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This article is a subsection of 9/11 Commission Report Chapter 1 full text
Boarding the FlightsEdit
When he checked in for his flight to Boston, Atta was selected by a computerized prescreening system known as CAPPS (Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System), created to identify passengers who should be subject to special security measures. Under security rules in place at the time, the only consequence of Atta’s selection by CAPPS was that his checked bags were held off the plane until it was confirmed that he had boarded the aircraft. This did not hinder Atta’s plans. 
Atta and Omari arrived in Boston at 6:45. Seven minutes later,Atta apparently took a call from Marwan al Shehhi, a longtime colleague who was at another terminal at Logan Airport.They spoke for three minutes.  It would be their final conversation.
Between 6:45 and 7:40,Atta and Omari, along with Satam al Suqami,Wail al Shehri, and Waleed al Shehri, checked in and boarded American Airlines Flight 11, bound for Los Angeles.The flight was scheduled to depart at 7:45. 
In another Logan terminal, Shehhi, joined by Fayez Banihammad, Mohand al Shehri, Ahmed al Ghamdi, and Hamza al Ghamdi, checked in for United Airlines Flight 175, also bound for Los Angeles.A couple of Shehhi’s colleagues were obviously unused to travel; according to the United ticket agent, they had trouble understanding the standard security questions, and she had to go over them slowly until they gave the routine, reassuring answers.  Their flight was scheduled to depart at 8:00.
The security checkpoints through which passengers, including Atta and his colleagues, gained access to the American 11 gate were operated by Globe Security under a contract with American Airlines. In a different terminal, the single checkpoint through which passengers for United 175 passed was controlled by United Airlines, which had contracted with Huntleigh USA to perform the screening. 
In passing through these checkpoints, each of the hijackers would have been screened by a walk-through metal detector calibrated to detect items with at least the metal content of a .22-caliber handgun.Anyone who might have set off that detector would have been screened with a hand wand—a procedure requiring the screener to identify the metal item or items that caused the alarm. In addition, an X-ray machine would have screened the hijackers’ carry-on belongings.The screening was in place to identify and confiscate weapons and other items prohibited from being carried onto a commercial flight.  None of the checkpoint supervisors recalled the hijackers or reported anything suspicious regarding their screening.
While Atta had been selected by CAPPS in Portland, three members of his hijacking team—Suqami,Wail al Shehri, and Waleed al Shehri—were selected in Boston.Their selection affected only the handling of their checked bags, not their screening at the checkpoint. All five men cleared the checkpoint and made their way to the gate for American 11. Atta, Omari, and Suqami took their seats in business class (seats 8D, 8G, and 10B, respectively). The Shehri brothers had adjacent seats in row 2 (Wail in 2A,Waleed in 2B), in the firstclass cabin. They boarded American 11 between 7:31 and 7:40. The aircraft pushed back from the gate at 7:40. 
Shehhi and his team, none of whom had been selected by CAPPS, boarded United 175 between 7:23 and 7:28 (Banihammad in 2A, Shehri in 2B, Shehhi in 6C, Hamza al Ghamdi in 9C, and Ahmed al Ghamdi in 9D).Their aircraft pushed back from the gate just before 8:00.
of them, Khalid al Mihdhar and Majed Moqed, checked in at the American Airlines ticket counter for Flight 77, bound for Los Angeles. Within the next 20 minutes, they would be followed by Hani Hanjour and two brothers,Nawaf al Hazmi and Salem al Hazmi.
Hani Hanjour, Khalid al Mihdhar, and Majed Moqed were flagged by CAPPS.The Hazmi brothers were also selected for extra scrutiny by the airline’s customer service representative at the check-in counter. He did so because one of the brothers did not have photo identification nor could he understand English, and because the agent found both of the passengers to be suspicious.The only consequence of their selection was that their checked bags were held off the plane until it was confirmed that they had boarded the aircraft.
All five hijackers passed through the Main Terminal’s west security screening checkpoint; United Airlines, which was the responsible air carrier, had contracted out the work to Argenbright Security. The checkpoint featured closed-circuit television that recorded all passengers, including the hijackers, as they were screened. At 7:18, Mihdhar and Moqed entered the security checkpoint.
Mihdhar and Moqed placed their carry-on bags on the belt of the X-ray machine and proceeded through the first metal detector. Both set off the alarm, and they were directed to a second metal detector.Mihdhar did not trigger the alarm and was permitted through the checkpoint. After Moqed set it off, a screener wanded him. He passed this inspection.
About 20 minutes later, at 7:35, another passenger for Flight 77, Hani Hanjour, placed two carry-on bags on the X-ray belt in the Main Terminal’s west checkpoint, and proceeded,without alarm,through the metal detector.A short time later, Nawaf and Salem al Hazmi entered the same checkpoint. Salem al Hazmi cleared the metal detector and was permitted through;Nawaf al Hazmi set off the alarms for both the first and second metal detectors and was then hand-wanded before being passed. In addition, his over-the-shoulder carry-on bag was swiped by an explosive trace detector and then passed. The video footage indicates that he was carrying an unidentified item in his back pocket, clipped to its rim.
When the local civil aviation security office[which?] of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) later investigated these security screening operations, the screeners recalled nothing out of the ordinary.They could not recall that any of the passengers they screened were CAPPS selectees.We asked a screening expert to review the videotape of the hand-wanding, and he found the quality of the screener’s work to have been “marginal at best.”The screener should have “resolved” what set off the alarm; and in the case of both Moqed and Hazmi, it was clear that he did not.At 7:50, Majed Moqed and Khalid al Mihdhar boarded the flight and were seated in 12A and 12B in coach. Hani Hanjour, assigned to seat 1B (first class),
soon followed.The Hazmi brothers, sitting in 5E and 5F, joined Hanjour in the first-class cabin.
Newark: United 93Edit
Between 7:03 and 7:39, Saeed al Ghamdi, Ahmed al Nami,Ahmad al Haznawi, and Ziad Jarrah checked in at the United Airlines ticket counter for Flight 93, going to Los Angeles.Two checked bags; two did not. Haznawi was selected by CAPPS.His checked bag was screened for explosives and then loaded on the plane. 
The four men passed through the security checkpoint, owned by United Airlines and operated under contract by Argenbright Security. Like the checkpoints in Boston, it lacked closed-circuit television surveillance so there is no documentary evidence to indicate when the hijackers passed through the checkpoint,what alarms may have been triggered, or what security procedures were administered.The FAA interviewed the screeners[who?] later; none recalled anything unusual or suspicious. 
The four men boarded the plane between 7:39 and 7:48. All four had seats in the first-class cabin; their plane had no business-class section. Jarrah was in seat 1B, closest to the cockpit; Nami was in 3C, Ghamdi in 3D, and Haznawi in 6B.
The 19 men were aboard four transcontinental flights. They were planning to hijack these planes and turn them into large guided missiles, loaded with up to 11,400 gallons of jet fuel. By 8:00 A.M. on the morning of Tuesday, September 11,2001,they had defeated all the security layers that America’s civil aviation security system then had in place to prevent a hijacking.
The Hijacking of American 11Edit
American Airlines Flight 11 provided nonstop service from Boston to Los Angeles. On September 11, Captain John Ogonowski and First Officer Thomas McGuinness piloted the Boeing 767.It carried its full capacity of nine flight attendants. Eighty-one passengers boarded the flight with them (including the five terrorists). The plane took off at 7:59. Just before 8:14, it had climbed to 26,000 feet, not quite its initial assigned cruising altitude of 29,000 feet.All communications and flight profile data were normal. About this time the “Fasten Seatbelt” sign would usually have been turned off and the flight attendants would have begun preparing for cabin service. At that same time, American 11 had its last routine communication with the ground when it acknowledged navigational instructions from the FAA’s air traffic control (ATC) center in Boston. Sixteen seconds after that transmission, ATC instructed the aircraft’s pilots to climb to 35,000 feet.That message and all subsequent attempts to contact the flight were not acknowledged. From this and other evidence, we believe the hijacking began at 8:14 or shortly thereafter.
Reports from two flight attendants in the coach cabin, Betty Ong and Madeline “Amy” Sweeney, tell us most of what we know about how the hijacking happened. As it began, some of the hijackers—most likely Wail al Shehri and Waleed al Shehri,who were seated in row 2 in first class—stabbed the two unarmed flight attendants who would have been preparing for cabin service.
We do not know exactly how the hijackers gained access to the cockpit; FAA rules required that the doors remain closed and locked during flight.Ong speculated that they had “jammed their way” in. Perhaps the terrorists stabbed the flight attendants to get a cockpit key, to force one of them to open the cockpit door, or to lure the captain or first officer out of the cockpit. Or the flight attendants may just have been in their way. At the same time or shortly thereafter, Atta—the only terrorist on board trained to fly a jet—would have moved to the cockpit from his business-class seat, possibly accompanied by Omari.As this was happening, passenger [[Daniel Lewin]], who was seated in the row just behind Atta and Omari, was stabbed by one of the hijackers—probably Satam al Suqami, who was seated directly behind Lewin. Lewin had served four years as an officer in the Israeli military. He may have made an attempt to stop the hijackers in front of him, not realizing that another was sitting behind him.
The hijackers quickly gained control and sprayed Mace , pepper spray, or some other irritant in the first-class cabin, in order to force the passengers and flight attendants toward the rear of the plane.They claimed they had a bomb.
About five minutes after the hijacking began, Betty Ong contacted the American Airlines Southeastern Reservations Office in Cary, North Carolina, via an AT&T airphone to report an emergency aboard the flight.This was the first of several occasions on 9/11 when flight attendants took action outside the scope of their training, which emphasized that in a hijacking, they were to communicate with the cockpit crew.The emergency call lasted approximately 25 minutes, as Ong calmly and professionally relayed information about events taking place aboard the airplane to authorities on the ground. At 8:19, Ong reported:“The cockpit is not answering, somebody’s stabbed in business class—and I think there’s Mace—that we can’t breathe—I don’t know, I think we’re getting hijacked.” She then told of the stabbings of the two flight attendants.
At 8:21, one of the American employees receiving Ong’s call in North Carolina, Nydia Gonzalez, alerted the American Airlines operations center in Fort Worth,Texas, reaching Craig Marquis, the manager on duty. Marquis soon realized this was an emergency and instructed the airline’s dispatcher responsible for the flight to contact the cockpit. At 8:23, the dispatcher[who?] tried unsuccessfully to contact the aircraft. Six minutes later, the air traffic control specialist[who?] in American’s operations center contacted the FAA’s Boston Air Traffic Control Center about the flight.The center was already aware of the problem.
Boston Center knew of a problem on the flight in part because just before 8:25 the hijackers had attempted to communicate with the passengers. The microphone was keyed, and immediately one of the hijackers said, “Nobody move. Everything will be okay. If you try to make any moves, you’ll endanger yourself and the airplane. Just stay quiet.”Air traffic controllers heard the transmission; Ong did not.The hijackers probably did not know how to operate the cockpit radio communication system correctly, and thus inadvertently broadcast their message over the air traffic control channel instead of the cabin public-address channel. Also at 8:25, and again at 8:29, Amy Sweeney got through to the American Flight Services Office in Boston but was cut off after she reported someone was hurt aboard the flight.Three minutes later,Sweeney was reconnected to the office and began relaying updates to the manager, Michael Woodward.
At 8:26, Ong reported that the plane was “flying erratically.”A minute later, Flight 11 turned south. American also began getting identifications of the hijackers, as Ong and then Sweeney passed on some of the seat numbers of those who had gained unauthorized access to the cockpit. Sweeney calmly reported on her line that the plane had been hijacked; a man in first class had his throat slashed; two flight attendants had been stabbed—one was seriously hurt and was on oxygen while the other’s wounds seemed minor; a doctor had been requested; the flight attendants were unable to contact the cockpit; and there was a bomb in the cockpit. Sweeney told Woodward that she and Ong were trying to relay as much information as they could to people on the ground.
At 8:38, Ong told Gonzalez that the plane was flying erratically again. Around this time Sweeney told Woodward that the hijackers were Middle Easterners, naming three of their seat numbers. One spoke very little English and one spoke excellent English.The hijackers had gained entry to the cockpit, and she did not know how.The aircraft was in a rapid descent.
At 8:41, Sweeney told Woodward that passengers in coach were under the impression that there was a routine medical emergency in first class. Other flight attendants were busy at duties such as getting medical supplies while Ong and Sweeney were reporting the events.
At 8:41, in American’s operations center, a colleague[who?] told Marquis that the air traffic controllers declared Flight 11 a hijacking and “think he’s [American 11] headed toward Kennedy [airport in NewYork City].They’re moving everybody out of the way.They seem to have him on a primary radar.They seem to think that he is descending.”
At 8:44, Gonzalez reported losing phone contact with Ong. About this same time Sweeney reported to Woodward,“Something is wrong.We are in a rapid descent . . . we are all over the place.”Woodward asked Sweeney to look out the window to see if she could determine where they were. Sweeney responded:“We are flying low.We are flying very, very low.We are flying way
too low.” Seconds later she said,“Oh my God we are way too low.” The phone call ended.
The Hijacking of United 175Edit
United Airlines Flight 175 was scheduled to depart for Los Angeles at 8:00.Captain Victor Saracini and First Officer Michael Horrocks piloted the Boeing 767 ,which had seven flight attendants. Fifty-six passengers boarded the flight.
United 175 pushed back from its gate at 7:58 and departed Logan Airport at 8:14. By 8:33, it had reached its assigned cruising altitude of 31,000 feet.The flight attendants would have begun their cabin service.
The flight had taken off just as American 11 was being hijacked, and at 8:42 the United 175 flight crew completed their report on a “suspicious transmission” overheard from another plane (which turned out to have been Flight 11) just after takeoff.This was United 175’s last communication with the ground.
The hijackers attacked sometime between 8:42 and 8:46.They used knives (as reported by two passengers and a flight attendant), Mace (reported by one passenger), and the threat of a bomb (reported by the same passenger).They stabbed members of the flight crew (reported by a flight attendant and one passenger).
Both pilots had been killed (reported by one flight attendant[myref 1]).The eyewitness accounts came from calls made from the rear of the plane, from passengers originally seated further forward in the cabin, a sign that passengers and perhaps crew had been moved to the back of the aircraft. Given similarities to American 11 in hijacker seating and in eyewitness reports of tactics and weapons, as well as the contact between the presumed team leaders, Atta and Shehhi, we believe the tactics were similar on both flights.
The first operational evidence that something was abnormal on United 175 came at 8:47, when the aircraft changed beacon codes twice within a minute. At 8:51, the flight deviated from its assigned altitude, and a minute later NewYork air traffic controllers began repeatedly and unsuccessfully trying to contact it.
“I think they’ve taken over the cockpit—An attendant has been stabbed—
and someone else up front may have been killed. The plane is making strange moves. Call United Airlines—Tell them it’s Flight 175, Boston to LA.”
Also at 8:52, a male flight attendant called a United office in San Francisco, reaching Marc Policastro.The flight attendant reported that the flight had been hijacked, both pilots had been killed, a flight attendant had been stabbed, and
the hijackers were probably flying the plane.The call lasted about two minutes, after which Policastro and a colleague tried unsuccessfully to contact the flight.
At 8:59, Flight 175 passenger Brian David Sweeney tried to call his wife, Julie. He left a message on their home answering machine that the plane had been hijacked. He then called his mother, Louise Sweeney, told her the flight had been hijacked, and added that the passengers were thinking about storming the cockpit to take control of the plane away from the hijackers.
It’s getting bad, Dad—A stewardess was stabbed—They seem to have knives and Mace—They said they have a bomb—It’s getting very bad on the plane—Passengers are throwing up and getting sick—The plane is making jerky movements—I don’t think the pilot is flying the plane—I think we are going down—I think they intend to go to
Chicago or someplace and fly into a building—Don’t worry, Dad— If it happens, it’ll be very fast—My God, my God.
The call ended abruptly. Lee Hanson had heard a woman scream just before it cut off. He turned on a television, and in her home so did Louise Sweeney. Both then saw the second aircraft hit the World Trade Center.
The Hijacking of American 77Edit
American Airlines Flight 77 was scheduled to depart from Washington Dulles for Los Angeles at 8:10. The aircraft was a Boeing 757 piloted by Captain Charles F. Burlingame and First Officer David Charlebois. There were four flight attendants. On September 11, the flight carried 58 passengers.
American 77 pushed back from its gate at 8:09 and took off at 8:20. At 8:46, the flight reached its assigned cruising altitude of 35,000 feet. Cabin service would have begun. At 8:51,American 77 transmitted its last routine radio communication. The hijacking began between 8:51 and 8:54. As on American 11 and United 175, the hijackers used knives (reported by one passenger) and moved all the passengers (and possibly crew) to the rear of the aircraft (reported by one flight attendant and one passenger). Unlike the earlier flights, the Flight 77 hijackers were reported by a passenger to have box cutters. Finally, a passenger reported that an announcement had been made by the “pilot” that the plane had been hijacked. Neither of the firsthand accounts mentioned any stabbings or the threat or use of either a bomb or Mace,though both witnesses began the flight in the first-class cabin.
At 8:54, the aircraft deviated from its assigned course, turning south.Two minutes later the transponder was turned off and even primary radar contact with the aircraft was lost.The Indianapolis Air Traffic Control Center repeatedly tried and failed to contact the aircraft.American Airlines dispatchers also tried, without success.
At 9:00,American Airlines ExecutiveVice President Gerard Arpey learned that communications had been lost with American 77.This was now the second American aircraft in trouble. He ordered all American Airlines flights in the Northeast that had not taken off to remain on the ground. Shortly before 9:10, suspecting that American 77 had been hijacked, American headquarters concluded that the second aircraft to hit the World Trade Center might have been Flight 77. After learning that United Airlines was missing a plane,American Airlines headquarters extended the ground stop nationwide.
At 9:12, Renee May called her mother,Nancy May, in Las Vegas. She said her flight was being hijacked by six individuals who had moved them to the rear of the plane. She asked her mother to alert American Airlines. Nancy May and Nancy's husband promptly did so.
At some point between 9:16 and 9:26, Barbara Olson called her husband,Ted Olson, the solicitor general of the United States. She reported that the flight had been hijacked, and the hijackers had knives and box cutters. She further indicated that the hijackers were not aware of her phone call, and that they had put all the passengers in the back of the plane. About a minute into the conversation, the call was cut off. Solicitor General Olson tried unsuccessfully to reach Attorney General John Ashcroft .
Shortly after the first call, Barbara Olson reached her husband again. She reported that the pilot had announced that the flight had been hijacked, and she asked her husband what she should tell the captain to do.Ted Olson asked for her location and she replied that the aircraft was then flying over houses. Another passenger told her they were traveling northeast.The Solicitor General then informed his wife of the two previous hijackings and crashes. She did not display signs of panic and did not indicate any awareness of an impending crash. At that point, the second call was cut off.
At 9:29, the autopilot on American 77 was disengaged; the aircraft was at 7,000 feet and approximately 38 miles west of the Pentagon. At 9:32, controllers at the Dulles Terminal Radar Approach Control “observed a primary radar target tracking eastbound at a high rate of speed.” This was later determined to have been Flight 77.
At 9:34,Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport advised the Secret Service of an unknown aircraft heading in the direction of the White House.[[American 77]] was then 5 miles west-southwest of the Pentagon and began a 330-degree turn. At the end of the turn, it was descending through 2,200 feet, pointed toward the Pentagon and downtown Washington.The hijacker pilot then advanced the throttles to maximum power and dove toward the Pentagon.
At 9:37:46,American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon, traveling at approximately 530 miles per hour. All on board, as well as many civilian and military personnel in the building, were killed.
The Battle for United 93Edit
At 8:42, United Airlines Flight 93 took off from Newark (New Jersey) Liberty International Airport bound for San Francisco.The aircraft was piloted by Captain Jason Dahl and First Officer Leroy Homer, and there were five flight attendants. Thirty-seven passengers, including the hijackers, boarded the plane. Scheduled to depart the gate at 8:00, the Boeing 757 ’s takeoff was delayed because of the airport’s typically heavy morning traffic.
The hijackers had planned to take flights scheduled to depart at 7:45 (American 11), 8:00 (United 175 and United 93), and 8:10 (American 77). Three of the flights had actually taken off within 10 to 15 minutes of their planned departure times. United 93 would ordinarily have taken off about 15 minutes after pulling away from the gate.When it left the ground at 8:42, the flight was running more than 25 minutes late.
As United 93 left Newark, the flight’s crew members were unaware of the hijacking of American 11.Around 9:00, the FAA,American, and United were facing the staggering realization of apparent multiple hijackings. At 9:03, they would see another aircraft strike the World Trade Center. Crisis managers at the FAA and the airlines did not yet act to warn other aircraft. At the same time, Boston Center realized that a message transmitted just before 8:25 by the hijacker pilot of American 11 included the phrase,“We have some planes.”
No one at the FAA or the airlines that day had ever dealt with multiple hijackings. Such a plot had not been carried out anywhere in the world in more than 30 years, and never in the United States.As news of the hijackings filtered through the FAA and the airlines, it does not seem to have occurred to their leadership that they needed to alert other aircraft in the air that they too might be at risk.
United 175 was hijacked between 8:42 and 8:46, and awareness of that hijacking began to spread after 8:51. American 77 was hijacked between 8:51 and 8:54. By 9:00, FAA and airline officials began to comprehend that attackers were going after multiple aircraft. American Airlines’ nationwide ground stop between 9:05 and 9:10 was followed by a United Airlines ground stop. FAA controllers at Boston Center, which had tracked the first two hijackings, requested at 9:07 that Herndon Command Center “get messages to airborne aircraft to increase security for the cockpit.”There is no evidence that Herndon took such action. Boston Center immediately began speculating about other aircraft that might be in danger, leading them to worry about a transcontinental flight—Delta 1989—that in fact was not hijacked. At 9:19, the FAA’s New England regional office called Herndon and asked that Cleveland Center advise Delta 1989 to use extra cockpit security.
Several FAA air traffic control officials told us it was the air carriers’ responsibility to notify their planes of security problems. One senior FAA air traffic control manager said that it was simply not the FAA’s place to order the airlines what to tell their pilots. We believe such statements do not reflect an adequate appreciation of the FAA’s responsibility for the safety and security of civil aviation.
The airlines bore responsibility, too.They were facing an escalating number of conflicting and, for the most part, erroneous reports about other flights, as well as a continuing lack of vital information from the FAA about the hijacked flights.We found no evidence, however, that American Airlines sent any cockpit warnings to its aircraft on 9/11. United’s first decisive action to notify its airborne aircraft to take defensive action did not come until 9:19, when a United flight dispatcher, Ed Ballinger, took the initiative to begin transmitting warnings to his 16 transcontinental flights: “Beware any cockpit intrusion— Two a/c [aircraft] hit World Trade Center.” One of the flights that received the warning was United 93. Because Ballinger was still responsible for his other flights as well as Flight 175, his warning message was not transmitted to Flight 93 until 9:23.
By all accounts, the first 46 minutes of Flight 93’s cross-country trip proceeded routinely. Radio communications from the plane were normal. Heading, speed, and altitude ran according to plan. At 9:24, Ballinger’s warning to United 93 was received in the cockpit.Within two minutes, at 9:26, the pilot, Jason Dahl, responded with a note of puzzlement: “Ed, confirm latest mssg plz—Jason.”
The hijackers attacked at 9:28. While traveling 35,000 feet above eastern Ohio, United 93 suddenly dropped 700 feet. Eleven seconds into the descent, the FAA’s air traffic control center in Cleveland received the first of two radio transmissions from the aircraft. During the first broadcast, the captain or first officer could be heard declaring “Mayday” amid the sounds of a physical struggle in the cockpit.The second radio transmission, 35 seconds later, indicated that the fight was continuing.The captain or first officer could be heard shouting:“ Hey get out of here—get out of here—get out of here.”
On the morning of 9/11, there were only 37 passengers on United 93—33 in addition to the 4 hijackers.This was below the norm for Tuesday mornings during the summer of 2001. But there is no evidence that the hijackers manipulated passenger levels or purchased additional seats to facilitate their operation. The terrorists who hijacked three other commercial flights on 9/11 operated in five-man teams.They initiated their cockpit takeover within 30 minutes of takeoff. On Flight 93,however, the takeover took place 46 minutes after takeoff and there were only four hijackers. The operative likely intended to round out the team for this flight,Mohamed al Kahtani,had been refused entry by a suspicious immigration inspector at Florida’s Orlando International Airport in August.
Because several passengers on United 93 described three hijackers on the plane, not four, some have wondered whether one of the hijackers had been able to use the cockpit jump seat from the outset of the flight. FAA rules allow use of this seat by documented and approved individuals, usually air carrier or FAA personnel.We have found no evidence indicating that one of the hijackers, or anyone else, sat there on this flight. All the hijackers had assigned seats in first class, and they seem to have used them.We believe it is more likely that Jarrah, the crucial pilot-trained member of their team, remained seated and inconspicuous until after the cockpit was seized; and once inside, he would not have been visible to the passengers.
At 9:32, a hijacker, probably Jarrah, made or attempted to make the following announcement to the passengers of Flight 93:“Ladies and Gentlemen:Here the captain, please sit down keep remaining sitting.We have a bomb on board. So, sit.” The flight data recorder (also recovered) indicates that Jarrah then instructed the plane’s autopilot to turn the aircraft around and head east. The cockpit voice recorder data indicate that a woman, most likely a flight attendant, was being held captive in the cockpit. She struggled with one of the hijackers who killed or otherwise silenced her.
Shortly thereafter, the passengers and flight crew began a series of calls from GTE airphones and cellular phones.These calls between family, friends, and colleagues took place until the end of the flight and provided those on the ground with firsthand accounts.They enabled the passengers to gain critical information, including the news that two aircraft had slammed into the [[World Trade Center]].
At 9:39, the FAA’s Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center overheard a second announcement indicating that there was a bomb on board, that the plane was returning to the airport, and that they should remain seated. While it apparently was not heard by the passengers, this announcement, like those on Flight 11 and Flight 77, was intended to deceive them. Jarrah, like Atta earlier, may have inadvertently broadcast the message because he did not know how to operate the radio and the intercom.To our knowledge none of them had ever flown an actual airliner before.
At least two callers from the flight reported that the hijackers knew that passengers were making calls but did not seem to care. It is quite possible Jarrah knew of the success of the assault on the World Trade Center. He could have learned of this from messages being sent by United Airlines to the cockpits of its transcontinental flights, including Flight 93, warning of cockpit intrusion and telling of the New York attacks. But even without them, he would certainly have understood that the attacks on the World Trade Center would already have unfolded, given Flight 93’s tardy departure from Newark. If Jarrah did know that the passengers were making calls, it might not have occurred to him that they were certain to learn what had happened in NewYork, thereby defeating his attempts at deception.
At least ten passengers and two crew members shared vital information with family, friends, colleagues, or others on the ground. All understood the plane had been hijacked. They said the hijackers wielded knives and claimed to have a bomb.The hijackers were wearing red bandanas, and they forced the passengers to the back of the aircraft.
Callers reported that a passenger had been stabbed and that two people were lying on the floor of the cabin, injured or dead—possibly the captain and first officer. One caller reported that a flight attendant had been killed. One of the callers from United 93 also reported that he thought the hijackers might possess a gun. But none of the other callers reported the presence of a firearm. One recipient of a call from the aircraft recounted specifically asking her caller whether the hijackers had guns.The passenger replied that he did not see one.No evidence of firearms or of their identifiable remains was found at the aircraft’s crash site, and the cockpit voice recorder gives no indication of a gun being fired or mentioned at any time.We believe that if the hijackers had possessed a gun, they would have used it in the flight’s last minutes as the passengers fought back.
Passengers on three flights reported the hijackers’ claim of having a bomb. The FBI told us they found no trace of explosives at the crash sites. [[One of the passengers]] who mentioned a bomb expressed his belief that it was not real. Lacking any evidence that the hijackers attempted to smuggle such illegal items past the security screening checkpoints, we believe the bombs were probably fake.
During at least five of the passengers’ phone calls, information was shared about the attacks that had occurred earlier that morning at the [[World Trade Center]]. Five calls described the intent of passengers and surviving crew members to revolt against the hijackers. According to one call, they voted on whether to rush the terrorists in an attempt to retake the plane. They decided, and acted.
At 9:57, the passenger assault began. Several passengers had terminated phone calls with loved ones in order to join the revolt. One of the callers ended her message as follows:“Everyone’s running up to first class. I’ve got to go. Bye.”
The cockpit voice recorder captured the sounds of the passenger assault muffled by the intervening cockpit door. Some family members who listened to the recording report that they can hear the voice of a loved one among the din.We cannot identify whose voices can be heard. But the assault was sustained.In response, Jarrah immediately began to roll the airplane to the left and right, attempting to knock the passengers off balance. At 9:58:57, Jarrah told another hijacker in the cockpit to block the door. Jarrah continued to roll the airplane sharply left and right, but the assault continued. At 9:59:52, Jarrah changed tactics and pitched the nose of the airplane up and down to disrupt
the assault.The recorder captured the sounds of loud thumps, crashes, shouts,and breaking glasses and plates.At 10:00:03, Jarrah stabilized the airplane.Five seconds later, Jarrah asked,“Is that it? Shall we finish it off?”A hijacker responded,“No. Not yet.When they all come, we finish it off.” The sounds of fighting continued outside the cockpit. Again, Jarrah pitched the nose of the aircraft up and down.At 10:00:26, a passenger in the background said,“In the cockpit. If we don’t we’ll die!” Sixteen seconds later, a passenger yelled,“Roll it!” Jarrah stopped the violent maneuvers at about 10:01:00 and said,“Allah is the greatest! Allah is the greatest!” He then asked another hijacker in the cockpit,“ Is that it? I mean, shall we put it down?” to which the other replied,“Yes, put it in it, and pull it down.”
The passengers continued their assault and at 10:02:23, a hijacker said,“Pull it down! Pull it down!”The hijackers remained at the controls but must have judged that the passengers were only seconds from overcoming them.The airplane headed down; the control wheel was turned hard to the right.The airplane rolled onto its back, and one of the hijackers began shouting “Allah is the greatest. Allah is the greatest.”With the sounds of the passenger counterattack continuing, the aircraft plowed into an empty field in Shanksville,Pennsylvania, at 580 miles per hour, about 20 minutes’ flying time from Washington,D.C.
- ↑ No physical, documentary, or analytical evidence provides a convincing explanation of why Atta and Omari drove to Portland, Maine , from Boston on the morning of September 10, only to return to Logan on Flight 5930 on the morning of September 11.However,Atta reacted negatively when informed in Portland that he would have to check in again in Boston. Michael Touhey interview (May 27, 2004).Whatever their reason, the Portland Jetport was the nearest airport to Boston with a 9/11 flight that would have arrived at Logan in time for the passengers to transfer to American Airlines Flight 11, which had a scheduled departure time of 7:45 A.M. See Tom Kinton interview (Nov. 6, 2003); Portland International Jetport site visit (Aug. 18, 2003). Like the other two airports used by the 9/11 hijackers (Newark Liberty International Airport and [[Washington Dulles International Airport]]), Boston’s Logan International Airport was a “Category X” airport : i.e., among the largest facilities liable to highest threat, and generally subject to greater security requirements.See FAA report,“Civil Aviation Security Reference Handbook,”May 1999,pp.117–118.Though Logan was selected for two of the hijackings (as were both American and United Airlines), we found no evidence that the terrorists targeted particular airports or airlines. Nothing stands out about any of them with respect to the only security layer that was relevant to the actual hijackings: checkpoint screening. See FAA briefing materials, “[[Assessment and Testing Data for BOS, EWR, and IAD]],” Oct. 24, 2001. Despite security problems at Logan (see, e.g., two local Fox 25 television investigative reports in February and April 2001, and an email in August 2001[which?] from a former FAA special agent[who?] to the agency’s leadership regarding his concerns about lax security at the airport), no evidence suggests that such issues entered into the terrorists’ targeting: they simply booked heavily fueled east-to-west transcontinental flights of the large Boeing aircraft they trained to fly that were scheduled to take off at nearly the same time. See Matt Carroll, “Fighting Terror Sense of Alarm;Airlines Foiled Police Logan Probe,” Boston Globe , Oct. 17, 2001, p. B1.
- ↑ 2. CAPPS was an FAA-approved automated system run by the airlines that scored each passenger’s profile to identify those who might pose a threat to civil aviation.The system also chose passengers at random to receive additional security scrutiny.Ten out of the 19 hijackers (including 9 out of 10 on the two American Airlines flights) were identified via the CAPPS system.According to the procedures in place on 9/11, in addition to those flagged by the CAPPS algorithm,American’s ticket agents were to mark as “selectees” those passengers who did not provide correct responses to the required security questions, failed to show proper identification, or met other criteria. See FAA report,“Air Carrier Standard Security Program,”May 2001,pp.75–76;FAA record of interview,Donna Thompson,Sept. 23, 2001;Chuck Severance interview (Apr. 15, 2004); Jim Dillon interview (Apr. 15, 2004);Diane Graney interview (Apr. 16, 2004). It appears that Atta was selected at random. See Al Hickson briefing (June 8, 2004).
- ↑ The call was placed from a pay phone in Terminal C (between the screening checkpoint and United 175’s boarding gate).We presume Shehhi made the call, but we cannot be sure. Logan International Airport site visit (Aug. 15, 2003); see also FBI response to Commission briefing request no. 6, undated (topic 11).
- ↑ 4. Flight 11 pushed back from Gate 32 in Terminal B at 7:40. See AAL response to the Commission’s February 3, 2004, requests, Mar. 15, 2004.
- ↑ 5. See UAL letter,“Flight 175—11Sep01 Passenger ACI Check-in History,” July 11, 2002. Customer service representative Gail Jawahir recalled that her encounter with the Ghamdis occurred at “shortly before 7 A.M.,” and when shown photos of the hijackers, she indicated that Mohand al Shehri resembled one of the two she checked in (suggesting they were Banihammad and Shehri). However, she also recalled that the men had the same last name and had assigned seats on row 9 (i.e., the Ghamdis), and that account has been adopted here. In either case, she almost certainly was dealing with one set of the Flight 175 hijackers. See FBI reports of investigation, interviews of Gail Jawahir, Sept. 21, 2001; Sept. 28, 2001. Even had the hijackers been unable to understand and answer the two standard security questions,the only consequence would have been the screening of their carry-on and checked bags for explosives. See FAA report,“Air Carrier Standard Security Program,” May 2001, p. 76.
- ↑ 6. For Flight 11, two checkpoints provided access to the gate.The second was opened at 7:15 A.M. The FAA conducted many screener evaluations between September 11,1999,and September 11,2001.At the primary checkpoints, in aggregate, screeners met or exceeded the average for overall, physical search, and X-ray detection, while falling below the norm for metal detection. No FAA Special Assessments (by “red teams”) were done at Logan security checkpoints during the two years prior to September 11, 2001. See FAA briefing materials,“Assessment and Testing Data for BOS, EWR, and IAD,” Oct. 24, 2001.
- ↑ 7. See Air Transport Association/Regional Airlines Association (ATA/RAA) report,“[[Air Carriers Checkpoint Operations Guide]],”Aug. 1999; FAA report,“Air Carrier Standard Security Program,”May 2001, appendix VI.
- ↑ 8. Mary Carol Turano interview (Mar. 11, 2004); FBI reports of investigation, interview of Nilda Cora, Oct. 4, 2001; interview of William Thomas, Sept. 14, 2001; interview of Jennifer Gore, Sept. 12, 2001; interview of Claudia Richey, Sept. 15, 2001; interview of Rosarito Rivera, Sept. 25, 2001.
- ↑ 9. See TSA report,“Selectee Status of September 11th Hijackers,” undated. For boarding and seating information,see AAL record, SABRE information on Flight 11, Sept. 11, 2001.These boarding times from the American system are approximate only; for Flight 11, they indicated that some passengers “boarded” after the aircraft had pushed back from the gate. See AAL response to the Commission’s February 3, 2004, requests, Mar. 15, 2004.
- ↑ 10. See TSA report,“Selectee Status of September 11th Hijackers,” undated; see also UAL letter, “Flight 175—11 Sep01 Passenger ACI Check-in History,” July 11, 2002.
- ↑ The Hazmis checked in at 7:29; the airline has not yet been able to confirm the time of Hanjour’s checkin. However, it had to have taken place by 7:35, when he appears on the checkpoint videotape. See AAL record, SABRE information for Flight 77, Sept. 11, 2001;[[AAL response to the Commission’s February 3, 2004, requests, Mar. 15, 2004]]; [[Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority videotape, Dulles main terminal checkpoints, Sept. 11, 2001]].
- ↑ See TSA report,“Selectee Status of September 11th Hijackers,” undated; see also FAA report,“[[Selectee List AALA #77,]]” undated; FBI report of investigation, interview of Vaughn Allex, Sept. 12, 2001;Vaughn Allex interview (July 13, 2004).
- ↑ The FAA conducted many screener evaluations at Dulles between September 11, 1999, and September 11, 2001.While the test results for physical search exceeded the national average, both the metal detector and X-ray results were below average. See FAA briefing materials,“Assessment and Testing Data for BOS, EWR, and IAD,” Oct. 24, 2001]].
- ↑ Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority videotape, Dulles main terminal checkpoints, Sept. 11, 2001; see also Tim Jackson interview (Apr. 12, 2004).
- ↑ Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority videotape, Dulles main terminal checkpoints, Sept. 11, 2001; see also Tim Jackson interview (Apr. 12, 2004).
- ↑ For investigation findings, see FAA report,“American Airlines Flight #77: Hijacking and Crash into the Pentagon, Sept. 11, 2001,” undated. For screener evaluations, see Tim Jackson interview (Apr. 12, 2004).
- ↑ See AAL record,SABRE information for Flight 77, Sept. 11, 2001;[[AAL response to the Commission’s February 3, 2004, requests, Mar. 15, 2004]].
- ↑ 18. UAL record, Flight 93 EWR bag loading status, Sept. 11, 2001; UAL record, Flight 93 EWR ACI passenger history, Sept. 11, 2001;UAL record, Flight 93 EWR full bag history, Sept. 11, 2001;TSA report,“Selectee Status of September 11th Hijackers,” undated; FBI report,“The Final 24 Hours,” Dec. 8, 2003.
- ↑ 19.The FAA conducted many screener evaluations at Newark between September 11, 1999, and September 11, 2001. Detection rates for metal detection, physical searches, and X-rays all met or exceeded the national averages. See FAA briefing materials,“Assessment and Testing Data for BOS, EWR, and IAD,” Oct. 24, 2001; see also FAA report,“United Airlines Flight 93, September 11, 2001, Executive Report,” Jan. 30, 2002.
- ↑ 20. UAL record, Flight 93 EWR ACI passenger history, Sept. 11, 2001; see also FBI report, “The Final 24 Hours,”Dec. 8, 2003.
- ↑ 21.While Flights 11 and 77 were at or slightly above the average number of passengers for the respective flights that summer, Flights 175 and 93 were well below their averages.We found no evidence to indicate that the hijackers manipulated the passenger loads on the aircraft they hijacked. Financial records did not reveal the purchase of any tickets beyond those the hijackers used for themselves. See FBI response to Commission briefing request no. 6, undated (topic 8);AAL report,“Average Load Factor by Day-of-Week,” undated (for Flights 11 and 77 from June 11, 2001, to Sept. 9, 2001);AAL response to the Commission’s supplemental document requests, Jan. 20, 2004;UAL report, Flight 175 BOS-LAX Load Factors, undated (from June 1, 2001, to Sept. 11, 2001); UAL report,“Explanation of Load Factors,” undated.
- ↑ 22. See AAL response to the Commission’s February 3, 2004, requests, Mar. 15, 2004; AAL record, Dispatch Environmental Control/Weekly Flight Summary for Flight 11, Sept. 11, 2001;AAL report,“Flight Attendant Jump Seat Locations During Takeoff And Flight Attendant Typical Cabin Positions During Start of Cabin Service,” undated;AAL report,“Passenger Name List, Flight 11/September 11,” undated.
- ↑ 23. Commission analysis of NTSB and FAA air traffic control and radar data. See AAL record, Dispatch Environmental Control/Weekly Flight Summary for Flight 11, Sept. 11,2001;NTSB report,“Flight Path Study—American Airlines Flight 11,” Feb. 19, 2002; Bill Hallec and Peggy Houck interview (Jan. 8, 2004).The initial service assignments for flight attendants on American 11 would have placed Karen Martin and Bobbi Arestegui in first class; Sara Low and Jean Roger in business class;Dianne Snyder in the midcabin galley;Betty Ong and Amy Sweeney in coach; and Karen Nicosia in the aft galley. Jeffrey Collman would have been assigned to work in coach, but to assist in first class if needed. See AAL report, “[[Flight Attendant Jump Seat Locations During Takeoff And Flight Attendant Typical Cabin Positions During Start of Cabin Service]],” undated; Bob Jordan briefing (Nov. 20, 2003).
- ↑ 24. NTSB report, Air Traffic Control Recording—American Airlines Flight 11, Dec. 21, 2001; NTSB report, Air Traffic Control Recording—United Airlines Flight 175, Dec. 21, 2001. Given that the cockpit crew of [[American 11]] had been acknowledging all previous instructions from air traffic control that morning within a matter of seconds, and that when the first reporting of the hijacking was received a short time later (the 8:19 call from Betty Ong) a number of actions had already been taken by the hijackers, it is most likely that the hijacking occurred at 8:14 A.M.
- ↑ 25.An early draft of an executive summary prepared by FAA security staff for the agency’s leadership referred to an alleged report of a shooting aboard Flight 11.We believe this report was erroneous for a number of reasons—there is no evidence that the hijackers purchased firearms, use of a gun would be inconsistent with the otherwise common tactics employed by the hijackers, the alleged shooting victim was seated where witness accounts place the stabbing victim (9B), and, most important, neither Betty Ong nor Amy Sweeney, the only two people who communicated to the ground from aboard the aircraft, reported the presence of a gun or a shooting. Both reported knives and stabbings.AAL transcript, telephone call from Betty Ong to Nydia Gonzalez, Sept. 11, 2001;AAL transcript, telephone call from Nydia Gonzalez to Craig Marquis, Sept. 11, 2001; AAL transcript, telephone call from Nancy Wyatt to Ray Howland, Sept. 11, 2001; Michael Woodward interview (Jan. 25, 2004).The General Accounting Office looked into the gun story and was unable to corroborate it. GAO report, summary of briefing re investigation,Aug. 30, 2002.
- ↑ 26. Craig Marquis interview (Nov. 19, 2003); Michael Woodward interview (Jan. 25, 2004); Jim Dillon interview (Apr. 15, 2004). See also AAL transcript, telephone call from Betty Ong to Nydia Gonzalez, Sept. 11, 2001. At the time of the hijacking,American Airlines flight attendants all carried cockpit keys on their person. See Craig Marquis, Craig Parfitt, Joe Bertapelle, and Mike Mulcahy interview (Nov. 19, 2003).
- ↑ 27. AAL transcript, telephone call from Nydia Gonzalez to Craig Marquis, Sept. 11, 2001; Obituary,“[[Daniel Lewin]],” Washington Post, Sept. 22, 2001, p. B7.
- ↑ 28. AAL transcript, telephone call from Betty Ong to Nydia Gonzalez, Sept. 11, 2001; AAL transcript, [[telephone call from Nydia Gonzalez to Craig Marquis]], Sept. 11, 2001. Regarding the claim of a bomb, see [[Michael Woodward]] interview (Jan. 25, 2004).
- ↑ 29. Calls to American’s reservations office are routed to the first open line at one of several facilities, among them the center in Cary, N.C. See Nydia Gonzalez interview (Nov. 19, 2003). On standard emergency training, see FAA report, “Air Carrier Standard Security Program,” May 2001, pp. 139j–139o; Don Dillman briefing (Nov. 18, 2003); Bob Jordan briefing (Nov. 20, 2003).The call from Ong was received initially by Vanessa Minter and then taken over by Winston Sadler; realizing the urgency of the situation, he pushed an emergency button that simultaneously initiated a tape recording of the call and sent an alarm notifying Nydia Gonzalez, a supervisor, to pick up on the line. Gonzalez was paged to respond to the alarm and joined the call a short time later. Only the first four minutes of the phone call between Ong and the reservations center (Minter, Sadler, and Gonzalez) was recorded because of the time limit on the recently installed system. See Nydia Gonzalez interview (Nov. 19, 2003); [[Nydia Gonzalez]] testimony, Jan. 27, 2004.
- ↑ 30.AAL transcript, telephone call from Betty Ong to Nydia Gonzalez, Sept. 11, 2001.
- ↑ 31. See Nydia Gonzalez interview (Nov. 19, 2003); Craig Marquis interviews (Nov. 19, 2003;Apr. 26, 2004); AAL record, Dispatch Environmental Control/Weekly Flight Summary for Flight 11, Sept. 11, 2001; AAL transcript, telephone call from Bill Halleck to BOS ATC, Sept. 11, 2001.The Air Carrier Standard Security Program required airlines to immediately notify the FAA and FBI upon receiving information that an act or suspected act of airplane piracy was being committed.
- ↑ 32. See FAA recording, Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center, position 46R, at 8:25 A.M.;Air Traffic Control Recording—American Airlines Flight 11,Dec. 21, 2001. Starting at 8:22,[[Amy Sweeney] attempted by airphone to contact the American Airlines flight services office at Logan, which managed the scheduling and operation of flight attendants. Sweeney’s first attempt failed, as did a second at 8:24.When she got through to Nunez, the latter thought she had reported her flight number as 12. Michael Woodward, supervisor at the Boston office, hearing that a problem had been reported aboard an American airplane, went to American’s gate area at Logan with his colleague Beth Williams.Woodward noted that the morning bank of flights had all departed Boston and the gate area was quiet. He further realized that Flight 12 had not even departed yet, so he and Williams returned to the office to try to clarify the situation. See FBI report,“American Airlines Airphone Usage,” Sept. 20, 2001; Michael Woodward interview (Jan. 25,2004).The phone call between Sweeney and Woodward lasted about 12 minutes (8:32–8:44) and was not taped. See AAL email,Woodward to Schmidt,“Flight 11 Account of events,”Sept. 19, 2001;AAL notes, Michael Woodward handwritten notes, Sept. 11, 2001; FBI report of investigation, interview of Michael Woodward, Sept. 13, 2001;AAL report, interview of Michael Woodward, Sept. 11, 2001; AAL transcript, [[telephone call from Nancy Wyatt to Ray Howland]], Sept. 11, 2001.
- ↑ 33. See AAL transcript, telephone call from Nydia Gonzalez to Craig Marquis, Sept. 11, 2001; NTSB report, “Flight Path Study—American Airlines Flight 11,” Feb. 19, 2002.AAL transcript, telephone call from Nydia Gonzalez to Craig Marquis, Sept. 11, 2001; AAL transcript, telephone call from Nancy Wyatt to Ray Howland, Sept. 11, 2001.
- ↑ 34. Michael Woodward interview (Jan. 25, 2004).
- ↑ 35.AAL transcript, telephone call from Nydia Gonzalez to Craig Marquis, Sept. 11, 2001; Michael Woodward interview (Jan. 25, 2004);AAL,Michael Woodward notes, Sept. 11, 2001.Also at this time American Airlines completed its “lockout” procedure for Flight 11, which restricted access to information about a hijacked flight in accordance with the Air Carrier Standard Security program. See FAA report,“Air Carrier Standard Security Program,” May 2001, p. 110.
- ↑ 36.AAL transcript, telephone call from Nancy Wyatt to Ray Howland,Sept. 11,2001;Michael Woodward interview (Jan. 25, 2004).
- ↑ 37.AAL transcript, telephone call from Nydia Gonzalez to Craig Marquis, Sept. 11, 2001.
- ↑ 38. Ibid .; Michael Woodward interview (Jan. 25, 2004).
- ↑ 39. NTSB report,“Flight Path Study—American Airlines Flight 11,” Feb. 19, 2002.
- ↑ 40.The 56 passengers represented a load factor of 33.33 percent of the airplane’s seating capacity of 168, below the 49.22 percent for Flight 175 on Tuesdays in the three-month period prior to September 11, 2001. See UAL report, Flight 175 BOS-LAX Load Factors, undated (from June 1, 2001, to Sept. 11, 2001). Nine passengers holding reservations for Flight 175 did not show for the flight.They were interviewed and cleared by the FBI.FAA report, “Executive Summary,” Sept. 12, 2001; FAA report,“Executive Summary, Chronology of a Multiple Hijacking Crisis,September 11, 2001,” Sept. 17, 2001; UAL record, Flight 175 ACARS report, Sept. 11, 2001; UAL record, Flight 175 Flight Data Recap, Sept. 11, 2001.
- ↑ 41.FAA report,“Executive Summary,”Sept. 12,2001;FAA report,“[[Executive Summary,Chronology of a Multiple Hijacking Crisis,September 11,2001]],”Sept. 17,2001;NTSB report,“Flight Path Study—United Airlines 175,” Feb. 19,2002;NTSB report,Air Traffic Control Recording—United Airlines Flight 175,Dec. 21,2001. At or around this time, flight attendants Kathryn Laborie and Alfred Marchand would have begun cabin service in first class; with Amy King and Robert Fangman in business class; and with Michael Tarrou ,Amy Jarret, and Alicia Titus in economy class. See UAL report, “Flight 175 Flight Attendant Positions/Jumpseats,” undated. United flight attendants, unlike those at American, did not carry cockpit keys. Instead, such keys were stowed in the cabin—on Flight 175, in the overhead bin above seats 1A and 1B in first class. See Don Dillman briefing (Nov. 18, 2003); Bob Jordan briefing (Nov. 20, 2003).
- ↑ 42.Asked by air traffic controllers at 8:37 to look for an American Airlines 767 (Flight 11),United 175 reported spotting the aircraft at 8:38. At 8:41, the flight crew reported having “heard a suspicious transmission” from another aircraft shortly after takeoff,“like someone keyed the mike and said everyone stay in your seats.” See NTSB report, Air Traffic Control Recording—United Airlines Flight 175, Dec. 21, 2001.
- ↑ 43. See Marc Policastro interview (Nov. 21, 2003); FBI reports of investigation, interview of Lee Hanson, Sept. 11, 2001; interview of Marc Policastro, Sept. 11, 2001; interview of Louise Sweeney, Sept. 28, 2001; interview of Ronald May, Sept. 11, 2001. On both American 11 and United 175, Boeing 767 double-aisled aircraft, the hijackers arrayed themselves similarly: two seated in first class close to the cockpit door, the pilot hijacker seated close behind them, and at least one other hijacker seated close behind the pilot hijacker. Hijackers were seated next to both the left and right aisles. On American 77 and United 93, Boeing 757 single-aisle aircraft, the pilot hijacker sat in the first row, closest to the cockpit door. See FBI report,“Summary of Penttbom Investigation,” Feb. 29, 2004, pp. 67-69;AAL schematics for Flight 11 and Flight 77;UAL schematics for Flight 175 and Flight 93.
- ↑ 44. NTSB report,“Flight Path Study—United Airlines 175,” Feb. 19, 2002; NTSB report, Air Traffic Control Recording—United Airlines Flight 175, Dec. 21, 2001.
- ↑ 45. See FBI report of investigation, interview of Lee Hanson, Sept. 11, 2001.
- ↑ 46. Flight crew on board UAL aircraft could contact the United office in San Francisco (SAMC) simply by dialing *349 on an airphone. See FBI report of investigation, interview of David Price, Jan. 24, 2002.At some point before 9:00, SAMC notified United’s headquarters of the emergency call from the flight attendant. See Marc Policastro interview (Nov. 21, 2003); FBI report of investigation, interview of Marc Policastro, Sept.11,2001;Rich Miles interview (Nov. 21, 2003).
- ↑ 47. NTSB report,“Flight Path Study—United Airlines 175,” Feb. 19, 2002.
- ↑ 48. See [[FBI] reports of investigation, interview of Julie Sweeney, Oct. 2, 2001; interview of Louise Sweeney, Sept. 28, 2001.
- ↑ 49. See FBI report of investigation, interview of Lee Hanson, Sept. 11, 2001.
- ↑ 50. See ibid.; interview of Louise Sweeney, Sept. 28, 2001.
- ↑ 51. NTSB report,“Flight Path Study—United Airlines 175,” Feb. 19, 2002.
- ↑ 52. AAL report, “Flight Attendant Jump Seat Locations During Takeoff And Flight Attendant Typical Cabin Positions During Start of Cabin Service,” undated;AAL email,Young to Clark,“Flight Crews,” Sept. 12, 2001;AAL record, Dispatch Environmental Control/Weekly Flight Summary for Flight 11, Sept. 11, 2001.
- ↑ 53.AAL record, System Operations Command Center (SOCC) log, Sept. 11, 2001, p. 2; NTSB report,“Flight Path Study—American Airlines Flight 77,” Feb. 19, 2002. Flight attendant Renee May would likely have started working in the first-class galley; Michele Heidenberger would have been in the aft galley; Jennifer Lewis would have been in first class; and Kenneth Lewis would have been in the main cabin. On cabin service, see AAL report, “Flight Attendant Jump Seat Locations During Takeoff And Flight Attendant Typical Cabin Positions During Start of Cabin Service,” undated. For cruising altitude, see NTSB report,“Flight Path Study—American Airlines Flight 77,” Feb. 19, 2002. On events in the cabin, see FAA recording, Indianapolis Air Traffic Control Center, position HNN R, Sept. 11, 2001; FBI report of investigation, interview of Theodore Olson, Sept. 11, 2001; FBI report of investigation, interview of Ronald and Nancy May, Sept. 12, 2001; AAL record, Dispatch Environmental Control/Weekly Flight Summary for Flight 11, Sept. 11, 2001.
- ↑ 54.Air traffic control notified American’s headquarters of the problem, and the airline began attempts to contact the flight by 8:59 via ACARS. See NTSB report,“Flight Path Study—American Airlines Flight 77,” Feb. 19, 2002.On American 11, the transponder signal was turned off at 8:21; on United 175, the code was changed at 8:47; on American 77, the signal was turned off at 8:56; and on [[United 93], the signal was turned off at 9:41. See FAA report,“Summary of AirTraffic Hijack Events: September 11, 2001,”Sept. 17, 2001; Richard Byard interview (Sept. 24, 2003);Linda Povinelli interview (Sept. 24, 2003); see also NTSB report,Air Traffic Control Recording—American Airlines Flight 77, Dec. 21, 2001;AAL record,Dispatch Environmental Control/Weekly Flight Summary for Flight 11, Sept. 11, 2001.
- ↑ 55. Gerard Arpey interview (Jan. 8, 2004); Larry Wansley interview (Jan. 8, 2004);AAL record, System Operations Command Center (SOCC) log, Sept. 11, 2001.
- ↑ 56. FBI report,“American Airlines Airphone Usage,” Sept. 20, 2001; FBI report of investigation, interview of Ronald and Nancy May, Sept. 12, 2001.
- ↑ 57.The records available for the phone calls from American 77 do not allow for a determination of which of four “connected calls to unknown numbers” represent the two between Barbara and Ted Olson, although the FBI and DOJ believe that all four represent communications between Barbara Olson and her husband’s office (all family members of the Flight 77 passengers and crew were canvassed to see if they had received any phone calls from the hijacked flight, and only Renee May’s parents and Ted Olson indicated that they had received such calls).The four calls were at 9:15:34 for 1 minute, 42 seconds; 9:20:15 for 4 minutes, 34 seconds; 9:25:48 for 2 minutes, 34 seconds; and 9:30:56 for 4 minutes, 20 seconds. FBI report,“American Airlines Airphone Usage,” Sept. 20, 2001; FBI report of investigation, interview of Theodore Olson, Sept. 11, 2001; FBI report of investigation, interview of Helen Voss, Sept. 14, 2001;AAL response to the Commission’s supplemental document request, Jan. 20, 2004.
- ↑ 58. FBI report,“American Airlines Airphone Usage,” Sept. 20, 2001; FBI report of investigation, interview of Theodore Olson, Sept. 11, 2001.
- ↑ 59. See FAA report,“Report of Aircraft Accident,” Nov. 13, 2001; John Hendershot interview (Dec. 22, 2003); FAA report, “Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events: September 11, 2001,” Sept. 17, 2001; NTSB report, “Flight Path Study—American Airlines Flight 77,” Feb. 19, 2002; Commission analysis of radar data.
- ↑ 60. See FAA report,“Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events: September 11, 2001,”Sept. 17, 2001;NTSB report, “Flight Path Study—American Airlines Flight 77,” Feb. 19, 2002; FAA report,“Report of Aircraft Accident,”Nov. 13, 2001.
- ↑ 61. See NTSB report,“Flight Path Study—American Airlines Flight 77,” Feb. 19, 2002;TSA report,“Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation for 2001,”Aug. 20, 2002, p. 41.
- ↑ 62. The flight attendant assignments and seating included Chief Flight Attendant Deborah Welsh (first class, seat J1 at takeoff); Sandra Bradshaw (coach, seat J5);Wanda Green (first class, seat J4); Lorraine Bay (coach, seat J3); and CeeCee Lyles (coach, seat J6). See UAL response to Commission questions for the record,Apr. 5, 2004; FAA report,“Chronology of the September 11 Attacks and Subsequent Events Through October 24, 2001,” undated; UAL records, copies of electronic boarding passes for Flight 93, Sept. 11, 2001; BobVarcadipane interview (May 4, 2004); Newark Tower briefing (May 4, 2004).
- ↑ 63. Although the flight schedule indicates an 8:00 A.M. “departure,” this was the time the plane left the gate area.Taxiing from the gate to the runway normally took about 15 minutes. Bob Varcadipane interview (May 4, 2004); Newark Tower briefing (May 4, 2004).
- ↑ 64. Commission analysis of FAA air traffic control data. On the FAA’s awareness of multiple hijackings, see AAL transcript, telephone call from Nydia Gonzalez to Craig Marquis, Sept. 11, 2001; Craig Marquis interview (Nov. 19, 2003);AAL record,System Operations Command Center (SOCC) log, Sept. 11,2001;UAL System Operations Control briefing (Nov. 20, 2003); Rich Miles interview (Nov. 21, 2003); UAL report, “Timeline: Dispatch/SMFDO Activities—Terrorist Crisis,” undated.
- ↑ 65.FAA audio file,Boston Center, position 46R, 8:24:38 and 8:24:56;Peter Zalewski interview (Sept. 23, 2003).
- ↑ 66. On September 6, 1970, members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine hijacked a Pan American Boeing 747, a TWA Boeing 707, and a Swissair DC-8. On September 9, a British airliner was hijacked as well. An attempt to hijack an Israeli airliner was thwarted.The Pan American plane landed in Cairo and was blown up after its passengers were released.The other three aircraft were flown to Dawson Field, near Amman, Jordan; the passengers were held captive, and the planes were destroyed.The international hijacking crisis turned into a civil war, as the Jordanian government used force to restore its control of the country. See FAA report, Civil Aviation Reference Handbook, May 1999, appendix D. The FAA knew or strongly suspected that Flight 11 was a hijacking 11 minutes after it was taken over; Flight 175, 9 minutes after it was taken over.There is no evidence to indicate that the FAA recognized Flight 77 as a hijacking until it crashed into the Pentagon.
- ↑ 67.FAA audio file,Herndon Command Center, line 5114, 9:07:13;FAA audio file,Herndon Command Center, position 15, 9:19. At 9:07, Boston Air Traffic Control Center recommended to the FAA Command Center that a cockpit warning be sent to the pilots of all commercial aircraft to secure their cockpits.While Boston Center sent out such warnings to the commercial flights in its sector, we could find no evidence that a nationwide warning was issued by the ATC system.
- ↑ 68. Ellen King interview (Apr. 5, 2004). FAA air traffic control tapes indicate that at 9:19 the FAA Air Traffic Control System Command Center in Herndon ordered controllers to send a cockpit warning to Delta 1989 because, like American 11 and United 175, it was a transcontinental flight departing Boston’s Logan Airport.
- ↑ 69.For American Airlines’ response, see AAL briefing (Apr. 26, 2004).For Ballinger’s warnings, see Ed Ballinger interview (Apr. 14, 2004). A companywide order for dispatchers to warn cockpits was not issued until 9:21. See UAL report, “Timeline: Dispatch/SMFDO Activities—Terrorist Crisis,” undated. While one of Ballinger’s colleagues assisted him, Ballinger remained responsible for multiple flights. See Ed Ballinger interview (Apr. 14, 2004). American Airlines’ policy called for the flight dispatcher to manage only the hijacked flight, relieving him of responsibilities for all other flights.On American Airlines’ policy, see Craig Marquis, Craig Parfitt, Joe Bertapelle, and Mike Mulcahy interview (Nov. 19, 2003). United Airlines had no such “isolation” policy. UAL System Operations Control briefing (Nov. 20, 2003).
- ↑ 70. On FDR, see NTSB report,“Specialist’s Factual Report of Investigation—Digital Flight Data Recorder” for United Airlines Flight 93, Feb. 15, 2002; on CVR, see FBI report,“CVR from UA Flight #93,”Dec. 4, 2003; Commission review of Aircraft Communication and Reporting System (ACARS) messages sent to and from Flight 93 (which indicate time of message transmission and receipt); see UAL record, Ed Ballinger ACARS log, Sept. 11, 2001. At 9:22, after learning of the events at the World Trade Center, Melody Homer, the wife of co-pilot Leroy Homer, had an ACARS message sent to her husband in the cockpit asking if he was okay. See UAL record,ACARS message, Sept. 11, 2001.
- ↑ 71. On FDR, see NTSB report,“Specialist’s Factual Report of Investigation—Digital Flight Data Recorder” for United Airlines Flight 93, Feb. 15, 2002; on CVR, see FBI report,“CVR from UA Flight #93,”Dec. 4, 2003; FAA report,“Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events: September 11, 2001,” Sept. 17, 2001; NTSB report, Air Traffic Control Recording—United Airlines Flight 93, Dec. 21, 2001.
- ↑ 72.The 37 passengers represented a load factor of 20.33 percent of the plane’s seating capacity of 182, considerably below the 52.09 percent for Flight 93 on Tuesdays in the three-month period prior to September 11 (June 11–September 4, 2001).See UAL report, Flight 93 EWR-SFO load factors, undated.Five passengers holding reservations for Flight 93 did not show for the flight.All five were interviewed and cleared by the FBI. FBI report,“Flight 93 ‘No Show’ Passengers from 9/11/01,” Sept. 18, 2001.
- ↑ 73. INS record,Withdrawal of Application for Admission for Mohamed al Kahtani,Aug. 4, 2001.
- ↑ 74. See FAA regulations,Admission to flight deck, 14 C.F.R. § 121.547 (2001);UAL records, copies of boarding passes for United 93, Sept. 11,2001.One passenger reported that ten first-class passengers were aboard the flight. If that number is accurate, it would include the four hijackers. FBI report of investigation, interview of Lisa Jefferson, Sept. 11, 2001;UAL record,Flight 93 passenger manifest, Sept. 11, 2001.All but one of the six passengers seated in the first-class cabin communicated with the ground during the flight, and none mentioned anyone from their cabin having gone into the cockpit before the hijacking.Moreover, it is unlikely that the highly regarded and experienced pilot and co-pilot of Flight 93 would have allowed an observer into the cockpit before or after takeoff who had not obtained the proper permission. See UAL records, personnel files of Flight 93 pilots. For jumpseat information, see UAL record,Weight and Balance Information for Flight 93 and Flight 175, Sept. 11, 2001;AAL records, Dispatch Environmental Control/Weekly Flight Summary for Flight 11 and Flight 77, Sept. 11, 2001.
- ↑ 75. Like Atta on Flight 11, Jarrah apparently did not know how to operate the communication radios; thus his attempts to communicate with the passengers were broadcast on the ATC channel. See FBI report,“CVR from UA Flight #93,”Dec. 4, 2003.Also, by 9:32 FAA notified United’s headquarters that the flight was not responding to radio calls.According to United, the flight’s nonresponse and its turn to the east led the airline to believe by 9:36 that the plane was hijacked. See Rich Miles interview (Nov. 21, 2003); UAL report, “United dispatch SMFDO activities—terrorist crisis,” Sept. 11, 2001.
- ↑ 76. In accordance with FAA regulations, United 93’s cockpit voice recorder recorded the last 31 minutes of sounds from the cockpit via microphones in the pilots’ headsets, as well as in the overhead panel of the flight deck. This is the only recorder from the four hijacked airplanes to survive the impact and ensuing fire.The CVRs and FDRs from American 11 and United 175 were not found,and the CVR from American Flight 77 was badly burned and not recoverable. See FBI report,“CVR from UA Flight #93,”Dec. 4, 2003; see also FAA regulations, 14 C.F.R. §§ 25.1457, 91.609, 91.1045, 121.359; Flight 93 CVR data. A transcript of the CVR recording was prepared by the NTSB and the FBI.
- ↑ 77. All calls placed on airphones were from the rear of the aircraft.There was one airphone installed in each row of seats on both sides of the aisle.The airphone system was capable of transmitting only eight calls at any one time. See FBI report of investigation, airphone records for flights UAL 93 and UAL 175 on Sept. 11, 2001, Sept. 18, 2001.
- ↑ 78.FAA audio file,Cleveland Center, position Lorain Radar; Flight 93 CVR data; FBI report,“CVR from UA Flight #93,” Dec. 4, 2003.
- ↑ 79. FBI reports of investigation, interviews of recipients of calls from Todd Beamer, Sept. 11, 2001, through June 11, 2002; FBI reports of investigation, interviews of recipients of calls from Sandy Bradshaw, Sept. 11, 2001, through Oct. 4, 2001.Text messages warning the cockpit of Flight 93 were sent to the aircraft by Ed Ballinger at 9:24. See UAL record, Ed Ballinger’s ACARS log, Sept. 11, 2001.
- ↑ 80.We have relied mainly on the record of FBI interviews with the people who received calls.The FBI interviews were conducted while memories were still fresh and were less likely to have been affected by reading the accounts of others or hearing stories in the media. In some cases we have conducted our own interviews to supplement or verify the record. See FBI reports of investigation, interviews of recipients of calls from Todd Beamer, Mark Bingham,Sandy Bradshaw,Marion Britton,Thomas Burnett, Joseph DeLuca,Edward Felt , Jeremy Glick,Lauren Grandcolas, Linda Gronlund, CeeCee Lyles, Honor Wainio.
- ↑ 81. FBI reports of investigation, interviews of recipients of calls from Thomas Burnett, Sept. 11, 2001; FBI reports of investigation, interviews of recipients of calls from Marion Britton, Sept. 14, 2001, through Nov. 8, 2001; Lisa Jefferson interview (May 11, 2004); FBI report of investigation, interview of Lisa Jefferson, Sept. 11, 2001; Richard Belme interview (Nov. 21, 2003).
- ↑ 82. See Jere Longman, Among the Heroes—United Flight 93 and the Passengers and Crew Who Fought Back (Harper- Collins, 2002), p. 107; Deena Burnett interview (Apr. 26, 2004); FBI reports of investigation, interviews of recipients of calls from Jeremy Glick, Sept. 11, 2001, through Sept. 12, 2001; Lyzbeth Glick interview (Apr. 22, 2004). Experts told us that a gunshot would definitely be audible on the CVR.The FBI found no evidence of a firearm at the crash site of Flight 93. See FBI response to Commission briefing request no. 6, undated (topic 11).The FBI collected 14 knives or portions of knives at the Flight 93 crash site. FBI report,“Knives Found at the UA Flight 93 Crash Site,” undated.
- ↑ 83. FBI response to Commission briefing request no. 6, undated (topic 11); FBI reports of investigation, interviews of recipients of calls from Jeremy Glick, Sept. 11, 2001, through Sept. 12, 2001.
- ↑ 84. See FBI reports of investigation, interviews of recipients of calls from United 93.
- ↑ 85. FBI reports of investigation, interviews of recipients of calls from United 93. For quote, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Philip Bradshaw, Sept. 11, 2001; Philip Bradshaw interview (June 15, 2004); Flight 93 FDR and CVR data.At 9:55:11 Jarrah dialed in the VHF Omni-directional Range (VOR) frequency for the VOR navigational aid at Washington Reagan National Airport, further indicating that the attack was planned for the nation’s capital.
- ↑ 86. Flight 93 FDR and CVR data.
- ↑ 87. Ibid.
- ↑ 88. Ibid.
- ↑ 89. Ibid.The CVR clearly captured the words of the hijackers, including words in Arabic from the microphone in the pilot headset up to the end of the flight.The hijackers’ statements, the clarity of the recording, the position of the microphone in the pilot headset, and the corresponding manipulations of flight controls provide the evidence. The quotes are taken from our listening to the CVR, aided by an Arabic speaker.