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Main article: 1980s

1987: Hamas Forms with the Support of Israeli Intelligence Edit

Sheikh Ahmed Yassin forms Hamas as the military arm of his Islamic Association, which had been licensed by Israel ten years earlier (see 1973-1978). According to Charles Freeman, a former US ambassador to Saudi Arabia, “Israel started Hamas. It was a project of Shin Bet, which had a feeling that they could use it to hem in the PLO.” [COUNTERPUNCH, 1/18/2003; DREYFUSS, 2005, PP. 191, 208] Anthony Cordesman, a Middle East analyst for the Center for Strategic Studies, states that Israel “aided Hamas directly—the Israelis wanted to use it as a counterbalance to the PLO.” A former senior CIA official speaking to UPI describes Israel’s support for Hamas as “a direct attempt to divide and dilute support for a strong, secular PLO by using a competing religious alternative.” Further, according to an unnamed US government official, “the thinking on the part of some of the right-wing Israeli establishment was that Hamas and the other groups, if they gained control, would refuse to have anything to do with the peace process and would torpedo any agreements put in place.” Larry Johnson, a counterterrorism official at the State Department, states: “The Israelis are their own worst enemies when it comes to fighting terrorism. They are like a guy who sets fire to his hair and then tries to put it out by hitting it with a hammer. They do more to incite and sustain terrorism than curb it.” [UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 2/24/2001 SOURCES: LARRY C. JOHNSON, UNNAMED FORMER CIA OFFICIAL] Entity Tags: Israel, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, Bin Laden Family Timeline Tags: Alleged Use of False Flag Attacks Category Tags: Terrorism Financing, Israel

1987: A. Q. Khan’s Nuclear Network Begins Selling Technology and Know-How Around this time, the network set up by Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan to purchase components for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons begins to sell the technology and know-how it has acquired to other nations, including Iran, North Korea, and Libya. A US analyst predicts this will happen (see Mid-1989), but neither the US nor its allies takes action against the network for some time. [GUARDIAN, 10/13/2007] Entity Tags: Abdul Qadeer Khan Timeline Tags: A. Q. Khan's Nuclear Network Category Tags: Pakistani Nukes & Islamic Militancy

1987: Office of Special Planning Closes Down The New York Port Authority’s Office of Special Planning (OSP) is closed down. It had been established in 1984 (see Early 1984) to evaluate and address the vulnerabilities of Port Authority facilities, including the World Trade Center, to terrorist attacks. [VILLAGE VOICE, 1/5/2000; NEW YORK COUNTY SUPREME COURT, 1/20/2004] The reasons for the closure are unknown. However, Peter Goldmark, who’d created the OSP, had resigned as executive director of the Port Authority in 1985 to take a new job. [GLANZ AND LIPTON, 2004, PP. 226-228] So the absence of his support for the office may have been a factor. Entity Tags: Office of Special Planning Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: 1993 WTC Bombing

1987: Pakistan Secretly Builds Nuclear Weapon Pakistan successfully builds a nuclear weapon around this year. The bomb is built largely thanks to the illegal network run by A. Q. Khan. Pakistan will not actually publicly announce this or test the bomb until 1998 (see May 28, 1998), partly because of a 1985 US law imposing sanctions on Pakistan if it were to develop nuclear weapons (see August 1985-October 1990). [HERSH, 2004, PP. 291] However, Khan will tell a reporter the program has been successful around this time (see March 1987). Entity Tags: Abdul Qadeer Khan, Pakistan Timeline Tags: A. Q. Khan's Nuclear Network Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Pakistani Nukes & Islamic Militancy

April 1987: Hamid Gul Becomes Head of ISI Gen. Hamid Gul is made head of Pakistan’s ISI. [YOUSAF AND ADKIN, 1992, PP. 91-92] General Gul is a favorite of CIA Station Chief Milt Bearden and US ambassador to Pakistan Arnie Raphel, who view him as an ally and a potential national leader of Pakistan. [BEARDEN AND RISEN, 2003, PP. 301] According to Bearden, however, he will later (sometime after 1990) turn against the US. [BEARDEN AND RISEN, 2003, PP. 358, 523-524] Evidence will later appear that in the late 1990s Gul is somehow able to give the Taliban advanced warning of US attempts to assassinate bin Laden with missile strikes (see July 1999). In 2004, allegations will appear in the US media that Gul was a key participant in the 9/11 plot and “bin Laden’s master planner” (see July 22, 2004). Entity Tags: Milt Bearden, Mark Adkin, Arnie Raphel, Hamid Gul, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence Category Tags: Soviet-Afghan War, Pakistan and the ISI

April 17, 1987: Bin Laden-Led Assault in Afghan War Is Total Failure Osama bin Laden commands his first company-sized attack in the Soviet-Afghan War, but the assault is an abject failure. Bin Laden has planned for the attack for months in advance and assembled a force of 120 fighters, including ones not usually based at his Maasada camp and jihad leader Abdullah Azzam (see Late 1986). The Arabs are to attack an Afghan government base just before darkness under covering artillery fire provided by two Afghan rebel commanders, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Following a quick strike, the Arabs will then withdraw, using the night to hide from Soviet aircraft. However, the logistics are badly handled: ammunition is not supplied to forward positions, the Arabs forget electrical wire to connect rockets to detonators, and they run out of food. In addition, an Afghan government soldier overhears their preparations and opens fire with a machine gun, pinning them down. The Arabs are forced to withdraw without even having begun their attack, suffering three casualties, including one killed. This incident is a serious blow to their pride, and Pakistani authorities even begin shutting down Arab guest houses at the mujaheddin staging centers in Pakistan. [WRIGHT, 2006, PP. 115-116] Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, Abdullah Azzam, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan Category Tags: Soviet-Afghan War, Osama Bin Laden

May 1987: Bin Laden-Led Force Holds Out against Soviets at Battle of Lion’s Den, Wins Big Propaganda Victory Soviet forces assault a position held by forces commanded by Osama bin Laden, but are repelled. This is the best-known battle in which bin Laden is involved in Afghanistan, and takes place at Jaji, around bin Laden’s Lion’s Den camp (see Late 1986). The attack may be the result of a small skirmish shortly before in which bin Laden’s Arabs attacked a group of Soviet troops, forcing them to withdraw. Attack - In the initial assault, the Soviets are repulsed by mortar fire, and the defenders are also successful against the second wave, killing and wounding several enemy soldiers. The Soviets then shell bin Laden’s positions for weeks, but the mujaheddin cannot be dislodged. [WRIGHT, 2006, PP. 115-116] Estimates of the number of troops vary. According to author Steve Coll, there are about 50 Arabs facing 200 Soviet troops, including some from an elite Spetsnaz unit. [COLL, 2004, PP. 162] Withdrawal - However, bin Laden begins to worry that his men will all be killed if they stay longer. As a result, he forces his men to retreat, although some of them protest and have to be cajoled into doing so. Before pulling out, the camp is destroyed so that the Soviets cannot use it; the canons are pushed into a ravine, the automatic weapons buried, and the pantry grenaded. Ordered to Return - Bin Laden’s men fall back on a camp run by a leading Afghan commander, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, one of the key mujahidden leaders in the area. However, Sayyaf has come to recognize the Lion’s Den’s strategic value, and is angry they pulled back without his approval. Sayyaf orders the Arabs back and sends about twenty of his own men to make sure they hold their position. Attacked Again, Victorious - After he returns, bin Laden, who has been ill, is too distraught at the camp’s poor condition and lack of food to give orders, and one of his senior assistants, Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri, takes over. Bin Laden is sent to guard one of the camp’s flanks, but his small group of men encounters a Soviet advance and comes under heavy mortar fire. Bin Laden will later comment, “It was a terrible battle, which ended up with me half sunk in the ground, firing at anything I could see.” Many accounts will say that at this point bin Laden falls asleep under enemy fire, although, according to author Lawrence Wright, he may actually faint due to low blood pressure. In any event, late in the day al-Banshiri is able to outflank the Soviets and force them to withdraw, securing a great victory for the Arabs. Significance of Battle - The Lion’s Den is only a small part of a larger engagement mostly fought by the Soviets against Sayyaf’s Afghans, but it is a hugely important propaganda victory for the Arabs. Bin Laden, who is given a Soviet AK-47 by al-Banshiri after the battle, will later comment, “The morale of the mujaheddin soared, not only in our area, but in the whole of Afghanistan.” Wright will later comment that it gives the Arabs “a reputation for courage and recklessness that established their legend, at least among themselves,” and becomes “the foundation of the myth that they defeated the superpower.” [WRIGHT, 2006, PP. 118-120] Coll will add: “Chronicled daily at the time by several Arab journalists who observed the fighting from a mile or two away, the battle of Jaji marked the birth of Osama bin Laden’s public reputation as a warrior among Arab jihadists… After Jaji he began a media campaign designed to publicize the brave fight waged by Arab volunteers who stood their ground against a superpower. In interviews and speeches around Peshawar and back home in Saudi Arabia, bin Laden sought to recruit new fighters to his cause and to chronicle his own role as a military leader.” [COLL, 2004, PP. 163] Entity Tags: Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri, Osama bin Laden, Lawrence Wright, Steve Coll Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan Category Tags: Soviet-Afghan War, Osama Bin Laden

May 28, 1987: Teenager Eludes Soviet Air Defenses, Lands on Red Square; Many Russian Officers Fired for Failings

Mathias Rust Landing in Moscow. [Source: sssss] In a quixotic attempt to ease Cold War tensions, a German teenager named Mathias Rust penetrates Soviet air defenses and flies all the way from Helsinki to Moscow, finally landing within yards of the Kremlin. His success in defeating Soviet air security is called “a national shame” by Mikhail Gorbachev, who promptly sacks a number of top military officers. Entering Soviet Airspace - According to a detailed recounting of Rust’s flight in Air & Space Magazine, his small Cessna is seen on Soviet radar as soon as he enters Soviet air space in what—after the break-up of the Soviet Union—is Estonia and, since he is not on a pre-approved flight, “three missile units were put on alert.” Throughout his flight, Rust takes no special measures to evade radar and simply flies straight toward Moscow at about 1,000 feet above ground. As he flies deeper inland, Soviet controllers continue to monitor his progress; “army units [are] put on high alert and two fighter-interceptors [… are] scrambled to investigate.” One of the interceptors reports seeing a small plane but takes no further action. It is unclear why Rust is not immediately forced to land or simply shot down. More Fighters Scrambled - About two hours later, as Rust enters another radar sector, the same sequence of events takes place: he is seen on radar, two fighters are scrambled. “A Soviet MIG-23 pull[s] up beside him.” Once again, for reasons that will not be established, the commander on the ground takes no further action: “the fighter pilot’s commander either did not believe the pilot’s report or did not think it was significant, so the information was never passed up the chain of command.” As he continues to Moscow, Rust’s plane is never lost to radar, but controllers fail to realize that he is an unauthorized foreign plane—there are no such things in the Soviet Union—and conclude that he must be a “student” or “a helicopter on a search-and-rescue mission.” "Ring of Steel" - Although Rust has turned off his transponder, air controllers decide to assign him a “friendly” designation, assuming he is a Soviet pilot who has forgotten to turn it on. As he approaches Moscow, Rust “pass[es] the outermost belt of Moscow’s vaunted ‘Ring of Steel,’ an elaborate network of anti-aircraft defenses that since the 1950s had been built up as a response to the threat of US bombers. The rings of missile placements circle the city […] but were not designed to fend off a single, slow-flying Cessna.” Finally, Rust reaches the outskirts of Moscow. The city’s airspace is restricted, with all overflights prohibited. “At about this time, Soviet investigators would later tell Rust, radar controllers realize[…] something [is] terribly wrong, but it [is] too late for them to act.” Mass Firings - The Soviet leadership’s reaction to the military’s bungling will be swift. Within days, the defense minister and air defense chief will be sacked and later “hundreds of other officers [will be] fired or replaced […]. It will be the biggest turnover in the Soviet military command since Stalin’s bloody purges of the 1930s.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 6/7/1987; AIR & SPACE MAGAZINE, 6/1/2005; WASHINGTON POST, 5/27/2007] Entity Tags: Mathias Rust Category Tags: Other Pre-9/11 Events

September 18, 1987: Lebanese Hijacker Is First Known Islamist Terrorist to Be Rendered by US A group of US agencies, comprising the CIA, FBI, DEA, and Defense Department, cooperates on the capture and rendition of Fawaz Younis, an Islamic militant linked to Lebanon’s Amal militia who was previously involved in two airplane hijackings. Arrested, Transferred to US - Younis is captured after being lured to a boat in international waters off Cyprus. He is then arrested and transferred to an aircraft carrier, from where he is flown directly to the US. The operation, which costs US$20 million, is so complicated because of rules set by the Justice Department. [TRENTO AND TRENTO, 2006, PP. 78-94] Author Stephen Grey will call the rules “very tight.” CIA manager Duane Clarridge will say, “This meant that Yunis had to be apprehended by the FBI in international waters or airspace, remain in constant custody of the feds, and remain clear of the turf of any sovereign nation—for the entire duration of his 4,000-mile journey to the United States.” [GREY, 2007, PP. 133-134] Details of Hijackings - In the first hijacking, Younis seized a plane in Beirut and attempted to fly it to Tunis, where the Arab League was meeting. The aim was to pressure the League into urging the Palestine Liberation Organization to leave Lebanon, as relations between it and local people had deteriorated. In the second hijacking, which took place five days later, the plane was seized by a team from Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah, who beat the passengers and shot one of them, US Navy diver Robert Stethem. Posing as a crewman during a stopover in Beirut, Younis entered the plane and took control of the hijacking. The passengers were removed from the plane in groups, and dispersed through Beirut. They were later released in return for safe passage for the hijackers (see June 14-30, 1985). Lured by Informant - The man who lured Younis to the boat is Jamal Hamdan, who had previously worked with the CIA on a false flag operation in Germany (see After Mid-April 1986). Authors Joe and Susan Trento will describe Hamdan as “a street hustler, murderer and drug dealer,” adding, “Hamdan’s Beirut police file is impressive.” Thanks to his connection to Amal, Hamdan was able to operate for a time despite his killings, but in 1985 he murdered a senior Druze official and then his sister-in-law, leading to his imprisonment. Amal leader and US intelligence asset Nabih Berri informed the US that Hamdan could help them with some drug cases, and he began providing the DEA and CIA with information about US-based drug dealers, which got him released from prison. Deal for Asylum - In return for helping the operation to capture Younis, dubbed operation Goldenrod, Hamdan insisted on “huge cash payments” and asylum for himself and his family in the US. The Trentos will comment, “In other words, the FBI arranged to bring into our country a murderer and terrorist in return for the capture of an airplane hijacker who had never killed any Americans.” [TRENTO AND TRENTO, 2006, PP. 78-94] Entity Tags: US Department of Defense, Jamal Hamdan, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Duane Clarridge, Amal, Central Intelligence Agency, Drug Enforcement Agency, Fawaz Younis, Stephen Grey Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, Counterterrorism Action Before 9/11

December 18, 1987: Congress Approves Hundreds of Millions of Dollars for Pakistan, Despite US Knowledge of Nuclear Weapons Program Although the US is already aware that the Soviet Union intends to withdraw from Afghanistan (see November 1986-November 1987) and a formal agreement on the Soviet withdrawal will be signed in four months (see April 1988), the US Congress approves aid of $480 million for Pakistan, despite its nuclear weapons program. Legislation has been passed that automatically cuts off aid to countries with illicit nuclear weapons programs (see August 1985 and August 1985), but this legislation is not invoked. Despite apparently knowing of the Pakistani program, Congress decides that supporting the war in Afghanistan is more important (see July 1987 or Shortly After and Late 1980s). Some lawmakers and officials will later say that at this time “everybody in Congress” knows that Pakistan has a nuclear weapons program (see Late 1980s), and anti-proliferation Senator John Glenn (D-OH) will later say the threat of nuclear proliferation “is a far greater danger to the world than being afraid to cut off the flow of aid to Afghanistan,” adding, “It’s the short-term versus the long-term.” [NEW YORKER, 3/29/1993] Entity Tags: John Glenn, Pakistan Timeline Tags: A. Q. Khan's Nuclear Network, War in Afghanistan Category Tags: Soviet-Afghan War

Timeline linksEdit

September 8 September 9 September 10 September 11

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