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9/11 Commission Report Chapter 1.2 full text

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This article is a subsection of 9/11 Commission Report Chapter 1 full text

Improvising a Homeland Defense[]

The FAA and NORAD[]

On 9/11, the defense of U.S. airspace depended on close interaction between two federal agencies: the FAA and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).The most recent hijacking that involved U.S. air traffic controllers, FAA management, and military coordination had occurred in 1993.[1] In order to understand how the two agencies interacted eight years later,we will review their missions,command and control structures,and working relationship on the morning of 9/11.

FAA Mission and Structure[]

As of September 11, 2001, the FAA was mandated by law to regulate the safety and security of civil aviation. From an [[air traffic controller]]’s perspective, that meant maintaining a safe distance between airborne aircraft.[2] Many controllers work at the FAA’s 22 Air Route Traffic Control Centers. They are grouped under regional offices and coordinate closely with the national Air Traffic Control System Command Center, located in Herndon,

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NEED PICTURES HERE Graphics courtesy of ESRI

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Virginia, which oversees daily traffic flow within the entire airspace system. FAA headquarters is ultimately responsible for the management of the National Airspace System.The Operations Center located at FAA headquarters receives notifications of incidents, including accidents and hijackings.[3] FAA Control Centers often receive information and make operational decisions independently of one another. On 9/11, the four hijacked aircraft were monitored mainly by the centers in Boston, New York, Cleveland, and Indianapolis.

Each center thus had part of the knowledge of what was going on across the system.What Boston knew was not necessarily known by centers in New York, Cleveland, or Indianapolis, or for that matter by the Command Center in Herndon or by FAA headquarters in Washington.

Controllers track airliners such as the four aircraft hijacked on 9/11 primarily by watching the data from a signal emitted by each aircraft’s transponder equipment.Those four planes, like all aircraft traveling above 10,000 feet, were required to emit a unique transponder signal while in flight.[4]


On 9/11, the terrorists turned off the transponders on three of the four hijacked aircraft.With its transponder off, it is possible, though more difficult, to track an aircraft by its primary radar returns. But unlike transponder data, primary radar returns do not show the aircraft’s identity and altitude. Controllers at centers rely so heavily on transponder signals that they usually do not display primary radar returns on their radar scopes. But they can change the configuration of their scopes so they can see primary radar returns.They did this on 9/11 when the transponder signals for three of the aircraft disappeared.[5]

Before 9/11, it was not unheard of for a commercial aircraft to deviate slightly from its course, or for an FAA controller to lose radio contact with a pilot for a short period of time. A controller could also briefly lose a commercial aircraft’s transponder signal, although this happened much less frequently. However, the simultaneous loss of radio and transponder signal would be a rare and alarming occurrence, and would normally indicate a catastrophic system failure or an aircraft crash. In all of these instances, the job of the controller was to reach out to the aircraft, the parent company of the aircraft, and other planes in the vicinity in an attempt to reestablish communications and set the aircraft back on course.Alarm bells would not start ringing until these efforts—which could take five minutes or more—were tried and had failed.[6]

NORAD Mission and Structure[]

NORAD is a binational command established in 1958 between the United States and Canada. Its mission was, and is, to defend the airspace of North America and protect the continent.That mission does not distinguish between internal and external threats; but because NORAD was created to counter the Soviet Wikipedia threat, it came to define its job as defending against external attacks.[7]

The threat of Soviet bombers diminished significantly as the Cold War ended, and the number of NORAD alert sites was reduced from its Cold War high of 26. Some within the Pentagon argued in the 1990s that the alert sites

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should be eliminated entirely. In an effort to preserve their mission, members of the air defense community advocated the importance of air sovereignty against emerging “asymmetric threats” to the United States: drug smuggling, “non-state and state-sponsored terrorists,” and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technology.[8]

NORAD perceived the dominant threat to be from cruise missiles. Other threats were identified during the late 1990s, including terrorists’ use of aircraft as weapons.Exercises were conducted to counter this threat, but they were not based on actual intelligence. In most instances, the main concern was the use of such aircraft to deliver weapons of mass destruction.

Prior to 9/11, it was understood that an order to shoot down a commercial aircraft would have to be issued by the National Command Authority (a phrase used to describe the president and secretary of defense). Exercise planners also assumed that the aircraft would originate from outside the United States, allowing time to identify the target and scramble interceptors.The threat of terrorists hijacking commercial airliners within the United States—and using them as guided missiles—was not recognized by NORAD before 9/11.[9]

Notwithstanding the identification of these emerging threats,by 9/11 there were only seven alert sites left in the United States, each with two fighter aircraft on alert.This led some NORAD commanders to worry that NORAD was not postured adequately to protect the United States.[10] In the United States, NORAD is divided into three sectors. On 9/11, all the hijacked aircraft were in NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (also known as NEADS), which is based in Rome, New York. That morning NEADS could call on two alert sites, each with one pair of ready fighters: Otis Air National Guard Base in Cape Cod, Massachusetts, and Langley Air Force Base in Hampton,Virginia.[11] Other facilities, not on “alert,” would need time to arm the fighters and organize crews.

NEADS reported to the Continental U.S. NORAD Region (CONR) headquarters, in Panama City, Florida, which in turn reported to NORAD headquarters, in Colorado Springs, Colorado.

Interagency Collaboration[]

The FAA and NORAD had developed protocols for working together in the event of a hijacking.As they existed on 9/11, the protocols for the FAA to obtain military assistance from NORAD required multiple levels of notification and approval at the highest levels of government. [12] FAA guidance to controllers on hijack procedures assumed that the aircraft pilot would notify the controller via radio or by“squawking”a transponder code of “7500”—the universal code for a hijack in progress. Controllers would notify their supervisors, who in turn would inform management all the way up to [[FAA headquarters]] in Washington.Headquarters had a hijack coordinator,who was the director of the FAA Office of Civil Aviation Security or his or her designate.[13] If a hijack was confirmed, procedures called for the hijack coordinator on

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duty to contact the Pentagon’s National Military Command Center (NMCC) and to ask for a military escort aircraft to follow the flight, report anything unusual, and aid search and rescue in the event of an emergency.The NMCC would then seek approval from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to provide military assistance. If approval was given, the orders would be transmitted down NORAD’s chain of command.[14]

The NMCC would keep the FAA hijack coordinator up to date and help the FAA centers coordinate directly with the military.NORAD would receive tracking information for the hijacked aircraft either from joint use radar or from the relevant FAA air traffic control facility. Every attempt would be made to have the hijacked aircraft squawk 7500 to help NORAD track it.[15]

The protocols did not contemplate an intercept.They assumed the fighter escort would be discreet,“vectored to a position five miles directly behind the hijacked aircraft,” where it could perform its mission to monitor the aircraft’s flight path.[16]

In sum, the protocols in place on 9/11 for the FAA and NORAD to respond to a hijacking presumed that

• the hijacked aircraft would be readily identifiable and would not attempt to disappear;

• there would be time to address the problem through the appropriate FAA and NORAD chains of command; and

• the hijacking would take the traditional form: that is, it would not be a suicide hijacking designed to convert the aircraft into a guided missile.

On the morning of 9/11, the existing protocol was unsuited in every respect for what was about to happen.

American Airlines Flight 11[]

FAA Awareness[]

Although the Boston Center air traffic controller realized at an early stage that there was something wrong with American 11, he did not immediately interpret the plane’s failure to respond as a sign that it had been hijacked. At 8:14, when the flight failed to heed his instruction to climb to 35,000 feet, the controller repeatedly tried to raise the flight. He reached out to the pilot on the emergency frequency.Though there was no response, he kept trying to contact the aircraft.[17]

At 8:21, American 11 turned off its transponder, immediately degrading the information available about the aircraft.The controller[who?] told his supervisor[who?] that he thought something was seriously wrong with the plane, although neither suspected a hijacking.The supervisor instructed the controller to follow standard procedures for handling a “no radio” aircraft.[18]

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The controller checked to see if American Airlines Wikipedia[who?] could establish communication with American 11. He became even more concerned as its route changed,moving into another sector’s airspace.Controllers immediately began to move aircraft out of its path, and asked other aircraft in the vicinity to look for American 11.[19]

At 8:24:38, the following transmission came from American 11:

American 11: We have some planes. Just stay quiet, and you’ll be okay.We are returning to the airport.


The controller only heard something unintelligible; he did not hear the specific words “we have some planes.” The next transmission came seconds later:

American 11: Nobody move.Everything will be okay. If you try to make any moves, you’ll endanger yourself and the airplane. Just stay quiet.[20]


The controller told us that he then knew it was a hijacking. He alerted his supervisor, who assigned another controller to assist him. He redoubled his efforts to ascertain the flight’s altitude. Because the controller didn’t understand the initial transmission, the manager of Boston Center instructed his quality assurance specialist to “pull the tape” of the radio transmission, listen to it closely, and report back.[21]

Between 8:25 and 8:32, in accordance with the FAA protocol, Boston Center managers started notifying their chain of command that American 11 had been hijacked.At 8:28, Boston Center called the Command Center in Herndon to advise that it believed American 11 had been hijacked and was heading toward New York Center’s airspace.

By this time,American 11 had taken a dramatic turn to the south.At 8:32, the Command Center passed word of a possible hijacking to the Operations Center at FAA headquarters.The duty officer replied that security personnel at headquarters had just begun discussing the apparent hijack on a conference call with the New England regional office. FAA headquarters began to follow the hijack protocol but did not contact the NMCC to request a fighter escort.[22]


The Herndon Command Center immediately established a teleconference between Boston, New York, and Cleveland Centers so that Boston Center could help the others understand what was happening.[23]

At 8:34, the Boston Center controller received a third transmission from American 11:

American 11: Nobody move please.We are going back to the airport.Don’t try to make any stupid moves.[24]

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In the succeeding minutes, controllers were attempting to ascertain the altitude of the southbound flight.[25]

Military Notification and Response[]

Boston Center did not follow the protocol in seeking military assistance through the prescribed chain of command. In addition to notifications within the FAA,Boston Center took the initiative, at 8:34, to contact the military through the FAA’s Cape Cod facility. The center also tried to contact a former alert site in Atlantic City, unaware it had been phased out. At 8:37:52, Boston Center reached NEADS.This was the first notification received by the military—at any level—that American 11 had been hijacked:[26]

FAA: Hi. Boston Center TMU [Traffic Management Unit], we have a problem here.We have a hijacked aircraft headed towards New York, and we need you guys to, we need someone to scramble some F-16s or something up there, help us out. NEADS: Is this real-world or exercise?

FAA: No, this is not an exercise, not a test.[27]


NEADS ordered to battle stations the two F-15 alert aircraft at Otis Air Force Base in Falmouth, Massachusetts, 153 miles away from New York City. The air defense of America began with this call.[28]

At NEADS, the report of the hijacking was relayed immediately to Battle Commander Colonel Robert Marr.After ordering the Otis fighters to battle stations, Colonel Marr phoned Major General Larry Arnold, commanding general of the First Air Force and NORAD’s Continental Region.Marr sought authorization to scramble the Otis fighters. General Arnold later recalled instructing Marr to “go ahead and scramble them, and we’ll get authorities later.” General Arnold then called NORAD headquarters to report.[29]

F-15 fighters were scrambled at 8:46 from Otis Air Force Base.But NEADS did not know where to send the alert fighter aircraft, and the officer[who?] directing the fighters pressed for more information:“I don’t know where I’m scrambling these guys to. I need a direction, a destination.” Because the hijackers had turned off the plane’s transponder, NEADS personnel spent the next minutes searching their radar scopes for the primary radar return.American 11 struck the North Tower at 8:46. Shortly after 8:50,while NEADS personnel were still trying to locate the flight, word reached them that a plane had hit the World Trade Center.[30]

Radar data show the Otis fighters were airborne at 8:53. Lacking a target, they were vectored toward military-controlled airspace off the Long Island coast.To avoid New York area air traffic and uncertain about what to do, the fighters were brought down to military airspace to “hold as needed.”From 9:09 to 9:13, the Otis fighters stayed in this holding pattern.[31]

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In summary, NEADS received notice of the hijacking nine minutes before it struck the North Tower. That nine minutes’ notice before impact was the most the military would receive of any of the four hijackings.[32]

United Airlines Flight 175[]

FAA Awareness[]

One of the last transmissions from United Airlines Flight 175 is, in retrospect, chilling. By 8:40, controllers at the FAA’s New York Center were seeking information on American 11.At approximately 8:42, shortly after entering New York Center’s airspace, the pilot of United 175 broke in with the following transmission:

UAL 175: New York UAL 175 heavy.

FAA: UAL 175 go ahead.

UAL 175:Yeah.We figured we’d wait to go to your center.Ah, we heard

a suspicious transmission on our departure out of Boston, ah, with someone, ah, it sounded like someone keyed the mikes and said ah

everyone ah stay in your seats.

FAA: Oh, okay. I’ll pass that along over here.[33]


Minutes later, United 175 turned southwest without clearance from air traffic control. At 8:47, seconds after the impact of American 11, United 175’s transponder code changed, and then changed again.These changes were not noticed for several minutes, however, because the same New York Center controller[who?] was assigned to both American 11 and United 175.The controller knew American 11 was hijacked; he was focused on searching for it after the aircraft disappeared at 8:46.[34]

At 8:48, while the controller was still trying to locate American 11, [[a New York Center manager]][who?] provided the following report on a Command Center teleconference about American 11:

Manager, New York Center: Okay. This is New York Center.We’re watching the airplane. I also had conversation with American Airlines, and they’ve told us that they believe that one of their stewardesses was stabbed and that there are people in the cockpit that have control of the aircraft, and that’s all the information they have

right now.[35]


The New York Center controller and manager were unaware that American 11 had already crashed.

At 8:51, the controller noticed the transponder change from United 175 and tried to contact the aircraft.There was no response.Beginning at 8:52, the controller made repeated attempts to reach the crew of United 175. Still no response.The controller checked his radio equipment and contacted another

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controller at 8:53, saying that “we may have a hijack” and that he could not find the aircraft.[36]

Another commercial aircraft in the vicinity[which?] then radioed in with “reports over the radio of a commuter plane hitting the World Trade Center.”The controller spent the next several minutes handing off the other flights on his scope to other controllers and moving aircraft out of the way of the unidentified aircraft (believed to be United 175) as it moved southwest and then turned northeast toward New York City.[37]


At about 8:55, the controller in charge[who?] notified a New York Center manager[who?] that she believed United 175 had also been hijacked.The manager tried to notify the regional managers and was told that they were discussing a hijacked aircraft (presumably American 11) and refused to be disturbed.At 8:58, the New York Center controller searching for United 175[who?] told [[another New York controller]][who?] “we might have a hijack over here, two of them.”[38] Between 9:01 and 9:02, a manager[who?] from New York Center told the [[Command Center]] in Herndon:

Manager,NewYork Center: We have several situations going on here. It’s escalating big, big time.We need to get the military involved with us. . . .We’re, we’re involved with something else, we have other aircraft that may have a similar situation going on here.[39]


The “other aircraft” referred to by New York Center was United 175. Evidence indicates that this conversation was the only notice received by either FAA headquarters or the Herndon Command Center prior to the second crash that there had been a second hijacking.

While the Command Center was told about this “other aircraft” at 9:01, New York Center contacted New York terminal approach control and asked for help in locating United 175.

Terminal: I got somebody who keeps coasting but it looks like he’s going into one of the small airports down there.

Center: Hold on a second. I’m trying to bring him up here and get you—There he is right there. Hold on.

Terminal: Got him just out of 9,500—9,000 now.

Center: Do you know who he is?

Terminal: We’re just, we just we don’t know who he is.We’re just picking him up now.

Center (at 9:02): Alright.Heads up man, it looks like another one coming in.[40]


The controllers observed the plane in a rapid descent; the radar data terminated over Lower Manhattan. At 9:03, United 175 crashed into the [[South Tower]].[41]

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Meanwhile, a manager from Boston Center[who?] reported that they had deciphered what they had heard in one of the first hijacker transmissions from American 11:

Boston Center: Hey . . . you still there?

New England Region:Yes, I am.

Boston Center: . . . as far as the tape, Bobby seemed to think the guy said that “we have planes.” Now, I don’t know if it was because it was the accent, or if there’s more than one, but I’m gonna, I’m gonna reconfirm that for you, and I’ll get back to you real quick. Okay?

New England Region: Appreciate it.

Unidentified Female Voice: They have what?

Boston Center: Planes, as in plural.

Boston Center: It sounds like, we’re talking to New York, that there’s another one aimed at the World Trade Center.

New England Region: There’s another aircraft?

Boston Center: A second one just hit the Trade Center.

New England Region: Okay.Yeah, we gotta get—we gotta alert the military real quick on this.[42]


Boston Center immediately advised the New England Region that it was going to stop all departures at airports under its control. At 9:05, Boston Center confirmed for both the FAA Command Center and the New England Region that the hijackers aboard American 11 said “we have planes.” At the same time,New York Center declared “ATC zero”—meaning that aircraft were not permitted to depart from, arrive at, or travel through New York Center’s airspace until further notice.[43]

Within minutes of the second impact, Boston Center instructed its controllers to inform all aircraft in its airspace of the events in New York and to advise aircraft to heighten cockpit security. Boston Center asked the Herndon Command Center to issue a similar cockpit security alert nationwide.We have found no evidence to suggest that the Command Center acted on this request or issued any type of cockpit security alert.[44]

Military Notification and Response[]

The first indication that the NORAD air defenders had of the second hijacked aircraft, United 175, came in a phone call from New York Center to NEADS at 9:03. The notice came at about the time the plane was hitting the South Tower.[45]

By 9:08, the mission crew commander at NEADS learned of the second explosion at the World Trade Center and decided against holding the fighters in military airspace away from Manhattan:

Mission Crew Commander, NEADS: This is what I foresee that we probably need to do.We need to talk to FAA.We need to tell ’em if

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this stuff is gonna keep on going, we need to take those fighters, put ’em over Manhattan.That’s best thing, that’s the best play right now. So coordinate with the FAA.Tell ’em if there’s more out there, which

we don’t know, let’s get ’em over Manhattan.At least we got some kind of play.[46]


The FAA cleared the airspace. Radar data show that at 9:13, when the Otis fighters were about 115 miles away from the city, the fighters exited their holding pattern and set a course direct for Manhattan.They arrived at 9:25 and established a combat air patrol (CAP) over the city.[47]

Because the Otis fighters had expended a great deal of fuel in flying first to military airspace and then to New York, the battle commanders were concerned about refueling.NEADS considered scrambling alert fighters from Langley Air Force Base in Virginia to New York, to provide backup.The Langley fighters were placed on battle stations at 9:09.[48] NORAD had no indication that any other plane had been hijacked.

  1. ↑ 90. In 1993, a Lufthansa aircraft was hijacked from its Frankfurt to Cairo route and diverted to JFK Airport in New York.The event lasted for 11 hours and was resolved without incident.Tamara Jones and John J. Goldman, “11-Hour Hijack Ends Without Injury in N.Y.,” Los Angeles Times, Feb. 12, 1993, p.A1.
  2. ↑ The second half of the twentieth century witnessed a tremendous growth of the air transport industry, and the FAA’s corresponding responsibilities grew enormously from the 1960s through 2001.Throughout that time, the FAA focused on setting and maintaining safety and efficiency standards. Since no plane had been hijacked inside the United States since 1991, sabotage was perceived as the most significant threat to civil aviation. For a broader discussion of the perception of the threat, see section 3.3.
  3. ↑ FAA report, “Administrator’s Fact Book,” July 2001; Benedict Sliney interview (May 21, 2004); John McCartney interview (Dec. 17, 2003).
  4. ↑ FAA regulations,AirTraffic Control transponder and altitude reporting equipment and use,14 CFR § 91.215 (2001).
  5. ↑ DOD radar files, 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron, “9/11 Autoplay,” undated; Charles Thomas interview (May 4, 2004); John Thomas interview (May 4, 2004); Joseph Cooper interview (Sept. 22, 2003);Tim Spence interview (Sept. 30, 2003). For general information on approaching terminals, see FAA report,“Aeronautical Information Manual,” Feb. 19, 2004. Times assigned to audio transmissions were derived by the Commission from files provided by the FAA and the Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) based on audio time stamps contained within the files provided by the sender. FAA tapes are certified accurate to Universal Coordinated Time by quality assurance specialists at FAA air traffic facilities. NEADS files are time-stamped as accurate to the Naval Observatory clock.We also compared audio times to certified transcripts when available.
  6. ↑ FAA Boston Center site visit (Sept. 22–24, 2003).
  7. ↑ 96. NORAD’s mission is set forth in a series of renewable agreements between the United States and Canada. According to the agreement in effect on 9/11, the “primary missions” of NORAD were “aerospace warning” and “aerospace control” for North America. Aerospace warning was defined as “the monitoring of man-made objects in space and the detection, validation, and warning of attack against North America whether by aircraft, missiles, or space vehicles.” Aerospace control was defined as “providing surveillance and control of the airspace of Canada and the United States.” See DOS memo, Exchange of Notes Between Canada and the United States Regarding Extension of the NORAD Agreement, Mar. 28, 1996; see also DOS press release,“Extension of NORAD Agreement,” June 16, 2000 (regarding the extension of the 1996 Agreement unchanged). For NORAD’s defining its job as defending against external attacks, see Ralph Eberhart interview (Mar. 1, 2004).
  8. ↑ 97. DOD report,“NORAD Strategy Review: Final Report,” July 1992, p. 55.
  9. ↑ 98. For assumptions of exercise planners, see Paul Goddard and Ken Merchant interview (Mar. 4, 2004). For the authority to shoot down a commercial aircraft prior to 9/11, granted to NORAD but not used against Payne Stewart’s plane in 1999 after the pilot and passengers lost consciousness, see Richard Myers interview (Feb. 17, 2004).A 1998 White House tabletop exercise chaired by Richard Clarke included a scenario in which a terrorist group loaded a Learjet with explosives and took off for a suicide mission to Washington. Military officials said they could scramble fighter jets from Langley Air Force Base to chase the aircraft,but they would need “executive”orders to shoot it down. Chuck Green interview (Apr. 21, 2004). For no recognition of this threat, see Ralph Eberhart interview (Mar. 1, 2004).
  10. ↑ 99. Richard Myers interview (Feb. 17, 2004).
  11. ↑ 100. Donald Quenneville interview (Jan. 7, 2004); Langley Air Force Base 119th Fighter Wing briefing (Oct. 6–7, 2003).
  12. ↑ 101. Collin Scoggins interviews (Sept. 22, 2003; Jan. 8, 2004); FAA report,“Crisis Management Handbook for Significant Events,” Feb. 15, 2000;DOD memo,CJCS instruction,“Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction of Derelict Airborne Objects,” June 1, 2001.
  13. ↑ 102. See FAA regulations, Hijacked Aircraft, Order 7110.65M, para.10-2-6 (2001); David Bottiglia interview (Oct. 1, 2003); FAA report,“Crisis Management Handbook for Significant Events,” Feb. 15, 2000. From interviews of controllers at various FAA centers, we learned that an air traffic controller’s first response to an aircraft incident is to notify a supervisor, who then notifies the traffic management unit and the operations manager in charge.The FAA center next notifies the appropriate regional operations center (ROC), which in turn contacts FAA headquarters. Biggio stated that for American 11, the combination of three factors—loss of radio contact, loss of transponder signal, and course deviation—was serious enough for him to contact the ROC in Burlington, Mass. However, without hearing the threatening communication from the cockpit, he doubts Boston Center would have recognized or labeled American 11 “a hijack.”Terry Biggio interview (Sept. 22, 2003); see also Shirley Miller interview (Mar. 30, 2004); Monte Belger interview (Apr. 20, 2004).
  14. ↑ 103. FAA regulations, Special Military Operations, Requests for Service, Order 7610.4J, paras. 7-1-1, 7-1-2 (2001); DOD memo, CJCS instruction, “Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction of Derelict Airborne Objects,” June 1, 2001.
  15. ↑ 104. Ralph Eberhart interview (Mar.1, 2004);Alan Scott interview (Feb.4, 2004);Robert Marr interview (Jan. 23, 2004);FAA regulations,Position Reports within NORAD Radar Coverage,Order 7610.4J, para. 7-4-2 (2001); DOD memo, CJCS instruction,“Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction of Derelict Airborne Objects,” June 1, 2001.
  16. ↑ 105. FAA regulations,Air/Ground Communications Security,Order 7610.4J, para. 7-1-6 (2001); FAA regulations, Vectors, Order 7610.4J, para. 7-2-3 (2001).
  17. ↑ 106. Peter Zalewski interview (Sept. 22, 2003);Terry Biggio interviews (Sept. 22, 2003; Jan. 8, 2004); Collin Scoggins interview (Sept. 22, 2003); Daniel Bueno interview (Sept. 22, 2003). For evidence of the numerous attempts by air traffic control to raise American 11, see FAA memo,“Full Transcript;Aircraft Accident;AAL11;New York, NY; September 11, 2001,” Feb. 15, 2002, p. 7.
  18. ↑ 107. DOD radar files, 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron, “9/11 Autoplay,” undated; Peter Zalewski interview (Sept. 22, 2003); John Schippani interview (Sept. 22, 2003).
  19. ↑ 108. Peter Zalewski interview (Sept. 22, 2003); John Schippani interview (Sept. 22, 2003).
  20. ↑ 109.FAA memo,“FullTranscript;Aircraft Accident;AAL11;NewYork,NY;September 11,2001,”Feb.15, 2002, p. 11; Peter Zalewski interview (Sept. 23, 2003).
  21. ↑ 110. Peter Zalewski interview (Sept. 23, 2003); John Schippani interview (Sept. 22, 2003);Terry Biggio interviews (Sept. 22, 2003; Jan. 8, 2004); Robert Jones interview (Sept. 22, 2003).
  22. ↑ 111.FAA memo,“FullTranscript;Aircraft Accident;AAL11;NewYork,NY;September 11,2001,”Apr. 19, 2002, p. 2; FAA record, Boston Center daily record of facility operation, Sept. 11, 2001;Terry Biggio interviews (Sept. 22,2003;Jan. 8, 2004); Daniel Bueno interview (Sept. 22, 2004). See also FAA memo,“Transcription of 9/11Tapes,” Oct. 2, 2003, p. 2; FAA audio file, Herndon Command Center, line 4525, 8:32–8:33.
  23. ↑ 112. See FAA memo,“Transcription of 9/11 Tapes,”Oct. 2, 2003, pp. 2–3; FAA record,[[New England Region Daily Log]], Sept. 11, 2001; [[Daniel Bueno interview (Sept. 22, 2003);Terry Biggio interviews (Sept. 22, 2003; Jan. 8, 2004).
  24. ↑ 113.FAA memo,“FullTranscript;Aircraft Accident;AAL11;NewYork,NY;September 11,2001,”Feb.15, 2002, p. 12.
  25. ↑ 114.FAA memo,“FullTranscript;Aircraft Accident;AAL11;NewYork,NY;September 11,2001,”Jan. 28, 2002, p. 5.
  26. ↑ 115.FAA memo,“FullTranscript;Aircraft Accident;AAL11;NewYork,NY;September 11,2001,”Apr. 19, 2002, p. 5;Terry Biggio interview (Sept. 22, 2003);Collin Scoggins interviews (Sept. 22, 2003; Jan. 8, 2004);Daniel Bueno interview (Sept. 22, 2003).
  27. ↑ 116. On 9/11, NORAD was scheduled to conduct a military exercise,Vigilant Guardian, which postulated a bomber attack from the former Soviet Union.We investigated whether military preparations for the large-scale exercise compromised the military’s response to the real-world terrorist attack on 9/11. According to General Eberhart,“it took about 30 seconds” to make the adjustment to the real-world situation. Ralph Eberhart testimony, June 17, 2004.We found that the response was, if anything, expedited by the increased number of staff at the sectors and at NORAD because of the scheduled exercise. See Robert Marr interview (Jan. 23, 2004).
  28. ↑ 117. For the distance between Otis Air Force Base and New York City, see William Scott testimony, May 23, 2003. For the order from NEADS to Otis to place F-15s Wikipedia at battle stations, see NEADS audio file,Weapons Director Technician position, channel 14, 8:37:15. See also interviews with Otis and NEADS personnel: Jeremy Powell interview (Oct. 27, 2003); Michael Kelly interview (Oct. 14, 2003); Donald Quenneville interview (Jan. 7, 2004), and interviews with Otis fighter pilots: Daniel Nash interview (Oct. 14, 2003);Timothy Duffy interview (Jan. 7, 2004).According to Joseph Cooper from Boston Center,“I coordinated with Huntress [“Huntress” is the call sign for NEADS]. I advised Huntress we had a hijacked aircraft. I requested some assistance. Huntress requested and I supplied pertinent information. I was advised aircraft might be sent from Otis.” FAA record, Personnel Statement of Joseph Cooper, Oct. 30, 2001.
  29. ↑ 118. Robert Marr interview (Jan. 23, 2004); Leslie Filson, Air War Over America (First Air Force, 2003), p. 56; Larry Arnold interview (Feb. 3, 2004).
  30. ↑ 119. NEADS audio file,Weapons Director Technician position, channel 14; 8:45:54; Daniel Nash interview (Oct. 14, 2003); Michael Kelly interview (Oct. 14, 2003); Donald Quenneville interview (Jan. 7, 2004);Timothy Duffy interview (Jan. 7, 2004);NEADS audio file,Mission Crew Commander position,channel 2, 8:44:58;NEADS audio file, Identification Technician position, channel 5, 8:51:13.
  31. ↑ 120. FAA audio file, Boston Center, position 31R; NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander position, channel 2, 8:58:00; NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander position, channel 2, 8:54:55. Because of a technical issue, there are no NEADS recordings available of the NEADS senior weapons director and weapons director technician position responsible for controlling the Otis scramble.We found a single communication from the weapons director or his technician on the Guard frequency at approximately 9:11, cautioning the Otis fighters: “remain at current position [holding pattern] until FAA requests assistance.” See NEADS audio file, channel 24. That corresponds to the time after the Otis fighters entered the holding pattern and before they headed for New York. NEADS controllers were simultaneously working with a tanker to relocate close to the Otis fighters.At 9:10, the senior director[who?] on the NEADS floor told the weapons director[who?],“I want those fighters closer in.” NEADS audio file, Identification Technician position, channel 5. At 9:10:22, the Otis fighters were told by Boston Center that the second tower had been struck. At 9:12:54, the Otis fighters told their Boston Center controller that they needed to establish a combat air patrol over New York, and they immediately headed for New York City. See FAA audio files, Boston Center, position 31R.This series of communications explains why the Otis fighters briefly entered and then soon departed the holding pattern, as the radar reconstruction of their flight shows. DOD radar files, 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron,“9/11 Autoplay,” undated.
  32. ↑ 121. In response to allegations that NORAD responded more quickly to the October 25, 1999, plane crash Wikipedia that killed Payne Stewart Wikipedia than it did to the hijacking of American 11, we compared NORAD’s response time for each incident.The last normal transmission from the Stewart flight was at 9:27:10 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time.The Southeast Air Defense Sector was notified of the event at 9:55, 28 minutes later. In the case of American 11, the last normal communication from the plane was at 8:13 A.M. EDT. NEADS was notified at 8:38, 25 minutes later. We have concluded there is no significant difference in NORAD’s reaction to the two incidents.See NTSB memo, Aircraft Accident Brief for Payne Stewart incident,Oct. 25, 1999; FAA email, Gahris to Myers,“ZJX Timeline for N47BA accident,” Feb. 17, 2004.
  33. ↑ 122. FAA memo, “Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; UAL175; New York, NY; September 11, 2001,” May 8, 2002, pp. 5–6.
  34. ↑ 123. FAA audio file, NewYork Center, position R42, 8:42–8:45; FAA memo, “[[Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; UAL175; New York,NY; September 11, 2001]],”May 8, 2002, pp. 6–8; DOD radar files, [[84th Radar Evaluation Squadron]],“9/11 Autoplay,”undated.The FAA-produced timeline notes,“Based on coordination received from [Boston Center] indicating a possible hijack, most of the controller’s attention is focused on AAL 11.” See FAA report,“Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events September 11, 2001,” Sept. 17, 2001; see also David Bottiglia interview (Oct. 1, 2003);FAA memo,“Full Transcript;Aircraft Accident;UAL175;NewYork,NY; September 11, 2001,” May 8, 2002, p. 9.
  35. ↑ 124. FAA audio file,Herndon Command Center,NewYork Center position, line 5114, 8:48.
  36. ↑ 125. FAA memo, “Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; UAL175; New York, NY; September 11, 2001,” May 8, 2002, pp. 12, 14.
  37. ↑ 126. Ibid., p. 15.At 8:57, the following exchange between controllers occurred:“I got some handoffs for you. We got some incidents going over here. Is Delta 2433 going to be okay at thirty-three? I had to climb him for traffic. I let you United 175 just took off out of think we might have a hijack over here.Two of them.” See FAA memo, “Full Transcript;Aircraft Accident;UAL175; New York,NY; September 11, 2001,”May 8, 2002.
  38. ↑ 127.See FAA report,“Summary of AirTraffic Hijack Events September 11,2001,”Sept. 17,2001;Evanna Dowis interview (Sept. 30, 2004); Michael McCormick interview (Dec. 15, 2003); FAA record, Personnel Statement of Michael McCormick, Oct. 17, 2001. See also FAA memo,“Full Transcript;Aircraft Accident;UAL175; NewYork, NY; September 11, 2001,” May 8, 2002, p. 17.
  39. ↑ 128. FAA memo,“Full Transcript; Command Center; NOM Operational Position; September 11, 2001,”Oct. 14, 2003, pp. 15–17.
  40. ↑ 129. FAA memo, “Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; UAL175; New York, NY; September 11, 2001,” Jan. 17, 2002, p. 3.
  41. ↑ 130.“[[N90 [New York Terminal Radar Approach] controller]][who?] stated ‘at approximately 9:00 a.m., I observed an unknown aircraft south of the Newark, New Jersey Airport, northeast bound and descending out of twelve thousand nine hundred feet in a rapid rate of descent, the radar target terminated at the World Trade Center.’” FAA report,“Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events September 11, 2001,” Sept. 17, 2001. Former NORAD official [[Alan Scott]] testified that the time of impact of United 175 was 9:02.William Scott testimony, May 23, 2003.We have determined that the impact time was 9:03:11 based on our analysis of FAA radar data and air traffic control software logic.
  42. ↑ 131. FAA audio file,Herndon Command Center,New York Center position, line 5114, 9:02:34.
  43. ↑ 132. Ibid., 9:03; FAA audio file, Herndon Command Center, Cleveland/Boston position, line 5115, 9:05; Michael McCormick interview (Oct. 1, 2003); David LaCates interview (Oct. 2, 2003).
  44. ↑ 133. FAA Audio File, Herndon Command Center, Boston Center position, line 5115, 9:05–9:07.
  45. ↑ 134. Joseph McCain interview (Oct. 28, 2003); Robert Marr (Jan. 23, 2004); James Fox interview (Oct. 29, 2003); Dawne Deskins interview (Oct. 30, 2003).
  46. ↑ 135. NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander position, channel 2, 9:07:32.
  47. ↑ 136. Daniel Nash interview (Oct. 14, 2003);Timothy Duffy interview (Jan. 7, 2004).
  48. ↑ 137. Because the Otis fighters had expended a great deal of fuel in flying first to military airspace and then to New York, the battle commanders were concerned about refueling. As NEADS personnel looked for refueling tankers in the vicinity of New York, the mission crew commander[who?] considered scrambling the Langley fighters to New York to provide backup for the Otis fighters until the NEADS Battle Cab (the command area that overlooks the operations floor) ordered “battle stations only at Langley.”The alert fighters at Langley Air Force Base were ordered to battle stations at 9:09. Colonel Marr, the battle commander at NEADS, and General Arnold,the CONR commander, both recall that the planes were held on battle stations, as opposed to scrambling, because they might be called on to relieve the Otis fighters over New York City if a refueling tanker was not located, and also because of the general uncertainty of the situation in the sky.According to William Scott at the Commission’s May 23, 2003, hearing,“At 9:09, Langley F-16s are directed to battle stations, just based on the general situation and the breaking news, and the general developing feeling about what’s going on.” See NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander, channel 2, 9:08:36; Robert Marr interview (Oct. 27, 2003); Larry Arnold interview (Feb. 3, 2004). See also Colonel Marr’s statement that “[t]he plan was to protect New York City.” Filson, Air War Over America, p. 60.

American Airlines Flight 77[]

FAA Awareness[]

American 77 began deviating from its flight plan at 8:54, with a slight turn toward the south.Two minutes later, it disappeared completely from radar at Indianapolis Center, which was controlling the flight.[1]

The controller[who?] tracking American 77 told us he noticed the aircraft turning to the southwest, and then saw the data disappear.The controller looked for primary radar returns. He searched along the plane’s projected flight path and the airspace to the southwest where it had started to turn.No primary targets appeared. He tried the radios, first calling the aircraft directly, then the airline. Again there was nothing.At this point, the Indianapolis controller had no knowledge of the situation in New York.He did not know that other aircraft had been hijacked. He believed American 77 had experienced serious electrical or mechanical failure, or both, and was gone.[2]

Shortly after 9:00, Indianapolis Center started notifying other agencies that American 77 was missing and had possibly crashed.At 9:08, Indianapolis Center asked Air Force Search and Rescue at Langley Air Force Base to look for a downed aircraft.The center also contacted the West Virginia State Police and asked whether any reports of a downed aircraft had been received. At 9:09, it reported the loss of contact to the FAA regional center, which passed this information to FAA headquarters at 9:24.[3]

By 9:20, Indianapolis Center learned that there were other hijacked aircraft, and began to doubt its initial assumption that American 77 had crashed.A discussion of this concern between the manager at Indianapolis and the Command Center in Herndon prompted it to notify some FAA field facilities that American 77 was lost. By 9:21, the Command Center, some FAA field facilities, and American Airlines had started to search for American 77.They feared

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it had been hijacked. At 9:25, the Command Center advised FAA headquarters of the situation.[4]

The failure to find a primary radar return for American 77 led us to investigate this issue further.Radar reconstructions performed after 9/11 reveal that FAA radar equipment tracked the flight from the moment its transponder was turned off at 8:56. But for 8 minutes and 13 seconds, between 8:56 and 9:05, this primary radar information on American 77 was not displayed to controllers at Indianapolis Center.[5] The reasons are technical, arising from the way the software processed radar information, as well as from poor primary radar coverage where American 77 was flying.

According to the radar reconstruction,American 77 reemerged as a primary target on Indianapolis Center radar scopes at 9:05, east of its last known position. The target remained in Indianapolis Center’s airspace for another six minutes, then crossed into the western portion of Washington Center’s airspace at 9:10.As Indianapolis Center continued searching for the aircraft,two managers and the controller responsible for American 77 looked to the west and southwest along the flight’s projected path, not east—where the aircraft was now heading. Managers did not instruct other controllers at Indianapolis Center to turn on their primary radar coverage to join in the search for American 77.[6] In sum, Indianapolis Center never saw Flight 77 turn around. By the time it reappeared in primary radar coverage, controllers had either stopped looking for the aircraft because they thought it had crashed or were looking toward the west.Although the Command Center learned Flight 77 was missing, neither it nor FAA headquarters issued an all points bulletin to surrounding centers to search for primary radar targets. American 77 traveled undetected for 36 minutes on a course heading due east for Washington, D.C.[7] By 9:25, FAA’s Herndon Command Center and FAA headquarters knew two aircraft had crashed into the World Trade Center.They knew American 77 was lost. At least some FAA officials in Boston Center and the New England Region knew that a hijacker on board American 11 had said “we have some planes.” Concerns over the safety of other aircraft began to mount.A manager at the Herndon Command Center asked FAA headquarters if they wanted to order a “nationwide ground stop.” While this was being discussed by executives at FAA headquarters, the Command Center ordered one at 9:25.[8]

The Command Center kept looking for American 77. At 9:21, it advised the Dulles terminal control facility, and Dulles urged its controllers to look for primary targets. At 9:32, they found one. Several of the Dulles controllers “observed a primary radar target tracking eastbound at a high rate of speed” and notified Reagan National Airport.FAA personnel at both Reagan National and Dulles airports notified the Secret Service.The aircraft’s identity or type was unknown.[9]

Reagan National controllers then vectored an unarmed National Guard C- 130H cargo aircraft, which had just taken off en route to Minnesota, to iden-

Page 26

tify and follow the suspicious aircraft.The C-130H pilot[who?] spotted it, identified

it as a Boeing 757, attempted to follow its path, and at 9:38, seconds after impact, reported to the control tower:“looks like that aircraft crashed into the Pentagon sir.”[10]

Military Notification and Response[]

NORAD heard nothing about the search for American 77. Instead, the NEADS air defenders heard renewed reports about a plane that no longer existed:American 11.

At 9:21, NEADS received a report from the FAA:

FAA: Military, Boston Center. I just had a report that American 11 is still in the air, and it’s on its way towards—heading towards Washington.

NEADS: Okay. American 11 is still in the air?

FAA:Yes.

NEADS: On its way towards Washington?

FAA: That was another—it was evidently another aircraft that hit the tower.That’s the latest report we have.

NEADS: Okay.

FAA: I’m going to try to confirm an ID for you, but I would assume he’s somewhere over, uh, either New Jersey or somewhere further south.

NEADS: Okay. So American 11 isn’t the hijack at all then, right?

FAA: No, he is a hijack.

NEADS: He—American 11 is a hijack?

FAA: Yes.

NEADS: And he’s heading into Washington?

FAA: Yes.This could be a third aircraft.

—[11]


The mention of a “third aircraft” was not a reference to American 77.There was confusion at that moment in the FAA.Two planes had struck the World Trade Center, and Boston Center had heard from FAA headquarters in Washington that American 11 was still airborne.We have been unable to identify the source of this mistaken FAA information.

The NEADS technician who took this call from the FAA immediately passed the word to the mission crew commander, who reported to the NEADS battle commander:

Okay, uh,American Airlines is still airborne. Eleven, the first guy, he’s heading towards Washington. Okay? I think we need to scramble Langley right now.And I’m gonna take the fighters from Otis, try to chase this guy down if I can find him.

—Mission Crew Commander, NEADS [12]
Page 27

After consulting with NEADS command, the crew commander issued the order at 9:23:“Okay . . . scramble Langley.Head them towards the Washington area. . . . [I]f they’re there then we’ll run on them. . . .These guys are smart.” That order was processed and transmitted to Langley Air Force Base at 9:24. Radar data show the Langley fighters airborne at 9:30. NEADS decided to keep the Otis fighters over New York.The heading of the Langley fighters was adjusted to send them to the Baltimore area. The mission crew commander explained to us that the purpose was to position the Langley fighters between the reported southbound American 11 and the nation’s capital.[13]

At the suggestion of the Boston Center’s military liaison,NEADS contacted the FAA’s Washington Center to ask about American 11. In the course of the conversation, a Washington Center manager informed NEADS:“We’re looking— we also lost American 77.”The time was 9:34.[14] This was the first notice to the military that American 77 was missing, and it had come by chance. If NEADS had not placed that call, the NEADS air defenders would have received no information whatsoever that the flight was even missing, although the FAA had been searching for it. No one at FAA headquarters ever asked for military assistance with American 77.

At 9:36, the FAA’s Boston Center called NEADS and relayed the discovery about an unidentified aircraft closing in on Washington:“Latest report.Aircraft VFR [visual flight rules] six miles southeast of the White House. . . . Six, southwest. Six, southwest of the White House, deviating away.” This startling news prompted the mission crew commander at NEADS to take immediate control of the airspace to clear a flight path for the Langley fighters:“Okay,we’re going to turn it . . . crank it up. . . . Run them to the White House.” He then discovered, to his surprise, that the Langley fighters were not headed north toward the Baltimore area as instructed,but east over the ocean.“I don’t care how many windows you break,” he said.“Damn it. . . . Okay.Push them back.”[15] The Langley fighters were heading east, not north, for three reasons. First, unlike a normal scramble order, this order did not include a distance to the target or the target’s location. Second, a “generic” flight plan—prepared to get the aircraft airborne and out of local airspace quickly—incorrectly led the Langley fighters to believe they were ordered to fly due east (090) for 60 miles.Third, the lead pilot and local FAA controller incorrectly assumed the flight plan instruction to go “090 for 60” superseded the original scramble order.[16] After the 9:36 call to NEADS about the unidentified aircraft a few miles from the White House, the Langley fighters were ordered to Washington,D.C. Controllers at NEADS located an unknown primary radar track, but “it kind of faded” over Washington.The time was 9:38.The Pentagon had been struck by American 77 at 9:37:46.The Langley fighters were about 150 miles away.[17] Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft. It was an aircraft that in fact had not been hijacked at all.After the second World Trade Center crash,Boston Center managers recognized that

Page 28

both aircraft were transcontinental 767 jetliners that had departed Logan Airport. Remembering the “we have some planes” remark, Boston Center guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked. Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. NEADS warned the FAA’s Cleveland Center to watch Delta 1989.The Command Center and FAA headquarters watched it too. During the course of the morning, there were multiple erroneous reports of hijacked aircraft. The report of American 11 heading south was the first; Delta 1989 was the second.[18]

NEADS never lost track of Delta 1989, and even ordered fighter aircraft from Ohio and Michigan to intercept it. The flight never turned off its transponder. NEADS soon learned that the aircraft was not hijacked, and tracked Delta 1989 as it reversed course over Toledo, headed east, and landed in Cleveland.[19] But another aircraft was heading toward Washington, an aircraft about which NORAD had heard nothing: United 93.

United Airlines Flight 93[]

FAA Awareness[]

At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller[who?].This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight.[20]

Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard “a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin.[21]

The controller responded, seconds later: “Somebody call Cleveland?”This was followed by a second radio transmission, with sounds of screaming.The Cleveland Center controllers began to try to identify the possible source of the transmissions, and noticed that United 93 had descended some 700 feet.The controller attempted again to raise United 93 several times, with no response. At 9:30, the controller began to poll the other flights on his frequency to determine if they had heard the screaming; several said they had.[22]

At 9:32, a third radio transmission came over the frequency:“Keep remaining sitting.We have a bomb on board.”The controller understood, but chose to respond: “Calling Cleveland Center, you’re unreadable. Say again, slowly.” He notified his supervisor[who?], who passed the notice up the chain of command. By 9:34, word of the hijacking had reached FAA headquarters.[23]

FAA headquarters had by this time established an open line of communication with the Command Center at Herndon and instructed it to poll all its centers about suspect aircraft.The Command Center executed the request and, a minute later, Cleveland Center reported that “United 93 may have a bomb on board.”At 9:34, the Command Center relayed the information concerning United 93 to FAA headquarters.At approximately 9:36, Cleveland advised the Command Center that it was still tracking United 93 and specifically inquired whether someone had requested the military to launch fighter aircraft to intercept the aircraft. Cleveland even told the Command Center it was prepared to

Page 29

contact a nearby military base to make the request.The Command Center told Cleveland that FAA personnel well above them in the chain of command had to make the decision to seek military assistance and were working on the issue.[24] Between 9:34 and 9:38, the Cleveland controller observed United 93 climbing to 40,700 feet and immediately moved several aircraft out its way.The controller continued to try to contact United 93, and asked whether the pilot could confirm that he had been hijacked.[25] There was no response.

Then, at 9:39, a fourth radio transmission was heard from United 93: Ziad Jarrah: Uh, this is the captain.Would like you all to remain seated. There is a bomb on board and are going back to the airport, and to have our demands [unintelligible]. Please remain quiet. The controller responded: “United 93, understand you have a bomb on board. Go ahead.”The flight did not respond.[26]

From 9:34 to 10:08,a Command Center facility manager provided frequent updates to Acting Deputy Administrator Monte Belger and other executives at FAA headquarters as United 93 headed toward Washington, D.C. At 9:41, Cleveland Center lost United 93’s transponder signal. The controller located it on primary radar, matched its position with visual sightings from other aircraft, and tracked the flight as it turned east, then south.[27]

At 9:42, the Command Center learned from news reports that a plane had struck the Pentagon.The Command Center’s national operations manager, Ben Sliney, ordered all FAA facilities to instruct all aircraft to land at the nearest airport.This was an unprecedented order.The air traffic control system handled it with great skill, as about 4,500 commercial and general aviation aircraft soon landed without incident.[28]

At 9:46 the Command Center updated FAA headquarters that United 93 was now “twenty-nine minutes out of Washington, D.C.”

At 9:49, 13 minutes after Cleveland Center had asked about getting military help,the Command Center suggested that someone at headquarters should decide whether to request military assistance:

FAA Headquarters: They’re pulling Jeff away to go talk about United 93.

Command Center: Uh, do we want to think, uh, about scrambling aircraft?

FAA Headquarters: Oh, God, I don’t know.

Command Center: Uh, that’s a decision somebody’s gonna have to make probably in the next ten minutes.

FAA Headquarters: Uh, ya know everybody just left the room.[29]


At 9:53,FAA headquarters informed the Command Center that [[the deputy director for air traffic services]] was talking to Monte Belger about scrambling

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aircraft. Then the Command Center informed headquarters that controllers had lost track of United 93 over the Pittsburgh area.Within seconds, the Command Center received a visual report from another aircraft, and informed headquarters that the aircraft was 20 miles northwest of Johnstown. United 93 was spotted by another aircraft, and, at 10:01, the Command Center advised FAA headquarters that one of the aircraft had seen United 93 “waving his wings.” The aircraft had witnessed the hijackers’ efforts to defeat the passengers’ counterattack.[30]

United 93 crashed in Pennsylvania at 10:03:11, 125 miles from Washington, D.C. The precise crash time has been the subject of some dispute.The 10:03:11 impact time is supported by previous National Transportation Safety Board analysis and by evidence from the Commission staff ’s analysis of radar, the flight data recorder, the cockpit voice recorder, infrared satellite data, and air traffic control transmissions.[31]

Five minutes later, the Command Center forwarded this update to headquarters:

Command Center: O.K. Uh, there is now on that United 93.

FAA Headquarters:Yes.

Command Center: There is a report of black smoke in the last position

I gave you, fifteen miles south of Johnstown.

FAA Headquarters: From the airplane or from the ground?

Command Center: Uh, they’re speculating it’s from the aircraft.

FAA Headquarters: Okay.

Command Center: Uh,who, it hit the ground.That’s what they’re speculating,

that’s speculation only.[32]


The aircraft that spotted the “black smoke” was the same unarmed Air National Guard cargo plane that had seen American 77 crash into the Pentagon 27 minutes earlier. It had resumed its flight to Minnesota and saw the smoke from the crash of United 93, less than two minutes after the plane went down. At 10:17, the Command Center advised headquarters of its conclusion that United 93 had indeed crashed.[33]

Despite the discussions about military assistance, no one from FAA headquarters requested military assistance regarding United 93. Nor did any manager at FAA headquarters pass any of the information it had about United 93 to the military.

Military Notification and Response[]

NEADS first received a call about United 93 from the military liaison at Cleveland Center at 10:07.Unaware that the aircraft had already crashed, Cleveland passed to NEADS the aircraft’s last known latitude and longitude. NEADS was never able to locate United 93 on radar because it was already in the ground.[34]

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At the same time, the NEADS mission crew commander was dealing with the arrival of the Langley fighters over Washington,D.C., sorting out what their orders were with respect to potential targets. Shortly after 10:10, and having no knowledge either that United 93 had been heading toward Washington or that it had crashed, he explicitly instructed the Langley fighters: “negative— negative clearance to shoot” aircraft over the nation’s capital.[35]

The news of a reported bomb on board United 93 spread quickly at NEADS.The air defenders searched for United 93’s primary radar return and tried to locate other fighters to scramble. NEADS called Washington Center to report:

NEADS: I also want to give you a heads-up,Washington. FAA (DC): Go ahead. NEADS: United nine three, have you got information on that yet? FAA:Yeah, he’s down. NEADS: He’s down? FAA:Yes. NEADS: When did he land? ’Cause we have got confirmation— FAA: He did not land. NEADS: Oh, he’s down? Down? FAA: Yes. Somewhere up northeast of Camp David Wikipedia. NEADS: Northeast of Camp David.

FAA: That’s the last report.They don’t know exactly where.[36]


The time of notification of the crash of United 93 was 10:15.[37] The NEADS air defenders never located the flight or followed it on their radar scopes.The flight had already crashed by the time they learned it was hijacked.

Clarifying the Record[]

The defense of U.S. airspace on 9/11 was not conducted in accord with preexisting training and protocols. It was improvised by civilians who had never handled a hijacked aircraft that attempted to disappear, and by a military unprepared for the transformation of commercial aircraft into weapons of mass destruction. As it turned out, the NEADS air defenders had nine minutes’ notice on the first hijacked plane, no advance notice on the second,no advance notice on the third, and no advance notice on the fourth.

We do not believe that the true picture of that morning reflects discredit on the operational personnel at NEADS or FAA facilities. NEADS commanders and officers actively sought out information, and made the best judgments they could on the basis of what they knew. Individual FAA controllers, facility managers, and Command Center managers thought outside the box in recommending a nationwide alert, in ground-stopping local traffic, and, ultimately, in deciding to land all aircraft and executing that unprecedented order flawlessly.

Page 32

American Airlines Flight 11 United Airlines Flight 175

(AA 11) (UA 175)

Boston to Los Angeles Boston to Los Angeles

Boston

New York City

7:59 Takeoff 8:14 Last routine radio communication; likely takeover 8:19 Flight attendant notifies AA of hijacking 8:21 Transponder is turned off 8:23 AA attempts to contact the cockpit 8:25 Boston Center aware of hijacking 8:38 Boston Center notifies NEADS of hijacking 8:46 NEADS scrambles Otis fighter jets in search of AA 11 8:46:40 AA 11 crashes into 1 WTC (North Tower) 8:53 Otis fighter jets airborne 9:16 AA headquarters aware that Flight 11 has crashed into WTC 9:21 Boston Center advises NEADS that AA 11 is airborne heading for Washington 9:24 NEADS scrambles Langley fighter jets in search of AA 11

Boston New York City

8:14 Takeoff 8:42 Last radio communication 8:42-8:46 Likely takeover 8:47 Transponder code changes 8:52 Flight attendant notifies UA of hijacking 8:54 UA attempts to contact the cockpit 8:55 New York Center suspects hijacking 9:03:11 Flight 175 crashes into 2 WTC (South Tower) 9:15 New York Center advises NEADS that UA 175 was the second aircraft crashed into WTC 9:20 UA headquarters aware that Flight 175 had crashed into WTC

Page 33

American Airlines Flight 77 United Airlines Flight 93 (AA 77) (UA 93) Washington, D.C., to Los Angeles Newark to San Francisco Dulles Pentagon 8:20 Takeoff 8:51 Last routine radio communication 8:51-8:54 Likely takeover 8:54 Flight 77 makes unauthorized turn to south 8:56 Transponder is turned off 9:05 AA headquarters aware that Flight 77 is hijacked 9:25 Herndon Command Center orders nationwide ground stop 9:32 Dulles tower observes radar of fast-moving aircraft (later identified as AA 77) 9:34 FAA advises NEADS that AA 77 is missing 9:37:46 AA 77 crashes into the Pentagon 10:30 AA headquarters confirms Flight 77 crash into Pentagon

Newark Shanksville, PA

8:42 Takeoff 9:24 Flight 93 receives warning from UA about possible cockpit intrusion 9:27 Last routine radio communication 9:28 Likely takeover 9:34 Herndon Command Center advises FAA headquarters that UA 93 is hijacked 9:36 Flight attendant notifies UA of hijacking; UA attempts to contact the cockpit 9:41 Transponder is turned off 9:57 Passenger revolt begins 10:03:11 Flight 93 crashes in field in Shanksville, PA 10:07 Cleveland Center advises NEADS of UA 93 hijacking 10:15 UA headquarters aware that Flight 93 has crashed in PA; Washington Center advises NEADS that Flight 93 has crashed in PA

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More than the actual events, inaccurate government accounts of those events made it appear that the military was notified in time to respond to two of the hijackings, raising questions about the adequacy of the response.Those accounts had the effect of deflecting questions about the military’s capacity to obtain timely and accurate information from its own sources. In addition, they overstated the FAA’s ability to provide the military with timely and useful information that morning.

In public testimony before this Commission in May 2003, NORAD officials stated that at 9:16,NEADS received hijack notification of United 93 from the FAA.[38]This statement was incorrect.There was no hijack to report at 9:16. United 93 was proceeding normally at that time.

In this same public testimony, NORAD officials stated that at 9:24, NEADS received notification of the hijacking of American 77.[39] This statement was also incorrect.The notice NEADS received at 9:24 was that American 11 had not hit the World Trade Center and was heading for Washington, D.C.[40]

In their testimony and in other public accounts, NORAD officials also stated that the Langley fighters were scrambled to respond to the notifications about American 77,[41] United 93, or both.These statements were incorrect as well.The fighters were scrambled because of the report that American 11 was heading south, as is clear not just from taped conversations at NEADS but also from taped conversations at FAA centers; contemporaneous logs compiled at NEADS, Continental Region headquarters, and NORAD; and other records. Yet this response to a phantom aircraft was not recounted in a single public timeline or statement issued by the FAA or Department of Defense.The inaccurate accounts created the impression that the Langley scramble was a logical response to an actual hijacked aircraft.

In fact, not only was the scramble prompted by the mistaken information about American 11, but NEADS never received notice that American 77 was hijacked. It was notified at 9:34 that American 77 was lost.Then, minutes later, NEADS was told that an unknown plane was 6 miles southwest of the White House. Only then did the already scrambled airplanes start moving directly toward Washington,D.C.

Thus the military did not have 14 minutes to respond to American 77, as testimony to the Commission in May 2003 suggested. It had at most one or two minutes to react to the unidentified plane approaching Washington, and the fighters were in the wrong place to be able to help.They had been responding to a report about an aircraft that did not exist.

Nor did the military have 47 minutes to respond to United 93, as would be implied by the account that it received notice of the flight’s hijacking at 9:16. By the time the military learned about the flight, it had crashed. We now turn to the role of national leadership in the events that morning.

Page 35

Notes[]

  1. ↑ 138. Commission analysis of FAA radar data and air traffic control transmissions.
  2. ↑ 139.The Indianapolis Center controller advised other Indianapolis Center personnel of the developing situation. They agreed to “sterilize” the airspace along the flight’s westerly route so the safety of other planes would not be affected. John Thomas interview (May 4, 2004).
  3. ↑ 140. John Thomas interview (Sept. 24, 2003).According to the FAA-produced timeline, at 9:09 [[Indianapolis Center]] “notified Great Lakes Regional Operations Center a possible aircraft accident of AMERICAN 77 due to the simultaneous loss of radio communications and radar identification.”FAA report,“[[Summary of AirTraffic Hijack Events September 11, 2001]],” Sept. 17, 2001.
  4. ↑ 141.FAA audio file,Herndon Command Center, National Operations Manager position, line 4525;FAA audio file,Herndon Command Center,National Traffic Management Officer east position, line 4530; FAA memo,“[[Full Transcription; Air Traffic Control System Command Center,National Traffic Management Officer, East Position; September 11, 2001]],” Oct. 21, 2003, p. 13.
  5. ↑ 142. Primary radar contact for Flight 77 was lost because the “preferred” radar in this geographic area had no primary radar system, the “supplemental” radar had poor primary coverage, and the FAA ATC software did not allow the display of primary radar data from the “tertiary” and “quadrary” radars.
  6. ↑ 143. David Boone interview (May 4, 2004);Charles Thomas interview (May 4, 2004); John Thomas interview (May 4, 2004); Commission analysis of FAA radar data and air traffic control software logic.
  7. ↑ 144. John Thomas interview (May 4, 2004); Charles Thomas interview (May 4, 2004).We have reviewed all FAA documents, transcripts, and tape recordings related to American 77 and have found no evidence that [[FAA headquarters]] issued a directive to surrounding centers to search for primary radar targets.Review of the same materials also indicates that no one within FAA located American 77 until the aircraft was identified by Dulles controllers at 9:32. For much of that time, American 77 was traveling through Washington Center’s airspace. The Washington Center’s controllers were looking for the flight,but they were not told to look for primary radar returns.
  8. ↑ 145.John White interview (May 7, 2004);Ellen King interview (Apr.5, 2004);Linda Schuessler interview (Apr. 6, 2004); Benedict Sliney interview (May 21, 2004); FAA memo, “Full Transcription; Air Traffic Control System Command Center, National Traffic Management Officer, East Position; September 11, 2001,” Oct. 21, 2003, pp.14, 27.
  9. ↑ 146. John Hendershot interview (Dec. 22, 2003).
  10. ↑ 147. FAA memo, “Partial Transcript; Aircraft Accident; AAL77;Washington, DC; September 11, 2001,” Sept. 20, 2001, p. 7.
  11. ↑ NEADS audio file, Identification Technician position, channel 7, 9:21:10.
  12. ↑ NEADS audio file,Mission Crew Commander, channel 2, 9:21:50;Kevin Nasypany interview (Jan. 22–23, 2004).
  13. ↑ 150. NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander, Channel 2, 9:22:34.The mission commander thought to put the Langley scramble over Baltimore and place a “barrier cap” between the hijack and Washington, D.C. [[Kevin Nasypany interview]] (Jan. 22–23, 2004).
  14. ↑ 151. NEADS audio file, Identification Technician position, channel 5, 9:32:10; ibid., 9:33:58.
  15. ↑ 152. For first quote, seeNEADS audio file, Identification Technician position, channel 5, 9:35:50. For second quote, see NEADS audio file, IdentificationTechnician position,channel 7, 9:36:34;Kevin Nasypany interview (Jan. 22–23, 2004). For the third quote, see NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander, channel 2, 9:39; 9:39:37; Kevin Nasypany interview (Jan. 22–23, 2004).
  16. ↑ 153.Dean Eckmann interview (Dec.1, 2003);FAA memo,“[[PartialTranscript;Scramble Aircraft;QUIT25;September 11, 2001]],” Sept. 4, 2003, pp. 2–4 (Peninsular Radar position); FAA memo,“[[Partial Transcript; Scramble Aircraft; QUIT25; September 11, 2001]],” Sept. 4, 2003, pp. 2–5 (East Feeder Radar position).
  17. ↑ 154. NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander, channel 2, 9:38:02; Dawne Deskins interview (Oct. 30, 2003).The estimated time of impact of Flight 77 into the Pentagon is based on Commission analysis of FDR, air traffic control, radar, and Pentagon elevation and impact site data.
  18. ↑ 155. Joseph Cooper interview (Sept. 22, 2003);NEADS audio file, Identification Technician position, recorder 1, channel 7, 9:41.
  19. ↑ 156. NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander position, channel 2, 9:42:08.
  20. ↑ 157. FAA memo, “Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident;N591UA (UAL93); Somerset, PA; September 11, 2001,” May 10, 2002, p. 10.
  21. ↑ ”158.The United 93 timeline in FAA report,“Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events September 11, 2001,” Sept. 17, 2001, states that at 9:28:17 “a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin was heard over the ZOB [ Cleveland Center ] radio.” See FAA memo,“[[Full Transcript;Aircraft Accident; N591UA (UAL93); Somerset, PA; September 11, 2001]],” May 10, 2002, p. 11.
  22. ↑ 159.The United 93 timeline in FAA report,“Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events September 11, 2001,” Sept. 17, 2001, states that at 9:28:54 a “second radio transmission, mostly unintelligible, again with sounds of possible screaming or a struggle and a statement,‘get out of here, get out of here’ from an unknown origin was heard over the ZOB [Cleveland Center] radio.” FAA audio file, Cleveland Center, Lorain Radar position; FAA memo, “[[Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; N591UA (UAL93); Somerset, PA; September 11, 2001]],” May 10, 2002, p. 11. At 9:31:48, ExecJet 56 also called in, reporting that “we’re just answering your call.We did hear that, uh, yelling too.” The FAA responded at 9:31:51,“Okay, thanks.We’re just trying to figure out what’s going on.” FAA memo,“[[Full Transcript;Aircraft Accident;N591UA (UAL93); Somerset, PA; September 11, 2001]],”May 10, 2002, p. 15.
  23. ↑ 160. FAA memo, “Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident;N591UA (UAL93); Somerset, PA; September 11, 2001,” May 10, 2002, p. 15.
  24. ↑ 161. FAA memo,“[[Full Transcription;Air Traffic Control System Command Center,National Traffic Management Officer, East Position; September 11, 2001]],” Oct. 21, 2003, pp. 10, 13; FAA audio file, Herndon Command Center,NewYork Center position, line 5154.
  25. ↑ 162. FAA memo, “Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident;N591UA (UAL93); Somerset, PA; September 11, 2001,” May 10, 2002, p. 19.
  26. ↑ 163. Ibid., p. 23.
  27. ↑ 164. FAA memo,“[[Full Transcription;Air Traffic Control System Command Center,National Traffic Management Officer, East Position;September 11,2001]],”Oct.21,2003,pp.16–17;FAA audio file,Cleveland Center, Lorain Radar position; FAA memo, “[[Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident;N591UA (UAL93); Somerset, PA; September 11, 2001]],” May 10, 2002, pp. 26–32.
  28. ↑ 165. FAA memo,“[[Full Transcription;Air Traffic Control System Command Center,National Traffic Management Officer, East Position; September 11, 2001]],” Oct. 21, 2003, pp. 17–19.
  29. ↑ 166. For 9:46 quotation, see ibid., pp. 19–20. For 9:49 discussion about military assistance, see ibid., p. 21.
  30. ↑ 167. For 9:53 discussion about scrambling aircraft, see ibid., p. 23. Neither Monte Belger nor the deputy director for air traffic services could recall this discussion in their interviews with us. Monte Belger interview (Apr. 20, 2004); Peter Challan interview (Mar. 26, 2004). Subsequently Belger told us he does not believe the conversation occurred. Monte Belger, email to the Commission, July 12, 2004. However, tapes from the morning reveal that at 9:53 a staff person from headquarters told the Command Center “Peter’s talking to Monte now about scrambling.” FAA memo,“[[Full Transcription;Air Traffic Control System Command Center,National Traffic Management Officer, East Position; September 11, 2001]],”Oct. 21, 2003, p. 23. For discussions about the status of United 93, see ibid., pp. 24–27.
  31. ↑ 168. Ibid., pp. 23–27.We also reviewed a report regarding seismic observations on September 11, 2001, whose authors conclude that the impact time of United 93 was “10:06:05±5 (EDT).”Won-Young Kim and G. R. Baum, “Seismic Observations during September 11, 2001,Terrorist Attack,” spring 2002 (report to the Maryland Department of Natural Resources). But the seismic data on which they based this estimate are far too weak in signal-to noise ratio and far too speculative in terms of signal source to be used as a means of contradicting the impact time established by the very accurate combination of FDR, CVR,ATC, radar, and impact site data sets.These data sets constrain United 93’s impact time to within 1 second, are airplane- and crash-site specific, and are based on time codes automatically recorded in the ATC audiotapes for the FAA centers and correlated with each data set in a process internationally accepted within the aviation accident investigation community. Furthermore, one of the study’s principal authors now concedes that “seismic data is not definitive for the impact of UA 93.” Email from Won-Young Kim to the Commission,“Re:UA Flight 93,” July 7, 2004; see also Won-Young Kim,“[[Seismic Observations for UA Flight 93 Crash near Shanksville, Pennsylvania during September 11, 2001]],” July 5, 2004.
  32. ↑ 169. FAA memo,“[[Full Transcription;Air Traffic Control System Command Center,National Traffic Management Officer, East Position; September 11, 2001]],” Oct. 21, 2003, p. 31.
  33. ↑ 170. For 10:17 discussion, see ibid., p. 34. For communication regarding “black smoke,” see FAA memo,“Full Transcript; Aircraft Accident; N591UA (UAL93) Somerset, PA; September 11, 2001,” May 10, 2002, pp. 16–18 (Cleveland Center, Imperial Radar position).This report from the C-130H was recorded on ATC audio about 1 minute and 37 seconds after the impact time of United 93 as established by NTSB and Commission analysis of FDR, CVR, radar, and impact data sets—more than a minute before the earliest impact time originally posited by the authors of the seismic data report.
  34. ↑ 171. NEADS audio file, Identification Technician, channel 5, 10:07.
  35. ↑ 172. NEADS audio file, Mission Crew Commander, channel 2, 10:10.
  36. ↑ 173. NEADS audio file, Identification Technician, channel 4, 10:14.
  37. ↑ 174. DOD record, NEADS MCC/T Log Book, Sept. 11, 2001.
  38. ↑ 175.William Scott testimony, May 23, 2003.
  39. ↑ 176. Larry Arnold testimony, May 23, 2003.
  40. ↑ 177. See DOD record, NEADS MCC/T Log Book, Sept. 11, 2001.The entry in this NEADS log records the tail number not of American 77 but of American 11:“American Airlines #N334AA hijacked.”See also [[DOD record, Surveillance Log Book]], Sept. 11, 2001.
  41. ↑ 178.William Scott testimony,May 23, 2003; DOD briefing materials,“Noble Eagle; 9-11 Timeline,” undated.

References[]

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