could still be power-related, and this is almost 24 approaching the hour because these times are about two 25 minutes out, we're about two or three minutes to
1 9 o'clock. 2 Page 39, to move forward again, Mr Baker calls in 3 again at 08.57, so in truth about 9.00, and he says that 4 he thinks that he should call in the matter as a major 5 incident, and the recipient of his call, the 6 British Transport Police controller, tells him about 7 instances elsewhere at Liverpool Street and 8 King's Cross. 9 The importance of this call is that Mr Baker 10 reiterates at the bottom of the page: 11 "Can we have ambulances to Aldgate, please? We've 12 taken injured into the Aldgate police office at 13 present." 14 So he's calling for ambulances, wounded having 15 already been taken into the Aldgate office. 16 Page 42, Mr Mingay calls in again -- and I think we 17 may have lost the part that I was intending to refer 18 to -- but at 08.58.53, there is a discussion -- 19 a continuing discussion concerning a power failure. The 20 controller talks of "walking wounded" and the caller 21 refers to there being a power surge, and there is 22 a reference to three or four walking wounded. So from 23 the position of the British Transport Police, the 24 information coming in appears to be not much clearer at 25 that stage.
1 Then, page 51, Mr Baker again calls in to say at 2 09.03: 3 "I want to make sure we've got sufficient resources 4 coming. We'll call this a major incident. I've got 5 about 25 wounded in the office at Aldgate." 6 The controller says he's getting reports of various 7 different incidents that are happening at the moment. 8 The controller says: 9 "What happened? We're getting calls of a power 10 failure or explosion, train collision." 11 Mr Baker says: 12 "I don't know, I was in the office at Aldgate, then 13 all of a sudden the building shook and we obviously 14 thought 'What the fuck was that?', we came downstairs 15 and then we could see sort of smoke issuing at Aldgate 16 on platform 2, and then, about 5-10 minutes later, 17 walking wounded started coming out of the tunnel ... 18 "And that really is as much as we've got. We've got 19 pandemonium here at the moment and we really need to get 20 some control here." 21 At 08.59, so approaching 10 past 9, Inspector Munn, 22 I think it is, calls in to say at 09.06.44: 23 "I'm at Aldgate station [I] confirm this is a train 24 accident, declare a major incident. We have numerous 25 injured people at this station ..."
1 Staying with Inspector Munn for a moment, we can 2 look also, not just at the logs showing the landline 3 calls but to the radio logs showing calls made by radio 4 to British Transport Police. At page 51 of this other 5 document, [BTP150-51], Mr Munn, Inspector Munn, can be seen 6 from this document to be calling in. Right at the 7 bottom of the page, he says: 8 "I've liaised with Mr Lawson at Liverpool Street 9 and, after consultation with the London Fire Brigade, if 10 you haven't done so already, he wishes it declared as 11 a major incident by the British Transport Police." 12 Could we then go forward one page, please? 13 The references to this document have altered, so 14 could we scroll forward through the next one or two 15 pages and we'll see whether we can find the section that 16 I wanted to bring to your attention. 17 Could we go back, then, please, to page 51 and go 18 back to the previous three pages and we'll see whether 19 it's before. The top of page 49 of this document: 20 "Bravo Quebec 10, go ahead. Alpha India, stand by. 21 "Yes, BX [that's the caller saying 'Yes, 22 Control Centre']. Urgent request for an ambulance to 23 Aldgate from paramedics and Fire Brigade on trains. 24 There are people on these trains who will die if they do 25 not get immediate care. We need ambulances to Aldgate
1 urgently. Over." 2 The controller says "Received" and the caller says: 3 "... I have a doctor with our unit in a doctor's 4 vehicle heading to Aldgate now ... 5 "Could we please have a few units LAS [London 6 Ambulance Service] here? We have distressed passengers 7 coming off the underground." 8 From our assessment, this call is about 10 or 11 9 minutes past 9, and the first ambulance which had been 10 sent to the Aldgate scene had not, by that stage, 11 arrived because, as we'll see in a moment, it in fact 12 went via Liverpool Street and one of the difficulties 13 encountered in relation to Aldgate was that the 14 ambulance -- the address given to the Ambulance Service 15 was not in fact initially the address at Aldgate; it was 16 the address of Liverpool Street. 17 We may not be able to find it because I think the 18 references have been altered, but if you could go to 19 page 56 of this document, we may find another call from 20 Inspector Munn. 21 We can't find it. In any event, at about 18 past 9, 22 Inspector Munn, the gentleman who called earlier, tells 23 the control that he's with the train at Aldgate. He 24 says that one carriage is decimated and that there is 25 clear bomb damage to one carriage and two confirmed
1 fatalities. 2 Significantly, for our purposes, he also says that 3 the Fire Brigade are here but won't go trackside until 4 power is confirmed off and were going to need paramedics 5 to the train urgently. 6 So one of the issues, my Lady, that you will no 7 doubt wish to explore is, even when it was possible to 8 say with certainty where the correct location was, 9 whether or not the emergency services were, in fact, 10 able to go down straightaway and, if not, why that was 11 so. 12 The first Fire Brigade unit had arrived at about 13 9.00, some 15 minutes before Inspector Munn's call, the 14 call which I have just made reference to but which we 15 can't see on the screen, and we will hear evidence from 16 Inspector Munn in due course how he showed the 17 Fire Brigade that the power was off by putting a foot on 18 the third rail, but the officers to whom he spoke still 19 nevertheless sought confirmation from London Underground 20 staff that the power was off, and there may be an issue 21 as to whether or not that delayed the arrival of 22 emergency help to the train itself. 23 The evidence of concern as to the risks to rescuers 24 is an important issue, and I don't wish to be seen in 25 any way to downplay the dangers in the risks to those
1 who attended, and I've made reference already to the 2 risk of secondary devices, but you will certainly hear 3 from passengers, in particular a Mr Henning, who says 4 that, when he made his way forward to the Aldgate 5 platform, having walked out of the third carriage of the 6 train, he saw two groups of firemen standing on the 7 platform. According to him, although there may be some 8 dispute with another survivor as to what exactly was 9 said, he said "Why aren't you down there, people are 10 dying?" And one of the firemen responded by saying that 11 there could be a secondary explosion. 12 It may be worth making the point that, of course, 13 someone had been down to the train at Aldgate because, 14 otherwise, the information about casualties and 15 fatalities could not have been known, but whoever it 16 was, probably a British Transport Police officer or 17 a member of London Underground staff had surely 18 discovered that the power was off and there may be an 19 issue as to how widely knowledge that the power was off 20 was disseminated. 21 Some witnesses speak that the London Fire Brigade 22 were the first to arrive, and so it may be that some 23 firefighters went to the carriages while others remained 24 on platform. Another witness expressed surprise that 25 the Fire Brigade were laying hoses on the track rather
1 than helping the injured. 2 At any rate, by 9.31 on this transcript, and, 3 therefore, I think, two minutes later, the process of 4 rescuing passengers on the Aldgate train is well 5 underway. We can see that because the caller, 6 Inspector Munn again, refers there to the fact that they 7 urgently require three more teams with carry-seats, 8 that's to say seats or stretchers enabling the injured 9 and the wounded to be brought off the train and he asks 10 for more officers to try to detrain a full train at the 11 same time. 12 My Lady, as I've said, I'm trying to adduce the 13 material through the eyes of the individual emergency 14 response services so as to give a more realistic 15 impression of how difficult it was to deal with the 16 information when it was received. 17 The London Ambulance Service next, please. This is 18 what's called a primary incident log sheet dated 19 7 July 2005. 20 We can see that from the top of the page, and also 21 the start time at 08.51.59. There are a lot of acronyms 22 and expressions, abbreviations in this document, which 23 I won't take you through now, they will become, I'm 24 sure, very familiar to us in due course, but at 25 08.51.59, a first call is received from the
1 British Transport Police, and we can see that because 2 "BTP" appears in the sender of the message, to the 3 London Ambulance Service, and the information in the 4 message text, the far right column, is: 5 "Liverpool Street explosion at location. Station 6 has been evacuated. No further details available", 7 NFDA. 8 At 08.55.07, as well as 08.55.03, we can see 9 internal notations indicating that ambulance vehicles -- 10 whether they be ambulance or fast-response units -- I'm 11 not entirely sure -- are dispatched to Liverpool Street. 12 At 08.58.49, British Transport Police call again: 13 "Explosion from either LUL [London Underground] or 14 Liverpool Street." 15 09.00.51, BTP call again: 16 "Burns/explosions. Not known if anything is still 17 burning. Possible explosion. Walking wounded. BTP had 18 no information. Smoke and a bang heard in the 19 underground." 20 Then at 09.01, the London Fire Brigade, we can see 21 that because the sender is LFCDA, I think it's London 22 Fire Civil Defence Team. 23 They call in and they say: 24 "Rendezvous point fire and explosion heard from 25 there [St Botolph]. Coming from Aldgate underground as
1 well. No further details available. LFB [London Fire 2 Brigade] on way." 3 At 09.02.34, the London Fire Brigade call in again, 4 but this time about Edgware Road, and we know that 5 because the message text includes a reference to 6 Praed Street, W2 "close to Paddington Tube station". 7 In the audio calls that we heard a few moments ago, 8 you will have heard repeated references to Praed Street. 9 Praed Street is not the location of the Edgware Road 10 London Underground station. It's a few streets away in 11 Chapel Street. One of the issues that you will need to 12 explore is the fact that the first information about the 13 bomb, or the explosion at Edgware Road use details 14 relating to Praed Street rather than Chapel Street and 15 this had an effect on the speed with which the emergency 16 services were able to respond. 17 At 09.03.11, a vehicle called N307, that is to say 18 an ambulance, calls in to say "status updated to red at 19 scene" and what that means is that the ambulance has 20 arrived at the scene and is ready to provide emergency 21 medical attention, but we can see that at 09.03 all that 22 that first ambulance has been able to achieve is to 23 attend the scene at Liverpool Street because that was 24 the address to which it had been sent, because that was 25 the address provided at the top of the page. It didn't,
1 of course, go to Aldgate. 2 At 09.03.40 there is then a call from the London 3 Fire Brigade concerning a major incident and a major 4 incident being declared at Liverpool Street, and also 5 a reference to an explosion at Paddington. 6 Over the page, please. At 09.04, London Underground 7 call in to the London Ambulance Service to give details 8 of an explosion at Chapel Street, and that is where the 9 reference is to the correct address for Edgware Road. 10 At 09.04, there is then a first reference to the 11 explosion at King's Cross because a caller, again the 12 British Transport Police, call in to say that: 13 "At King's Cross station at St Pancras Road, carbon 14 monoxide inhalation/hazardous chemicals, train stuck in 15 tunnel, smoke inhalation, people on board. 16 British Transport Police will come back to us with 17 further details when obtainable." 18 At 09.05.38, the first London Ambulance vehicle -- 19 I think it's a fast-response paramedic -- is dispatched 20 to Praed Street. So at 09.04, that dispatch occurs 21 15 minutes after the actual time of the explosion and 22 that is the first dispatch to Praed Street. 23 At 09.05.57, report from London Underground service 24 of an explosion at Liverpool Street. 25 09.06, a further dispatch of a vehicle to
1 Praed Street, and then, at 09.06.16, the vehicle, the 2 London Ambulance vehicle which arrives at 3 Liverpool Street declares that its status is red and is 4 therefore in a position to provide care. 5 Could we then please go over the page to 09.00.13, 6 there's an important entry here because an ambulance at 7 09.14, E205, calls in to say "We've got an explosion on 8 one of the trains", this is at Edgware Road: 9 "We're unsure at the moment of what. Can you send 10 down as many as you can from the station ambulance-wise? 11 We haven't got any London Fire Brigade on the scene at 12 the moment. We've got one police car. We'll get back 13 to you." 14 There is then a discussion about a full CHALET 15 report. A CHALET report is a reference to an acronym, 16 CHALET, but which demands, I think, emergency services 17 to provide information in a certain way, but the L from 18 CHALET denotes "location", and plainly the receiver of 19 the call is concerned to get precise information as to 20 the location of the emergency. 21 The caller E205 says: 22 "I'll give you a CHALET report. At the moment, 23 casualty-wise, we're unsure. It's rush hour, it could 24 be anything up to 1,000. We're not too sure what the 25 explosion is, what hazards we have at the moment.
1 Access is on Chapel Street and on the Metropolitan Line, 2 which is pretty clear at the moment. That's the same 3 location. As I said before, we need the Fire Brigade 4 down here. We've got one police car so we're going to 5 deal with them. Unsure at the moment what else -- 6 whether we need any CBRN [chemical, biological, 7 radiological or nuclear] assistance or anyone else, and 8 we're not too sure what type it is, so at the moment 9 that's it and unclear until I get back to you." 10 At 09.16 over the page, we can see a call from the 11 British Transport Police: 12 "Update Aldgate underground. BTT confirmed 20-25 13 walking wounded and others badly injured. Multiple 14 ambulances required." 15 Then at 09.16, E205 calls in: 16 "There's been some sort of explosion on the train. 17 As far as we know, there's a couple of trains in 18 a tunnel with numerous casualties floating around this 19 hallway, here, Edgware Road/Chapel. Edgware Road 20 station, Chapel Road. Just as many ambulances as you 21 can get, sort of, you know, at least 6, 7, 8. People 22 with burns, cuts, bruises and all sorts, so we need 23 just -- need as many ambulances as you can muster up at 24 the moment." 25 My Lady, I'll return to some of the other entries in
1 due course when dealing with the time lines for each 2 scene, but that short exploration of the LAS document 3 shows how, again, information is received piecemeal, how 4 there are conflicting reports, and the information 5 available to the emergency services is affected to 6 a considerable degree by a lack of precise knowledge as 7 to the location of the bombs themselves. 8 One other final source of information, if I may, is 9 the computer-aided dispatch record, the CAD document, 10 with which I know you'll be very familiar from other 11 judicial proceedings, but it is, in essence, the 12 computer-aided dispatch system which is the means by 13 which the Metropolitan Police and City of London Police 14 in London record messages received by way of emergency 15 calls and I mentioned it a little earlier. 16 In 2005, a 999 call to report an emergency would 17 have been received by a telephone operator who would 18 then direct the call to the appropriate emergency 19 service. If the call required police assistance, the 20 operator would then pass the caller to a call-receiving 21 unit, then known as the Central Communications Complex 22 Information Room in New Scotland Yard. Information is 23 then recorded and the taking of that information starts 24 an incident record within the CAD, the computer-aided 25 dispatch system, and then that information is then
1 passed to the relevant part of the police to deal with. 2 Those references or CAD numbers start sequentially 3 from 0 at the beginning of every day, so this one, which 4 was received around about 08.51, was CAD message 2334 5 for that day, 7 July. 6 We've been provided, my Lady, with hundreds of CADs, 7 computer-aided dispatch documents, for the day, but we 8 intend to focus on just a handful of the early ones. 9 There are different versions in circulation 10 depending on whether they originate from the City of 11 London Police or the Metropolitan Police. This one is 12 the City of London Police version. 13 Pages 2 and 3, please. 14 Page 2, we can see at the top of the page, four 15 lines down: 16 "Incident 2334 entered at 0851." 17 So that is the time of the first call to City of 18 London Police in relation to an incident that concerned 19 the 7 July bombs. 20 Over on page 2, please, we can see that the 21 substance of the first information is that there seems 22 to have been a bit of an explosion opposite the 23 Great Eastern Hotel, so this is a CAD report relating to 24 Aldgate. 25 At 08.53.45, there is a reference to "no further
1 details but units not on the hurry-up". 2 At 08.55.32 we can see an update from 3 British Transport Police that there's been some form of 4 explosion in the ticket office at Liverpool Street 5 station [TFL23-1]. 6 This CAD is then superseded by another CAD, because 7 another call calls in -- there was another caller and 8 that generates a new record with other information in 9 relation to that call, and this one is CAD 2337, we can 10 see that number at the top of the page, incident 2337, 11 and this call is received at 08.51: 12 "British Transport Police assistance requested. 13 Loud bang heard on platforms 1-2 Met Line 14 [Metropolitan Line]. Station evacuated." 15 08.53.07 we can see a reference to London Ambulance 16 Service being called. 17 At 08.56.37: 18 "British Transport Police believe explosion on 19 Hammersmith & City line. No reports of injuries at this 20 time." 21 So this CAD report would seem to indicate that the 22 information erroneously was to the effect that there had 23 been an explosion in the Liverpool Street area as 24 opposed to nearer Aldgate, and that it was on the 25 Hammersmith & City line rather than the Circle Line.
1 2338, finally, we can see the incident number at the 2 top, it was entered at 08.51, the fourth line down, and 3 the caller, middle of the page, was a member of the 4 public, Mr Jitesh Sodha. 5 Over the page, we can see what he reported. He 6 reported at 08.51.45: 7 "Sounds of an explosion from empty building. Smoke 8 coming from a building. Also from the Tube station." 9 We'll hear from Mr Sodha in due course, but he will 10 recount how he was standing outside Beaufort House, 11 directly opposite the rear entrance of Aldgate 12 London Underground station, when he heard a very loud 13 explosion, and he and his colleague immediately formed 14 the view that it had been a bomb, and they tell the City 15 of London Police, or the Met Police, that smoke was 16 coming from storage buildings nearby. 17 We can see at 08.57.02: 18 "INFT believes [informant believes] explosion may be 19 from tunnel in Tube station." 20 A reference in the following line to the London Fire 21 Brigade called. 08.57.45: 22 "City of London Police CCTV, a large amount of smoke 23 coming up from the Tube line into Aldgate one-way by 24 St Botolph's." 25 08.58:
1 "Smoke is coming from the tunnel under the bridge." 2 08.57.47: 3 "The informant [that's Mr Sodha] can't see anybody 4 injured." 5 But he does report in the following line staff going 6 down into the station and the station being evacuated. 7 On the following page, a police officer at the top 8 of the page, I think calls in to say that London Fire 9 Brigade are on the scene, looks like Tube collision, 15 10 or so walking wounded, and then at 09.02, an officer 11 calls in to say there's been a large explosion between 12 Aldgate and Liverpool Street: 13 "Believe some civilians still trapped." 14 At 09.04, a caller reports at 43 that there seems to 15 have been an electrical explosion but injuries are more 16 severe. 17 Then at 09.09 there is a reference to an LFB, 18 a London Fire Brigade supervisor on the hurry, and 19 a minute later a police officer calls in to say: 20 "There is a bomb in one carriage 100 yards into the 21 tunnel -- I have multiple casualties, some possibly 22 fatal. I need a police liaison officer here at the 23 Aldgate end. London Ambulance Service also required as 24 well as more police officers to take witness 25 statements."
1 By that time, 09.010, the London Ambulance Service, 2 although called, had not yet reached Aldgate as opposed 3 to Liverpool Street. 4 Can I please put up for you the time line in 5 relation to Aldgate? Again, I'm very grateful to 6 Mr O'Connor and Mr Hay for their hard work in preparing 7 the time lines for each of the four bombsites. 8 This is the time line in relation to Aldgate. Many 9 of these entries we've looked at through the medium of 10 the records kept by the emergency services themselves, 11 so I can be fairly brief. But we can see at 08.47 the 12 reference there to the call to British Transport Police 13 about the loud bang on the platform, at platforms 1 and 14 2 on the Metropolitan Line, and that was one of the 15 calls that we saw on the British Transport Police hard 16 copy transcript of landline calls. 17 At 08.48.40, there's a reference to the tunnel 18 telephone trip. 08.48.42, the outer rail tripping, and 19 then, at 08.48.43, the track alive indications being 20 extinguished. All those obviously postdate -- they are 21 subsequent to the explosion which, as I said, occurred 22 at 08.49.00, but they precede the explosion on this time 23 line, my Lady, because those are the times given in the 24 contemporaneous documentation, but they must obviously 25 be wrong.
1 There is then a reference to the conversation that 2 we saw in the Transport for London document between the 3 Metropolitan Line controller and the power room control 4 operator, and then, at the bottom of the page, Mr Baker 5 reporting a bang at Aldgate from his vantage point in 6 the British Transport Police office above Aldgate 7 platforms. 8 Over the page, please, we can see that the London 9 Ambulance Service received then their first call at 10 08.50. 11 There are references then to the information taken 12 from the City of London computer-aided dispatch records 13 at 08.51, 08.51.38, the reference to smoke from 14 Mr Taylor that we saw in the transcript, and then the 15 999 call from Mr Sodha to which I've made reference just 16 a few moments ago, and then, at 08.51.59, the London 17 Ambulance Service receive an emergency call informing 18 them of an explosion at Liverpool Street. 19 The Fire Brigade are requested as a result of 20 Mr Baker's call at 08.52, and then over the page, 21 please, we can see the call that Celia Harrison, the 22 Aldgate station supervisor made at 08.53.38. Further 23 extracts from the CAD reports, and then, further down 24 the page, the first call to the Fire Control London Fire 25 Brigade from the Metropolitan Police to attend Aldgate.
1 The London Fire Brigade's log of that call is at 2 08.56.49, and then, from the Fire Brigade records that 3 we looked at some half an hour ago, we can see, at 4 08.57.39, that the London Fire Brigade sent mobilisation 5 messages to a number of units. 6 Halfway down the page, there is a further request to 7 London Ambulance Service by the British Transport Police 8 at 08.58 to attend to three to four walking wounded. 9 Further extracts from the CAD records, and then at 10 09.00, the first Fire Brigade appliance, F332, arrives 11 at the scene and at the same time London Fire Brigade 12 send mobilisation messages to other units to attend. 13 At 09.00.51 the London Ambulance Service receive 14 a call to attend Aldgate as opposed to Liverpool Street, 15 and at 09.02 London Fire Brigade send further 16 mobilisation messages to the Shadwell pump ladder, 17 Southwark pump ladder and to Station Commander Dowgate. 18 At 09.03, the London Ambulance Service, ambulance 19 N301, arrives at Liverpool Street and is diverted to 20 Aldgate, and at 09.06 the duty officer from the London 21 Ambulance Service also arrives at Liverpool Street. 22 By that time, major incidents have been declared by 23 the London Fire Brigade and British Transport Police, 24 but it's quite apparent from the time line there are 25 still difficulties concerning the exact location of the
1 Aldgate bomb. 2 Over the page, we can see at 09.08 further 3 mobilisation messages to further Fire Brigade units. At 4 10 past 9, PC Kemp from City of London Police makes the 5 reference that we saw just a few moments ago in the City 6 of London CAD to a bomb in one carriage 100 yards into 7 the trouble. I think I may have said that was 8 Inspector Munn; it was PC Kemp, and he is the officer 9 who makes that first connection to a bomb in the 10 carriage. 11 Inspector Munn to BTP control makes an urgent 12 request for an ambulance to Aldgate from paramedics and 13 Fire Brigade "There are people on these trains who will 14 die if they do not get immediate care", and that was the 15 reference I read out a few moments ago. 16 The first London Ambulance Service ambulance arrives 17 at Aldgate at 09.14, we can see that at the bottom of 18 the page and, over the page, they report an explosion, 19 possible fatalities and they request five further 20 ambulances. 21 It's not enough, and BTP report to the London 22 Ambulance Service at 09.16 that multiple ambulances are 23 required. 24 In fact, a fast-response car, EC46, arrives at 25 Aldgate after being flagged down by the police, so in
1 a way, the process of diversion from Liverpool Street to 2 Aldgate is circumvented because of that police officer 3 flagging the car down. 4 Then the London Ambulance Service declare a major 5 incident at 09.18. If we can turn to the Edgware Road 6 time line, please -- my Lady, perhaps that's 7 a convenient moment before, in fact, I turn to the 8 details of the time line in relation to Edgware Road. 9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Certainly. 10 MR KEITH: I see, my Lady, that Mr Eadie has arrived and, as 11 my Lady knows from last week, there are certain issues 12 to be discussed in relation to the legal argument 13 concerning whether or not you may adopt a closed 14 material procedure, and we would invite to you give some 15 directions in relation to the skeletons and the timing 16 of that argument. 17 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Will those who don't wish to stay -- 18 I'm not going to be deciding or hearing submissions in 19 relation to whether or not I can have closed hearings, 20 I'm just setting the timetable for hearing those 21 submissions, so I would understand if anybody felt that 22 they wished to leave at this stage. 23 MR KEITH: My Lady, I'm going to ask Mr Andrew O'Connor to 24 address you in relation to that matter on behalf of the 25 Inquest team.
1 Discussion re closed hearings 2 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: My Lady, you will recall that at the 3 directions hearing last Monday, Mr Eadie raised two 4 legal issues, both of which relate in general terms to 5 closed processes upon which the Secretary of State seeks 6 your ruling. 7 Put shortly, those legal issues are, first, whether 8 you have power to receive in evidence material that 9 would otherwise be excluded by virtue of the prohibition 10 at section 17 of RIPA, that's the Regulation of 11 Investigatory Powers Act and, second, whether you have 12 the power to receive evidence in a closed hearing, that 13 is with the interested persons excluded. 14 At the hearing last week, my Lady, there was some 15 debate about the detailed procedure by which these 16 issues were to be resolved, but you made clear that you 17 wished to rule on them as soon as possible. 18 The main reason for expedition is to allow your 19 ruling to be considered by higher courts if any of the 20 interested parties wished to pursue that course without 21 interfering with our own timetable. 22 My Lady, at the last hearing you directed Mr Eadie 23 to provide written submissions addressing those two 24 issues by last Friday. That direction was complied 25 with, we have those submissions and we're grateful for
1 them. 2 My Lady, you indicated, as Mr Keith has said, that 3 you would hear further submissions and give further 4 directions today providing for the disposal of those 5 issues. 6 My Lady, there are a number of practical issues that 7 arise, such as the date on which you will hear oral 8 submissions on those issues and dates for service of 9 written submissions and so on. 10 There is also an issue of a little more substance 11 that was left over from the last hearing, that is 12 whether it is necessary or appropriate for you to 13 consider closed factual material served by the Secretary 14 of State, that is the material Mr Eadie referred to on 15 the last occasion as worked examples, in reaching your 16 conclusion on, in fact, the second of those issues. 17 My Lady, may I briefly address you on those two 18 areas? 19 As far as the practical issues are concerned, the 20 starting point, it seems to us, is the date on which you 21 will be able to hear oral submissions. 22 The witness timetable that has been devised only 23 provides for one day per week when we do not have 24 witnesses in attendance. Most weeks, that is a Friday, 25 although, as you've indicated, there are some weeks when
1 that will be a Thursday due to other judicial 2 commitments of yours on those weeks. 3 Insofar as the next few weeks are concerned, 4 my Lady, we have ourselves taken the view that Friday of 5 this week would simply be too early to hear these oral 6 submissions, given the need for a number of different 7 parties to prepare for them and to provide written 8 submissions. 9 Skipping over two weeks, in two weeks' time, 10 Thursday, 28 November, is not a possibility since you 11 have other judicial responsibilities on that day, and 12 going a week further, 5 December, simply seems to us to 13 be leaving it too late. 14 What that leaves my Lady is 22 October where we 15 believe that you are likely to be able to make available 16 at least some of the day to hear oral submissions. 17 It does, therefore, seem to us, my Lady, that 18 22 October, which is a Friday, is probably the day when 19 it will be necessary for you to hear oral submissions on 20 these two issues. 21 Turning to the question of the service of written 22 submissions, my Lady, as I have said, the Secretary of 23 State has already served written submissions. The next 24 step is for other interested parties who wish to address 25 you on these matters to file written submissions.
1 My Lady, we propose that the date on which they 2 should do so is by 4.00 pm this Friday, that is 3 15 October. 4 My Lady, there is one caveat to that which has been 5 a matter raised with me by Mr Patterson, and that is 6 this: the Leeds submissions, if I can put it this way, 7 on this issue on behalf of the families are likely to 8 come from Mr O'Connor Queen's Counsel who takes the lead 9 on the issue of preventability, but it is possible at 10 least that some of the other representatives of other 11 families may not wish simply to adopt his submissions, 12 they may wish to make supplementary or, indeed, 13 different submissions to those that he has made. 14 It therefore seems at least possible, my Lady -- and 15 I'm sure that others will address you on this -- that 16 other representatives of the families will wish to see 17 Mr O'Connor's submissions and serve their own 18 submissions after having seen his. 19 My Lady, in those circumstances, we propose that any 20 further submissions from any other representatives of 21 families following Mr O'Connor's submissions should be 22 served by close of play a week today, Monday, 23 18 October. 24 My Lady, I hope that that will provide them with 25 enough time. Although they will only have the weekend
1 to read Mr O'Connor's final submissions, I do understand 2 from him that he is proposing to circulate an outline of 3 his submissions this week, I think Wednesday, the day 4 after tomorrow. 5 We are all having to work with compressed 6 timetables, and we would hope that, since they will have 7 seen the outline of his submissions on Wednesday this 8 week, they will be in a position to serve their 9 submissions by the close of play next Monday. 10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: We're not just all working to 11 compressed timetables, Mr O'Connor. I'm afraid fitting 12 in this kind of legal argument at this stage with so 13 little notice is going to cause inconvenience, not only 14 to the parties here, but to a number of other people to 15 whom I have commitments. 16 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: My Lady, quite so. 17 My Lady, two other matters. I have mentioned to the 18 Treasury Solicitor the desirability, given the fact that 19 there are likely to be a number of authorities referred 20 to, of preparing a combined bundle of authorities, and 21 they have indicated they would be prepared to do that, 22 so we would propose that they be directed to serve 23 a consolidated bundle of authorities by, say, noon on 24 Tuesday next week, that is the 19th. 25 Finally, my Lady, we would propose ourselves to
1 serve written submissions prior to the hearing. We 2 would propose to do that by, at the latest, 10.00 in the 3 morning on Thursday, 21 October, next Thursday. 4 My Lady, clearly you will wish to hear others on 5 those directions, but those are our suggestions. 6 My Lady, if I may touch briefly on the points of 7 principle that I mentioned. 8 As I've said at the last hearing, Mr Eadie indicated 9 his desire that in ruling on the second issue of 10 principle -- that is the question on whether you have 11 the power to hear closed evidence in the absence of the 12 public and interested persons -- that you might consider 13 what he described as worked examples. That is material 14 that is subject to PII claims. 15 Madam, at the last hearing, Mr Keith sounded a note 16 of caution about that proposal. We continue to be 17 cautious about it. May I just briefly outline why? 18 My Lady, first, there are a number of practical 19 problems. 20 The first, which really is a matter for Mr Eadie, 21 but he did mention at the last hearing the difficulties 22 that might be experienced in actually preparing these 23 worked examples. At that point, we didn't know what 24 date we were aiming for. We now know that we're aiming 25 for the 22nd. He will enlighten you as to whether that
1 is in itself a problem. 2 But even if it was possible to serve those closed 3 papers in good time for a hearing at the end of next 4 week, there is also the time available at the hearing 5 itself to take into account. 6 My Lady, we anticipate that not only will you need 7 to hear submissions from ourselves, Mr Eadie, 8 Mr O'Connor, possibly other families, possibly other 9 interested persons -- I'm afraid I don't know whether 10 the police intend to make submissions themselves. 11 So, my Lady, there will be a substantial amount of 12 oral submission that needs to be made, and we would have 13 a concern that, if it is necessary to go into the closed 14 material in any detail -- and one would imagine that it 15 probably is, otherwise the process would not be worth 16 undertaking -- that might cut short unnecessarily and 17 undesirably the time that is available for open legal 18 argument. 19 My Lady, there are also, it seems to us, at least 20 possibly certain principled objections to this course. 21 The first point we would make is this: the issue 22 Mr Eadie has identified is clearly a matter of 23 principle, not fact, simply whether you have the power 24 to conduct closed proceedings. 25 It is, as Mr Eadie recognises in his submissions,
1 a novel issue, and it is clear that it is at least 2 potentially an issue which would have great potential 3 significance for future inquests and, unsurprisingly, 4 therefore, it is one which, as I've said, may need to be 5 considered by the higher courts. 6 In all those circumstances, my Lady, we would 7 suggest that there is merit in confining the ruling that 8 you give on this issue simply to the point of principle: 9 namely, whether or not you have the power, and not, at 10 least at this point, descending into the facts of these 11 cases. 12 My Lady, that is of course the route that was 13 followed in the recent Al Rawi case, the Guantanamo Bay 14 civil damages claims. Although, as Mr Eadie rightly 15 observes in his submissions, that case was factually 16 distinct to this, in the sense that it concerned the 17 existence of a power to hear closed proceedings in civil 18 damages claims in the Queen's Bench division and not 19 coronial proceedings, the same principle, namely, the 20 existence or otherwise of a power to hold closed 21 proceedings, was in play and we would submit that the 22 course followed there, namely, to restrict argument to 23 that point of principle, has merit here. 24 My Lady, finally, there is one other consideration 25 which we would submit rather weighs against the worked
1 examples idea. That is simply that the worked examples 2 themselves would, of course, be closed material. If you 3 were to consider them, that would entail excluding the 4 families and their representatives from part of the 5 hearing on this issue. It may also require you to 6 produce a closed ruling that the families would not see. 7 Given the importance of this issue to the families, 8 we would submit that that approach would be highly 9 undesirable and is another factor that weighs against 10 considering closed material. 11 My Lady, can I just make it clear that if the 12 consideration of closed material was necessary to enable 13 to you determine these points, then plainly it may have 14 been necessary simply to bear these disadvantages, but 15 we don't understand that to be quite the way that the 16 Secretary of State puts it. The implication from 17 Mr Eadie's submissions, both the oral submissions he 18 made last week and his written submissions, is that 19 these worked examples provide a context to the argument 20 of principle but are not critical to resolving it. 21 It seems to us, in fact, that, whilst these examples 22 might be highly relevant to the question of whether you 23 exercise a power to sit in closed, they would not be 24 directly relevant to the prior question of whether that 25 power exists in the first place.
1 My Lady, I hope that explains the reservations that 2 we have on this small point. No doubt you'll hear 3 further submissions from Mr Eadie and on behalf of the 4 families about it. Perhaps it goes without saying that, 5 if you do decide that you will admit closed material, it 6 will need to be made available, both to us and, indeed, 7 to you, as soon as possible to enable preparations to be 8 made. 9 My Lady, unless I can assist further, those are the 10 points we wish to raise at this stage. 11 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: No, thank you, Mr O'Connor. I keep 12 forgetting, apparently, to turn my microphone on. Will 13 the stenographer please cough loudly, if she needs my 14 attention? 15 Mr Eadie, are you going to go next? I think you're 16 probably principally in the firing line here. 17 MR EADIE: If that's convenient, I will. 18 My Lady, just before we start, it may be worth just 19 emphasising that the reason that the Security Service 20 and the Secretary of State are seeking the ruling from 21 my Lady that we are has nothing to do with concerns 22 about fault or about covering up material. It is solely 23 because there is information in their possession which 24 is judged to be highly relevant to the decision that you 25 have to make which cannot be made public for good
1 reasons of national security and, in this context, 2 national security in fact means the protection of the 3 public. That is the reason why certain material cannot 4 be put into the public domain. 5 My Lady, as far as the timetable is concerned, 6 perhaps I ought to come back to that and deal first with 7 Mr O'Connor's point about the mechanism for determining 8 the issues that are before you. 9 You will appreciate that, from the last hearing, the 10 reason that we wished, in addition to the points of 11 principle, to do worked examples and to get my Lady's 12 ruling on concrete examples in relation to public 13 interest immunity and matters of that kind was, firstly, 14 because my Lady has always expressed concern that these 15 sort of issues needed to be dealt with by reference to 16 concrete material, if at all possible, but, secondly, 17 because all concerned on our side recognised the scale 18 of the task which faced them, and the sooner there was 19 guidance from the inquest and from my Lady as to how, in 20 relation to particular types of material, the balances 21 that public interest immunity require to be struck are 22 to be struck, the better it will be for all concerned. 23 So our underlying concern with raising that 24 staggered or that example process with you was precisely 25 to further the aim that I know lies very close to
1 my Lady's heart: namely, to permit the preparation for 2 the hearing in February, or whenever it is, of the 3 preventability issues without causing disruption to the 4 timetable that you're currently engaged in, and the more 5 guidance, as I say, that can be provided in relation to 6 the actual approach that will be followed, the easier it 7 will be for all concerned to try to deal with that type 8 of material as expeditiously and as efficiently as 9 possible. 10 That is, therefore, the reason for suggesting worked 11 examples. We accept entirely the point that my learned 12 friend Mr O'Connor makes again today, and I hope it was 13 a point that I made the other day. It is, of course, 14 possible for my Lady to determine the issues of 15 principle separately from the worked example issues. 16 That, however, leads to something of a difficulty 17 and perhaps a proposal for a solution. 18 The difficulty is that it will not be possible to 19 have the worked examples ready by 22 October, which is 20 a date, if I may, I'm going to come back to, and, 21 therefore, if worked examples do find favour with 22 my Lady as a procedural course, the only realistic 23 procedural option would be to set a date at some future 24 point a little further in advance, hopefully not too far 25 in advance, for dealing with those worked examples.
1 That could happen separately from the points of 2 principle and, I'm afraid, if the timetable is the one 3 outlined by my learned friend, would have to follow on 4 a separate date. 5 So far as the date itself is concerned, we have 6 a little difficulty on this side, because 22 October, 7 which appears to be the date being proposed, is a date 8 that certainly I can't do because I'm already in court. 9 Now, I'm fully alive to the fact that there's 10 a limit to how much I can pray that in aid. I don't 11 know whether there is any flexibility within the 12 timetable, whether witnesses have been warned so that 13 the dates, as I see from the timetable helpfully put up 14 on the Lextranet, for any of those witnesses to move 15 from, say, a Thursday to a Friday, but you will 16 understand that my clients regard these issues of 17 principle and, indeed, the worked examples as being very 18 important and, if it is possible -- and of course it may 19 not be, but if it is possible, they would like me to 20 present the argument on their behalf. 21 If you are stuck with the Fridays that are currently 22 blank in the timetable, then I anticipate that may cause 23 something of a difficulty. I could do this Friday, but 24 it doesn't sound as though anyone else is going to be 25 ready to receive the argument by that date. I don't
1 know whether that is a practical course. My Lady was, 2 of course, very concerned to see that this issue was 3 determined as soon as possible, but it may not be 4 possible to have the oral argument this Friday. 5 I can't do the 22nd. The 28th, as I understand it, 6 which is the next Thursday, you can't sit, "Not sitting 7 today" it says in the timetable, but there are probably 8 reasons which can't be moved for that and then there are 9 witnesses scheduled for the Friday. So the week after 10 isn't a possibility. 11 The first Friday, I'm afraid, that I could do would 12 be 12 November and, of course, if it went to 13 12 November, one could perhaps have the issues of 14 principle and the worked examples all dealt with 15 together. 16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I'm sorry to interrupt you, Mr Eadie, 17 but I've just received a piece of information that may 18 have an impact on this line of submissions. 19 Whereas I thought I had an immoveable commitment on 20 28 October all day, I am reminded properly that, in 21 fact, that commitment has itself been moved and I'm just 22 wondering whether 28 October -- I'm sorry it's coming as 23 a complete bolt from the blue to Mr O'Connor, who's 24 considered his submissions, because I told him earlier 25 I couldn't do 28 October.
1 Do you want to have a moment to reflect on how that 2 would affect your submissions on the timetable? 3 MR EADIE: My Lady, it would affect them, if I can put it 4 this way, positively and I can tell you that immediately 5 because I have my diary when I'm in court and when 6 I have conferences which I can move and, of course, any 7 conference can be moved, but a court date can't. 8 I could do Thursday, 28 October, if that is a date that 9 my Lady can do. I imagine that Mr O'Connor's timetable 10 could accommodate that, because it would simply involve 11 the luxury of another week for everyone to prepare for 12 this interesting argument. 13 But that would be a thoroughly welcome date from our 14 point of view. I don't know if that causes 15 inconvenience to anyone else. They may have planned 16 their diaries around it. (Pause) 17 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Sorry about that, Mr Eadie, I'm just 18 getting Mr Smith to double-check, but I'm as confident 19 as I can be, advised as I am by Mrs Anckorn that the 20 28th is available, in which case I don't know if 21 Mr O'Connor wants to just allow a little more leeway in 22 his timetable perhaps for the likes of Mr Saunders and 23 others to consider Mr O'Connor's submissions? 24 MR O'CONNOR: Yes, as Mr Eadie rightly observes, there can 25 be a little slightly more relaxed timetable. May
1 I suggest, then, if Mr O'Connor QC can still make Friday 2 the 15th, that is this Friday, the other families' 3 representatives could perhaps -- sorry, this Friday, the 4 other families' representatives could perhaps serve 5 their submissions on perhaps close of play on Wednesday, 6 the 20th, that is the middle of next week. The 7 authorities could be prepared the day after that, 8 Thursday, the 21st. My Lady, perhaps we could file our 9 submissions, we could then have the weekend and file our 10 submissions on the Monday of the following week. That 11 would be, I think, the 25th. 12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Subject to hearing confirmation that 13 I am available on the 28th -- and I'm extremely grateful 14 to Mrs Anckorn for pointing out that I may be -- 15 Mr Eadie, going back then to -- if that's possible, are 16 we confident that, if my rulings went against you, we 17 are still going to be able to maintain the timetable 18 because you may wish to pursue the points of law 19 elsewhere, they being, as everyone seems to agree, 20 possibly significant rulings? 21 MR EADIE: My Lady, that rather depends on how the superior 22 courts are placed, as you observed last time. The only 23 thing I can say -- and perhaps should have said last 24 time in relation to that, which you may not be aware of 25 and I don't think it necessarily helps the timetable
1 terribly, because it would take their Lordships and her 2 Ladyship some time to give judgment in any event, but 3 there is currently scheduled in the Supreme Court 4 a hearing in the linked cases of Al Rawi, which my 5 learned friend has mentioned, and also a case called 6 Tariq, which raises followup article 6 issues about 7 closed process. That is currently scheduled, I believe, 8 for some point in, I think, the second or third week 9 of January 2011. So next January. 10 I simply alert to you that fact. I'm not suggesting 11 that we can piggy-back into that timetable. There is, 12 of course, a leapfrog procedure which can be operated in 13 certain circumstances. 14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I was going to ask you whether -- I'm 15 afraid I hadn't had the opportunity to consider it yet 16 myself. The leapfrog procedure might apply to these 17 proceedings, might it? 18 MR EADIE: I confess I'm afraid I haven't had a chance to 19 look at it either. I suspect it may be only from the 20 High Court rather than from a Coroner's Court, but -- 21 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: But it could go, as it were, from 22 after -- the one after me? 23 MR EADIE: Exactly so, and it may be that that would be an 24 appropriate course because it raises very similar 25 looking issues.
1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Good news, 28 October is all right. 2 MR EADIE: Good news or bad news, from my point of view. We 3 are very grateful for that. We can work on the basis of 4 the 28th. That leaves the remaining issue: can we do, 5 on that date, issues of principle, arguments of 6 principle, get everyone through who needs to be heard on 7 that, and worked examples? I confess I have some doubt 8 given the array of legal talent which you will be 9 hearing from on that day, whether we can do everything 10 in that day, but can I leave it this way: that we will 11 use our best endeavours, if we possibly can do, to get 12 worked examples at least to you and your team, if we 13 possibly can do, in advance of that date and it may be 14 that we can and it may be that we won't have time to be 15 able to deal with that issue. 16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: You still have to confront and 17 address Mr O'Connor's argument that you are asking me to 18 consider closed material for the purposes of considering 19 whether I can have closed material, closed hearings and 20 there is, of course, the point Mr O'Connor made that the 21 families may have very real objections to that course. 22 I know not. The families may have different views 23 amongst themselves. But you need to be careful. Just 24 because the material is ready and available in time, it 25 doesn't mean I will be prepared to consider it for the
1 purposes of the argument. I need to put that marker 2 down, Mr Eadie. 3 MR EADIE: That I quite understand, but that may be an issue 4 about which you will have to receive submissions in the 5 event that Mr O'Connor and those who sit alongside him 6 object to that course. 7 However, in any event, and almost irrespective of 8 my Lady's ruling, you will have to consider PII 9 applications. 10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Oh, indeed. 11 MR EADIE: But there can be no possible objection to going 12 into closed for that process. 13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Indeed. 14 MR EADIE: Because there is no other way of determining it 15 without the issue being resolved by the disclosure in 16 advance of it, which would obviously not be sensible, so 17 of course I am alive to the point Mr O'Connor makes. It 18 would be a matter for my Lady at or around that time to 19 determine whether you wish to receive it for that 20 purpose. The only marker which I would wish to put down 21 is that, irrespective of my Lady's ruling, even assuming 22 you rule against me, it would still be beneficial, for 23 all the reasons I outlined, to have example PII issues 24 dealt with. 25 All that would be different would be that the
1 balance that you would have to strike would be different 2 because, obviously, if you get to the stage where you're 3 considering relevance/importance, on the one side, 4 against the damage to national security on the other, it 5 does make a bit of a difference whether you approach 6 that saying there was a closed process or there is not 7 a closed process. 8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I'm not sure we're not confusing 9 different concepts here, which is: one, my using 10 material substantively; and, the other, my deciding what 11 material can be published. Anyway, we can come back to 12 that Mr Eadie. 13 May I ask you a question? In relation to if you 14 don't have your worked examples by the 28th, you were 15 talking earlier about you might -- we might have to have 16 separation of the decision on the issues in principle 17 and then the consideration of the worked examples. Can 18 you envisage that kind of system working as far as your 19 submissions are concerned if I did deal with the matters 20 as issues of principle and then, if I agreed, considered 21 your worked examples? 22 MR EADIE: My Lady, the short answer to that is "yes", we 23 would be content, as it were, to have a staggered 24 process and there may be good sense in it, whereby 25 my Lady would determine the points of principle first
1 and then move on to the worked examples. The only, 2 perhaps separate occasion, after you've ruled, we would 3 just have to approach those on the basis that my Lady 4 was right in her ruling, which I'm sure is an easy 5 assumption for us all to make. But we would entirely 6 accept that staggered process has good sense. 7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Right, thank you. 8 Is there anything further, as far as you're 9 concerned? 10 MR EADIE: No, I'm grateful and I'm very grateful for the 11 28 October date. 12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Well, I'm sure my team are too, 13 because I'm afraid that -- well, we won't start passing 14 blame, but anyway, I'm glad that suits all. 15 Does it suit you, Mr O'Connor? 16 MR PATRICK O'CONNOR: Madam, yes, we were prepared to 17 facilitate next Friday and we are obviously therefore 18 prepared to facilitate Thursday, the 28th, and to that 19 end, we have offered, in order to oil the wheels with 20 the other legal teams for the bereaved, we are prepared 21 to serve on them a summary of our position on Wednesday, 22 so they will have more time to consider the position. 23 Hopefully, my Lady, you do agree you would prefer to 24 have the maximum coordination between the legal teams 25 for the bereaved and it's in order to facilitate that
1 that we would give them that notice. 2 Now, granted we have the benefit of another six 3 days. We were going to be extremely compressed in 4 giving advice and obtaining instructions from our 5 clients. I'm sure each team has that practical 6 difficulty. 7 So it loses very little. We were offering to 8 basically circulate our completed skeleton argument by 9 Friday, 4.00 pm, but if we could please do it by 10.00 10 on Monday, granted we have another six days, that would 11 very much ease this practical burden on my instructing 12 solicitor, and whether we then serve our skeleton 13 argument Monday, 10.00 am, on everyone or whether we 14 hold it back until we get feedback from our colleagues 15 acting for the other bereaved, we're in your hands. 16 Either way, it doesn't matter too much. We can either 17 wait for feedback, discuss, coordinate as best we can 18 and then serve on everyone a few days later, on the 19 Wednesday, or not, simply go with our line and then 20 everyone else makes their decision. I'm in your hands 21 on that. 22 My Lady, the second issue is whether you should be 23 considering worked examples. 24 We submit not. We agree with the reservations of my 25 learned friend Mr O'Connor. First of all, we invite
1 you -- as with any issue of principle, we would be 2 inviting you to assume in favour of the Secretary of 3 State that there exists the strongest, most relevant 4 most exculpatory material, the best theoretical example 5 in his favour, because one always tests an argument that 6 way. Make that assumption as we have to, and then argue 7 the point about whether there is a power. 8 My Lady, secondly, there is a grave danger of 9 confusing this issue with the guidance that my learned 10 friend for the Secretary of State would be grateful for 11 in relation to how you're going to decide issues of 12 public interest immunity. 13 Now, they are different things and, in fact, my 14 learned friend has just demonstrated how different they 15 are, because he's just indicated that the answer to that 16 question, with respect to each document, is going to 17 differ whether you are accepting there's going to be 18 a closed process or not. 19 So my learned friend has really demonstrated how 20 separate they are and the logical order in which these 21 things must be approached; ie closed process or not 22 first, then the worked examples and how you're going to 23 practically approach public interest immunity criteria. 24 Madam, thirdly, this will not help anyone on the 25 RIPA question because, as my learned friend's skeleton
1 argument demonstrates, the remarkable anomaly is that, 2 if you're going to be invited to receive RIPA material, 3 it can't be shared with your own team of lawyers, by 4 contrast with the statutory position in relation to 5 inquiries under the Inquiries Act. 6 So you would be left, madam, metaphorically naked, 7 without assistance at all, which is also a logical 8 consequence of the propositions about how you receive 9 evidence, that you would literally, under some 10 extraordinary process, be receiving evidence without any 11 assistance from your Inquest team. 12 So you're not going to get -- you're in great 13 difficulty, we submit, procedurally and sensibly on the 14 RIPA half of the question. 15 Then fourthly, there's timescale, because we 16 anticipate being excluded from this room for really 17 quite a long time indeed if you're going to be 18 discussing practical examples and guidance on the 19 applicability of public interest immunity criteria. 20 We're not going to fit all that into one working day. 21 May we next express our concern that there's such 22 prompt and ready discussion about an appellate process 23 going right up to the Supreme Court. Madam, we do 24 sincerely hope that the whole disclosure process is not 25 going to be held back by these anticipated lines of
1 appeal, which are -- the whole process being begun so 2 belatedly now anyway, and we do hope that a rolling 3 process is going to be continuing as best it can 4 nevertheless. 5 Madam, finally, your team's response to the 6 different submissions on these questions, may I ask 7 that, because we now have a slightly more relaxed 8 process, we can have those on Monday, the 25th, if 9 you're going to be having the hearing on Thursday, the 10 28th. I missed it if my learned friend said it. So we 11 get three days' notice and we know where we stand. 12 Madam, I'm most grateful. That's all I say. 13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you, Mr O'Connor, and thank you 14 for offering to give your outline submissions earlier, 15 I'm sure that would help others to start forming their 16 own thinking, the extent to which they agree or disagree 17 with your submissions. I do, as you say, I'm afraid, 18 require maximum coordination. I mean, if other people 19 disagree with the submissions that are going to be made, 20 they must, of course, put forward those submissions, but 21 obviously we haven't got enough time for anybody to 22 repeat essential principles if they agree with them. As 23 I say, there's no room for repetition essentially. 24 MR PATRICK O'CONNOR: Madam, all I've left open for to you 25 clarify is whether we serve on everybody, including your
1 team, next Monday at 10.00 am, which we are offering, or 2 whether there should be that delay for us to reconsider, 3 in light of suggestions from our colleague teams and we 4 therefore postpone for 48 hours or so before we serve on 5 everyone. I absolutely leave that to you and perhaps my 6 learned friends as well. 7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Coltart, have you any views on 8 that? 9 MR COLTART: Yes, I have. I don't see any reason for any 10 further delay on that basis. Mr O'Connor has very 11 helpfully suggested that we receive a summary of his 12 points on Wednesday of this week. We will discuss those 13 amongst ourselves immediately and with him, and one 14 would hope he would be in a position still to serve his 15 submissions by Monday of next week as envisaged. 16 I do have two other issues to raise in relation to 17 this topic. 18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Are they timetabling ones? 19 MR COLTART: They are in a sense, yes. 20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Right. 21 MR COLTART: What I mean by that is this: that I would be 22 grateful for further clarification from the Secretary of 23 State in relation to two aspects of his submissions, and 24 I suggest that we ought to receive his clarification 25 before we respond next week.
1 The first is it's not clear to me to what extent he 2 envisages this closed process would operate. 3 At one end of the scale, is he suggesting that the 4 entirety of the preventability issues should be held 5 behind closed doors with no opportunity for us to attend 6 and ask questions or, at the other end of the scale, is 7 he simply suggesting that, as and when they arise in 8 evidence, small and discrete areas of that evidence 9 should be canvassed in closed session? 10 If it is the latter, which I hope very much it is, 11 what is the trigger in his submission for moving from 12 open session to closed session? Is it the same test 13 that would apply on an application for PII or, if it's 14 some different test, perhaps he could articulate what it 15 is? 16 That's the first area of clarification. 17 The second is this, and it relates to the protocol 18 which we thought had been agreed between the parties for 19 applications for public interest immunity and, madam, 20 you will recall that they are set out in a letter from 21 Mr Smith to all the interested persons dated 27 May and 22 they are set out in some detail and, in essence, and to 23 summarise, the position was this: that you would be 24 provided, and your legal team would be provided, with 25 copies of all documents in relation to which PII was
1 asserted, and you would have an opportunity to consider 2 the underlying material and decide whether the claim for 3 public interest immunity ought to be upheld or not. 4 Now, it may be, of course, those claims would be 5 upheld, but at least the families would have the comfort 6 of knowing that you had seen all the relevant material 7 and that you had been responsible for making the 8 decision as to whether it should be withheld or 9 otherwise. 10 My reading -- and I might be wrong about this -- my 11 reading of Mr Eadie's skeleton argument, particularly at 12 paragraphs 24 and 25, suggests a much more restrictive 13 approach to public interest immunity, and the 14 possibility that if a claim for PII is made, you may not 15 see the underlying material at all. 16 What he says is this: that PII is a preclusionary 17 principle. If it applies, the effect is that the 18 material covered by it cannot be produced to the 19 decision-making court or body at all, and I don't know 20 whether he envisages what I might describe as a more 21 old-fashioned approach to PII applications, whereby the 22 certificate is signed off by the minister in question 23 and is put before the judge but not the underlying 24 material and, if that is what he's suggesting, then we 25 would obviously wish to make further submissions about
1 that. 2 So I ask him to clarify that the Secretary of State 3 intends to adhere to the protocol which was set out in 4 Mr Smith's letter, but if that isn't the case, then we 5 ought to receive representations as to why there should 6 be some change in that procedure and what it should be. 7 So I would be grateful for that clarification 8 perhaps by the middle of this week before we're asked to 9 respond in writing to the arguments advanced. 10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Eadie, I don't think we need to 11 wait for the middle of this week, do we? Can you answer 12 the questions now? 13 MR EADIE: My Lady, I can, now I've had a moment or two to 14 recover from Mr O'Connor's metaphorical flight of fancy. 15 In relation to the first of the points that my learned 16 friend makes, of course we are not saying that the 17 entirety of the preventability issue should be tried in 18 closed. I hope it's clear throughout the submissions 19 that we recognise that every conceivable effort must be 20 made to put as much as can possibly be put into the 21 public domain and for that to be tested in public. That 22 is in everyone's interest, including the 23 Security Service's, and my Lady will be well aware that 24 the preventability issue has already been considered at 25 some length and in some detail by another body and that
1 body has released a significant quantity of material and 2 details into the public domain. So the answer to his 3 first question is a categorical "no". We do not 4 envisage the entirety of the preventability issue will 5 happen in closed. 6 The second issue that he raised is susceptible of an 7 equally clear answer. The material in question will of 8 course be made available to the inquests, to my Lady and 9 to her team. The point that is being made in 10 paragraph 24, as I hope is clear from paragraph 24, at 11 least to my Lady, is that if PII operates, it operates 12 as a preclusionary principle. That therefore prevents 13 relevant material, potentially important material that 14 cannot be disclosed for good public interest or national 15 security reasons from being available to the trier of 16 fact, ie my Lady, and that, we respectfully submit, is 17 a very, very unfortunate outcome, for all the reasons 18 that I gave last time, and it is for that reason that, 19 amongst others, we recommend a closed process as more 20 consistent with the interests of justice than the 21 full-blown operation of that preclusionary principle. 22 But in no sense were we intending in paragraph 24 or 23 anywhere else in our skeleton argument to suggest that 24 the material which might be the subject of a PII claim 25 would not be made available to my Lady. I hope that's
1 clear. 2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: That's how I understood it, Mr Eadie. 3 MR EADIE: I'm grateful. 4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you very much. Right, 5 Mr Coltart, you have your answers. 6 Mr Saunders, do you have any comments? 7 MR SAUNDERS: Nothing to add, my Lady, thank you. 8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you. Ms Sheff? 9 MS SHEFF: My Lady, we would appreciate the additional time 10 offered by Mr O'Connor QC to the rest of the bereaved 11 family representatives. 12 Just to reiterate, we would appreciate the 13 opportunity Mr O'Connor has offered us. We are in 14 a position where we have two clients who reside abroad, 15 and we have to contact them via interpreters. 16 We also have two other clients who are not able to 17 travel to solicitors' offices, and we know that the 18 preventability issue is one on which at least three of 19 them have expressed serious concerns as to the way in 20 which these matters will be dealt with by the inquest 21 and, therefore, if there is to be -- and hopefully there 22 is, for both time saving and lack of repetition 23 purposes -- a consistent approach from the bereaved 24 families we would very much like that opportunity and we 25 ask for only 24 to 48 hours, say, from -- if we adopt
1 Mr O'Connor's suggestion that he would be in a position 2 to serve that document on us at 10.00 am on Wednesday, 3 if it could then be discussed between the bereaved 4 families' representatives over the next day or two and 5 a consolidated document served on your Ladyship's team 6 and all the other parties by Wednesday morning. That 7 should give us enough time to take instructions. 8 We will in advance put our clients on notice of the 9 issues which are likely to be discussed and then we can 10 summarise the issues set out in Mr O'Connor's document 11 for them so that we can respond in respect of our 12 instructions and consolidate them within the one 13 document. 14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I think this timetable is getting 15 a little messy with amendment. I think the best thing, 16 Ms Sheff, is for me to say I am content to allow as much 17 flexibility within the timetable as possible and 18 I suggest that you all get your heads together when 19 I leave to make sure you're happy with the timetable, 20 working towards a hearing on these issues on 28 October, 21 and then, if I'm happy with it, I'll order to that 22 effect. 23 MS SHEFF: Indeed, my Lady. All I suggest is that the final 24 document goes to your team by Wednesday which I think 25 was -- I see some nodding -- Wednesday, 20 October,
1 which I think was the date proposed in any event for the 2 families' submissions. Thank you, my Lady. 3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you very much. 4 Now, anybody else. Mr Hill, is the 5 Metropolitan Police concerned with these arguments? 6 MR HILL: May I just say this? We haven't made a final 7 decision, but I think it's unlikely, my Lady, that we 8 will submit a written document in relation to the 9 principles that you will be addressing on the 28th. 10 We'll make a final decision, but that's our current 11 indication to you, and, therefore, all I would ask for 12 today's purposes is that we act on the assumption that, 13 should the oral submissions on the 28th elucidate or 14 still more depart from what's been provided in writing, 15 we would assume that you would allow an opportunity for 16 brief representations to be made, even by an interested 17 person such as the Metropolitan Police who hasn't 18 submitted in writing. 19 The reverse would be true, therefore, if the 20 argument on principle is simply by way of adopting the 21 written submissions and we have not submitted in 22 writing, it follows we'd have nothing to add. 23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: It would depend upon the extent to 24 which any submission had deviated from a written 25 submission, Mr Hill, because obviously I can't allow
1 people to stand up and say: oh, well, I didn't expect to 2 say anything but now Mr Eadie has put it a slightly 3 different way in my submission, so I'm afraid you're 4 going to have to make sure that, if you want to make 5 written submissions, you somehow fit into part of this 6 timetable. Of course, if something completely 7 unexpected that affected the Metropolitan Police came 8 out then I wouldn't exclude anybody, but I do think you 9 need to be conscious of the fact that, if you are 10 intending to make submissions, you should put them into 11 writing out of fairness to everybody else concerned. 12 MR HILL: Thank you. That's helpful. 13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you. Any other organisation? 14 Yes, Mr Skelt? 15 MR SKELT: My Lady, it's likely we will submit our position 16 in writing. The only amendment muddying the waters -- 17 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Do you have your microphone on, 18 Mr Skelt? 19 MR SKELT: Thank you. We will make our position clear in 20 writing. The only amendment to the timetable, without 21 wishing to complicate it any further, is that we would 22 seek to, in all likelihood, make some short 23 supplementary submissions once we've seen Mr O'Connor 24 QC's position on behalf of the families. At the moment, 25 Mr O'Connor's proposed timetable I think restricts
1 supplementary submissions to those on behalf of families 2 only. 3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other interested persons. 4 MR SKELT: That aside, I have nothing else to add, thank 5 you. 6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other organisation concerned? 7 Right, Mr O'Connor, are you content if I rise and leave 8 you to discuss the fine-tuning of the timetable, but in 9 broad terms I am content with the submissions made? 10 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: Yes, my Lady, certainly, and in fact 11 I think that Mr Skelt's last point answers Mr O'Connor's 12 question for him as to whether he should serve generally 13 his submissions on that Monday or not. If other parties 14 other than simply the other representatives of the 15 deceased are to respond to them, then he will need to 16 serve them generally on that Monday. My Lady, the 17 answer is, yes, we are almost entirely agreed and we'll 18 be able to draft something between us. 19 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: As it seems to me, given the time 20 available on 28 October, and given what Mr Eadie has 21 just told me, we don't really need to address the 22 question of the worked examples for the 28th. 23 Essentially the 28th is the hearing to consider the two 24 issues that Mr Eadie wishes to advance. 25 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: My Lady, I think that will be the case.
1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Right. 2 Of course we shouldn't forget there are 3 unrepresented parties, and so, if any unrepresented 4 party has any representations they want to make, I would 5 urge them to make them to Mr Smith by whatever means of 6 communication they have been using to date to contact 7 him. 8 MR O'CONNOR: My Lady, yes. 9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So if you would go away, please, and 10 consider the timetable, I can put it into formal order, 11 perhaps tomorrow. 12 MR O'CONNOR: My Lady, yes. My Lady, will we be sitting at 13 10.00 or 10.30? 14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I was about to ask Mr Keith, would 15 10.00 be appropriate? I mean, you're the one who knows 16 how much -- 17 MR KEITH: I think it will be, yes. 18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Very well, 10.00 tomorrow. Thank you 19 all. 20 (4.58 pm) 21 (The inquests adjourned until 10.00 am the following day) 22 23 24